The War Office and rearmament 1935-39 by Harris, John Paul
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








The War Office and rearmament 1935-39
Harris, John
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
THE WAR OFFICE AND REARMAMENT 1935-39 
by 
John Paul Harris 
Thesis submitted for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of London 




This thesis is an examination of the role played by the 
War Office in the British rearmament effort of the 19301s. 
It challenges the assumption that the British General Staff 
was backward-looking, reactionary and inflexible. It shows 
that the General Staff had, by 1935, developed a detailed, 
vivid and in many ways prescient scenario of the early stages 
of the next European war and of the role which the British 
Army was to play in it. The General Staff, it is argued, 
had a firm belief in the necessity of preparing the Army for 
a Continental role, throughout the second half of the 1930s, 
and produced consistent and very convincing reasoning in 
support of this. The General Staff also had a much better 
appreciation of Continental (including German) military 
doctrine than has generally been assumed, and much better 
ideas on the future development of the British Army than it 
has generally been given credit for. 
The War Office's endeavours to build up the industrial 
I capacA. ty necessary to wage war effectively are analysed, as 
are the Office's attempts to modify its own institutions to 
cope with the demands of a major peacetime rearmament 
effort. Finally, in'three case studies, the War Office's 
performance in preparing for three of the most modern and 
technical aspects of war: armoured, anti-aircraft and 
chemical, is discussed. 
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PART ONE 
THE WAR OFFICE, REARMAMENT AND STRATEGY 
-I- 
Preface 
The aim of this thesis Is to examine the contribution of the War 
Cffice to the rearmament effort of the second half of the 1930's. Much 
has now been written on rearmament, but the War Office's contribution, 
though the object of a good deal of adverse comment by some contem- 
poraries and some historians, has never been the subject of a close, 
study. Bearmament is a vast topic and it would be Impossible, in a 
single thesis, to deal with every aspect even of one department's work. 
A selective approach was therefore considered essential from the start. 
The thesis is divided Into three main parts. In the first section we 
examine the strategic thought of the General Staff, how the personalities 
and ideas of the General Staff related to those of the Secretaries of 
State of the period and how they in turn interacted with their Prime 
Ministers and with the over-all policies of the Cab"inet and the 
Treasury. In the second part the efforts made by the Departments 
of the Master General of the Or'dnance and of 
*the* Director General of 
Munitions Production to develop the. industrial capacity needed for 
rearmament and war production are examined. The third and final 
section of the thesis consists of case studies of the way In which the 
War Cffice handled three particular aspects of the rearmament effort. 
7be three studies : on armour, anti-aircraft defence and chemical 
warfare, were chosen because they represent the most modern aspects 
of war and therefore, presumably, the greatest challenges to an allegedly 
hidebound and traditionalist organization. Armour and air defence 
are also the areas in which the War Cffice has been subjected to the 
most intense criticism. 
-2- 
In some ways It would have been tempting to reverse the order 
of the second and final sections of the thesis. From one point of 
view it would have seemed appropriate to have Immediately followed 
the discussion, In the first section, of the General Staff's 
Continentalist strategic view by an examination of Its efforts to 
create armoured forces - vitally Important for a Continental role. 
This, however, would have been to suggest the fallacy that it Is 
possible to create armed forces simply by strategic thought - by 
dreaming them up. In reality armed forces' are the products of a 
marriage of strategic thought, on the one hand, with technical 
development and industrial production on the other. The best plan 
for the thesis seemed therefore to be an examination of each of the 
marriage partners in turn: first the General Staff and its strategic 
policy, then the M. G. 0. 's and D. G. M. P. 's departments and the 
technical expertise and industrial base which they were trying to 
develop, and finally, in the case studies, to study the emergence of 
the offspring, the armed forces themselves. from this often uneasy 
union. 
-3- 
The War Office And The Apparatus_ Of Government 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the contribution made 
by the War Office to the formation and execution of rearmament 
policy rather than to provide a detailed analysis of the War Office as 
an Institution. It is nevertheless essential to provide the readers with 
a sketch of the policy-making bodies of the War Office, to offer 
some analysis of the department's rather obscure internal mechanics, 
and to show how it fitted In with the rest of the apparatus of 
government. Space does not allow us to trace the historical evolution 
of the War Office, and we must confine ourselves to an examination 
of its structure at the beginning of the rearmament effort. 
No ministry of defence existed in the inter-war period and each of 
the armed forces was controlled by a separate government 
department: - the Navy by the Admiralty, the Air Force by the Air 
Ministry and the' Army by the War Office. The War Office, however, 
was far more than simply the government department In charge of 
the administration of the Army. it had a complicated series of 
agency responsibilities to all three Services including the control of 
the Royal Ordnance Factories, many aspects of scientific research, 
and the development of many types of weaponry('). 
In theory, War Off Ice policy was worked out by a supreme 
administrative body known as the Army Council. , The Ariny Council, 
however, was an artificial creation imposed upon the War Office from 
(i) Industrial Production. Memorandum by Lord Weir, 27th January 
1936. WEIR 17/5 and Weir to Duff Cooper, 2nd June 1936. 
WEIR 17/8. Weir Papers. Churchill College Cambridge. 
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the outside by the Esher Committee of 1904. The Esher Committee 
had wanted to make the War Office more like the Admiralty,, and 
the Army Council was a direct Imitation of the Admiralty Board. 
The graft did not take, and the Army Council -failed to, work in 
the way In which the Esher Committee had intended, 
(') 
at least- 
until the arrival of Hore-Belisha. at the War Office in 1937., 
Hore-Bellsha made a determined effort to revitalise, the Army 
Council, and to force It to operate in the manner intended by its 
creators, 
(ii) but this policy, for reasons which we shall shortly 
examine, was of dubious wisdom and met with dubious success. 
The composition of the Army Council Is nevertheless worth 
analyzing because Army Council members were also the heads of 
the main branches of the War Office. In 1934 the membership of 
the Army Council consisted of three politicians,, one civil- servant 
and four soldters - who were often referred-to as the Mtlltary. 
Members 
The Secretary of State for War, a Cabinet minister, was head 
of the War Office as a whole and "responsible to Parliament for all 
the business 
f 
of the Army Council"(lv). The office of Secretary of- 
State for War was a peculiarly difficult one for any politician to 
fill. Within the Cabinet his position was weak. 7be War Office's 
(1) Minute 3. W. 0. file I/General/3893. WO/32/2561. 
Minute 1. I/General/4147. WO/32/4580. 
Hampden Gordon, The War Cffice, (Putnam ý1935) 
pp. 7-8 
(IV) Gordon, OP. cit., p. 7. 
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public Image had seldom been very favourable and was particularly 
tarnished In the inter-war period'because of the anti-military 
reaction owing to the bitter memories of the First World War. 
In peacetime all spending departments in'the government were 
subject to scrutiny and constraint by the dominant Treasury Interest, 
and War Office expenditure often seemed particularly unproductive. 
I Within the War Office, however, the, position of the Secretary'' 
of State was strong. The Esher Committee, which, In 1904, had 
made a report leading to the re organization of the War'Office, had 
tried to ensure that the political Interest would be dominant over 
the -military interest, and on the whole had been successful In this. 
Since 1904 there had been no Command er- In -Chief of the Army. 
instead there were the four Military Members of the Army Council, 
each controlling a separate military department of the War Office. 
All the heads of War Office departments were personally 'responsible 
(i) 
to the Secretary of State With two exceptions they were all 
Army Councillors and were theoretically supposed to, report to the 
Secretary of State at Army Council meetings. 
One of -the'exceptions to this rule was the Military Secretary who 
had a small department of his own but reported to ihe Secretary of 
State directly The Military Secretary was responsible for 
Minute 3. W. O. file. I/General/3893. - WO/32/2561 
Gordon, op. cit., p. 211. 
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giving Independent advice on the promotion of officers, their 
selection for particular appointments, and the granting to them of 
rewards and honours. The Secretary of State did not normally use 
the Military Secretary's advice to, make positive suggestions of 
his own for promotions and honours, but he exercised a vitally. 
important veto power. The Military Secretary was thus of very 
great importance to the Secretary of State. , 
Viscount Gort, who was 
made Chief of the Imperial General Staff In December 1937, had 
come to the attention of Mr. Leslie Hore-Belisha, through serving as 
Military Secretary('). In addition to the Military Secretary, the 
Secretary of State had a personal staff consisting of a principal 
private secretary, and an assistant secrerary(u) 0 
The Secretary of State's two ministerial colleagues on the Army 
Council were the, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (U. S. of S. ) 
and the Financial Secretary, also known as the Finance Member 
(F. M. ) of the Army Council. The Parliamentary Under Secretary 
was vice-President of the Army Council, a rather empty title and 
was charged with giving advice on ýthe Territorial Army and on 
questions relating to War Office lands. The Director General of 
the Territorial Army and the Comptroller of Lands-reported to him 
and he represented them on the Council. The Financial Secretary, 
though not himself an Important policy-maker, was charged with the 
crucial task of defending the Army Estimates in Parliament, for, 
lI/HB 1937/58b. Liddell Hart Papers. King's College 
London. 
Bri. tish Imperial Calendar, 1934, p. 388. 
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which it- was essential that he -had a thorough understanding of War 
Office policy. ' and was'an able speaker. ' He was also very important 
as a general War Office spokesman In the House of Commons, a 
task which could fall entirely to him Wboth the Secretary of State and 
the Parliamentary Under Secretary happened to be In th& Lords. 7be 
Financial Secretary'was, despite his title, not the head of the 
Finance branches of the War-Office, which were dictually responsible 
tIo the Permanent Under Secretary; but the Director"Of Army 
Contracts, a civil servant with the crucial d6ty-'of allocating contracts 
to manufacturers, was responsible to the F. M. alone 
(1) 
. 
The post of Financial Secretary was sometimes occupied by 
promising politicians who could prove their abilities' in It and use 
it as a stepping stone to higher positions. Such was'ihe case with 
Mr. Alfred Duff Cooper who became successively Secretary of'State 
for War and First Lord of the Admiralty after having served as 
Financiql Secretary at the War'Office froMi 1931 to 1935 The 
two Parliamentary Under Secretaries of our period,; '- however, 
Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal and Lord Munster, " appear to 
have been of little significance in political or administrative terms. 
The two junior ministers were normally expected to back up 
the Secretary of State in carrying through government policy against 
departmental opposition if this should arise. 4 7bis was not always 
the case In practice. Hore-Belisha noticed that both L6rd Strathcona 
(i) Gordon, OP. Cit., Pp. 7-10. 
Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (Rupert Hart, Davis 1953) 
pp. 168-189 - 
-8- 
and Mount Royal, the Parliamentary Under Secretary, and Sir Victor 
Warrender, the F. M. -had tended to, identify themselves with the 
Military Members and ýthe departmental received wisdom rather than 
lending -him their full support In his Innovative efforts(). -. Indeed 
Strathcona was to take part in the abortivejunior ministers' revolt 
of December 1938 In which he conspired with junior ministers from 
other departments to have Hore-Belisha removed from the War 
office("). The positions of the Secretary of State and the junior 
ministers were alike, however,.,. ýJn that they were all, subject to - 
General Elections, government reshuffles and all the other, normal 
vagaries of political life. 
7be only civil servant to have a seat on the-Army, Council, 'was 
the 
Permanent Under Secretary (P. U. S. ). As his title-suggests his 
function was to lend an element of continuity and stability- to, the 
policy-making -process. To this end he served as, the Council's 
Secretary. ý He was the only long-term fixture on the, Army Council; 
the -politicians, as we-have just mentioned, could te moved. at -,. 
fairly frequent Intervals, and the normal period of service for a 
Military Member was only four years. The P. U., S..,, Iwas 
the head 
of what was often referred to as the Central department of the 
War Office. He had a particular responsibility for all financial 
matters, including the internal economy of the War Office, control 
of military expenditure, the drawing up of the Army Estimates for 
Liddell Hart Memoirs Vol. 11 pp. 54-55. 
R. J. Minney, 7jbe Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, 
(Collins 1960) p. 161. 
'-9- 
Parliament, accounts and audit, and the Royal Army Pay Corps. 
He was - In charge of - editing and issuing Army regulations, - Army 
Council Instructions and the Army List. His, area, of personal- 
responsibility Included the administration of the Royal Army Chaplain's 
department, and, until Hore-Belisha appointed a specialist- Director 
of Public Relations, relations with the Press. Finally, he supervised 
the central registry where files, were kept, and where large numbers 
of them were eventually destroyed('). 
0 The Central department contained threeývery powerful Finance 
(accounting) branches, each headed by a civilian Director of Finance. 
The Directors of Finance were Immediately responsible, to the Deputy 
Under Secretary, the second most important, civil servant in the 
War Office("), The close control of these -accounting branches over 
the activities of the War Cffice and therefore over the, management 
of the Army as a whole had become notorious by the mid-thirties. 
indeed even the author of the semi-official account in the first 
Whitehall series, himself a civil servant in the Central department, 
felt compelled to preface his account of the finance branches with 
the remark, "Hard things have-been said about Army Finance and 
(iii) the fact is not at all surprising" 
At this period the Permanent Under: Secretary of the Treasury 












57 and 67-75. -. 
(Iii) Gordon op. cit., p. 231., 
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the careers of senior civil servants In all, departments(). - -There 
was therefore a natural tendency for War Office civil servants to 
be responsive to Treasury pressure, and, the civil servants were 
the only long-term fixtures in the'War Office, soldiers seldom 
holding a post for longer than four years. The whole system 
tended to create a stultifying parsimonious atmosphere, - which became 
. especially bad In the disarmament period of the 1920s and the early 
1930s. " As late as January 1939, however, the Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence Major-General Henry Pbwnall, was 
claiming that rearmament was, being held up, by 
the f Inancial system by' which we ý have to fight - our 
way, not only In the Treasury (who on the whole 
are pretty reasonable and quick) but fight, our 
way past our own Finance to get to the Treasury. 
We have to break down their opposition to 
asking for money. It's mostly the system, but 
of course it's also the personalities who have 
been born and brought up In the system, 
particularly (Sir Frederick) Boverschen (Deputy 
Under Secretary of State for War, 1936-43). 
His attitude Is -essentially negativeýand he allows 
himself to be very seriously heckled by the 
Treasury juniors when he goes to meetings. He 
is the wrong man for the job and the job is 
wrong'- a bad combination. I fancy fur will fly 
before we are much older, but it's time there 
was a show down for the whole of "Finance" 
Is infected with the sa If virus 
and is fairly 
on everyone's nerves. 
P11 
Pouwnall's acc6unt of War Office F Inance - 
Is, however, rather 
one-sided. As Director of Military Operations and lntelllgenceý it 
was not part of Pbwnall's duties to negotiate with the Treasury, and 
Sir Christopher Bullock, Permanent Under Secretary at the 
Air Ministry lost his job partly because he had antagonized 
Fisher. Notes on the case of Christopher Bullock. lJ29. 
Liddell Hart Papers. 
(ii) B. J. Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 181-182. 
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an examination of the minutes of the Treasury Inter-Service 
Committee does not entirely bear out his, contention - that the 
Treasury officials were reasonable and, quick in their financial 
dealings with the War Office('). Though by the beginning of 1939, 
when Pownall made this comment, ý the Treasury was, muchý less 
obstructive, enormous delays had earlier been Imposed on War 
Cffice programmes. The harassed, and somewhat negative state 
of -mind of some War Cffice finance officers was probably due to 
the fact that It was they who had to argue the War C(fice's case in 
negotiations with the Treasury. They, consequently knew from long 
experience just how awkward the Treasury could be. it was 
certainly not true that the whole of Finance was "infected"- with the 
same "virus". Bovenschen's attitude was notorious with the , 
soldiers In the War Office, 
(") but Sir Reginald Paterson and, Mr. 
Kenneth Lyon, two Assistant Under Secretaries ýareý amongst others, 
remembered as being enormously helpful to the Army's cause., 
Paterson and Lyon frequently had the most uncongenial task of 
representing the War Office at meetings of the-Treasury Inter-Service 




See, for example, ý T. 1. S. C. 45th Meeting, 13th November 1936 
and T. L S. C. 92nd Meeting, item 4, on Tank Programme. 
WO/32/4441. 
Conversation with Sir ]Ronald-Adam at his home, Caryllas Lea, 
Faygate, Sussex, 18th November 1979. 
See, for example, T. 1. S. C. 2nd Meeting, 20th March 1936. 
7161/1315. T. 1. S. C. 37th Meeting, 7th October 1936, and 
T. I. S. C. 40th Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
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We must now examine the four Military branches of the War 
Office. The First Military Member of the Army Council was the - 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The General Staff, the 
department which he controlled, was responsible for strategic thought,, 
intelligence, the organization of the Army for war,, - and military 
training and education(). The Second Military Member, the 
Adj utant- General, was concerned with personnel: - their recrultmen4 
(it) 
.- discipline, health and mobilization In an emergency .. The . 
Quarter-Master General., the 7bird Military Member, controlled, 
housing policy, - the movement of troops and stores, transport, food, 
fodder and the care of animals("'). The Fourth. and last Military 
Member, the Master General of the Ordnance was in charge of the - 
supply of clothing, and the design, manufa . cture, procurement and 
repair of both "general" and "warlike" storesOV). The C. 1. G. S. - 
was normally either'a full General or a Field Marshal and the other 
Military Members normally Lieutenant- Generals. The period of 
service as a Military Member was usually four years(v). 
Two of the Military branches of the War Office we need not 
analyze in any detail. The routine of man-management, discipline 



















War Office List 1935, pp. 119-131. 
(V) Gordon, op., cit., p. 
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are largely outside the scope of this thesis, and it is not proposed 
to examine mobilization plans. Similarly we are not concerned with 
mundane business of supplying the Army with food and fodder and 
taking care of Its beasts - the principaLroles of the Q. NL G. 's 
branch. We will therefore concentrate attention on the General 
Staff and the department of the Master-General of'the Ordnance. 
7be General Staff was designed to function as the "brain" of the 
Army, engaging in strategic thought and preparing the''Army In terms 
of organization, equipment, ' training and intelligence, to meet the 
requirements of war(). The Chief of the Imperial General Staff'-,, 
was the senior soldier In the War Cffice, but not'in'any sense a 
Commander- 'In'Chtef. ]Rather he stood as primus Inter -pares 'with the 
other Military Members and was definitely subordinate to'the -- ' 
Secretary of State who had the right to fire him and hire a replacement 
a right which Hore-Belisha exercised in December 1937 
(11) 
. 
The General Staff was sub-divided Into three Directorates, the 
General Staff Directors being the most important soldiers In the 
War Office after the Military Members. They were, in order of 
seniority : the Director of Military Operations'and Intelligence, 
the Director of Staff Duties, and the Director of Military Training. 
The Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (D. M. O. 'and I. ) 
was the most prestigious of all the War Office Directors. Together 
with the C. 1. G. S. he played a vital role In the making of strategy,, 
War Office List 1935, p. 79. 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 69. 
. 
and he bore a particular responsibility for detailed operational 
planning and for the collection and collation of military intelligence. 
There were two -Military Operations branches (M. 0. s) under the D. M. 
0. and 1. , and five -Military Intelligence, branches (K 1. s). M. 0.1 
dealt with strategy, operational planning, " Imperial organization for 
defence, military, aeronautics and questions relating --to -the League 
of Nations. M. O. -2 dealt with Coastal Defences, Home Defenceý', 
generally and relations with the armed forces -of the'Domintons- 
and the Colonies. The general organization and co-ordination of all 
intelligence for the General Staff was - handled by M. L 1. M. 1.2 and 
M. I. 3 divided, the world up between them for the purpose of 
intelligence gathering. M. 1.2 covered India, the Far East, the Middle 
East, the U. S. S. R. , Poland, the- Baltic and - the Baltic Stateý. ', M. 1.3 
covered the remainder of Europe, -the Near East and-. the Americas. 
M. 1.4 was a Geographical Section,, In charge of keeping maps. 
F Inally M. 1.5, the most, famous of the General Staff Intelligence 
branches, dealt with counter- esp lonage and the internal security of 
(i) 
the United Kingdom against subversion 
The Director of Staff Duties (D. S. D. ) was charged with the 
organization -of the Army in war, - signals,, staff work,,, and all officer 
education other than the purely technical. In his capacity, as a, ", 
general co-ordinator of staff -work, the D. S. D. - saw"to the execution 
of the General Staff policies, though he was not so Important as the 
(1) War Office List 1934, pp. 79-83. 
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D. M. 0. and 1. - as a policy -maker(). The Director of Military 
Training (D. M. T. ) was responsible for all collective military 
training in the Army and the individual training of other ranks 
Rearmament threw a spotlight on the activities of the Master 
General of the Ordnance's department which performed such vital 
functions as scientific research, the technical development of 
weaponry, the manufacture of war material and the control of the 
]Royal Ordnance Factories. The novel problems of a major peacetime 
rearmament effort caused a series of revolutionary changes In the - 
structure of the War Office's munition supply apparatus, and much 
of the responsibility for the production and supply of munitions was 
transferred to a newly created official, the Director General of 
Munitions Production, whose post, established in September 1936, 
carried a seat on the Army Council("'). The structure of the: 
technical research and munitions production apparatus will, be examined 
In some detail In the central section of this thesis, which deals with 
the development of Industrial capacity. 
The relationships between the General- Staff and the departnients 
of the Master General of the ordnance and the Director General of 
Munitions Production were crucial to rearmament. - In general terms 
it was up to the General Staff to decide upon the types and quantities 
of munitions required. The M. G. O. 's department had to develop 
them, and the D. G. M. P. had to see that they were manufactured 
See Chart on "Distribution of Business Within the War Office", 
War Office List 1934. 
War Office List'1935, pp. 79-83. 
(Ili) Appointment of D. G. M. P. as an additional member of the Army Council. WO/32/4581. 
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to the necessary standard and in the correct quantity('). The 
lines along which technical development was to advance were 
Indicated by the C. 1. G. S. 's Research' Committee,, late Ir renamed the 
C. I. G. S. 's Specification Committee. On this body both the 
General Staff and the technical experts of the M. G. O. 's department 
were represented. Unfortunately, though accounts of the genesis 
and development of some Individual pieces of equipment have survived 
in the War Cffice papers, 
(11) 
the papers of the C. 1. G. S. 's 
Specification Committee do not appear to have survived as a whole. 
It Is now hoped that the reader should have a general idea of the 
structure of the War Office and of the distribution of business within 
it. Having sketched the machine and examined some of Its most 
important parts we must now look at some of the criticisms which 
were made of It. The most common criticism of the War Office 
apparatus made by contemporaries prior to rearmament was that 
it was ill-co-ordinated. 7be various departments of the Office 
sometimes seemed to work too much In isolation from one another. 
In January 1933, a Parliamentary Under Secretary, Lord 
Stanhope,, who was a relative newcomer to the War Office, 
complained, In a minute addressed to the Secretary of State, the 
P. U. S. and the F. M., about the lack of consultation and Integration, 
particularly at the top. This minute and the responses it stirred 
Department of the Director General of Munitions Production. 
W. 0. file I/General/4039. WO/32/4585. 
See, for example, "A Chronology and Description of Progress 
In the Design and Production of Infantry Tank" AIM, 
November 1937. WO/32/4441. 
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from other Army Councillors off er some Insights into the modus 
operandi of the Office as a whole and into the attitudes to business 
of Its senior officials. Stanhope pointed out that, during the 
calendar year 1932, the Army Council had met three times only, 
whereas it was normal practice in the Admiralty to have weekly 
meetings of the Admiralty Board. The Admiralty system, Stanhope 
claimed, resulted In better co-ordination. In particular, "the 
Parliamentary members of the Board were kept In touch with the 
work of the Naval memberil(i). 
At the War Office, on the other hand, meetings 
of the Army Council are extremely rare, and 
although I understand that meetings are held and 
"ad hoc" conferences take place, the Impression 
left on my mind is that,, compared to the Admiralty, 
members of Council work in water-tight compart- 
ments and transact business between each other 
largely by minutes on the files. The most 
extreme Instance*of this practice which I have 
so far discovered was on II/Abroad/54, where 
the charges to be made on officers In Malaya 
for the use of motor garages caused members 
of the Council to write no less than 26 minutes 
on this very minor subject - the question could 
have been settled around a table after a brief 
discussion. 
The Army has been fortunate in having a military 
and a civil service staff of great ability who 
pull together, and I do not suggest that policy 
has suffered by the absence of Council meetings. 
I cannot pretend however that U. S. of S. is as 
In touch as he ought to be, nor do I think that 
with a less good personnel the present system 
is either sound or economical. 
He suggested regular fortnightly Army Council meetings as the 
(11) 
solution to the problem 
(i) 
(Ii) 
Minute 1. W. 0. file I/General/3893. WO/32/2561. 
Gordon, OP. Cit., p. 261. 
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Much of the responsibility for the smooth working of the War 
office machine lay with the P. U. S. and his central department. 
Herbert Creedy, who was p. U. S. from 1924 until July 1939, generally 
favoured informal procedures. 
The Whitehall series volume on the War'Office, written by one 
of Creedy's subordinates gives an Important clue to central depart- 
ment attitudes to the conduct of off icial- business when It'suggests 
that 
the mere discarding of formal procedures'can 
do much to expedite business. Thus even at 
the highest level, formal meetings of the Army 
Council with all the machinery of printed precis 
are so infrequent as to be rare. 
Creedy pointed out that the idea of having frequent and regular 
Army Council meetings was not a new one. Prior to the First 
World War It had been tried though "it did not persist with any 
success. " In periods of genuine emergency, however, daily or 
even more frequent Army Council meetings were held, on a 
strictly informal basis. During the 1920s this had occurred in the 
cases of the Chanak crisis and the Chinese Nationalist advance on 
SLmghai in 1927. 
Tbe constitutional position In the Admiralty was very different from 
that In the War Cffice. Whereas the Admiralty had always worked 
as a Board, bearing collective responsibility for all Naval affairs, In 
the War Office, Members of Council had far more individual 
accountability for the conduct of business in their own departments, 
and their responsibility to the political head of the Office, the 
Secretary of State, was "a rather more personal one". Creedy 
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plausibly argued that the War Office system had positive, advantages 
over -that of the Admiralty. Far more of the purely administrative 
business -was dealt with In the War Office at the level of Director 
and below. Creedy suggested that this was 
all to the good as It saves the time -of Members 
of Council and leaves them free to apply their 
minds to questions of policy. 
Creedy was well aware-of the problem of excessive minute-writing 
and his, central department tried to encourage direct Informal 
discussions between officials as ii means of reducing this. Creedy 
pointed outýthat there were 
various well-understoo& arrangements, at, present 
by which excessive minute-writing can be and 
is -avoided, for example by meetings -of the 
Military Members with P. U. S. to discuss 
questions and to makyecommendations to 
the Secretary of State 
There were also meetings colloquially called "The Quartet" 
between the P. U. S. 's department and that of the Adj utant- General 
to discuss the interpretation of financial regulations, particularly 
as they affected pay allowances and pensions. The normal 
composition of the Quartet was the P. U. S., his Deputy, the 
Adj utant- General, and a Director In the A. G. 's department, the 
Director of Personal Services. But the group's membership was 
highly variable and it could equally well become a sextet or an 
octet. It had a particular role in settling "many questions where 
the military and civil sides do not see eye-to-eye. 
Minute 3. W. 0. f Ile I/General/3893. WO/32/2561. 
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The Secretary of State moreover was always at liberty to call 
a meeting of two or three members of Council who were directly 
concerned with a particular issue, and it was one of the constitu- 
tional pecularities of the War Office that the power of the Army , 
Council could be exercised and Its duties performed, -by any three 
of its members acting together. 
Creedy apologized for not having kept the U. S. of S. fully 
informed on some issues, but Duff Cooper, the F. M., who was - 
0 ft our spokesman In the House of Commons", had 
"not felt himself 
embarrassed by any lack of knowledge of what is going on. " Indeed 
Duff Cooper fully supported Creedy, believing that frequent meetings 
of the full Army Council would be a waste of time. The whole 
Incident seems to Illustrate, among other things, the very small 
slýnjfjcance attached to Parliamentary Under Secretaries in the 9 
War off ice. 
To conclude his argument against the usefulness of frequent ý 
Army Council meetings Creedy quoted a letter written by Lord 
oxford about his experiences as Secretary of State before the 
First World War. 
... I had come clearly to the conclusion that the Army Council as it then worked was a cautious 
and ineffective instrument. I have sat there for 
hours while my time and that of others was being 
wasted over details which affected only one, or 
at the outside two of the sub-departments repre- 
sented, and which could have been settled in 
half the time If the Members concerned had me;,, 
informally in my room or that of the C. 1. G. S. 
Lord HatIsham, the Secretary of State for War, came down, - 
(1) Minute 3. W. 0. file I/General/3893. WO/32/2561. 
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firmly on Creedy's side and echoed the arguments employed by 
Creedy and Duff Cooper. After this no major attempt seems to 
have been made to revolutionize the Office's procedures 'until 
the arrival of Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State for War In May 
1937. The Army Council met only once In--each of the years 1933 
and 1934, twice In 1935 and four times In 1936(l). Hore-Belisha' 
imposed fortnightly Army Council meetings, 
(ii) 
the proposal which 
had been rejected, apparently almost unanimously, - in 1933., - It is 
difficult to say whether anything was gained by this. General Sir 
Harry Knox, the Adjutant-Ceneral, regarded these meetings as 
*fall nonsense"("'). It would be wrong to accept Knox's view 
without corroboration as Knox was notoriously suspicious of all 
innovation(lv). The reactions of other Army Council members do 
not appear to have been recorded. An examination of the proceedings 
of these meetings, however, shows that many matters were 
referred to the Council which, could quite well, have been, settled at 
a lower level and which, Indeed, seem to have been effectively 
decided beforehand. 
We may reach the tentative conclusion that frequent meetings of 
the full Army Council were of dubious utility either for consultation 
or for the execution of business, and that dectsions,., taken 'within-, -the 
(i) Army Council Minutes. WO/163/39, WO/163/40, WO/163/41. 
(ii) Minney, OP. cit., p. 64. 
These fortnightly Army Council meetings were, however, 
more informal than their predecessors. The first was, held 
on 5th July 1937. WO/32/4195. 
(iv) B. J. Bond, British Military Pblicy Between The Two World 
Wars (Oxford 1980) p. 51.1 
-22- 
War Office were arrived at by a process of informal discussions 
sometimes recorded and sometimes not, and by the writing of 
minutes. Minutes were often written to define an individual's 
views more clearly and permanently after some preliminary 
discussion had taken place. once arrived at, decisions were 
communicated to Army Commands by formal, serial-numbered War 
Office letters, written in the name of the Army Council and 
1) 
carrying its full authorit But this cannot always be taken to 
imply that the Army Council as a whole had met on the issue, nor 
even that all of Its members had been consulted("). 
I 
Another criticism sometimes made of the War Cffice by 
contemporaries was that it was out of touch with the Army Commands 
(111) At times there was no doubt considerable and with the troops 
truth In this allegation. Under a strong and active C. I. G. S. 
, 
the 
problem was less likely to arise. Montgomery-Massingberd was 
well aware that he was running an Army with global commitments 
and was anxious to keep In touch with all of it. 
In addition to visits to troops In Great Britain I 
felt it was important to visit those abroad so far 
as time would allow. In 1934 and 1935 therefore 
I visited the garrisons in Malta, Gibraltar, 
Egypt, Palestine and the Sudan. I found such 
For example, W. 0. letter 86/Chemical/646,12th December 1936. 
WO/32/4315. W. 0. . letter 20/Cavalry/83,8th December 1934., - 
The full authority of the Army Council could be exerted by 
any three of Its members acting together. Minute 3. W. O. 
file I/General/3893. 
Burnett-Stuart's unpublished memoirs, p. 23., Quoted in_ 
Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between The Two World 
Wa rs p. 39. 
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visits of the greatest assistance to me when 
matters concerning these garris 67 s were 
discussed by the Chiefs of Staff 
Criticisms persisted, however, ' and In a'-press release at the time . 
of the Army Council changes of December'1937, Hore-Belisha 
announced that 
... It Is the Intention In future to bring General Officers holding the principal commands at home 
I 
Into closer assýf ilation with 
the central direction 
of Army policy 
We must now examine the relationship between the War Office 
machinery and the rest of the apparatus of government. 7be 
supreme body in charge of British defence policy as a whole was, 
of course, the 
ICI 
abinet. But British Cabinets seldom, In peare, 
have sufficient time or technical expertise for a highly detailed 
discussion of defence policy. 7be increasing complexity of war In 
the twentieth century had, however, made it vital that defence policy 
should be under continuous review at a level above that of the Service 
departments. This need led to the creation, In 1904, of the 
committee of Imperial Defence (C. 1. D. ), a basically ministerial 
body to which military, technical, and industrial experts could be 
called to give advice("'). 
The C. I. D. Itself has found a historian in Professor F. A. 
Johnson, and its secretary and guiding genius a biographer In 
Autobiography of a Gunner (unpublished memoirs), p. 67. ' 159/1000. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, King's College Londoi 
(11) -War Office Press Communique, Ist February 1938. WQ/32/4580. 
F. A. Johnson, Defence by Committee, Oxford 1960, pp. 12-13. Johnson's account is now somewhat datETand its usefulness is limited because it was written before the Committee's papers were made public. 
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Captain S. Roskill(t). There would be little point In attempting 
to retrace the steps of these scholars. It Is probably worthwhile 
to point out, however, that both Johnson and Roskill take a rather 
optimistic view of this organization, which was still the main 
vehicle for inter-departmental defence discussion throughout the 
inter-war period. During this period the problems of British and 
Imperial defence became ever more numerous and complicated and 
the C. I. D. arguably less and less suitable for Its purpose. 
The C. 1. D. sprouted a great jungle of permanent and ad hoc 
sub-committees and sub-committees, which, In the 1930s, grew 
at tropical speed. Two of the most Important permanent sub- 
committees were the Chiefs of Staff and the Principal Supply 
Officers. 7be Chiefs of Staff Committee, on which the War, Off Ice 
was represented by the C. I. G. S., was established In 1923, - and- 
existed for the purpose of high-level talks on strategy("). The 
Principal Supply Officers' Committee, on which the War Office'-was 
represented by the Master General of the ordnance, reviewed 
the supply of raw materials that muld be required in war, and the 
country's industrial capacity for war production("'). 
The fact remains, however, that the whole C. 1. D. system was 
purely advisory. Executive action in the interests of national 
defence continued to be the responsibility of the Service departinents, 
Jbid and Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, 3 vols. 
(Collins 1974). 
(11) Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, CAB 53/1-24. 
Minutes of Principal Supply Officers' Committee, 
CAB 60/1-17. 
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and they acted in accordance with policy decisions which, ultimately, 
were taken by the Cabinet. British defence planning, because of ý 
the independence of the three Service departments and the weakness 
of the C. I. D., was found to lack proper cohesion when rearmament 
began. The C. I. D. 's weakness created-a kind of power vacuum 
into which the Treasury was able to move. The control of defence 
policy by the Treasury was far from ideal and the Treasury proved 
a particularly stern master for the Army. But the War Office Itself 
certainly bore some of the responsibility for the-development of-this 
situation. The Idea of forming an independent Ministry of Defence 
had been advocated by Churchill and others() but there Is no evidence 
that it gained much support inside the War Office in the, 1930s. 
In peacetime, defence plans drawn up by the various branches 
of the C. 1. D. , even if approved ý In, principle by the Cabinet, were 
subject to'detalled financial scrutiny by the Treasury, which could 
delay their implementation for long periods and force cuts If these 
were thought necessary. During the rearmament years, real 
power, which in practice meant control of Service expenditure, lay 
with the Treasury Inter-Service Committee, a Treasury committee 
attended by representatives of the Service departments, which was 
totally separate from the C. I. D. 
(11). Sir Warren Fisher, 
Permanent Under Secretary at the Treasury, and a personal friend 
of Neville Chamberlain, perhaps had more real influence on policy 
than Sir Maurice Hankey. The appointment of Sir Thomas Inskip 
(1) Bond, British Military Pblicy Between The Two World Wa p. 22. 
Papers of the Treasury inter-Service Committee. 
T161/1315, - T161/1335. 
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as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence in 1936 had very 
little effect on the situation. Inskip appears to have been appointed 
to this office because, knowing little. of defence, he was unlikely 
to rock the boat('). 
The Cabinet could have over-ruled decisions made by Treasury 
off Icials at the T. 1. S. C. but In practice seldom did. Baldwin 
and Chamberlain generally shared the Treasury's economic concerns 
(e. g. an adverse balance of trade) and strategic. assumptions (e. g. 
the necessity of putting airpower before the rearmament 
of the Field Force) were also held In common 7be Cabinet 
therefore proved only too happy to delegate major decision on 
defence to Treasury officials. As Major-General Pownall pointed 
out, there was 
... a very marked tendency on the part of 
ministers to say In effect "yes that's a very 
good idea off you go and see if you can get the 
money out of the Treasury. " (iii) 
Pownall rightly claimed that this system amounted to the 
"negation of ministerial authority". But though ministers may 
delegate authority they cannot relinquish the final responsibility. 
7be ultimate responsibility for British defence lay In the thirties, 
where it still lies, with the Cabinet Itself. 
Neville Chamberlain's diary, entry under Ilth October 1936. ' 
Chamberlain Papers Library of the University of Birmingham,, This is not to say ; t3at Inskip was always as tame as Chamberlain had hoped. 
Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-39 (Scottish 
AcademiF-PFe-s`-s=. 5 
(iii)- Bond, Chief of Staff Vol. -J, p. 175. 
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N 
The War Office And Strategic Polic 
Introduction 
In this section we will attempt to trace the development of the 
General Staff's strategic thought In the 1930s, to show how the 
General- Staff related to the political leaders of the War Office, 
the Secretaries of State, and how they In turn interacted with th& 
Covernments of which they fOrMed part. It Is Intended to show that 
from 1933 onwards, despite global imperial commitments, the 
General Staff attempted, with remarkable steadiness of purpose, to 
concentrate on preparing for war against the power which they 
regarded as the main enemy -ý Germany. it is further intended to 
demonstrate that between November 1933 and December 1937 the 
General Staff consistently affirmed the need to prepare a Field 
Force'to fight alongside Continental allies, and that the strategic' 
arguments put forward In favour of this course were very strong. 
Thoughs, In December 1937, political pressure forced the General 
Staff to relegate the preparation of a Field Force for the Continent 
to the lowest priority, It will be shown that even under the new 
leaders appointed by Hore-Bellsha : Gorr, Adam and -Pbwnall, the 
General Staff remained unconvinced of the wisdom of this policy, and 
never lost sight of the need to prepare the Army for a Continental 
role. We will also contend that having absorbed the lessons of 
the Great War and kept abreast of post-war developments In military 
theory and technique, the General Staff had a fairly accurate vision 
of the early stages of the next war. 
A look at the development of the War Office's strategic policy 
at this period offers a fascinating contrast between the" Personalities 
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working methods and policies of two successive Secretaries of, 
State, Duff Cooper and Hore-Belisha. Against the former some 
(1) historians have repeated accusations of laziness and Ineffectiveness 
His successor, on the other hand, has been lauded as a dynamic 
and reforming War Minister, who, while acting In partnership with 
a progressive and far-sighted military theorist, made "desperate 
attempts" to "clean up" the War Office and produce an Army 
Council "capable of understanding" the National Government's 
(Ii) 
strategic policy The strategy developed by Chamberlain,, 
Trenchard, Weir, Liddell Hart and Hore-Belisha which was oppcfsed 
to the preparation of a strong Field Force for the Continent, and 
which ran counter to the advice of the General Staff has had 
(Ili) favourable treatment by some historians 7bough the General 
Staff view is expressed forcibly and, Informally In the diaries of 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, (1v) it has still, perhaps, not 
been given a. sufficiently sympathetic examination by historians, 
(V) 
An adequate appreciation of the General Staff Is case may lead. to 
some reassessment of the relative merits of, Duff Cooper and 
J. R. Colville, Man of Valour, (Collins 1972), p. 73. 
Maurice CowlidE -The Impact of Hitle (Cambridge 1975), p. 149. 
D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies., (Longmans 1965), 
p. 113. 
R. J.. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (Collins 
1960), pp. 54-59. P ter Dennis, Decision by Default, 
(R. K. P. 1972), pp. 120-126. G. C. Peden British Rearmament 
and the Treasury 1932-39, (Scottish Academic Press 1979), 
pp. 134-139. 
(IV) Brian Bond (ed. ), 
' 
Chief of Staff, Vol., I (Les Cooper 1972) 
M Brian Bonds British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars 
goes some way towards this. 
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Hore-Belisha as Secretaries of State, the one respecting, and the 
other frequently ignoring General Staff advice. 
An Imperial Army 
Great Britain In the mid-thirties believed Itself to be a Great 
Power and possessed a vast maritime Empire, yet the British Army 
was minute In n urnerical strength and desperately short of equipment(i), 
The ordinary soldier was badly housed, badly paid and very low 
In social status. Military service was consequently unpopular and 
toi). the Army was always well below its very low peace establishmen 
The Army Estimates fell progressively In the years following the 
Great War. There was a drop from 012,000,000 In 1919 to 
06,000,000 In 1921. From 1921 onwards the pressure to economize 
increased enormously. The Geddes Committee on National 
Expenditure submitted an interim report affecting the Army votes 
in December 1921. Ibis was followed by Lord Colwyn's Committee 
of 1925 on the expenditure of the Service departments and the 
May Committee of 1931 which considered all means of drastically 
reducing national expenditure. By 1924 Army expenditure had 
dropped to f. 44,783,000 and in 1934 the Estimate was 939,600,000(111). 
There is a consensus of opinion amongst historians that by this 
stage Britain's level of military preparedness had fallen below 
The Present Distribution and Strength, of the British Army 
in Relation to its Duties, Ist November 1927, WO/32/2823. 
Report of the Warrender Committee on the Cardwell 
System, 8th August 1937, Appendix A. WO/32/4612. 
Hampden Gordon, The War Office, (Putnam 1935), p. 319. 
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the danger point('). 
Immediately prior to rearmament the strength of the British 
Army excluding India stood at about 150,000 men. 7be, British 
troops In India numbered about 60,000, but they were not 
administered or financed by the War Off Ice and had a. separate 
chain of command. &cluding India the Army's overseas garrisons 
numbered thirteen. The largest was Egypt where there were about 
10,000 troops under a General Officer Commanding and the 
smallest was Mauritius where a minute garrison was commanded 
by a Lieutenant Colonel("). 
Low and continuously decreasing military expenditure., and a 
depleted Army, were not the only problems which the War Office 
had to face In the disarmament 
-years. - 
The other main difficulty 
which, it must be emphasised, old not cease with rearmament, was 
the extraordinary complexity of the Army's tasks. There, was a gen- 
eral tendency for the Cabinet and the Treasury progressively to 
diminish the Army's effectiveness without In any, way reducing Its 
commitments. The number and variety of the tasks which the 
Army could be called upon to perform perplexed and bewildered 
0 
the General, Staff(" . 
Though, before the rise of Hitler, the danger of another European 
war seemed remote, Britain Incurred complicated, and ill-defined 
(1) Peden, op. cit., p. 8. 
Gordon, The War Office p. 319. 
The Present Distribution and Strength of the British Army 
in Relation to its Duties, para. 2, Ist Nov. 192% WO/32/2823. 
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military obligations under the Port of Locarno in 1925, and her 
commitments overseas had grown considerably since the Great 
War. Mandates had been accepted f rom the League of -Nations 
for Iraq and Palestine and these territories were prone to Intern I al 
upheavals which made them security liabilities. The General 
Staff had good cause to bemoan the "general upheaval'of the world" 
which had resulted from the war and to deplore "the chaotic 
condition of China, the Swaraj movement In India, and the political 
ambitions of an Independent anti-British Egypt. "(') 
The major task of the British Army when not Involved In a 
Great War was Imperial defence. The relationship between the Army 
at home and the Imperial garrisons was defined by the'Cardw611 
system. An understanding of the imperial role of the Army. ' and 
of the operation of the Cardwell system Is essential in o, id e'r to 
comprehend the problems which faced the War Office during 
rearmament. 
, 
Infantry battalions of the line were -grouped 
in 
pairs, and in theory, at any one time, one battalion was at home 
and the other In India or one of the overseas garrisons. 
size of the Army was arrived at by establishing the number of 
battalions required overseas and maintaining a roughly equal 
number at home. Both the size and the composition of the Army 
.S at home were to a great extent dictated by the requirements of 
The Present Distribution and Strength of the British Army 






Internal security duties figured prominently, in the Army's 
imperial role. The control of Inter-communal rioting became. a 
major task In India between the wars(") and the same problem arose 
In Palestine in an even more acute form where it culminated, in 
Palestine was 1936,, In a major revolt by the Palestinian Arabs. 
still tying down a large part of the British Army at the time of 
Munich("'). The Empire's overwhelming need, therefore, was for 
infantry, which was the most flexible and adaptable arm(lv). The 
infantryman could be used effectively to separate Hindu and Moslem 
mobs with a minimum of bloodshed,, to suppress troublesome 
tribesmen of the North-West Frontier, and with good discipline and 
some practice could learn to deal with a guerrilla enemy without 
Indiscriminately massacring the civil population(v). The Empire's 
Report of the Warrender Commission on the Cardwell System, 
8th August 1937, and the British Army, Considerations on 
its Scale, Form and Functions, by Captain B. H. Liddell 
Hart, 31st May 1937. WO/32/4614. 
Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Unofficial Histo 
(Cassell 1959), Chapter IV. 
The British Regular Army and its commitments, Paper by 
Adj utant. - General, 26th October 1938, para. 3 (c), (d) and 
(e). WO/32/4616. Chiefs of Staff, Draft Appreciation of 
the Situation in the Event of War Against Germany, para. 
3 (vi), September 1938. CAB 53/41. 
(iv) The British ]Regular Army And Its Commitments, Paper by 
Adj utant- General, 26th October 1938, para. 3 (c). 
WO/32/4612. 
(V) For accounts of riot control In India, see Field Marshal 
Sir William Slim, Unofficial History, (Cassell 1959), 
Chapter IV and for North-West Frontiers operations 
see Chapter V. I 
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use for tanks, however, was limited between major wars. Light 
tanks did prove useful on -the North-West Frontier of India, but for 
many Internal security and counter- Ins urgency tasks, their usefulness 
was very limited('). 
During the 1920s, the advocates of a high degree of mechanization 
In the British Army, realizing that it was not possible, for financial 
reasons, both to develop considerable armoured forces and to retain 
the same quanitities of the other arms, -tried to force the General Staff 
to make a choice between "machine-power" and "manpower". Though 
the General Staff was generally In agreement with the aim of creating 
armoured forces, as the E4erimental Mechanical Force and Tank 
Brigade exercises proved, it could not afford to carry out such 
developments at the expense of manpower. The'Var Office was faced 
with the task of garrisoning an Empire covering a large, part of the, 
world's land surface with an Army minute in numerical strength. 
There was already an acute shortage of infantry andIt would hardly 
have been possible to make further manpower reductions -without - 
virtually abandoning parts of the Empire 
(it). 
Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, (Cassell 1959), 
pp. 406 -13. - 
The Present Distribution and Strength of the British Army 
In Relation to Its Duties, para. 9, lst November 1927. 
WO/32/2823. The shortage of infantry persisted into the 
late thirties. The British Regular Army And Its Commit- 
ments, Paper by Adj utant- General, 26th October 1938, 
para. 3. WO/32/4616. The latter paper makes it clear 
that In addition to shortages of equipment, the Army was 
facing a major crisis of manpower. 
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Until 1933, the General Staff had a bewildering range of military 
problems scattered over, the globe but had no clear long-term enemy 
against whom preparations for a major war could be concentrated. 
7bough the General Staff was consistently suspicious of Germany, 
(') 
until 1933 Germany had very little military power and was not overtly 
aggressive., The General Staff's arrangements for the mobilization 
of the Field Force were framed for the Defence of India plan 
(11) 
-, 
designed to check a Russian invasion through Afghanistan., 7be events 
of 1933-34 revolutionized the situation. It became obvious that Germany 
was rearming on a considerable scale, In flagrant breach of the 
Treaty of Versailles("'). 
The Role, of Montgomery -Mass Ingberd 
The officer primarily responsible for organizing the British Army's 
response to the Increasingly dangerous international situation which was 
emerging In the mid-thirties was General Sir Archibald A. Montgomery- 
Massingberd, who became C. 1. G. S. In February 1933. Though he 
retired early, In April 1936, owing to 111-health, In most respects the 
War Off Ice's rearmament programme was based upon- the foundations 
Field Marshal Milne told the C. 1. D. in 1925 that the General 
Staff ".... regard the German nation as a primitive people, 
scientifically equipped.... vigorous, prolific and unscrupulous, 
combining the height of modern efficiency- with the mentality 
and brutality of the Middle Ages. ' The present and Future 
Military Situation In Germany, 29th January 1925. CABý12. 
General Staff Intelligence appreciation paper of the early 
thirties show great interest in German military developments. 
See for example WO/190/281, WO/190/254, WO/190/266. 
(11) The Present Distribution and Strength of the British Army 
In Relation to Its Duties, para. 5. WO/32/2823. 
(III) Note -on the Trend of German Rearmament by M. 1.3, November 1934, WO/190/281. 
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of strategic thought which he had la Id 'Unt [I'Dec ember 1937. Far 
from showing a reluctance to change the mainly Imperial, extra 
European, role'of the Army, which had predominated In 'the twenties 
and 'early thirties, the General Staff under Montgomery-Massingberd 
settled down very quickly to working out the requirements of 
European war fought alongside France(') against Germany("). ' 
Montgomery-Massingberd played such a crucial 'role In formulating 
the thought"of -the General Staff at this critical period that some 
preliminary examination' of his character and background Is worthwhile. 
Born in 1871 and brought up In Ulster of a Protestant landed family, 
he was commissioned from Woolwich into the'Royal Artillery. He 
saw a great deal of action In 'South Africa, where, with highly mobile 
light artillery, ', In close co-operation'with light, cavalry, he was 
engaged In the'pur'sult, of Boer commandos. His experience of'mObile 
warfare reinforced an'enthustasm for horsemanship and a, respect 
for the cavalry which were'to remain with him. More's Ignif icant 
for his future career, however; was a staff appointment held In 
Capetown In 1902. There, in addition to becoming a personal friend 
of ]Rudyard Kipling, many of whose attitudes he undoubtedly shared, 
he'began seriously to study his'professton for the first time. Like 
many of his contemporaries he was. thrilled by Henderson's 
Montgomery -Mass ingberd developed very close relations with the 
French High Command under Weygand. Handing Over Notes 
by Fleld, Marshal A. A. Montgomery -Mass Ingberd, section VII. 
M-M158/9. Montgomery -Mass ingberd Papers. 
(ii) Germany was clearly designated as the main enemy in Statement 
by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, (D. R. C. 7), 9th 
January 1934. CAB/16/109. 
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Stonewall Jackson and conceived the ambition to go to -Staff College 
after reading It. From this point onwards it was as -a staff off Icer 
that he primarily distinguished -himself. Having passed Staff College 
before the Great War, he filled key appointments as Chief of Staff ý, 
to General Rawlinson while the latter was commanding Fourth Corps 
and later Fourth Army on the Western -Front('). Rawlinson was 
widely regarded as one of the most brilliant officers of his, timem) 
and, it -is unlikely-that he'would have tolerated anything less than the 
highest standards of staff work in his formations. 
At first sight, however, Montgomery -Mass Ingberd seems to have 
been a dubious choice for C. 1. G. S. 7bough highly experienced as a 
staff officer, he had never commanded a large formation In war. . 
In 
the twenties and early thirties, moreover, he had not been Identified 
with the principal advocates of mechanized warfare. Serving on the 
Cavalry and Artillery Committees he made It clear thathe still saw 
a role. for the horse. He also felt that-it was wrong to allow the-, 
Experimental Mechanized Force to continue to flaunt Its superiority 
over the other arms on Salisbury Plain after 1928.7bough by deciding 
upon the permanent establishment of the Ist Tank Brigade when he 
became C. I. G. S., he proved that he had grasped the Importance of 
armoured forces, In 1928 he believed that more effort should be 
concentrated on the mechanization of the older arms to enable them 
to meet the requirements of modern war. To this end he helped to 
Autobiography of a Gunner (Unpublished Memoirs). M-M159/1. 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd Papers. 
Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between The Two World Wars, 
(Clarendon Press-OMT, p. ; 3. 
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terminate the Mechanized Force expertmefit(l), During this period 
he s ucCeeded in making a bitter enemy, of Liddell Hart("). Liddell 
Hart has to a great extent dominated the writing of the British military 
history of the Inter-war period, and historians have tended to echo his 
extremely hostile and unbalanced opinion of, Montgomery-Massingberd, 
("') 
an opinion which we will attempt to rectify In this thesis. 
7bere Is no doubt that Montgomery -Mas singberd was a natural 
conservative. In his private papers we find a eulogy on the value of 
"Tradition"(lv) to which he ascribed Britain's victory in the Second 
World War. After a close look at the General Staff papers which he 
prepared as C. 1. G. S. , however, there can be little doubt that he had 
a very good military mind. The culmination of his strategic thought 
at this period was the excellent paper "7he Future Reorganization ý of 
the British Army". 7bis paper contained possibly the best pre-war 
analysis of German military and air doctrine made by'any commentator, 
and explained how the General Staff intended to develop a mechanized 
Field Force, which, fighting alongside Continental allies, could meet 
the Germans on equal terms(v), 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd was fortunate In-having, as his most 
senior colleague on the General Staff at a critical period, Major-General 
Autobiography of a Gunner. M-MI59/1. Montgomery -Mass ingberd 
Papers. 
Liddell- Hart, Memoirs Vol. ' I, ' 'pp. '102-103,120,172. 
See for example Norman Dixon, On the Pyschology of Milita 
Incompetence pp. 113,115,116,117. 
Tradition. M-M/159. Montgomery -Mas singberd Papers. 
(V) 7he Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1,9th September 1935. WO/32/4612. 
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G. Dill, D. IvL 0. and 1. from January 1934 to September 1936, who 
in addition to being a first-rate staff officer, (Liddell Hart described 
him as the "ablest brain" at G. H. Q. at the e- nd of the Great War), 
0) 
was a personal friend(il). Unfortunately owing to tI he patchiness of 
the surviving War Office papers, It Is not generally pos - sible to 
gauge the Infl'uence of I Dill on General Staff ''papers signed by 
Montgomery-MassIngberd. 7be Influence of the other General Staff 
Directors of the period, including Major-General C. P. Heywood 
(D. S. D. May 1934 April 1936). and Major-General A. Z McNamara 
(D. M. T. October'1933 - August 1936), is similarly difficult to'judge. 
The General Staff's Response to* German' Rearmament 
The Cabinet's abandonment- of disarmament, ' and the tentative 
beginnings of a rearmament policy tn 1933-34 were produced by more 
than one stimulus. The Admiralty was particu .1 arly worried , by th e 
emergence of the Japanese threat In the Far East. The eyes of the 
General Staff, however, were fixed very firmly on Germany. 7be 
General Staffs appreciation f i-les compiled by the D. NL 0. and 1. Is 
branch, and based mainly on Information collected by M. 1'. 3, show 
an almost obsessive interest In German rearmament. Indeed, even 
prior to Hitler's Chancellorship, German military training exercises, 
developments in German-mllitary doctrine, and-possible German, 
Infringements of the military clauses, of the Versailles Treaty seem 
(1) ll/HB 1937/29. Liddell Hart Papers. 
7bis Is clearly Illustrated in personal letters from Dill to 
Montgomery -Mass I ngberd 1939-44. M-M160/1-24. 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd Papers. 
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I 
to have been the focus of the General Staffs Intelligence Interest(i). 
The process of adjusting the British - 
Army to meet the challenge 
of a resurgent Germany began with the Defence Requirements inquiry 
of November 1933 to February 1934. On 15th November the Cabinet 
decided to set up the Defence Requirement Committee to examine the 
worst deficiencies of the fighting services and to compile a report on 
how to remedy them. The committee consisted of the Chiefs of Staff, 
the permanent of the Treasury and the Foreign Office - Sir 
Warren Fisher and Sir Robert Vansittart, and the grey eminence of 
British government and defence planning Sir Maurice Hankey, who was 
secretary to both- the C. 1. D. and the Cabinet. With Hankey In the 
chair, the War. Off Ice view was represented by the C. 1. G. S., 
Montgomery -Mass I ngberd(I 
1). 
The D. R. C. had to reckon with two main threats, the Japanese 
menace, in the Far East and the German menace In, Europe. 
MontgoMery-Massingberd made it clear that the General Staff regarded 
Germany as the more serious threat("'). General Staff advice in this 
respect was given a generally sympathetic reception In the D. R. C. 
especially by Vansittart and Fisher, both of whom were Intensely 
Germanophobic. For the Far East, the D. R. C. recommended a show 
Appreciation files on Germany in the early thirties include 
WO/190/281, WO/190/254 and WO/190/266. 
C. I. D. Defence Requirements Sub-Committee Report, 28th February 1934. 
CAB 16/109. One preliminary meetiýg of the b. P.. C. had already taken place on the 14th November. From e start ýbntgomery-Massingberdls 
concern was with the Field Force. I am grateful to Mr John Barnes for pointing this out. 
(i: U) Statement by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (D. R. C. 7), 9th January 1934. CAB-16/109. 
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of strength followed by an attempt at an accomodation with Japan 
7bis was very mUch in acc6idance with General Staff views. 
Montgomery-Massingberd regarded the abandonmenf of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance as "Insensate folly"(11)'ana his predecessor had 
looked back with great nostalgia to the friendly relations with Japan 
-010 which had prevailed In the pre-1914 era 
7he D. R. C. decided that rearmament should not be directed 
primarily against Japan. 7be Japanese were unlikely to attack unless 
there was the "sudden temptation of aýfavourable opportunity arising 
from complications elsewhere. And elsewhere means Europe, ''I and 
danger to us In Europe can only come from Germany. This conclusion 
was of vitpl Importance for the War Cffice, and the five-year, 
deficiency programme recommended by the General Staff ývas based 
(IV) 
upon It 
The whole of the section of tý'e- first D. R. C. 'repo rt I dealing with the' 
Army bears the imprint of Montgomery-Mas , singberd's 'military mind. 
it was in fact' the direct result of his advice as contained In ,a- 
memorandum entitled "Statement by the Chief of the Imperial 'General 
Staff ", which he signed on 9th'january 1934(v). We know little about 
C. I. D. Defence Requirements Sub-Committee Report, 28th, -. - February 1934. (D. R. C. 14), paras. 9-12. CAB 16/109. 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd to Hankey, llth September. 1933. r CAB 21/369. 
Distribution and Strength of the British Army In Relation to Its 
Duties, para. 2, Ist November 1927. WO/32/2823. 
(iv) D. R. C. 14, para. 9 -12. CAB 16 /109. 
(V) D. R. C. 7. CAB 16/109. 
-41- 
the development of this paper. As it Is not particularly long, and 
the views contained In It check with everything known about 
Montgomery-Massingberd's Ideas from other sources, 
(I) he may well 
have written it alone. Though It Is likely that he consulted the 
General Staff Directors while compiling It, especially the D. M. 0. and 1. 
of this period, Major-General W. H. Bartholomew, no minutes 
written about It appear to survive In the War Cfflce papers. We must , 
assume, in the final analysis, that, this document was Montgomery- 
Massingberd's work, If only because such an experienced and 
dedicated staff officer Is unlikely to have left so vital a task to his,, 
subordinates. 
7be D. IR. C. 's proposals for the Army reflected exactly Montgomery- 
Massingberd's strengths and weaknesses as a military, thinker. ýHis 
strengths included a sound grasp of strategy, a thorough appreciation 
of the importance and the requirements of artillery, --and, an understanding 
of the need to develop industrial capacity for war production especially 
for the supply of shell("). His weaknesses were an inclination to 
over-value horsed cavalry, 
("') 
at least until 1934, when he appear, 
to have changed his mind about it, 
('v) 
and a tendency to neglect the 
anti-aircraft defence of Great Britain(v). -But if he played down the 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd left some illuminating private paperso 
including an unpublished autobiography, M-M159/1 and Handing 
Over notes for his successor. M-M158/9. Centre for Military 
Archives, King's College London. 
D. IR. C. 14, para. 88. CAB 16/109. 
D. R. C. 14, para. 100, 28th February 1934. CAB 16/109. 
(tv) Minute 1,15th October 1934. WO/32/2847. 
(V) D. B. C. 7, para. 8,9th January 1934. CAB 16/109. 
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strategic air menace,, to his credit he understood -better than th6 
R. A. F. the Importance of tactIcal airpower., He emphasised the 
importance of having adequate air support for theTteld Force In 
several major documents(i). Moreover, though he did not believe, 
as did some radical theorists, that armoured forces could largely replace 
the older arms, he was by no means an opponent of the tank, nor of 
armoured formations. As early as 1934 he wanted to Include a Tank 
Brigade in the Field Force(") and by October 1934 he had decided to 
replace the Cavalry Division by a mechanized Mobile Division("'). In 
the f Irst D. R. C. report, however, a horsed Cavalry Division was still 
Intended to accompany the Field Force(lv). 
Montgomery-Massingberd's strategy was avowedly Continental Ist- and 
the main emphasis of'the rearmament programme which he proposed 
was on the equipment of the Field Force for war In Europe. At this 
stage all the Chiefs of Staff publicly expressed agreement with this 
Policy, I and they were able to present very strong arguments In Its 
support(v). The defence of the Low Countries against occupation by 
a potentially hostile Great Power was a long-standing British pre- 
D. R. C. 7. para. 2, CAB 16/109.7be Future Reorganization of 
the British Army, ' Part 1, Section 2, para. (f), 9th September 
1935. WO/32/4612. 
D. R. C. 7, para. 2. CAB 16 /109. 
Minute 1, 15th 
-October 
1934. WO/32/2847. 
D. B. C. 14. para. 84. CAB 16/109. 
(V) Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirements Report, 31st July 
1934, Appendix III, 7he Position of the Low Countries, Summary 
of Information obtained from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
CAB 16/110. 
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occupation. The Low Countries were as vital, as ever in terms of 
sea-power, "as proved by the experience of the Great War, when 
German destroyers and submarines were a continual menace, to our 
sea communications. " Their -significance had further been enhanced 
by the growth of airpower('). 
Today the Low Countries are even more important to, us 
In relation to the air defence of this country. Their 
Integrity Is vital to us In order to obtain that depth in 
our defence of London which Is so badly needed, and of 
which our geographical position will otherwise deprive 
us. If the Low Countries were in the hands of a hostile 
power not only would the frequency and Intensity, of 
attack on London be Increased, but the whole of the 
Industrial areas of the Midlands and the North of 
England would be brought within the range of pene- 
, tration of hostile air attacks(U). 
Nor were the possibilities of the Germans establishing air and naval 
bases, in the Low Countries the only, arguments In, favour of a 
Continental commitment. - There was another argument which the - 
General Staff-continued to stress for the rest of-the 1930s. A, British 
Field ýForce was believed essential In, order to -sustain the political 
and military will of France and Belgium to resist a -German onslaught. 
'Assistance on sea and In the air will. always appear to 
Continental peoples threatened by land Invasion to be 
but indirect assistance. Refusal on our part to provide 
direct assistance would be interpreted by our ex-Allies 
as equivalent to abandoning them to their fate., The., , 
arrival of even the small forces proposed would have an (III) incalculable moral effect, out - of all proportion to their, size -. 
7be British Army in the early, thirtiesf-' however, was totally,: 
Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirements Report, 31st July 1934, 
Appendix 111, The Position of the Low Countries, Summary of Infor- mation obtained from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. CAB 16/110. D. R. C. 14, para. 25. CAB 16/109. 
(Ili) Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirement Report, 31st July 
1934, Appendix III, The Position of the Low Countries. 
CAB 16/110. 
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unprepared for a European war. - 7he coast defences of the U. K. 
were completely out of date and no effective air defence system 
existed even for London. The arrangements for the despatch of, a 
Field Force were designed for the Defence of India against a possible 
Invasion by Russia and were entirely Inadequate for a major European 
war, as was the Field Force's equipment. Single divisions could be 
placed In the field at the end of each of the first two months of war. , 
A third division could be despatched at the end. of four months and 
the two remaining divisions would only be sent after six months 
In order to help maintain the Integrity of the Low Countries and lend 
support to Continental allies, the General Staff recommended that the 
Anny should be able to field a Regular Expeditionary Force of one 
Cavalry Division, four Infantry Divisions and a. Tank Brigade, "together 
with af ull complement of G. H. Q. troops and L. of C. troops. " 7he 
reinforcement of the Regulars by'Territorial contingents could only be 
considered when this essential first step had been taken(lt). 7he Field 
Force envisaged In the f Irst D. R. C. report was smaller than that of 
1914, but the General Staff contended that "modern equipment and 
(III) 
adequate reserves" were more important than ""mere numbers" 
7be 1914 experience had convinced the General Staff that It was , 
essential to ensure adequate reserves of both ammunition and manpower 
behind the Field Force. With Montgomery-Massingberd, a gunner 
by trat . ning, as C. 1. G. S. , the General Staff was unlikely to forget the 
extremely dangerous shell shortage which had occurred In 1914-15. 
(i) D. R. C. 14, para. 84. 
(it) D. R. C. 14, para. 28. 
(ill) D. R. C. 14, para. 2. 
C AB 16 /109. 
CAB 16/109. 
C AB 16 /109. 
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The provision of an adequate supply of ammunition -Is 
vital to the success of a modern army and it Is 
unthinkable after our experiences In the past that. 
we should allow ourselves to get Into a position which 
would force us to go to war handicapped by a shortage 
of these essential munitions(i). 
It is clear that the Ceneral Staff had learnt much from the experience 
of 1914-18 and had devoted a great deal of thought to the Industrial 
problems of modern war. Montgomery -Mass I ngberd's ability to 
relate the strategic policy of the General Staff to its Industrial require- 
ments appears particularly impressive. The Gener-al Staff believed 
that there were two main ways of dealing with the rnýnitions problem. 
The War Office could store In peace the full amount of shell reserves 
necessary until post-mobilization production, at a rather slow rate of 
acceleration, overtook war expenditure. Alternatively efforts could be 
made In peacetime to build up Industrial capacity so that production 
could be expanded at a much more rapid rate after the outbreak of war. 
The General Staff's advice tended towards the second scheme. If 
no new industrial capacity were created, and if the War Office 
attempted to accumulate all the ammunition reserves that would be 
necessary without it, the expenditure figures would be 
(a) To complete requirements for the first three months 
E2,860,000. 
(b) Required for reserves after the third month until 
post -mobil izatio n on . present scale'fructifies 
**.. E25,130,00001). ,I 
Though it would, not be possible to dispense with reserves for the 
first three months, the General Staff hoped that expenditure on shell 
reserves for after the third month of war could be reduced drastically 
(1) D. P. C. 14, para. 88. CAB 16/109. 
(ii) D. R. C. 14, para. 89. CAB 16/109. 
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if a policy of creating additional Industrial capacity, In peacetime were 
introduced. The problem of the development of reserve industrial 
capacity was being considered by the Principal Supply Cfficers'-. . 
Committee and until, their expert technical advice was obtained It was 
difficult for the General Staff to give an accurate estimate of the 
expenditure necessary. But a sum of E8,000,000 was provisionally, 
allotted to be spent on the accumulation of ammunition reserves between 
the third month of war and the twelfth('), 
Having dealt with ammunition reserves, manpower- was the next 
problem to be discussed. While pointing out that the Territorial Army 
provided the only means of reinforcing the Regular Expeditionary 
Force, the General Staff did not consider it advisable, at this stage,, 
to press for the rearmament of the Territorials. The T. A. had a 
low peace establishment but recruiting was so inadequate that they 
were well below it. Their equipment was obsolete and they lacked 
reserves of munitions. Nevertheless they were awarded-, only 9250,000 




7be D. R. C. obviously governed by the views. of,, Montgomery- 
Massingberd, went to great lengths to defend its proposed organization 
of the Field. Force against "the advocates in the country of an 
extreme degree of mechanization who would like to see the infantry 
abolished and replaced by men in fighting machines. " 7be report 
D. R. C. 14, para. go. CAB 16 /109. 
D. R. C. 14, paras. 93-96. CAB 16/109. 
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argued that a completely mechanized Army would be useful only 
for war In a European theatre and on ground suitable for Its 
employment, whereas the British Army had to be prepared for war 
(I) 
In many different theatres and to fight on all kinds of terrain 
7he Field Force proposed In 1934 Included both a 'Cavalry 
Division and a Tank Brigade. 7hough by October 1934 Montgomery- 
Massingberd had come to the conclusion that a Mobile Division should 
be substituted for the Cavalry 
( Division, 11) In February 1934, he 
still proposed only to mechanize the first-line transport of the 
cavalry and to provide It with some light motor vehicles for 
reconnaissance -a rather weak compromise(III). 7be infantry iias 
to be modernized by the mechanization of Its first-line transport and 
its firepower augmented by light automatic weapons, light mortars 
and anti-tank guns. The engineers signals and artillery of the Field 
Force were also to be mechanized, and this brought the total 
recommended expenditure on the Field Force to over f. 25 million. 
Though the peace strength of the Army Included five Infantry 
divisions, only four were Intended to take the field at the outbreak 
of war. The fifth would be needed to make up deficiencies in the 
other four and to provide a small mobile reserve(lv). 
For defended ports at home and abroad a total of 911,515,000 was 
thought necessary. The ports East of Suez were believed the' most 
(i) . D. R. C. 14, paras. 97-98. CAB 16/109. 
(it) Mtnute 1,15th October 1934. WO/32/2847. 
D. R. C. 14, para. 100. CAB 16/109. 
D. R. C. 14, paras. 101-104. CAB 16/109; 
-48- 
vulnerable and ES, 105,000 was allocated to them as agaýnst 
E2,254,000 for ports on the MedIterranean and Cape -routes and 
E4,156,000 for Home ports. The guns of almost all the defended ports 
of the Empire had not been modernized for nearly thirty years 
and it was largely on guns and ammunition that this money was 
intended to be spent('). 
The seemingly extraordinary feature of the -first D. R. C. report 
compared with later British defence policy Is the extremely low 
financial priority which was given to the anti-aircraft defence of 
Great Britain. Only El, 730,000 was to be spent over a period of . 
five years. Ihe programme recommended was admitted to "leave 
the United Kingdom north of the Wash with no anti-aircraft guns or 
searchlights. " 7bough they Included first-line ammunition supplies 
for A. A. units these proposals made no provision for ammunition 
reserves, which It was estimated would cost another Ej million. 
Even this extremely limited programme of A. A. expansion might not be 
completed within five years the D. R. C. warned, owing to the severe 
recruitment difficulties which T. A. anti-aircraft units faced("). 
7jbe low priority accorded to expenditure on anti-aircraft defence 
becomes easier to understand after following Montgomery -Mass Ingberd's 
reasoning in "Statement by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff". 
With the aircraft technology of the mid-thirties It was thought unlikely 
that the German Air Force could mount an effective offensive against 
Great Britain from bases in Germany. The German Air Force 
would become a truly deadly menace to Great Britain only If the 
D. R. C. 14, paras. 109 -113. 
(ii) R. C. 14, paras. 109 -121. 
C AB 16 /109. 
C AB 16 /109. 
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German Army occupied the Low Countries or Northern France(l). 
This Montgomery-Massingberd's Continentalist strategy, placing the 
main emphasis on Field Force requirements, ý was Intended, to 
prevent("). Furthermore, the General Staff believed that the Germans 
would concentrate on France first, and that while France was In the 
war only 25% of Germany's air strength could be used against Britain. 
In the case of possible air attack by Germany, it may 
be assumed that she will become threatening at such 
a time when her air forces are on a parity with those 
of France. Her maximum effort would therefore be 
of the same order, but it may be assumed that any 
effort against this country would be considerably 
relaxed by diversions In other directions. It has 
therefore been assumed that Germany In such 
circumstances would be able to concentrate 25970- 
of this strength against this country(M). 
Montgomery-Massingberd's argument carried a great deal of 
weight. It was far more realistic than some of the Air Ministry 
prophecies Inspired by the Douhet-Trenchard school, of thousands 
of tons of high explosive raining down on British cities within the 
(IV) first few days of the war Britain did not, In the event, sustain 
serious bombing until the German Army had disposed of both Poland 
and France. But by the German occupation of the Low Countries 
and France, Great Britain was placed In an extremely difficult 
position. Whereas the Germans could bomb London heavily from 
Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirements Report, 
_Appendix 
111, para. 2. CAB 16/110. 
(11) D. R. C. 14, para. 25. CAB 16/109. 
(111) D. R. C. 7, para. 8. CAB 16/109. 
(tv) See for example Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall's 
comment at C. 1. D. 349th Meeting, 3rd March 1939. 
CAB 2/7. 
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bases immediately across the Channel with the aircraft ranges of 
1940-42, it was extremely- difficult for the R. A. F. to do comparable 
damage to Germany. Montgomery -Mass Ingberd wanted to pursue a 
Continentalist, forward policy of military support to France and 
dental of the Low Countries to Germany(). If that policy were to be 
effectively Implemented, he argued, the air defence of Great Britain 
would be a much ý less acute problem 
(Ii) 
0 
7be General Staff 's proposals for - the rearmament ý of, the Army, 
as contained In the D. R. C. report of February 1934, had serious 
limitations, especially the lack of provision for the Territorial Army, 
without which the Regular Army could not be relnforced, ý and the 
failure, until October 1934, to recommend-the replacement 'Of the 
Cavalry Division by an armoured formation. The proposals as a 
whole, moreover, were extremely modest, estimated to cost only 
E40 million over five years. But this report was written only three 
years after the economic crisis of 1931, rearmament had to start 
somewhere, and the General Staff -appears to have been reluctant to 
make more extravagant demands, perhaps for fear of the reaction from 
politicians and the Treasury. And, however modest these proposals 
might appear with hindsight, they were nothing like modest enough 
for the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Upon completion the D. E. C. report of February 1934 was presented 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army, 9th 
September 1935, Part 1. WO/32/4612. Handing Over Notes 
sections 1,11, VII and V111. M-M158/9. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. 
Montgomery -Mass ingberd made this point very explicitly at 
the C. I. D. 's 269th Meeting, item 6,16th April 1935. CAB 2/6. 
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to the Cabinet which held several meetings on the subject and still 
failed to reach a decision. Eventually it was referred, somewhat 
ironically, to the Ministerial Committee on Disarmament 
(1) 
.. Giving 
evidence to this committee, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. 
Neville Chamberlain' advis ed that, An financial terms, "to put it 
bluntly we are faced withý proposals impossible to carry out"("). 
Chamberlain wanted not merely to cut down the Army's programme 
from E40 million to E19'' million, but also to Insist that 96-L -million 2 
of this be spent on anti-aircraft -defence at home. ' The-Committee 
chairman Mr. Stanley Baldwin, forced a modification In Chamberlain's, 
position, agreeing to allocate the War Office a mere UO million, 
but'allowing it to spend the bulk'of th16-on the Field Force("'), ý 
But while drastically cutting the rearmament programme which the 
General Staff had recommended for the Army, ý'the Ministerial 
Committee accepted the- strategic principles upon which, it -was 
based. 
Chamberlain had attacked the whole concept of - a- I Field Forc'e'for the 
Continent (IV) Accordingly, ministers subjected the Chiefs of Staff 
to some ýery searching strategic questions. As'the Ministerial 
Committee's report explained, 
While we never doubted that an efficient Army must 
be maintained for use In different parts of 
Including the North-West Frontier of India,. 




Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirements Report, 
31st July 1934. CAB 16/110. 
Ibid, para. 47. 
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role) required the most careful examination for 
public opinion here, though acutely alive to the 
dangers of air attack will be very reluctant to 
undertake any kind of military commttment on 
the Continent of Europe(O. 
The Chiefs, of Staff, however, produced Impressive arguments 
In favour of giving help to Continental allies on land, 
(11) 
the ý 
Ministerial Committee accepted these, 
(111) 
, and Chamberlýin thiýreby suffere 
significant rebuff on this issue of principle. 
Ube fact that the Chiefs of Staff gave overwhelming, and apparently 
unanimoust support to the General Staff's arguments In favour of a- 
Field Force for the Continent seems -to have owed much to the 
personal Influenqe of the C. 1. G. S. . Montgomery-Massingberd,: 
possessed a potent mixture of tact, charm and, lucidity which made . 
him very effective at, committee work('v). His personal relations with 
the other Chiefs of Staff were outstandingly favourable, 
(v) 
and, on this 
Ministerial Committee, _ Defence Requirements 
Report, para. . 34. CAB 16/110. 
Ibid, Appendix III. CAB 16/110. 
(iii) Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirements Report,, para. 34. 
CAB 16/110. 
(iv) In a conversation with Liddell Hart General Sir Charles Bonham- 
Carter gave his opinion that Montgomery -Mass ingberd had been 
the best C. I. G. S. since the war at putting over the Army's 
case in committee. 11/1935/114. Liddell Hart Papers. 
(V) At the 170th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff committee on 31st March 
1936, Sir Ernle Chatfield, in the chair, said'that "on the last 
occasion, on which -Sir, Archibald 'Montgomery -Mass I ngberd would 
attend a C. O. S. meeting, he -wished to express his gratitude to him for the valuable co-operation which he had rendered during 
the past- three years. The various problems which had confronted 
the C. 0. S. had been solved in the most amicable way and he 
felt that was largely due to the geniality and goodwill of Sir 
Archibald Montgomery -Mass ingberd. Air Vice-Marshal Court said 
he felt, sure the C. A. S., had he been present, would have fully 
associated himself with the remarks of Sir Ernle Chatfield. " 
/CAB 53/5. Such laudatory valedictions were not normal practice. 
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occasion he argued the General Staff's case particularly well In the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee. 7bough the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir 
Edward Ellington, was at first Inclined wildly to exaggerate the impact 
of airpower and to belittle the role of ground forces,, he was 
eventually talked out of adopting this extreme stance by Montgomery- 
MassIngberd and Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the Chief of the 
Naval Staff('). 
Unfortunately the War Off Ice influence on the Ministerial 
Committee was nothing- like so strong. Lord Hailsham endorsed the 
General Staff's case and argued It very valiantly In committee, -but 
Chamberlain was unmoved. It became clear that Hallsham- was 
fighting a losing battle, unsUPPorred by other ministers(ii). Hatlsham 
found, as Duff Cooper was later to do, that the position of the 
Secretary of State for War within the Cabinet was a weak one., A 
Secretary of State who argued his department's case, against the 
normally dominant Treasury interest could expect to have an extremely 
frustrating time. 
Lord Hailsham appears to have been somewhat -upset by this 
defeat for the Army 
Oli). We know from Montgomery -Mass ingberd's 
private papers that the C. 1. G. S. regarded the rejection of the - 
General Staff's advice as a serious blow 
(iv) 
, It would be Interesting 
C. O. S. 125th Meeting, 4th May 1934. CAB-53/4. 
Ministerial Committee Meeting, 17th July 1934. CAB 16/110. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 48. - 
(IV) Autobiography of a Gunner, p., 65. M-M159/1. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. 
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to know the personal reaction of other Army'Council members,, but 
these are not recorded in the War Office files. War Office minutes 
tend to be very formal and restrained. Few soldiers, or civil 
servants appear to have been prepared to commit themselves to paper 
in public criticism of their political masters. 
7he Future Reorganization of the British Arm 
The rejection of the General Staff's advice, as contained In the 
D. R. C. report of February 1934, delayed the beginning of a real 
rearmament effort for the Army- until February 1936.7be General 
Staff, however, was by no means inactive in the Interval. Shortage 
of cash was not allowed to produce mental paralysis. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Initiated a series of reforms'which show that he was 
rapidly becoming a convert to a policy of thorough mechanization. 
Having decided to establish the lst Tank Brigade as a permanent 
formation in November 1933, he lent great encouragement to the work 
of the Brigade, earning glowing praise from Its commander Brigadier 
P. C. S. Hobart,, who was not known for, sycophancy to superior 
officers('). In October 1934 he took the further decision to form a 
mechanized Mobile Division 
(it) 
which would replace the Cavalry 
Division, and he followed this up by Initiating a series of experiments 
'with mechanized cavalry("'). At the same time the General Staff 
Hobart to Liddell Hart, 24th July 1934.1/376/7. Liddell 
Hart Papers. 
7-The Formationof A Mobile Division, Minute 1,15th October 
1934. WO/32/2847. 
War Office Letter. 20/Cavalry/831.8th December 1934. 
WO/32/2847. 
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pressed ahead with the mechanization of Infantry and artillery 
transport, and with the reorganization and re-equipment of the 
artillery, as rapidly as the availability of funds would allow 
(i) 
.I 
In the sequence of events. which brought about a serious 
rearmament programme for the British Army, the Abyssinian war 
of 1935 was prominent. Italy had not hitherto beenregarded as a 
likely enemy("). 7be Abyssinian war together with the growing I 
threat of German rearmament forced a reappraisal of defence 
problems. In July 1935 the D. R. C. wrote an interim report which 
drew the Cabinet's attention to the Increasing dangers of the 
international situation("'). kter considering this, the Cabi'net 
authorized the D. R. C. to draw up proposals for a more thorough- 
(IV) 
going programme of rearmament 
It was against this background that the General Staff drew up its 
most comprehensive policy paper of the 1930s. Entitled "The Future 
Beorganization of the British Army", it was completed on 9th 
Handing Over Notes, 11, Present Army Policy. M-M158/9. 
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers. Mechanization of the 
Divisional Artillery, Minute 1, WO/32/2840. Mechanization 
of the R. H. A. and Light Artillery, Minute 1,18th October 
1934. WO/32/2838. Rearmament of the Field Artillery 
with 25 pdr Equipment. WO/32/4451. 
D. R. C. 14, Introductory, para. 1. CAB 16/109. 
Defence Requirements Committee, Interim Report. 
(D. R. C. 25). CAB 16 /112. 
(IV) Defence Requirements Committee, 7bird Report (D. R. C. 
37), Vol. 1, Introduction, para. 5. CAB 16/112. 
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September 1935('). * It, was a bulky document of some thirty-eight 
typescript pages, sweeping In Its, scope, penetrating In many of Its 
insights, and extraordinarily prescient In some of Its predictions. 
Yet It, has apparently been neglected by historians. - it was, divided 
Into three parts. In Part 1: the paper entered Into an -analysis, of the 
lessons, of, the Great War, gave an account of developments In 
weapons, tactics and organization since the war, offered a lengthy 
scenario of, the probable course of a future war-with Germany, and 
then drew conclusions as to how the Field Force should be organized, 
equipped and trained for a Continental role(")., In Part- II the paper 
discussed the peace commitments of the Army, -possible secondary 
(non-Continental) war commitments, and the organization of the 
Territorial Army. Finally in the third and last section, general 
conclusions were drawn 
As with General Staff paper presented to the D. R. C. in January 
1934 (D. R. C. 7), It is not possible to trace the development of this 
document in any detail. We know only that it was drawn up by- 
the, General Staff, signed by Montgomery -Mass ingberd, presented ýto 
two successive Secretaries of State for War, Halifax and Duff -Cooper, 
and circulated, to members of the Army Council('V),, - It would be, 
7be Future Reorganization of the British Army, 9th---, 
September 1935. WO/32/4612. 
Ibid, Part 1. WO/32/4612. 
Ibid, Parts II and III. WO/32/4612. 
Minutes 2,4 and 15. WO/32/4612. 
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helpful to know what was contributed to It by Individual members 
of the General Staff, but unfortunately we simply do not have the 
evidence to discover this. 
In the Introduction, Montgomery -Mass I ngberd pointed out that though 
N 
he was primarily concerned with "the military commitment which 
His Majesty's Government have selected as the most urgent ... war 
against a first class power in Europe", he also had to take In to 
account "tasks performed in peace particularly In our garrisons 
abroad" Which would have to be continued, "often In an intensified 
form" in war. He was clearly bearing in mind the likelihood, In 
wartime, of increased unrest In India and the colonies. 7be possibility 
of a Soviet threat to India, moreover, had still not officially been 
ruled out and Montgomery -ýMas s Ingberd had at least to pay -lip-service 
to the needs -of the Defence of India Plan. Nevertheless by far the 
heaviest accent, was placed on preparations for a Continental war 
against Germany(l). 
, 
In his analysis of the lessons of the First World War, which 
drew heavily upon the ]Report of the Kirke Committee, 
(ii) Montgomery- 
Massingberd emphasised that the, prime cause of the static 
positional warfare which had predominated on the Western Front was 
"the relative superiority of defensive weapons and tactical methods 
over those of the attack. 'Ibis outstanding feature of the campaign 
was the outcome of developments in the defensive power of machine 
Future Reorganization, Introduction. WO/32/4612. 
Kirke Committee on the Lessons of the Great War, 
Report. WO/32/1297 and WO/32/1305. 
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guns, artillery, and field fortifications. Of these the machine 
gun perhaps exerted the greatest influence ... whereas tn_August 
1914 we had one machine gun to 300 infantry, 
'we 
had at the 
armistice, one automatic weapon to 20 Infantry"(i). 
I 
however, did not assume as did his Montgomery-Massingberd- 
critic, Liddell Hart, that the defensive was still almost totally 
dominant. He showed that he had a clear appreciation of the role 
which had been played by tanks and aircraft In breaking the stalemate 
in the closing stages of the war, and he obviously saw them as the 
weapons of the future("), 
The tank provided the most efficient means yet 
discovered of dealing with wire obstacles and 
with rifle and machinegun fire. The employment 
of tanks, when available In large numbers, greatly 
assisted the impetus of the attack ................ 
The use of aircraft enabled the offensive to be 
carried beyond the battle zone and Into the 
enemy's country. The effect of the development 
on the armies was, at first, chiefly felt In the 
increased facilities afforded for observation and 
reconnaissance, in the restrictions consequently 
imposed on movement by daylight, and in the more 
efficient direction of artillery fire. There was 
towards the end of the war, however, an Increasing 
tendency to use aircraft for offensive operations 
against the enemy's rearward organization. it can 
hardly be claimed that the potentialities of an air 
striking force acting in conjunction with land 
operations were ever fully developed, although 
there were significant instances of effective action 
Future Reorganization, Part 1, The Main Characteristics 
of the War 1914-18, paras. 2 and 3. WO/32/4612. 




lines of communication and retreating 
troops( 
Montgomery-Massingberd pointed out that the main problem of 
the 1918 campaign had been the difficulty of exploiting a breakthrough. 
"Cavalry which carried out this, role in other theatres were never 
able to perform It on the Western Front. But means to overcome 
this problem were now In sight. "It seems reasonable to assume 
that suitable mechanized and armoured formations, acting In 
combination with light aircraft could have achieved It"("). 
Tbus, by this stage, the General Staff had certainly recognized 
the futility of sending a Cavalry Division to the Continent, and, 
conversely, regarded armoured and mechanized formations as being 
of enormous Importance. Montgomery -Mass I ngberd believed the 
"introduction of a self-contained armoured formation into our field 
army" one of the most significant post-war developments. lHe 
recognized that by the mid-thirties armoured vehicles were "capable 
of operations widely differing from the close support of Infantry for 
which tanks were originally produced"("'). He went on to show, In 
the scenario which he presented of the opening stages of the next 
war, that the combined use of mechanized ground forces and tactical 
airpower offered the Germans the best chance of success(tv). 
Future Reorganization, Part 1, The Main CharactertstIC's of the 
War 1914-18, para. 5. WO/32/4612 
(it) Future Reorganization, Part 1, The Main Characteristics of the 
War 1914-18, para. 6. WO/32/4612. 
(lit) Future Reorganization, Part 1, Tendencies between 1918 and 
1935, para. 3. WO/32/4612. 
OV) Future Reorganization, Part 1, Forecast of the Opening Stages 
of a War with Germany, para. 4. WO/32/4612. 
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In Montgomery-Massingberd's view Germany would wish to I 
obtain a swift victory in the event of another European war. His 
"Forecast of the opening stages of a war with Germany" pointed out 
that, "Ibe Great War has left af Irm conviction among European 
nations that a long drawn out struggle is disastrous even for the 
victor. " There were Indications that Germany would make "strenuous 
endeavours" to secure "an early decision"'and that the German Army 
was training for mobile operations to this end. The attitude of the 
French at the outbreak of war was expected to be defensive, and In 
these circumstances It was thought that the Germans would have 
three possible strategies for securing a quick victory. They 'could 
launch a sudden attack with "a small, highly trained, highly mobile 
force" on a selected portion of the French defences on the Franco- 
German border, or by-pass these fortifications by'a' sweep either 
through Switzerland or through Holland and Belgium, 7be British 
General Staff In 1935 were of the opinion that a'direct'German 
assault on the Maginot Line offered poor prospects of success 
Although an advance on this- front may become more 
practicable In the f uture if and when new methods of 
overcoming fortifications may have been devised, it 
would appear most likely that Germany's main effort 
would be made here and especially as long as the 
demilitarized zone exists. 
The French fortifications on this front were regarded as being 
very strong and special steps had been taken to guard against the - 
possibility of surprise tank attack. it was also considered highly 
unlikely that the Germans would attempt to advance through 
Switzerland, because of the difficult terrain, the stance of the Swiss, 
who were expected to be determinedly hostile to any violation of their 
-61- 
neutrality, and the attitude of Mussolini, who at this stage, was 
still a party to the Streas Front(i) 7be Germans were therefore 
expected to seek victory through the Low Countries. Montgomery- 
Massingberd, believed that the Germans would violate Dutch 
neutrality. 7be creation of the Liege fortified position and other 
fortified positions in Belgian Limburg and the Ardennes would make 
an outflanking movement through Dutch Limburg and southern Holland 
(11) the best course of action for, them 
The Belgian General Staff was known to be planning for delaying 
actions on, Belgium's frontiers followed by a. determined defence of 
the line Liege-Albert-Canal-Antwerp. 7be Dutch Army was expected 
to hold defensive positions on the Peel. According to Montgomery- 
Massingberd, the Belgian, General Staff hoped French and British 
re-inforcements would arrive In timeto enable them to hold the 
Liege-Albert-Canal-Antwerp line. But, failing this, they anticipated 
a retirement to the -line of the, River Scheldt, _ In which case, the 
Dutch Army was expected to fall back "behind the Inundations of the 
Litrecht position covering Amsterdam and Rotterdam"("'). 
The General Staff. believed it vital to British security that at 
least the western 'part of Holland and Belgiumý should be retained, In 
order to prevent the Germans getting access to the sea, to, provide 
Future Reorganization, Part 1, Forecast of the Cpening Stages 
of a War with Germany, para. 3. WO/32/46124 
Future Reorganization, Part 1, Probable Conditions of Entry into a European War and forecast of the type of force 
required, para. 2. WO/32/4612. 
Ibid, para. 3. WO/32/4612. 
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depth for the air defence of Great Britain, and to provide protection 
for British air bases from which a counter-off ensive In the air 
could be launched against Germany. rIbe Initial role, of the British 
Army would be "to provide sufficient moral and material support to 
our Allies" to prevent western Holland and Belgium being, over-run 
by the Germans. To this end it Was believed essential to, ensure the 
swift despatch of the First Contingent of the Field Force, which-was 
to include four infantry divisions and one mechanized mobile division. 
Montgomery-Massingberd envisaged the role of the British force as 
being strategically defensive; though It might be possible to adopt 
the tactical offensive at times(').. 
Montgomery - Mass! ngberd's concept of the use of airpower In the 
next war is extremely interesting. It is evident that the, General 
Staff had devoted considerable thought to this matter and had come'up 
with ideas strikingly different from those of the Air Ministry. -ý 
Montgomery-Massingberd did not share theprevailing fears of some 
politicians and airmen that Germany would open a war In which Great 
Britain was Involved with a knock-out blow against London. He 
believed that Germany would, not use more than a small'part of --her 
air forces against targets In Great Britain until she had secured 
decisive victory on the Continent, and that the intensity of air 
attack would be very limited indeed unless the German Army overran 
Future Reorganization, Part 1, Probable Conditions of our 
Entry into a European War and forecast of the type of force required, paras. 4 and 5. WO/32/4612. 
f 
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Holland and Belgium(O. The C. 1. G. S. agreed with the French and 
Belgian General Staffs that the targets the Germans would select 
for air attack In the early stages of war would conform to the 
objectives of the Field Armies "air action being directed against' 
enemy air bases, construction centres, railway nodal points and 
concentration areas. In fact the object of the air attack would be 
"to paralyse the enemy's movements, concentration and administration 
systems and to make possible a breakthrough by a highly mobile land 
force"("). Montgomery -Mass tngberd has been frequently criticised as 
an ulira-conservative, not sufficiently open to new ideas, ' but In fact 
this was an extremely accurate summary of the German doctrine. - - 
on the combined use of armo'ur and airpower. His description of 
the way'air forces could help mobile land forces to achieve breaký' 
through was perhaps more prophetic than any made by Liddell Hart. 
Because of his view of the way the Germans would use their air 
forces, Montgomery -Mass Ingberd believed it'essential ýto establish 
at the outset of a war, and In conjunction with allied armies, ' an 
effective system of air'defenc6 on the Continent. He thought It 
important "to ensure that demands for local defence at home are"not 
given undue weight"("'). 7he C. 1. G. S'. was very concerned about 
the attitude of the R. A. F. and regarded the existing state of Army/ 
B. A. F. co-operation as completely, unsatisfactory. . 
He remarked-In a,. ,, 
Statement by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
9th January 1934. (D. R. C. 7), para. 8. CAB 16/109. 
Future Reorganization, Part 1, Forecast of the opening 
stages of a war with Germany, para. 5. WO/32/4612. 
(tit) Future Beorganization, Part 1, Probable conditions of our 
entry Into a European War and forecast of the type of 
fnrce remflri: ýH. nmrq R WO/32/4612- 
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sentence which would no doubt have horrified the Air Ministry, 
and confirmed Its worst fears about the Intentions of the other 
services, that "it may be necessary to examine the question of 
whether a system analagous to that of the Fleet Air Arm would not 
give better results"(). 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd hoped that the prompt arrival of a 
well-equipped first contingent of the Field Force might help prevent 
the kind of quick victory for which the Germans would certainly aim. 
If a German victory were prevented In the opening stages, the 
arrival In good time of the second, third and fourth contingents would 
be a very valuable reinforcement for the Allies. Indeed the General 
Staff believed that the reinforcement of the Regulars by' Territorial 
contingents was essential to prevent the Field Force getting--Into the 
kind of dangerously depleted state in which the B. Z F. had found 
itself in late 1914(11). 
In the conclusion to this paper Montgomery-Massingberd, while 
paying lip-service to the requirements of the Defence of India plan, 
and emphasising the need to raise more infantry battalions to 
reinforce depleted garrisons abroad, reaffirmed his commitment to the 
Continent. The aim of the General Staff was to "reorganize the 
Regular and Territorial Armies on such a scale as will enable them 
I 
lbid, Part 1, Considerations governing the Organization 
and Equipment of the Field. Force. WO/32/4612. 
Future Reorganization, Part 1, Forecast of the opening 
stages of a war with Germany, para. 4. WO/32/4612. 
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to take part In a Continental war"('). 
With financial provision as at present contemplated, 
however, the fact must be faced that It will be a 
considerable number of years before, the Regular 
Field Force can be fully equipped for war, and 
while everything possible should be done to 
Improve the efficiency of the Territorial Army 
in time of peace, post-war production will, under 
present conditions, have to be largely relied -, upon, 
for their final equipment. It must however be 
realized that should an emergency occur In the 
Interim, the size and nature of the force available 
will depend u 
'pon 
the extentýto which our programme 
is completed(II). 
It was the Issue of the Territorial Army's rearmament which was 
later to trigger off a violent controversy between the War Office and 
the Treasury. 
The C. I. G. S. 's proposals for "Ibe Future Reorganization of the 
British Army" had a generally favourable reception from his colleagues 
on the Army Council("'). Most of them had'no di fferences 'with the 
st I rategic principles which he expounded, and they confined their 
remarks to the financial and administrative implications of his 
proposals. 7be comment of Lieutenant-General' Sir Harry'Knox, the 
Adj uta nt- General, was typical In Its over-all sense, If not In Its 
brevity. 
7hank you for letting me see this paper, dated 
9th September 1935, on the further organization 
of the British Army. 
As the review is on broad lines I have no comment 
to make at present ... I am In general agreement 
Future Peorganization, Part-'III, General- Conclusions, -Para"'I. 
WO/32/4612. 
Future ]Reorganization, Part III, General Conclusions, para. 2. WO/32/4612. 
Oil) Minutes 2-14. WO/32/4612. 
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with the conclusions in your paper(). 
Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, whose special responsibility 
the Territorial Army was, predictably emphasised the need to take 
the Territortals seriously. 
eo. It Is pointed out that, for the final equipment' 
of the T. A. it Is necessary to depend on post-war 
production. With- that there can be no disagreement. 
But It does seem of supreme Importance to spend 
money on improving conditions of service now. 
Moreover the expenditure of a moderate sum now 
will certainly be a safeguard against one greater 
by far later on. 
It will be disastrous if we do not treat the T. A. 
really seriously very soon(U). 
Montgomery-Massingberd expressed complete agreement on the 
need to Improve T. A. conditions of service. 
rIbe only member of the Army Council to express any real dissent 
from Montgomery-Massingberd's views was Lieutenant -General 
]Reginald May, the Quarter-Master General. May was "In general 
with the policy outlined In this Paper, "("') and was mainly concerned 
to comment upon the logistical implications. But he was not 
confident that Montgomery -Mass i ngberd's forecast of the German use 
of airpower was entirely correct. 
I do feel that our anti-aircraft measures are 
Inadequate for what will be required on mobi- 
'"lization. We have, ýor will shortly"have, two 
Air Defence Brigades who are to go overseas, and 
therefore the protection at the various ports of 
embarkation will have to be carried out by A. D. G. B. 
(Air Defence Great Britain). My own view Is that 
Minute 5, 21st October 1935. WO/32/4612. 
Enclosure 5A, 16th Oct[Ober 1935. WO/32/4612. 
(iii) Enclosure 11H, 10th December 1935. WO/32/4612. 
-67- 
Germany will put much more Into the air than 
appears to be contemplated. She Is not going to 
risk a failure in her next war. 7b1s paper shows 
how much stronger the French, Belgian and Dutch 
defences are than they were In 1914.1-feel, 
therefore, that her main attack In the early stages 
will be In the air. I feel that she will direct most 
of her hostile air attack (so far as we are 
concerned) against our large cities, but she will 
also attack our Field Force at the points of 
embarkation, during transit and at the points of 
dis embarkation(l). 
The fact that May shared the prevailing fears of many politicians 
that Germany would concentrate on air attack against British cities 
perhaps helps to explain why Hore-Bellsha retained him on the Army 
Council after sacking the other Military Members In December 1937. 
May's evident anxiety about the defence of the homeland against air 
attack and -his worries about the dangers of shipping the Field Force 
to France fitted In very well with Hore-Belisha's New Army Policy, 
which pushed the Continental commitment Into the background in 
favour of the needs of Home air defence. Certainly May's relations 
with Hore-Belisha were very good, 
(") 
and, conversely, Pownall, an 
ardent Continentallst, described him as "the weakling Reggie May"("'). 
There is, however, no evidence to suggest that May's doubts were 
allowed to Influence- the strategic policy of the General Staff under 
(i) Enclosure 11H, para. 3.10th December 
. 
1935. WO/32/4612. 
In November 1937 Hore-Belisha considered promoting 
May to the office of Adjutant-General. Liddell Hart, 
Memoirs Vol. 11, p. 68. 
(III) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 208. 
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Montgomery-Massingberd or his successor, Deverell('3. 
Duff Cooper was 'shown this paper upon taking 
up his appointment as Secretary of State for Wars, 
in November 1935. Though he did not make detailed 
comments he must have found -the paper 
helpful in 
defining existing General Staff policy. It may 
have formed the basis' of his -view' that he was 
working with "a loyal and competent staff" 
(")_ 
and 
perhaps helps to explain why he later, displayed 
such selfless determination in arguing the General 
Staff's case in inter-departmentall discussions, 
even jeopardizing his own career by opposing 
Neville Chamberlain. 
Montgomery-Massingberd, though not actually 
.11 naming May, remarks in his unpublished memoirs, 
"the idea that German aeroplanes could prevent 
a Field Force under modern conditions-, from 
leaving our ports was ludicrous but was 
seriously suggested. ', M-MI59/1, p 66. - 
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers. 
(ii) Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, p. 206. 
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Duff Cooper As Secretary Of State For War 
Duff Cooper took over f rom Lord Halifax as Secretary of State 
for War In November 1935. ý Halifax had held the ý office only - for five 
months and in this time had, no'discernible impact on departmental - 
policy. Duff Cooper, however,: was to, be Secretary of State in -the 
critical period until May 1937, - during which time a-serious rearmament 
effort for the Army was Initiated. In, these months Army policy 
became a central Issue in government circles. Some account of 
Duff -Cooper's character and background is therefore desirable. 
Born in 1890, the son of a surgeon,, he went via Eton and -Oxford 
intoý the Foreign Office, where he served, until the manpower shortage 
forced him Into the Army In 1917. ý 'Ibough he saw ý bitter , fighting 
during the 1918 campaign In France, where he served an infantry 
officer, he did not come away personally embittered against or 
contemptuous of the Army's leadership., -ý Indeed, he later wrote a- 
favourable official biography, of Haig. - Believing strongly In social 
reform he was definitely on the Left of his party when he entered 
Parliament as a Conservative in 1924. He'never devoted himself 
wholly to politics and government, being also a successful writer 
and the husband, of a socially very active actress. 7bese outside 
activities ý sometimes led Cabinet colleagues to regard him, wrongly, 
as frivolous. Samuel Hoare, something of a prude, 
(") 
told - 
Enclosure 8A, para. 4,10th October 1935. WO/32/4612. 
Hoare was described by F. E. Smith as "the last of a long 
line of maiden aunts". Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 1, p. 143 
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Chamberlain that he had the "lowest opinion" of Duff Cooper, who 
was "mixing in bad company and drinking far t6o much champagne"(i) 
possibly a reference to his association with the Fort Belvedere 
set surrounding the Prince'of Wales. 
As Secretary of State for War, however, Duff Cooper is 
remarkable mainly for doing what, he perceived as his duty regardless 
of the, consequences for his political career. In view of his strong 
support for the General Staff over the despatch of a Field Force to 
the Continent In time of war, it Is perhaps relevant that, like 
Montgomery-Massingberd, he was a Francophile. 'Chamberlain' 
accused him of being "lazy"(") when giving reasons for removing 
him from the War Office In May 1937, but In fact, In his eighteen 
months as Secretary of State, Duff Cooper's record of attendance at 
D. P. R. and C. 1. D. meetings was impeccable, better than that of his 
predecessor 
(111). On Issues which affected his department he'spoke, 
often at some length, and always to the point. He presented major 
memoranda on all the most Important subjects with which the War 
office was concerned : the role'of the Army and the rearmament of 
Chamberlain's diary, 8th February 1936. Chamberlain 
Papers. Library of the University of Birmingham. 
Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, p. 149. 
In Duff Cooper's period as Secretary of State for War there 
were 26 meetings of the D. P. R. Committee and 22 meetings 
of the C. 1. D. Duff Cooper attended all. CAB 16/136, 
CAB 16/137, CAB 2/6. Halifax had missed the 7th and 13th 
Meetings of the D. P. R. CAB 16/136. 
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M (11) Territorials, the development of armoured forces, . and the 
anti-aircraft defence of Great Britain("'). In his bitter controversy 
with Chamberlain over the role of the ArTny he clearly-- expended 
enormous energy on a, matter from which he could hope, for no- 
personal gain - not the conduct of a dilettante. His memoirs are 
on the whole extremely modest about his term as Secretary of rState 
for War, but his claim that he had been - "a true friend to the Army" 
(1v) 
is undoubtedly justified. 
Rearmament At Last 
7be General Staff's proposals, for the rearmament of the'Army, 
which, had been circulated within the War Cff Ice In the ý memorandum on 
"'Ibe Future Reorganization of the British Army", were communicated 
to the D. -R. C. - in a much shorter document, containing much less 
general strategic discussion, which was signed, by, Montgomery-Massingberd 
on 2nd October 1935(v). , Whereas In the first Defence Requirements 
Inquiry,, 'the General Staff had -suggested equipping a Regular Field 
Force only, It was now recommended that twelve divisions of the 
(vi) Territorial Army should be prepared forýContinental warfare 
The first Contingent of the Field Force was to Include four Infantry 
'The Role of the British Army. Memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for War. (C. P. 326 (36)). CAB 53/29. 
7he Tank Situation, 19th October- 1936. - WO/32/4441. 
Prospects of Munitions Production for Anti-Aircraft Defence, 
Note by the Secretary of State for War (D. P. R. 101), Ist 
July 1936. CAB 3/6. 
(IV) Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget pp. 205-206. 
(v) Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff On Army 
]Requirements. (D. B. C. 28), 2nd October"1935. CAB 16/112. 
(Vi) Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (D. 1R. C. 28), 
paras. 11-18. CAB 16/112. 
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I 
Divisions, the Mobile Division, two Air Defence Brigades, and an 
unspecified number of Army Co-operation Squadrons of the R. A. F. 
In addition to the armour Included In the Mobile Division, four 
Army Tank Battalions were to be formed for close support to the 
Infantry('). 
Montgomery -Mass I ngberd thought It essential to speed up the 
arrangements for mobilization. 7be Mobile Division and the Air 
Defence Brigades werp to be ready for disembarkation on the 
Continent within a week of the outbreak of war and the remainder 
of the first contingent a week later. 7he second, third and fourth 
contingents, each consisting of four Territorial divisions, were to 
arrive on the Continent after the fourth, sixth and eighth months of 
(1i) 
the war respectively 
Again the General Staff emphasised the necessity of developing 
the industrial muscle required to support the Army in war. In order 
to provide equipment and particularly ammunition for the much 
enlarged Field Force which was now being proposed, the General 
Staff advocated, In conjunction with the Principal Supply Officers and 
other industrial. advisers of the government, the creation of a huge 
"Shadow Industry"("'). The M. G. 0., Sir Hugh Elles, submitted 
a D. R. C. paper In which the Shadow Industry concept was very 
Defence Requirements Committee, Third Report 
(D. R. C. 37), 21st November 1935, Vol. -1. para, - 65. CAB 16 /112. 
D. R. C. 37, para. 66. CAB 16/112. 
010 D. IR. C. 28, paras. 6-10 and 16-18. CAB 16/112. 
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lucidly explained'). 
7be principle Is briefly -this. Firms who do not, 
normally make warlike stores are engaged to do 
so by placing orders with them for a relatively 
small output of peace production on the condition 
that they lay out their works and hold machinery 
for a war output which represents their peace 
output many times multiplied, e. g. tenfold. 
It Is to be noted that whereas the Shadow Arma- 
ment Industry scheme applies essentially to the 
new firms, It ma y be applied equally to the existing 
contractors to expand their "war potential". 
Obviously certain conditions are necessary :-, , *,, 
a) An approved long-term programme guaranteeing 
funds to the Department. 
b) Continuity of orders to the trade so that 
contractors may be attracted by "business propositions". 
c) Continuity of orders so that personnel especially 
supervisory staffs may be trained. 
d) Subsidies, whether taken up In the cost of the 
produced article or in direct payment, so that 
plants may be balanced and maintained to create 
a "war potential". 
e) Greater recourse may be necessary to non- 
competitive contracts, but machinery exists by 
which, under ministerial authority this can be 
arranged(ii). 
Elles also believed that it would be necessary to spend money 
on the expansion of the Royal Ordnance Factories. But even with 
an enormous expansion of the war potential In peacetime, the 
'i" 
General Staff wanted to spend E32,276,000 on ammunition reserves 
for the first contingent of the Field Force "to bridge over the 
period from the outbreak of war till factory production Is available 
7be Problem of Making Good The Army's Deficiencies And 
The Rate At Which They Can Be Remedied (D. 'R. C. 29), 
2nd October 1935. CAB 16/112. 
D. R. C. 29, paras. 2 and 3. CAB 16/112. 
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to meet war needs"(). 7he War Office thus certainly, cannot be 
accused of failing to relate Its strategic policy to, its Industrial 
requirements. 
7he main weakness of the General Staffs proposals as embodied 
in the D. R. C. report of November 1935 was the unduly low priority 
given to the Army's part In the air defence of Great Britain. Even 
if the validity of the General Staff's Continentallst, Jorward strategy 
policy Is accepted in general terms, E590,000 seems an unduly 
small amount for home A. A. defence. Only two Territorial Divisions 
were to be equipped for anti-aircraft duties as opposed to the 
twelve which were to proceed to the Continent, and there was still 
no mention of plans, to extend the air defences north of the Wash. 
In view of the recruitment difficulties experienced by the T. A. . even 
(11) 
the existing scheme would be difficult to Implement 
it was on the Issue of the rearmament of the Territorial I 
Contingents of the Field Force, however, that the General Staff's 
proposals ran Into trouble In the discussions -at the ministerial 
Defence Pblicy and Requirements Committee. Again It was 
Chamberlain who 'frustrated the General Staff's plans 
(111). Ever since 
the first D. R. C. report, Chamberlain had taken the line that the 
rearmament of the Navy and the R. A. F. would give better value 1 1- 
for money than the rearmament of the Army for a Continental war. 
(1) D. R. C. 37, paras. 67 and 69. -CAB 
16/112. 
(it) D. R. C. 37, para. 70. CAB 16 /112. 
Defence Pblicy and Requirements Committee, Minutes of 
the 4th Meeting. CAB 16/123. 
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Chamberlain claimed in his diary that he had largely dominated 
the proceedings of the D. P. R. 
(1) 
and there was a good deal of truth 
in this. Chamberlain Introduced onto the D. P. R. Lord Weir, a 
highly, respected Scottish Industrialist who worked as an adviser to 
the Air Ministry, -- and who shared many of Chamberlain's. attitudes 
to both strategy and economic policy. Weir believed that the f uture 
of war lay largelyý with the bomber, and, he conversely. regarded ýarmtes 
as of relatively minor significance. He also believed, like 
Chamberlain, that it was dangerous to divert too much Industrial 
effort into military production In peacetime("). Chamberlain "got-, 
Weir to put In a paper raising the whole question of the Field-Force 
In favour of the substitution of a fighting Air Force". Weir and 
Chamberlain made It clear that they wanted concentration on the Air 
Force and a much more limited programme for the Army. Duff 
Cooper, who had -become Secretary of State for War in November 
1935, objected In the strongest terms and stalemate ensued. It was 
only when Chamberlain persuaded Baldwin,, who largely remained 
silent in the early meetings, to intervene personally, that the 
committee was able to give d decision("'). Baldwin made no effort, 
to rule out the commitment of a Field Force to the Continent. At 
a D. P. R. meeting on 14th January, however, he put forward a proposal 
to postpone a decision on the rearmament of the Territorial 
/ 
Chamberlain's diary. Entry under 19th January 1936. 
Chamberlain Papers. Library of the University of Birmingham. 
D. P. R. Ist Meeting, 30th December 1935. WEIR 17/1 
Weir Papers, Churchill College Cambridge. 
Chamberlain's diary, 19th January 1936. Chamberlain Papers. 
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contingents of the Field Force. He did so on the basis of Weir's 
advice that Industrial capacity was unlikely to be available for their 
re-equipment for about three years. If sufficient capacity became 
available to begin re-equipping the Territorials sooner than 
expected the matter could be re-opened. Despite protests from 
Duff Cooper this conclusion'-was accepted bk the, D. P. R. 
(1) 
This was by -no means an unmitigated -defeat for the War office. 
The principle of sending a Field Force- to the Continent was 
maintained. 7he options were also left open in'the long term for 
the rearmament of the Territortals. Within a year the War Office 
would'again ralse'this Issue("). According to Chamberlain's diary 
Wntgomery-Massingberd accepted the set-back over the T. A. - 
philosophically 
(III). We know that Montgomery-MassIngberd was 
very anxious to rearm the Territorial Army,, though even he 
believed It ý improbable that this task could be completed before the 
(iv) 
outbreak -of -war But as an experienced staff officer, skilled- 
in negotiation, he probably considered it best to remain calm and 
bide his time. When the Cabinet, after some further discussion, 
decided to accept the D. P., 1R. package, In February 1936, the 
General Staff was' at least at liberty to proceed with a realistic 
rearmament programme for the Regular Army. 
(1) D. P. R. 4th Meeting. CAB 16/123. 
00 The Role of the British Army. Memo. by the Secretary 
of State for War. (C. P. 326 (36)). CAB 53/29. 
(m) Chamberlain's diary, 19th January 1936. 
(IV) Future Reorganization, Part 111, General Conclusion, 
para., 2. WO/32/4612. 
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Changes In 7be General Staff 
Between February and December 1936, while the War Office'went 
ahead with the rearmament of the Regular Army, the matter of 
the Territorial Army's re-equipment-lay temporarily dormant. In 
the meantime there was a major changeover In-the leadership, of the 
General Staff. ý In April 1936 Montgomery-Massingberd retired(') and 
In the same month the "refreshingly progressive"(") D. S. D. -- 
Major-General C. P. "Cuff In" Heywood ended his term in the War - 
Off ice. Heywood, whom Liddell Hart had - tipped as af uture C., 1. C. Sq,,, 
was to die of a heart attack within the yeýr. In September Dill 
vacated his post as D. M. 0. and I., and was ýshortly-, afterwards sent 
to Palestine, where he commanded the British garrison at aý time of 
great turbulence. 
PIbe new C. 1. G. S. , General Sir Cyril Deverell, was a very 
different sort of soldier from his predecessor. Whereas Montgomery- 
Massingberd was essentially a staff officer - thoughtful, articulate, 
and skilled in negotiation, Deverell had made his reputation as a 
ruthless, aggressive Infantry commander-on the Western Front In 
(111) 
the Great War. He had earned the unenviable nickname 'Tutcher" 
He was born in 1874 and commissioned Into the West'. Yorkshire 
Regiment In 1895. He achieved very rapid promotion during the war, 
Autobiography of a Gunner, p. 70. M-M159/1. 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd Papers. 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 1. p. ý 
262, Vol. 11 p. 32. 
Brian Bond, British Millta 
Wars (Oxford 1980). -F. ". 
Policy Between 7be Two World 
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rising to command the 3rd Division from August'1916 until April 
1919. For much of the 1920s he had served In India and he became 
Chief of the General Staff there in 1930-31(l). He appears from 
the comments of some contemporaries to have been less articulate 
than his predecessor, sometimes giving the Impression of being 
(ii) tongue-tied and taciturn 
Heywood was replaced as D. S. D. by another gifted off Icer - 
Major-General Z K. Squires. Liddell Hart noted that Squires was a 
"master of detail", certainly a quality needed in this post and that he 
was -fvmuch liked"("'). In addition to performing the normal D. S. D. 
roles of co-ordinating staff work and seeing to the execution. of 
policies decided upon by the C. 1. C. S. and the D. M'. 0. ' and I., 
(iv) 
Squires sometimes performed the vital task of defending General 
Staff policies against the criticism of Treasury officials at the 
(v) 
Treasury Inter-Service Committee 
Major-General Robert Haining who, In September 1936, replaced 
Dill as D. M. 0. and 1. , the most important PolICY-maker on the 
General Staff after the C. I. G. s. , was born In 1882 and had served 
on the Western Front as an artillery off Icer throughout the Great 
Biographical Notes For 7be Information Of 7he Press. 
WO/32/4198. 
11/1937/94. Talk with Deveiell, '18th November 1937. Liddell 
Hart Papers. Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. ill. 
(iii) ll/HB 1937/29. Liddell Hart Papers. 
(tv) See, for example, Minutes of a meeting -held on 13th zFebruary, 1936 to consider the rearmament of the Field Artillery with 
25 pdr. equipments and similar meeting on 19th March, with 
Squires in the chair. WO/32/4451. See also discussions 
on the provision of, 3.7 inch guns, Minute 2,12th May 1936. 
WO/32/3476. 
(v) T. 1. S. C. - 45th Meeting, 13th November 1936. WO/32/4445. 
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War. After the war he held a series of staff appointments, 
culminating In a highly prestigious post as Commandant of the 
imperial Defence College from January 1935, an appointment which 
indicates that he was highly rated In terms of Intellect('). 
Under Deverell and Haining there were few discernible changes in 
the basic General Staff policies Initiated by Montgomery-MassIngberd 
and Dill. The continuation by Deverell of policies which he had 
begun was later commented upon by Montgomery-MassIngberd In his 
private papers("). Montgomery -Mass ingberd drew up, for-his 
successor's benefit, a lengthy set of, "Handing-Over Notes" which 
carefully explained the rationale behind the General Staff's stance on 
all the major Issues : the importance of the Low Countries, the 
preparation of the Field Force for the Continent, mechanization, 
anti-aircraft defence, relations with the Air Ministry, and contact 
with the French General Staff. During his,, nineteen months as 
C. 1. G. S., 
("') Deverell produced no comprehensive restatement of 
General Staff policy comparable with Montgomery-Masstngýerd's 
"Future Reorganization of the British Army" - probably an Indication 
that he wished to make no fundamental change. He proceeded with 
mechanization very much on the lines which Montgomery -Mass Ingberd 
had laid down. And, while defending the General Staff's policy on 
I 
W Biographical Notes for the Information of the Press. 
WO/32/4198. 
00 Autobiography of a Gunner, p. 64. M-NU59/1. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. 
Handing Over Notes. M-M158/9. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. 
-80- 
sending a Field Force to the Continent, which he did with 
considerable skill and success at the Chiefs of Staff Committee In 
January 1937, it Is interesting that Deverell repeated almost exactly 
many of the arguments contained in Montgomery -Mass Ingbeid's 
"Handing-Over Notes"('), 
7be Debate On 7he Role Of 7be Arm 
The D. P. R. had not settled the Issue of the Territorial Army's 
rearmament in January 1936, but had merely agreed to postpone 
decision. 7be Issue threatened to blow up again at any time and 
did so dramatically In December 1936. In the interval attitudes had 
hardened. 
Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the achequer, heir- 
apparent to Stanley Baldwin as leader of the Conservative Party, and 
the dominant character In the Cabinet, did not wish to accept the 
Chiefs of Staff a-rgument In favour of a substantial and expensively 
equipped Field Force for the Continent. He did not believe that It 
was possible to rearm the Navy, the R. A. F. and both the Regular 
and the Territorial Armies simultaneously without jeopardizing the 
economic recovery which was the National Government's main 
achievement 
(Ii) 
. He was, furthermore, extremely unwilling to cut 
back social expenditure, 
(iii) 
and he believed that the political 
C. 0. S. 192nd Meeting, item 2, and Role of the British Army, 
Memorandum by C. 1. G. S. Appendix to C. 0. S. 192nd 
Meeting, 12th January 1937. CAB 53/6. 
Giving financial advice on the first D. R. C. Report, 
Chamberlain claimed that "to put it bluntly we are faced by 
proposals Impossible to carry out. " C. P. 205 (34), para. 47. 
31st July 1934. CAB 16/110. 
Peden op. cit. F- 10. 
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consequences of being seen to prepare an Army, for the Continent 
might be very damaging('). 
Chamberlain looked around for an alternative strategy. He 
became Increasingly reliant on unofficial military advice from, Lord 
Trenchard, Lord Weir, (it) and from Captain B. H. Liddell Hart("'), 
Lord Trenchard, an ex-Chlef of the Atr Staff was ý, the most Important 
British advocate of the Idea that strategic bombing would be-, decisive 
In the next war(v). Chamberlain was exposed to such arguments 
a great deal because his trusted industrial adviser, Lord Weir, also 
believed in them(v). Chamberlain' became very- concerned by the 
prospect of a knock-out blow against London at the outset of a war(VI). 
But he did not initially recommend a concentration of effort on 
fighter defences. Rather he argued that, the-best policy would be to 
create a powerful bomber striking-force which would deter German 
The Role of the British Army. Memorandum by the 
Chancellor of the achequer, (C. P. 334 (36)), para. 14,15 
and 16, llth December 1936. CAB 53/29. 
D. P. R. . Ist Meeting, 30th December 1935 and 4th Meeting, 16th January 1936 WEIR 17/1. Weir Papers, Churchill 
College Cambridge. W. J. Reader, Architect of AIE12. owe , (Collins 1968), pp. 230-231. MiddlFm-as and Barnes Baidwin 
(Weidenfield and Nicolson 1969), p. 903. 
(III) Liddell Hart's Influence was, at first Indirect, through Weir, 
who was impressed by Liddell Hart's limited liability 
arguments, but In 1937, Liddell Hart and Chamberlain 
corresponded directly, and Chamberlain read some of 
Liddell'Hart's writings. WEIR 17/10. Weir Papers. Liddell 
Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 1. p. 386. 
(tv) Andrew Boyle, Trenchard, (Collins 1962). pp. 574-579. 
(V) W. J. Reader, Architect of Airpowe , pp. 229-235. 
(VI) Maurice Cowling, 7he IMDact-of Hitler, p. 179. 
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aggression(i). Having'failed to . rule out completely'the despatch-of 
a Field Force to the Continent, Chamberlain adopted the position 
that Great Britain should limit her liability to send, land forces 
to t1re. support of an ally to a Regular Field Force of four Infantry 
divisions and a mobile division("). He was encouraged In maintaining 
4 
this position by the writings of Liddell Hart, who held that the 
defensive was now so strong-on land that, the French could hold their 
own without British assistance 
(111) 
0 
In imposing his wishes, Chamberlain was able to make very 
effective use of the Treasury apparatus, -- thus preventing the War 
Office from creating industrial capacity to supply munitions to the 
Territorial, Army. ý The Treasury, however, was not the, only 
agency through which Chamberlain tried to enforce his will. When 
In March 1936 the National Government yielded to outside pressure and 
created the new post of Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, 
Chamberlain played a large part in the decision to give this to Sir 
Tbomas Inskip. He did so because he believed that 'Inskip 'would be 
f9safe" though not "inspiring "(1v). Certainly, by October, 1936, 
Chamberlain was trying to use Inskip to secure the adoption- of his 
The, Role of 7he British Army. Memorandum by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. (C. P. 334 (36)), para. 5. 
Ilth December 1936. CAB 53/29. 
(H) Chamberlain's diary, 
'25th 
October, 1936. 
010 Treasury Inter-Service Committee, 40th Meeting, 27th 
October 1936,52nd Meeting, 17th December 1936. T161/1316. 
(iv) Chamberlain's diary, llth March 1936. 
a 
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own views on defence. Chamberlain told Inskip that he "really must 
have some decision on the future functions of the Regular and 
Territorial Armies", and made his own views on this subject'quite 
clear. Inskip, however, ' also "itstened' to the' 'advice of the'General 
Staff and had doubts about the principle of "limited liability" which 
Chamberlain advocated(1)9 
It has'already been pointed-oui that there was an Intimate' 
relationship between Army Policy and Industrial capacity. ' Chamberlain 
had succeeded In having a deciston'on the rearmament of the T. A. 
postponed because Weir'had advised that sufficient -industrial capacity 
was simply not available to rearm -all"three ser-vices'on'a Urge- 
scale, simultaneously Weir, however. ' had also helped the War 
Office , to reorganize iti'munition supply apparatus. -' '7bIs was 'a'very 
necessary step'because'the War Office had agency" responsibilities to 
the Navy and the Air Fo'rce'f6r the production of 'vital munitions, 
such As'T. N. T., as well as its particular duty 'to' the Army. ' ` Weir 
had advised the creation of a new Army Council post carrying 
sweeping powers("') - -that of Director General of Munitions Production. 
Ironically It was the man appointed to this position, an ex-naval 
off 1cer ,- Ehgineer ViCe-Admiral Sir'Harold Brown, who'challenged 
Weir's industrial advice 'and thereby triggered off the intens6, debate 
on the I role of the Army' which took place In December 1936 and 
Chamberlain's diary, -25th October''1936. 
D. P. R. lst Meeting, 30th December 1935 and 4th Meeting, 16th 
January 1936. WEIR 17/1. Weir Papers. Chamberlain's 
diary, 19th January 1936. 
Weir to Duff 'Cooper, 2nd June 1936, -WEIR 17/8. Weir-Pýpers, 
Churchill College Cambridge. 
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januaxy 19370). 
Brown appears to have Idendfled htmself with the Ceneral Staff 
view on the rearmament of the Territorials. He made valiant efforts 
at the Treasury Inter-Service Committee to secure funds, for the 
building of reserve munitions factories for the Territorials, but 
was thwarted by Treasury officials("). It was also part of Brown's 
job, to locate private Industrial capacity which was available for use 
by the Nar Office. . 
Browq had come to the conclusion, In the 
interval between his appointment, in July 1936 and December, that there 
was already sufficient Industrial, capacity In the countryý to' make a 
start on the. rearmament of the Territorials, and he communicated this 
I (lit) to Duff Cooper 
Duff Cooper lost little time in taking up this matter at Cabinet 
level. He asserted that the Cabinet had already accepted In principle 
the creation of a Field Army of five Regular and 12 Ter; itorial 
divisions. 7be only reason for postponing the equipment of the, 
Territorials was 
the doubt whether any substantial progress could 
be made with It pending the completion of the 
equipment of the Regular Army. 
He made it clear that In his own opinion any suggestion of a limited 
liability military policy was wholly, unrealistic and quoted Inskip who 
had earlier stated In the House of Commons that 
Role, of- the British Army. Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State for War. (C. P. 326 (36)), paia. 7. CAB 53/29. 
See, for example,, T. 1. S. C. 40th Meeting, 
 
27th October 1936. 
T161/1316. 
The Role of the British Army. Memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for War. (C. P. 326 (36)), para. 7. CAB 53/29. 
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Once Involved In aý major war ... Great Britain'can 
never give up until she is safe again. 7hat means,, 
however much as we may regret It that we shall 
have to make the maximum effort until victory is 
complete. 
Duff Cooper added that the maximum effort would need to be made with 
minimum delay and so the Territorial -Army should be ready to support 
the ]Regular Field Force as soon as possible after the outbreak of - 
war. 
When It had decided to postpone the re-equipment, 6f the T. A. for 
three years the Cabinet had added that if-, contrary to expectations, It 
should prove possible to make a start before the end of this period, 
the matter could be re-opened. Duff Cooper explained that the 
D. G. NL P. believed it was now possible to make such a start and "the 
industrial situation of the country and its capacity for output bring 
the proposal within the range of practical possibility". 7be War 
office was not suggesting that Industry's present output was sufficient 
fully to equip the T. A. But sufficient capacity could be created If 
due notice was given and this "without the extravagant expenditure 
and Interference with Industry" which would occur If the rearmament 
of the Territorials were left until the onset of an emergency. By 
announcing an ultimate Intention to rearm the Territorials the 
Government would lend considerable encouragement to industry to 
create more capacity. This would help with the eq'uipment of the 
-iRegular 
Army and also create useful war potentialM. 
7be War Office wanted to start immediately to provide peace 
Ibe Role of the British Army. Memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for War (C. P. 226 (36)), paras. 5,6,7 and 8. 
CAB 53/29. 
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equipment for the T. A. and to supply mobilization equipment and 
war reserves as soon as possible. The Territorial Army was well 
below the manpower strength that would be required In war and would 
need time for the training of new personnel before going overseas. , 
But In Duff Cooper's view the Territorials should have the necessary 
equipment to take the f leld as soon as training of personnel would allow. 
In conclusion he asked his colleagues to reaffirm their decision that 
it was essential to have an effective Field Force capable of 
co-operating with Continental ý allies and in accordance with that 
decision to authorize the equipment oi the T. A. "as and when the 
opportunity occurs"(0. 
Chamberlain, however, strongly disagreed with Duff Cooper's 
proposals. He argued that the Navy had always been regarded as 
Britain's first line of defence and must have-precedence over the 
Army. , Unless Britain had powerf ul air forces she, would be at the 
mercy of "a sudden knockout blow from a Continental power". 
For such Is the power of attack from the air that 
It Is only by building up a strong Air Force 
capable Itself of dealing a powerful attacking 
blow and therefore affording a strong deterrent 
against any attack upon us that we can ever 
hope to provide a real measure of security for 
these Islands(ii). 
lbough Chamberlain took note of Brown's opinion that the 
industrial situation, made It possible to begin re-equipping the, T. A., 
(i) ibid, paras. 9 and 10. CAB 53/29. 
Ibe Role of the Army. memorandum by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer (C. P. 334 (36)), paras. 5 and 6. CAB 53/29. 
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he argued, without producing much evidence, that this was not the 
case. He asserted that though work on rearmament had only been 
in progress for a few months there were already signs' of shortages 
"or Impending shortages" of skilled labour. 7bere were indications 
that exports were "slackening" despite "favourable trade tendencies" 
and overseas trade once lost would be difficult to recover. EXpendi- 
ture on defence was mounting and there was "a continuous upward 
strain on our Industrial and other resources". He arguedon this 
very slender evidence that the execution of the defence programme 
approved by the Cabinet In February 1936 which Included a Field Force 
of five Regular divisions was all the country's resources could stand. 
He made the further point that even if It turned out, over the next 
two or three years, that Great Britain did have the Industrial strength 
to rearm the Territorials as well as the Regulars and the other two 
services, the rearmament of the Territorials might not be the best 
way of using this capacity. In Chamberlain's view It was unnecessary, 
due to the country's geographical position, to maintain a large army 
ready for war at a moment's notice and therefore they had the 
option of devoting a higher proportion of national resources to the 
Air Force than did other nations. He thought this a better idea 
because air forces had recently emerged as "a factor of first-rate 
if not decisive Importance". He advocated concentration on the 
building up of an air force "which might well exercise a preponder- 
ating Influence" rather than equipping in peacetime a military force 
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which could only be small compared with Continental armies('), 
7hough Chamberlain denied that'he believed a major war could be 
fought on the principle of limited liability, he maintained that 
Great Britain's resources were In fact limited. Finally, he dealt - 
with what for him a vital point In the issue - his conviction that 
it was politically extremely dangerous to be seen to be preparing 
for campaigns on the Continent. He emphastsed that the "political 
temper" of the British people was opposed to "Continental adventures" 
and that the public would regard any such preparations as likely to 
result in entanglement "in disputes which do not concern us". He 
felt that "this almost instinctive aversion from large-scale mllttaryý 
preparations" could not be Ignored by the po I Icy -makers, whether or 
not it was thought to correspond "with a sound preparation of the 
principles on which our foreign policy should be founded"("). 
7be arguments which Chamberlain deployed-on this occasion are 
treated favourably- In Peter Dennis's book, Decision by Default. 
According to Dennis, Ithamberlain 
saw the Illogicality of Duff Cooper's reference 
to limited liability. He admitted that In a 
major war Britain could not hold back Its re- 
sources, but pointed out that this Imposed the 
necessity ef making the best use of those 
resources 
7be Role of the Army. Memorandum by, the Chancellor, of 
the Exchequer,, paras. 7-12. CAB 53/29. 
(it) lbid, paras. 12-18. CAB 53/29. 
Dennis, ', Decision by Default, pp. 85-6. 
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In fact there was nothing illogical In Duff Cooper's argument. He 
simply believed that it was not beyond Great, Britain's industrial 
resources to equip a small seventeen division-Field Force as well as 
the Navy-and the Air Force. Chamberlain offered no concrete, evidence 
to disprove, this and Duff Cooper had his Information from Sir, Harold 
Brown who was presumably In a good position -to know. Lord Weir ý, 
the government's principal Industrial adviser and a close collaborator 
with Chamberlain had'. earlier stated that -"the. word of the man 
responsible for supply must carry"('). In this case the man responsible 
for-supply was Brown, a- nd Chamberlain was over-riding his advice. 
Naturally the necessity of making the best use of resources existed. 
What-Duff Cooper was, advocating was aýbalanced contribution-to an 
allied war effort, which would include a substantial Army as'well as 
Naval and Air Forces. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was, for 
political reasons, suggesting a concentration on the building up of 
a strategic bomber force to the detriment of the Army. 
was Chamberlain's arguments that were badly thought out. 
was dominated by fears and hopes -which were largely illusory. 
He 
His f ear 
of -the knock-out blow from the air against Britain at the start of a war 
was greatly exaggerated for the reasons which the General Staff had 
earlier outlined. The Germans could not bomb Great Britain very effec- 
tively unless they occupied the Low Countries or Northern France. They 
would. probably not wish to concentrate their airpower- on a target as 
remote as Britain until they had first settled the more immediate account 
D. P. R. Industrial Production, Memorandum by Lord Weir 
sub-heading: Financial Control. WEIR 17/5 (Weir Papers). 
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with the French Army('). 7be offer of air forces alone would give 
little comfort to the French who were'dominated by fear of a very 
grave threat on land. A British Air Expeditionary force In France 
could have very little Immediate Impact'on a land campaign because 
the R. A. F. 's doctrine, training and equipment were not oriented 
towards tactical support to ground forces, as the British General-Staff 
was only too well aware("), It was illusory to hope that by expandIng 
the R. A. F. Germany could be deterred from aggression on the 
Continent. The B. A. F. was only capable of doing serious damage to 
industrial areas In Germany If It had bases In the Low Countries or 
France. If the Germans obtained the early decisive victory on land 
for ýwhich the, British General Staff always'warned they would aim, 
and overran the Low Countries and France, then Britain would be 
acutely vulnerable- to air attack, 
(lv)' but Germany would be virtually 
saf e. 
Duff Cooper was not content to let Chamberlain have the last word. - 
On 14th December 1936 he gave the Cabinet another statement of 
the War Mice's ýviews on the same subject. In Duff Cooper's opinion 
though it was Impossible to predict the conditions of a future war, 
7he Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1, sub- 
heading: Forecast of the Opening Stages of a War with Germany, 
para. 5. WO/32/4612. 
7be Future ]Reorganization of the British Army, Part I, sub- 
heading: Governing the Organization and Equipment of the- 
Field Force, para. (tv) (f). WO/32/4612. 
Oil) lbid, Part I: sub-heading: Forecast of the Cpening Stages of 
a War with Germany, paras. I and 2. - WO/32/4612. 
D. R. C. 14, para. 25. CAB 16/109. 
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the simplest and gravest emergency which might Involve Great 
Britain would be a German attack on France and Belgium. Such a 
situation would be analagous to that of 1914 and It had been the view 
of successive Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of State for War that In 
that eventuality an expeditionary force would be needed for the 
Continent. 7be presence of four British divisions on the Western 
- Front in August 1914 had been very important politically and psycho- 
logically "and may have had a determining effect on the history of 
the War". But the war on the Western Front had been very nearly 
lost In October of that year because of lack of reinforcementsM. 7be 
moral the War Office drew from this tale was clear - that efforts 
should be made as soon as possible to have the Territorial Army, 
which- was the only possible source of reinforcements for the Regulars, 
In the maximum state of readiness for war. 
Duff Cooper pointed -out that British military policy "throughout, 
this century" had been based on the possibility of'having, to send an 
expeditionary force to the Continent. If, In the Cabinet's wiew, this 
possibility existed no longer, the whole of British military policy 
would have-to undergo radical change. However, Duff Cooper could 
hardly believe, that the Cabinet will be prepared 
to banish such a possibility from their minds and 
if they 'are not prepared to dismiss such a possi- 
bility they must be prepared to face It. 
Facing it, in the War Office view, meant rearming the Territorials 
as soon as possible to support the Regulars In Continental warfare. 
The Role of the British Army, Memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for War (C. P. 337 (36)), paras. 6 and 7. CAB 53/29. 
-92- f 
Chamberlain had suggested that alternative military pollcies'be 
examined but Duff Cooper maintained that 
the competent authorities would not be willing 
to dismiss the particular contingency to which 
I have referred and so long as that one remains 
all other alternatives have little significance(i). 
As deadlock seemed to exist In the Cabinet where he had met his 
match In determination and strength of character, Chamberlain looked 
for a way round. On Christmas Eve 1936 he recorded In his diary, 
During the week I got the Cabinet to agree to an 
Inquiry Into -the role of the Army and the T. A. In, 
war by T. Inskip and the Chiefs of Staff and I 
have begged Tom to get Trenchard to help him as 
I cannot believe that the Chiefs of Staff can take 
an objective view unaided(U). 
Oncd again we find Chamberlain trying to put pressure on Inskip. 
Again he was uns uccessf ul. In their report of 28th January 1937, - the 
Chiefs of Staff repeated most of the arguments which Duff Cooper 
had -employed. 7hey came to the conclusion that it was probably not 
possible to stop an advancing army by airpower alone, that In the 
event of a German attack it would be necessary for the Western 
Allies to put large land forces into the field, and that "it would be 
out of the question for political reasons" to place the entire onus of 
fighting the ground war on Great Britain's Continental Allies. Great 
Britain ought therefore to be prepared to despatch a Regular Field 
Force of four infantry divisions and one mobile division at the, outset 
and the Territorial Army ought to be ready to back up the, Regulars 
lbid, para. 8. CAB 53/29. 
Cýamberlain's diary, 24th December 1936. (Chamberlain 
Papers). 
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within four months. The Chiefs- of Staff accepted'that the Territorial 
Army could not be equipped on "any considerable scale In a short 
time" but thought that -"the earlier all our forces can be brought Into 
action the better" thus Implicitly supporting the War Office view'that 
a start should be made with the rearmament of the Territorials as 
soon as possible. 7be Chiefs deprecated any interference with the 
Territorial Army's existing organization which they thought might 
have serious effects on Its efficiency and morale. Finally they 
emphasised the "grave concern" which the delay in settling the role 
I 
of the Army was causing. 7he inquiry which Chamberlain had Initiated 
(1) Into the role of the Army had thus backfired upon him 
The Chiefs of Staff did not reach these conclusions without 
considerable discussion however, and for a time It seemed that the 
Chief of the Air Staff was likely to adopt a line similar to that of 
Chamberlain, Trenchard and Weir. The ultimate acceptance by the 
other Chiefs of Staff of the validity of the War Cffice's case was to 
a great extent creditable to Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, 
Montgomery-MassIngberd's successor as C. I. G. S. 
Sir Edward Ellington, the Chief of the Air Staff, pointed out, 
in discussions on 12th January 1937, that having committed a Field 
Force to the Continent, the danger might arise of continuous pressure 
to go on increasing It. This might result In the country's industrial 
resources being over-stratned and In a reduction of the resources 
available for other parts of the war effort such as the Air Force. 
(1) Role of the British Army (C. 0. S. 550), 28th January, 1937, 
Conclusions (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (ix), (x), (Xiii). CAB 53/30. 
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Deverell replied. that Britain had been capable of -maintaining an 
Army of five million men In the Great War and he found it hard to 
believe that* it would now prove Impossible to support twelve 
Territorial divisions as well as the Regular Army. But Ellington 
was worried that the country's resources would be smaller in a 
future war because of the effects of air attack on Industrial production. 
An air raid or even the threat of an air raid In 
the vicinity of an Industrial district might 
stop all work there for the whole day or longer 
Irrespective of actual material damage. 
Deverell did not challenge Ellington about the effects of airpower 
but insisted that despite any dislocation caused by bombing, the, 
country's resources ought to be able to support an expeditionary force 
of the size of the General Staff was proposing, which was only-a 
quarter of that maintained in the First World War 
Deverell's eventual success In defending the War Cffice's case 
in discussion with the other Chiefs was probably due to the sheer 
strength of the arguments which he was able to muster. He was 
certainly capable of some fairly sophisticated politico-strategic 
thought, more than most historians have given him credit for. He 
pointed out that 
The Governments of all the totalitarian states 
exercise In peace a high degree of control over 
the human and industrial activities of their 
countries. They are thus enabled to create in, 
peace what is, In fact, the machinery of war, and 
In this respect they cannot fall to secure a great 
ýdvantage over countries governed on democratic 
principles. 
In Deverell's opinion it followed that the totalitarian states 
C. 0. S. 192nd Meeting, item 2. CAB 53/6. 
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would seek to exploit this advantage by striking Immediately war 
broke out "with the greatest force and speed which they (could) 
command". If those states were the aggressors they would have the 
initiative, and the defenders might have to withstand in the earliest 
stages a scale of attack heavier than any occurring subsequently. 
Deverell believed that the dictators would wish to avoid a long war 
because the standard of living of their peoples had already been 
lowered by the development of their armed forces(). Like his 
predecessor he was convinced that Germany would seek a swift 
victory. Montgomery-Massingberd had based his argument on the 
conviction implanted by the Great War that long wars were disastrous 
even for the victor. Deverell carried this further. He thought the 
dictator states could never stand a long war. "Tbeir populations 
would not have the stamina to do It"("). 
With hindsight we can see that the Idea of the German people 
lacking stamina was fallacious. But what Deverell was really concerned 
to emphasise was that because the Germans would seek decisive 
results In the early stages the British must have all their armed 
forces, Including the Territorial Army, In a high degree of readiness. 
The General Staff was consistently concerned to emphasise that "our 
first essential aim is to survive the opening stages". A lack of 
preparedness at the outbreak of war would lead to the despatch of 
an ill-equipped Field Force to confront well-equipped foreign armies. 
Role of the British Army. Memorandum by C. 1. para. 7. Appendix to C. 0. S. 192nd Meeting, 12th January 1937. 
CAB 53/6 
(11) C. 0. S. 192nd Meeting, Item 2,12th January 1937. CAB 53/6. 
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In Deverell's view 
such a course would never be tolerated by public 
opinion In this country. It Is one of the 
lessons of the last war which has most Impressed 
itself on the national mind(O. 
'Ibough Deverell persuaded Chatfield and Ellington fairly quickly 
that it was essential to have the Territorial Army ready as soon as 
possible after the outbreak of war, they were still worried that 
there might be a temptation to absorb all the nation's strength Into 
the Army. Chatfield thought the Cabinet could be convinced of the 
necessity of preparing five Regular and twelve Territorial divisions 
for the Continent provided this "represented the limit to which we 
should go In all our military effort on land". Deverell emphasised 
that the- War Office was not asking for a full-scale National Army, 
but doubted whether It was politically possible to announce any 
definite limit to the country's military liability In war. If Great 
Britain announced limited liability to the French "they might throw 
up the sponge". He quoted the Foreign Office view that a limited 
liability military policy would lead to political Isolation In Europeol). 
Despite Deverell's remarkable success In convincing his 
colleagues of the validity of the General Staff view, the Chiefs of 
Staff Report did not help the War Office to accelerate or expand its 
deficiency programme. Nor did it settle the Issue of the role of the 
Army. All the report did was to check Chamberlain's attempt to 
rule out the rearmament of the Territorials. Even so the check was 
Role of the British Army Memorandum by the C. 1. G. S. para. 8, 
Appendix, to C. 0. S. 192nd Meeting, 12th January 1937. CAB 53/6. 
(ii) C. 0. S. 192nd Meeting, item 2. CAB 53/6. 
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a temporary one. When Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin, on'28th 
May 1937, It was clear that he would enforce his own views'on all 
vital matters of def ence and foreign policy. 
The formation of the Chamberlain Cabinet was a momentous event 
In the history of rearmament and for the War Office the removal of 
I 
Duff Cooper and his replacement by Hore-Bellsha proved a serious 
blow. , Mils Is not how historians have generally seen It. Many have 
been attracted by Hore-Belisha's apparent qualities of dynamism, 
willingness'to Innovatev and flair for publicity(). 7he Influence of 
Liddell Hart 'upon historians has ensured that the period'of "Tbe 
partnership" between Hore-Belisha and this eminent military theorist 
has-been generally looked upon as a bright spell in a gloomy period. 
Duff Cooper did his reputation little good by writing about his period 
as Secretary of State for" War only rather briefly In his memoirs 
and by being very modest about his endeavours 
Chamberlain's main concern about the War Office when he formed 
his Cabinet was to get Duff Cooper 'out, ý not to put Hore-Bellsha 
in. ' Indeed he seems to have decided upon Hore-Bellsha for this 
position relatively late("'). It Is difficult to credit Chamberlain's 
claim that he had, to, move Duff Cooper because he was "lazy". A 
more likely explanation is that it was Duff Cooper's very vigour In 
arguing for General Staff policies that* led to his removal. 
See, for example, D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies, ' p. 113. 
Duff Cooper, Old Men Forge, pp. 205-206. 
Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, pp. 205-206. 
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Chamberlain and Duff Cooper had, as we have seen, been crossing 
. swords over the role of the Army Issue repeatedly since January 
1936.7he final, and perhaps the most heated confrontation came at 
a Cabinet meeting on 5th May 1937, not much more than three 
weeks before Chamberlain became Prime Minister('), 
on this particular occasion Duff Cooper tried to insist upon the 
implementation of the Chiefs of Staff's report of January 1937 on the 
]Role of the British Army, which had recommended that a minimum 
of four Territorial Divisions should be prepared to join the ]Regular 
Field Force on the Continent within four months of the outbreak of 
war. Duff Cooper insisted that the Cabinet would be foolish to 
ignore this professional military advice. At this point Chamberlain's 
tone appears to have been somewhat irate. He retorted that the 
Cabinet had every right to reject the Chief of Staff's advice on this 
matter, which was not purely military, but had also important political 
and economic Implications 
7be most likely explanation of Duff Cooper's replacement as 
Secretary of State of War, therefore, is ý that It was due to a 
difference of strategic principle. 
liability and Duff Cooper did not. 
Chamberlain believed In limited 
Had Chamberlain believed Duff 
Cooper lazy or incompetent It would have made little sense to create 
him First Lord of the Admiralty. 
Cabinet Minutes, 5th May 1937, extract in Minister for the 
Co-ordination of Defence's Papers. CAB 64/35. 
(ii) Cabinet Minutes, 5th May 1937. CAB 64/35. 
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7be 1ý Admiralty was generally considered to be a more desirable 
office and Duff Cooper was very pleased to be offered it He 
nevertheless had regrets about leaving the War Office. He recorded 
In his memoirs that 
I felt Fhad been a true friend to the Army and 
that the Army needed friends, that I had been 
working with a loyal and competent staff and that, 
after ei ht en months, I was beginning to learn 
my job(' . 
'ibe' extreme modesty which Duff Cooper displays here Is very 
much'in contrast with the character of his successor. Duff Cooper 
listened carefully to the advice of his military colleagues and " 
consistently supported the General Staff line on strategic policy. 
H6re-Belisha was a bad listener(") and was apparently sufficiently 
confident of the superiority of his own strategic insight to sack the 
C. I. G. S. 'within seven months of arrival at the War Cffice. 
Mie Advent of Hore-Belisha ' 
Mr. Leslie Hor' e-Belisha has often been seen as a great 
reforming War'Minister in the tradition of Cardwell and Haldane. 
Emcouraged by Liddell Hart he consciously cast himself In this role("') 
and this is the way he Is portrayed In R. J. Minney's account, 
(Lv) 'which, 
though a classic of its* kind, is essentially an exercise In haglography. 
A balanced assessment of the man is extremely difficult, and we 
Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, p. 206. 
(ii) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 132-136. 
(iii) ,, Bond, 
Chief of, Staff, Vol. 1, p. 136. 
(iv) R. J. Minney, 7he Private Papers of Hore-Beltsha, (Collins 1960). 
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must perhaps wait until his private papers are available to 
historians before his career can be given a fully adequate treatment. 
But It Is proposed, here, to offer a tentative re-interpretation of 
his role. 
Hore-Bellsha was forty-three when he came to the War Office. 
His father having died in his Infancy, he was brought up by a doting 
mother and when, during his teens, his mother remarried, by a 
step-father who was a senior civil-servant. He was educated at 
Clifton and St. john's, Oxford, his undergraduate studies being 
interrupted by the outbreak of, the First World War. He was an 
officer in the Royal Army Service, Corps from 1914 to 1918, though, 
unfortunately, we know little of his experience of Army life. After 
an extremely short career at. the bar he entered Parliament as a 
Liberal in 1923.. He adhered to the "National" Liberal branch of his 
party In the split of 1931, and gained his first Cabinet post, as 
Minister of Transport, In 1936. Hore-Belisha had-definitely dlsýlayed 
a talent for Innovation and a flair for publicity at the, Ministry-of 
Transport. , But having -little prior knowledge of matters of national 
defence, 
(') he was not an obvious candidate for the War Office., Why 
then did Chamberlain pick him? 
One possible answer to this question may be found In Hore-Belisha's 
flamboyant personality. Chamberlain may have seen the publicity- 
conscious. Transport minister, a favourite with the Press, as an 
answer to Winston Churchill, who was being canvassed as a possible 
(t) Bond, Liddell Hart, p. 
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Secretary of State for War by some of the die-hards(l). , But this 
is'probably only part of the explanation. Chamberlain picked as 
Secretary of State for War an individual who was both Intensely 
ambitious and peculiarly vulnerable to pressure. Hore-Belisha 
was, In fact, totally dependent on Chamberlain for his political f uture. 
For as long a's he had Chamberlain's backing he survived successive 
crises: the Army Council sackings of December 1937, the Sandys 
Case of June 1938, and the junior ministers' revolt of December 1938. 
But when Chamberlain withdrew his support Hore-Belisha was destroyed 
politically. Hore-Belisha lacked any firm political base. - His own 
Party was minute, and, after 1935, totally dependent for Its future 
on the goodwill of the Conservatives. In the Cabinet'he was generally 
unpopular with other ministers who were perhaps envious of his 
glamorous public image("). 
Hore-Belisha was moved to the War Cffice by Chamberlain In 
May 1937. By November he had decided, against the advice of the 
General Staff, that the Army should be organized primarily for 
Home and Imperial defence and that very much. less emphasis should 
be placed on preparations for Continental warfare("')., 7bis was 
what Chamberlain had wanted all along. We know'that when he sent 
Hore-Belisha to the War Office, Chamberlain told him that drastic 
Minney, op. cit., P., 14. 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 82. 
Hore-Belisha to Chamberlain, November 1937. Quoted 
in Minney op. cit., p. 69. 
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changes were needed('ý, We know also that Chamberlain suggested, 
In October 1937, that Hore-Bellsha should read a chapter in one of 
Liddell Hart's books which argued against the commitment of a 
British Field Force to the Continent. Chamberlain thus left 
Hore-Belisha In little doubt as to what he was meant to do. , In the 
period May 1937 to March 1938, during which he carried -out a 
revolution in strategic policy, it is, perhaps, not unreasonable to 
suggest that Hore-Belisha was essentially Chamberlain's man at the 
War office, responding to Chamberlain's wishes. Amongst these 
cutting down the scale of expenditure proposed by the General Staff, 
and driving away the politically uncongenial spectre of the, British 
I 
Army fighting again on Continental battlefields were probably at least 
as important as any desire for modernization or reform. 
We know that amongst those whose'strategic advice was more 
acceptable to Chamberlain, -* that the collective wisdom of the Chiefs 
of Staff - which he openly derided(") - were Trenchard, Weir and 
Liddell Hart. Can It be co-incidence that it was to these same - 
individuals that Hore-Belisha turned for help upon taking up his 
appointment? We have already noted that Chamberlain played a large 
part In the decision to appoint Inskip as Minister for the Co-ordination 
of Defence, knowing full well Inskip's Ignorance of questions of 
Dennis, Decision by Default, p. 101. 
Chamberlain's diary, 24th December 1936, recording 
conversation with Inskip. See also Cabinet Minutes, - 5th 
May 1937. CAB 64/35. 
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national defence(). He had then attempted both to put pressure on 
Inskip and to Indicate where the latter should go for advice 
have begged Tom to get Trenchard to help him as I cannot believe 
that-the Chiefs of Staff can take an objective view unaided". Would 
It be too outrageous to suggest that. he was repeating the same pattern 
with Hore-Belisha? Hore-Belisha was., perhaps, rather more 
amenable to this. kind, of influence than Inskip had been. In flagrant 
breach of normal convention, Hore-Belisha Invited both Trenchard_ 
and Weir to attend Army Council meetings, 
(") 
and Weir actually 0 
did attend on some occasions 
(III). 
, Hore-Belisha also bombarded the 
General Staff with unsolicited advice from Liddell Hart,, much of It 
(IV) 
hostile to the General Staff's Conitnentalist strategic -policy 
Hore-Belisha's suggestion of Trenchard to replace Deverell as C. 1. G. S. 
(v) 
is entirely consistent with the Idea that he was collaborating with 
Chamberlain In introducing the policy for which the latter had long 
pressed,: - the concentration of defence expenditure on building up a 
large bomber force for deterrence and the reduction of the Army's 
role to Home and Imperial defence. 
Chamberlain's diary, 24th December 1936. 
00 Minney, op. cit., pp. 66-68. 
(III) Informal Army Council 8th Meeting, 28th October 1937. 
WO/163/47. 
(iv) Suggestions on the Reorganization of the British Army, 
8th June 1937 and the British Army Considerations on its 
Scale Form and Functions, 31st May 1937. WO/32/4612. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 130-132. 
(V) II/HB 1937/58b. Liddell Hart Papers. 
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Because he arrived at the War Office with the Idea, implanted 
by Chamberlain, that drastic changes of policy were necessary, It 
was natural that Hore-BeItsha should associate himself with Liddell 
Hart, a military expert who was both respected by Chamberlain and 
intensely critical of existing War Mice policies. ' H6re-Belisha 
was Introduced to Liddell Hart by Duff Cooper, who had not been 
averse to taking unofficial as well as official adv ic 
I. Hore-Belisha, 
however, seems to have fallen much more heavily under the Influence 
of Liddell Hart than his predecessor and this Influence seems to 
have extended from Intellectual Indebtedness, to the point of 
pyschological dependence. Hore-Belisha described his relationship 
with Liddell Hart as the "Partnership"("). His reliance on the 
Partnership to a degree which was thought to preclude due attention 
to his professional military advisers Inevitably caused much ill-feeling 
at the War Office('11). 
The Cardwell System Challeng 
Shortly after his appointment Hore7Belisha put, forward two papers 
by Liddell Hart, for the consideration of his colleagues on the Army 
Council, as part of a general review of organization and policy. 
These papers emphasised Home and Imperial defence almost to the 
exclusion of a Continental role. In "7be British Army: Considerations 
Minney, op. cit., p. 54. On Duff Cooper's contacts with 
Liddell Hart see Talks with Duff Cooper 11/1936/28 and 
11/1937/49. Liddell Hart Papers. 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 
Conversation with Sir Ronald Adam, 18th November 1979. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, vol. 1, pp. 130-132. 
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on its Scale, Form and Functions" and "Suggestions on the 
Re-organization of the Army", Lidell Hart was Intensely critical of 
the Army's existing organization and particularly of the CardwelL 
system. -He argued that 
7his, system of linked battalions at home and 
abroad has had an unintended sequel of far- 
reaching effect. For it has meant that the 
needs of the overseas garrisons have hence- 
forth governed the scale and even the form of 
the Army at home(O. 
In Liddell Hart's opinion the Army as it existed in 1937 was not 
appropriately equipped for any of its possible roles. For a 
Continental war one mobile division was not enough and he advocated 
the creation of two or even three. The Infantry was Inadequately 
armed for the Continent but over-equipped for most imperial 
policing and imperial defence duties. Liddell Hart suggested that 
there ought to be two different types of infantry division: the "Close- 
Fighting" division and the "Light Foot" division. Both types were to 
be equipped solely for Imperial defence. The Close Fighting divisions 
were Intended for fighting an external enemy, such as Italy, in the 
event of an attack on a part of the Empire, such as Egypt. But the 
Light Foot divisions were to be equipped only for war against 
primitive peoples and for Internal security operations. 
Under the system Liddell Hart proposed, not even the Regular 
infantry divisions would be equipped to a standard necessary for 
Continental warfare, and the only troops available for that purpose 
7be British Army: Considerations on Its Scale Form and 
Functions, 31st May 1937. WO/32/4614. 
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would be the mobile divisions. However, Liddell Hart suggested that 
even these should be very lightly equipped. He contemplated 
stripping them of artillery support on the grounds that this reduced 
their mobility and suggested that they rely on close air support from 
the 1R. A. F. Instead. From an Army which thought itself desparately 
short of manpower, Liddell Hart thought It possible to cut out a lot 
of superfluous personnel In the infantry battalion. He proposed doing 
this by reducing the strength of the section from eight men to six, 
because in his view the light machine gun gave the section enough 
firepower without a strong rifle group, and the duty of the riflemen 
was merely to serve and defend the machine gunners('). 
In these papers Liddell Hart certainly made some useful suggestions 
such as that the strength of the British Army In India should be- 
examined with a view to reduction and that the garrisons In Egypt 
and the Eastern Mediterranean should be reinforced. But he'falled 
to find a. really convincing and workable alternative to the Cardwell 
system. Liddell Hart's suggested reforms had the disadvantage that 
the two Light Foot divisions would be useless for purposes other 
than internal security and fighting uncivilized peoples, whereas a 
serious threat to the Dnpire by a first-class power might require 
the whole of the expeditionary force. Some of his suggestions took 
no account of the realities of the situation which faced the War Office. 
it was unrealistic to suggest the creation of two or even three mobile 
divisions when the Treasury would not make sufficient money or 
Suggestions on the Reorganization of the Army, 8th June 
1937. WO/32/4-614. 
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Industrial capacity available to adequately equip one. 7be reduction 
of the strength of the rifle sections to six was objected to on the 
grounds that whereas Liddell Hart based his proposal on the idea of 
machine, warfare needing fewer men, casualties would probably be 
higher in, mechanized warfare. And 
- In countries such as Palestine and India, warfare 
is not machine-warfare but partakes more of the 
nature of police work and the need Is still for men 
rather than machines(i). 
Liddell Hart's attack on the Cardwell System led Hore-Belisha 
to initiate a major Investigation into Its working by a committee under 
týe chairmanship of Sir Victor Warrender. 7be Committee's report 
which came out on 8th August 1937 pointed out that the virtue of the 
Cardwell System lay In the maintenance of both imperial garrisons, 
which could be kept quite small, and a strong home-; -based force for 
home defence, the provision of drafts for overseas units, and the 
formation of a Field Force in emergencies. By linking infantry 
regiments with particular localities It helped foster regimental 
spirit 
Ibe difficulties in the system stemmed from the conflicting 
claims of garrison duty and a strong reserve for the Field Force. 
There were also acute difficulties In maintaining its balance In the 
face of minor emergencies which required more troops to be sent 
abroad but which did not warrant full mobilization. Though the ideal 
Report of the Committee on the Cardwell System, para. 61 
(c), 8th August 1937. WO/32/4614. 
Report of the Committee on the Cardwell System, para. 14 
(a). WO/32/4614. 
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was to have an equal number of line Infantry battalions at home 
and abroad, this condition had only been met for very short Intervals 
during the period 1868-1937. Normally there was always a slightly 
greater number of battalions abroad, and at the time of writing there 
was an excess of fourteen overseas('). 
r1bough the Cardwell SYstem was alleged to be a cause of bad 
I recruiting the Warrender Committee did not accept that this was the 
case., 7he true, causes of the unpopularity of military service were 
low pay, severe discipline, low social status, poor employment 
prospects after completing service and long periods spent overseas 
in unhealthy climates*- The pre-Cardwell Army had had even greater 
problems In attracting recruits and no alternative to the Cardwell 
System had been suggested which was likely to Improve the situation. 
7be Committee explored a variety of means of restoring the balance 
of the system and a number of alternative systems. It had been 
suggested that Instead of enlisting all soldiers for medium service, 
a combination of short service and long service enlistment should be 
used. Men could thus be enlisted for short service at home with no 
liability to serve abroad In peacetime. 7bat Idea was rejected on 
the grounds that, though It would be quite easy to recruit men for 
short service at home, It would be conversely even more difficult to 
find recruits for the long service units required to man the overseas 
garrisons. Another option which was examined and rejected was a 
system of general enlistment into the infantry rather than recruitment 
(i) lbid, para. 14 (b). WO/32/4614. 
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into particular regiments, a system which would enable a man to be 
switched from regiment to regiment as manpower shortages occurred. 
, Ibis procedure was not favoured on the grounds that it would erode 
regimental spirit and morale. Liddell Hart had suggested that the 
size of the British, Army, In India could be reduced and some of Its 
duties taken over by a gendarmerie. If the gendarmerie were to be 
composed of men recruited In Great Britain, however, it would be 
competing for recruits with the Army and so the over-all position 
was not likely to improve(). 
Liltimately, though by no means satisfied with the working of the 
Cardwell System, the Warrender Committee was 
left with the definite impression that short of the 
perfect system which has hitherto failed to emerge, 
the Cardwell System,... still has much to recommend 
It and It Is questionable whether we should not be In 
a worse plight than we are today If we were working 
under any of the alternative systems which he have 
had under review(ii). 
In fact the Cardwell System was not overthrown at this time and 
Hore-Belisha concentrated his energies on other methods of improving, 
recruiting. Many of the reforms which Hore-Bellsha Introduced to 
improve the Army's manpower situation were Indeed very much 
worthwhile. , 
7be Army's image was improved by the removal of some 
petty restrictions. Married soldiers below the age of 25 who had 
previously been compelled to sleep in barracks because there were 
no married quarters available for- them, were allowed to sleep outýof 
]Report of the Committee on the Cardwell System, paras. 15-29. 
WO/32/4614. 
(11) Ibid, Conclusions and Recommendations, para. 64. WO/32/4614. 
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barracks with their wives. Obstacles to recruitment were removed 
by dropping some regulations about recruits' teeth and eye-sight 
which were probably over-f ussy(i). 
Duff Cooper also had made a determined effort to gain the 
co-operation of the government departments In the improvement of 
recruiting for the Army and had tried to Improve soldiers' living 
conditions by the building of new barracks. The Ministry of Labour, 
however, was very worried about the political dangers of displaying 
recruiting posters In Labour INchanges, the Treasury opposed, his 
plans for building new barracks and Weir opposed any Increase In 
soldiers' pay on the grounds that this would interfere with the labour 
market in a way harmf ul to Industry 
(11). Hore-Belisha had formerly 
served Sir Warren Fisher at the Treasury and his relationship with 
Sir Warren Fisher was amicable("'). 7bis may help to explain 
why Hore-Belisha was more successful than his predecessors in 
gaining Treasury consent for barrack construction and why new 
barracks at Warminster, Bordon and Tidworth were'constructed under 
his regime(lv). 
lbe Pressure For A Change Of Army Pblic 
7be formation of the so-called "New Army, Policy" was a serious 
(i) Minne5r, op. cit., pp. 45 and 46. 
On the Treasury's attitude to -barrack construction see Peden, 
op. cit., p. 169. On recruiting posters and soldiers' pay 
see D. P. R. 8th Meeting, 30th January 1936. WEIR 17/1 
(Weir Pap ers) 
Letter from Fisher to Hore-Bellsha, Nov. 1937. Quoted In 
Minney, op. cit., p. 71. 
(IV) Minney, op. cit., p. 46. 
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blow to the rearmament of the Army and brought a breakdown In 
the relationship between the Secretary of State and the C. I. G. S. 
After Chamberlain became Prime Minister it was perhaps Inevitable 
that the possibility of a Continental role for the Army would be pushed 
Into the background. Treasury pressure on the Services to define 
their priorities more clearly mounted steadily after May 1937. Whereas' 
a White Paper on defence issued in February had quoted E1,500 
million as the minimum figure for defence expenditure, a memorandum 
by the new Chancellor, Sir John Simon, In. June quoted the same figure 
as the maximum(). This was the beginning of the policy of 
"rationing" the expenditure of the Service departments. 7he Treasury 
had become alarmed by the escalation of defence expenditure and was 
issuing dire warnings of national bankruptcy. At the same time, 
however, the Admiralty was pressing for a two power standard and it 
became obvious that something would have to give. What emerged was 
an unholy alliance between the Admiralty and Treasury designed to 
compel the War Cffice to reduce its expenditure on the Field Force. 
Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, began pressing for reduction In the 
Army's rearmament programme in November 1937 and the Director 
of Naval Plans, Phillips, concluded that "The Field Force should 
be reduced and our Army limited In general to those forces essential 
for garrison purposes", in order that the country could support a large 
(ii) Air Force afid a great Navy 
Memorandum on Defence E4enditure, (C. P. 165 (37% 
2,5th June 1937. CAB 24/270. 
"Notes on Defence EKpendIture Papers" by Phillips, 10th 
Nov. 1937. ADM. 116/3631. 
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Finally the Treasury conýtnced Hankey that unless there was a 
reduction in the plans of the Service departments the nation would 
face a situation similar to that of 1931. Hankey had always been one 
of the foremost advocates of the need to maintain a powerful Navy and 
to defend the Empire. He was also well aware that In Weir and 
Trenchard the Air Force had powerful backers who had the ear of 
the Prime Minister. He came to the conclusion that the axe must 
fall on the Army and recommended on 22nd November that 
In future the role of the Field Force should be to 
provide for the military requirements of the Empire, 
and the additional provision made In previous pro- 
grammes to equip Itfor service on the Continent 
of Europe should be cancelled(l). 
Hankey's conversion was probably decisive partly because of his 
own enormously Influential position and partly because of his close 
relationship with Sir Thomas Inskip. In his general review of 
defence which culminated in the crucial report of 13th December 1937, 
Inskip decided to give participation In land campaigns on the Continent 
the lowest pr ority, coming after both Home and Imperial defence. 
There can be little doubt that Inskip was under an enormous amount of 
pressure to do this, not only from Sir John Simon and the Treasury 
officials, but also from Chatfield, Hankey and the Prime Minister 
himself. Having taken the decision, Inskip certainly does not seem 
to have been happy about it. In his report he Incorporated the caveat 
If France were again to be in danger of being overrun 
by land armies, a situation might arise when, as in 
the last war we should have to Improvise an army to 
The Cost of Defence, memorandum by Hankey, 23rd Nov. 1937. 
n6l/855. 
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assist her. Should this happen the Government of 
the day would almost certainly be criticised for 
having neglected to provide against so obvious 
a contingency(i). 
Previously Inskip had spoken out against the doctrine of limited 
liability in the House of Commons. And when, in October 1936, 
Chamberlain had urged him to give a decision against preparing the 
Territorials for a Continental War, Deverell had warned Inskip that 
without considerable British forces on the Continent the Germans might 
achieve a breakthrough and seize the Channel Ports, Chamberlain's 
response to Deverell's warning when informed of It by Inskip was 
"tell that to the marines". But Inskip was clearly not so sanguine 
(11) 
0 
The Army Council Sackings 
Hore-Belisha, on the other hand, had no doubt about the New 
Army Policy at this stage. Indeed he had been moving towards it 
under the Influence of Liddell Hart before the Cabinet accepted Inskip's 
report on, 22nd December 1937. After a tiip to France in November, 
Hore-Belisha became convinced that the Maginot Line could be held 
with very few troops and that the French could defend themselves 
without British support on land. He wrote to Chamberlain 
My view after the fullest survey Including a visit 
to France is that our Army should be organized 
to defend this country and the Empire, that to 
organize It with a military prepossession In favour 
of a Continental commitment Is wrong. The C. I. G. S. 
though he may overtly accept this view does not 
accept It In fact or in practice, and he has told me 
that he Is upa le to advise any modification In our 
organizationkil)l.. 
Defence 0cpenditure in Future Years, (C. P. 316 (37)), 
part V, para. 75. CAB 24/273. 
Chamberlain's diary, 25th October 1936 (Chamberlain Papers). 
Minney, op. cit., p. 69. 
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It is clear from Hore-Belisha's letter to Chamberlain, quoted 
above that the main reason for his decision to sack Deverell was a 
difference of strategic principle. Deverell had been strongly In 
favour of a Continental role for the Army and was not prepared to 
see the re-equipment of the Field Force relegated to a very low priority. 
Hore-Bellsha, no doubt anxious to fit in with Chamberlain's Ideas, and 
leaning heavily on the advice of Liddell Hart, took the opposite view. 
7bere had been disputes about other Issues, such as the size of 
the British Army in India, which Hore-Bellsha wanted to reduce, 
against Deverell's advice, 
0) 
and the appointment of a commander for 
the Mobile Division, 
(") but these were minor matters compared with 
the re, volution In strategic policy which was being forced on the War 
Office against the advice of the General Staff. 
Hore-Belisha's letter calling for Deverell's resignation, however, 
avoided the central Issue of strategic policy and Implied that Deverell 
was being forced out for simple administrative Incompetence - for 
, 
failing to make progress with rearmament. 
You will not have been unaware that In various quarters 
doubts have been expressed whether the War Office was 
making as rapid progress In rearmament as the other 
Deverell has been much criticised for his reluctance to 
reduce the British garrison in India and his opposition to 
Hore-Bellsha on this issue. See, for example Brian Bond,, 
British MilitaEZ Policy Between The Two World Wars, 
ýp. 112-113 and Minney, op. cit., pp. : )J, 54,66 and 69. 
Deverell's advice, however was based not on mere prejudice, 
but on the experience of twelve years service In India. This 
was a time of growing Nationalist ferment which culminated 
in the "Quit India" movement of the early forties. Indeed 
British authority In India was probably less secure than at any 
time since the Mutiny. 
(11) Il/HB 1937/47b and ll/HB 1937/48b. Liddell Hart Papers. 
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Defence Departments and this has been a source of 
concern to Government In these anxious times when 
action brooks no delay(t). 
Deverell was no doubt far from Ideal as C. 1. G. S. , being In- 
articulate of speech, and too conventional In his attitude to the 
making of senior military appointments. But there was a strong 
element of hypocrisy In Hore-Belisha's explanation to Deverell of the 
reasons for his removal. The suggestion was that the Government 
was anxious to proceed with the rearmament of the Army and that 
Deverell was an obstacle to this. In fact the Cabinet had never 
shown much enthusiasm for the Army's re-equipment and the main 
motive for the introduction of the New Army Policy, which Deverell 
lost his job resisting, was to cut down the level of rearmament 
expenditure proposed by the General Staff. If the War Office 
was making less progress than the other two Service departments 
that was largely because It was the conscious policy of Chamberlain. and 
the Treasury to rearm the Navy and the R. A. F. but drastically to 
restrict the money and the Industrial capacity available to the 
War office. The New Army Policy did not change this situation. It 
merely exaggerated an existing tendency and provided a strategic 
(Ii) rationale of a rather negative kind for what was already happening 
Deverell replied to Hore-Belisha's letter In strong terms and we 
should not be too surprised at this. Soldiers have emotions like other 
people and Hore-Bellsha had offended him deeply. 
Minney, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
Hore-Belisha's New Army Policy involved a cut of E70 million 
in the War Office's programme which was accepted by the 
Cabinet on 23rd March 1938. Cabinet 16 (38). 
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My conscience Is clear as to my duty to the Army 
and as to its rearmament. Time will show that 
your criticisms as far as I am concerned are as 
unjust as they are cruel(O. 
Most historians who have dealt with the Army Council 'sackings . 
have done so In a manner favourable to Hore-Belisha. Hore-Bellsha 
was much praised by the contemporary press, with which he was 
something of a darling, for his moral courage in going through with 
the sackings, 
(Ii) 
and this sentiment has been echoed by later writers("'), 
Deverell's case has largely 
-gone 
by default. Within little over a 
year, however, Hore-Belisha had swung-round to an acceptance of the 
need to prepare the Army for a Continental war, the very Issue over 
which he had sacked Deverell. And though It Is easy to appreciate 
Hore-Belisha's dilemma, his moral courage In solving It can perhaps, 
be over-stressed. By December 1937 he was under almost Irrestible 
pressure to implement the changes In Army policy which were wanted 
by the Treasury, the Naval Staff and. Hankey and for which Chamberlain 
himself had long been pressing. To do this against the resistance 
of 
-the 
leaders of the General Staff and the Military Members of the 
Army Council would have been extremely difficult. In removing 
these obstacles, Hore-Belisha was really following the line of least 
resistance. To resist Chamberlain, as Duff Cooper had done, 
required courage indeed. Hore-Belisha nevertheless approached the 
decision with understandable trepidation about the public reaction, and 
Minney, op. cit., p. 72. 
(10 Minney, OP. Cit., pp. 72-76. 
(iii) British Military Policy Be*tween the Two World Wars p. 255. 
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was during this period that his reliance on the advice and support 
of Liddell Hart was at its greatest. He told Liddell ýHart afterwards 
that "You have driven me to the water and have made me drink"('). 
7he changes at the War Office were announced to the public on 
2nd December, 1937. Deverell, Knox and Elles were all to leave the 
Army Council. 7be official version was that Deverell and Knox 
were going in order to facilitate the promotion of younger officers, 
and that Elles was retiring in order to allow an administrative - 
reorganization whereby the M. G. 0. -'s department would be merged' 
with that of the Director General of Munitions ProductloP 
0.7b 
e 
reason given for Elles) retirement was at least partly true. Such 
a reorganization was In fact carried out(" 
1). Elles, however, had 
also been showing signs of stress and diminished vigour, and, his 
removal had been contemplated for months 
(iv) 7bus, though Elles 
was retired at the same time as Deverell, the motive was rather 
different. Knox's retirement seems to have been due mainly to his 
association with the policies which Montgornexy -Mass Ingberd and 
V) Deverell had pursued, and to his reputation as an arch -conservative( . 
7be only Military Members to survive the purge were May, the Q. M. G., 
who, as we have noted, had expressed doubts about the despatch of a 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 69.. 
War Office Press Communique, 2nd December 1937. WO/32/4198. 
Reorganization of the M. G. O. 's department. WO/32/4196. 
(IV) Talk with Hore-Belisha, 5th November 1937. ll/HB 1937/78 (a). 
Liddell Hart Papers. 
(v) Talk with Hore-Bellsha, 21st November 1937. ll/HB 1937/108 
(a). Liddell Hart Papers. 
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Field Force to the Continent, -and Major-General, Walter _Kirke, 
the 
Director General of the Territorial Army, whose elevation to the 
Army Council was Hore-Belisha's doing('). 
The changes In the General Staff were the most critical for, making 
a. revolution in strategic policy. In addition to forcing theý retirement 
of the C. 1. G. S., Hore-Belisha rid himself of the other main policy 
maker on the General Staff - HaIning the D. M. O. and 1.,, ýwho-was sent 
to command the British -garrison in Palestine("). But In making fresh 
General Staff appointments, Hore-Bellsha made errors which were 
ultimately fatal to his own career. The most logical procedure for 
Hore-Bellsha to have adopted would have been to seek out senior 
officers reluctant to commit, the Army to a Continental war and in 
agreement with the policy of concentration on Home and Imperial defence. 
Though perhaps not very numerous, such officers did exist. General 
Sir, john Burnett-Stuart fell Into this category("'). 'General Sir Edmund 
lronside was lukewarm about a Continental role, 
('V) 
as was Major- 
General Sir Frederick Pile, the commander of lst A. A. Division, who 
wished to see a diversion of resources from the Field Force to anti- 
V) 
aircraft defence at home( . 
Conversation with H-B on the telephone, 7th October 1937. 
ll/HB 1937/51 (a). 
War Office Press Communique, 2nd December 1937. 
WO/32/4198. 
War Office Press Communique, 2nd December 1937. 
WO/32/4198. 
R. J. Macleod and D. Kelly (eds. ), The Ironside Diaries, 
(Constable 1962), p. 48. 
(V) Bond, Liddell Hart, p. 106. 
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Burnett-Stuart, however, had been passed over as C. 1. G. S. In 
favour of Deverell, In April 1936, and by the end of 1937, he was 
rather old for the Post. His appointment would have made obvious 
nonsense of the polite fiction that Deverell was retiring to make way 
for a younger man. Trenchard, who was suggested, by Hore-Belisha, 
(1) 
would have fitted In very well with the Ideas of Chamberlain and Liddell 
Hart on the role of the Army, but he was actually older than Deverell. 
As an ex-Chief of the Air Staff, moreover, it would have been necessary 
both to bring him -out of retirement, "and to transfer him to the Army. 
-Ia most . unorthodox procedure. ' Liddell Hart did not encourage 
Hore-Belisha to pursue this line. Pile and Ironside, however, each 
appear to have been given some consideration as Deverell's successor. 
Pile certainly was an extremely able off Icer whose commitment to 
giving a high priority to home defence was strong. He was, however, 
very obviously a protege of Liddell Hart's, and as such was much 
resented In some quarters 
(11) 
0 
But Hore-Belisha's final choice, which Initially seems to have been 
quite agreeable to Liddell Hart, fell upon Major-General the Viscount 
John Standish Gort for C. 1. G. S. , and on 
Colonel Ronald Forbes Adam 
for Deputy C. I. G. S., a newly-created post. The Directorship of 
Military operations and Intelligence, vacated by Haining, was filled 
in January 1938 by Brigadier Henry Pownall. Ironically all of these 
new General Staff policy-makers turned out to be strongly in favour of 
(i) ll/HB 1937/58b. Liddell Hart Papers. 
(i 1) ll/HB 1937/17b and II/HB 1937/58b. Liddell Hart PaperS. ý 
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the preparation of a Field Force for 'the Continent(). They 
campaigned against Liddell Hart's Influence In the War Office(") and 
ultimately Gort and Pbwnall were Instrumental In Hore-Belishals 
downfall("'). 
(; ort's role In the events of November -December 1937 at the 
War C)ffice was both enigmatic and crucial. As Hore-Belisha's Military 
Secretary he urged the latter to dismiss Deverell and to go ahead with 
a complete change of regime on the Army Council(iv). His motive 
is obscure. He did not himself want to -be C. 1. G. S. , at least not 
immediately, 
(v) 
and his appointment to that office In December 1937 
may have been a surprise to him(v'). Liddell Hart later suggested 
that the root of the enmity betWeen Deverell and Coft may have been 
a quarrel over Gort's Income tax(v"). It Is, however, difficult-to 
believe that Gort was ignorant of the direction which Hore-Belisha 
wanted strategic policy to take. He had after all been working closely 
with Hore-Belisha for two months and he was personally acquainted , 
Sir ]Ronald Adam has Informed the writer that he was always 
in favour of preparing the Army for the Continent and that 
he was not consulted on this matter before his appointment. 
The Continentalist views of Gort and Pbwnall are evident from 
Pownall's diaries. Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 139. 
(ii) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 131. 
(111) Ibid, pp. 162-168. 
Ov) Talk with H-B,, ' 26th October 1937. ll/HB 1937/67(a), 
Liddell Hart Papers. 
(v) Dinner with Gort, 22nd November 1937.11/1937/96. 
Liddell Hart Papers. 
(vi) Bond, British Milita! Z Policy Between the Two W6rld Wdrs, 
(Oxford TRW), p. 255. 
(Vii) Talk with Gort. 11/1938/12. Liddell Hart Papers. 
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with Liddell Hart. - In urging Hore-Belisha to dismiss Deverell he 
was helping to remove the main obstacle to, the Introduction, of, what 
became known as the New Army Policy and he should have realized 
this., But when the General Staff was compelled by Hore-Bellsha to 
Introduce that poltcY while he was C. 1. G. S. he became upset and 
depressed'). His relationship with Hore-Beltsha deteriorated rapidly, 
and ultimately he and the Secretary of State were barely on speaking 
terms. It would have been difficult to conduct War Office business 
at all If it had not been for the tolerance and diplomacy of Adam, 
who managed to establish a gc? od working relationship with Hore-Belisha 
(11) while at the same time remaining, on terms of friendship with Gort 
We must now look briefly at the characters of the, men most 
responsible for making General Staff policy from the beginning of 1938 
to the outbreak of war. By the general standards of the. period both, 
Gort and Adam were very young to have acquired such elevated 
positions In the Army. Gort was 51 and Adam 52. Gort's high 
reputation was due to his combination of Inspiring leadership and 
proven courage on the battlefield with serious study of his profession 
and mastery of the skills of a staff officer. He had earned the V. C. 
on the Western Front. He attended Staff College after the war, and 
served as an instructor there from January 1.021 to April 1923. 
being Director of Military Training In India, he commanded the 
Staff College at Camberley for eighteen months before becoming 
After 
(1) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 131. 
Conversation with Sir Ronald Adam, 18th November 1979, 
and Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 164. 
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Hore-Belishats Military Secretary in Sept I ember 1937(l). Gort was 
a "natural leader", but in the judgment of some of those who knew 
him best he was essentially more a fighter than an Intellectual 
soldier or an administrator. As Adam put It to the author, "C. I. G. S. 
was not really Jack Gort's thing". Pownall also noted that Gort's 
temperament was not Ideally suited to the job. He was a great 
worrier and was subject to "waves of depression" during disagreements 
with Hore-Belisha 
(ii) 
Adam and Pownall, however, had both made'their reputations more 
as staff officers than as commanders, and they were better at office 
politics than Gort. Both were gunners. Adam was a graduate of 
the Staff College and the Imperial Defence College, and he had 
succeeded Gort as commandant at Camberley He was a first-rate 
administrator with qualities of patience and good humour which helped 
oil the wheels of the War Office even when personal friction was at 
its greatest. Wherea's Hore-Bellsha believed that Cort would be most 
acceptable to th e An-fiy as a whole as C. 1. G. S. , beca us e of h Is 
elevated social position and his V. C., the Secretary of State looked 
to Adam as the real brains on the General Staff(lv). Pownall had 
served on the C. I. D. Secretariat from 1933-36 and though he affected 
to despise secretarial work he was in fact extremely good at, it. It 
Biographical Notes for the Information of the. Press, 
2nd December 1937. WO/32/4198. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 164. 
Biographical Notes for the information of the Press, 
2nd December 1937., WO/32/4198. 
Talk with H-B, 27th March 1939, ll/HB, 1939/3. Liddell 
Hart Pap ers. 
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was Pbwnall who actually drafted many of the General Staff policy 
papers of this period). 
In terms of -the policies which they wished to pursue, little 
difference Is apparent between Deverell and Haining on the one. hand, 
and Gort, Adam and Pownall on the other. There was continuity 
rather than change in General Staff attitudes to the main Issues, a 
continuity which extended back to k&ntgomery-Massingberd's era. 
As we shall see in later chapters, -the new, men continued with the tank 
programme as worked out under Deverell, merely scaling it down 
somewhat in accordance with the New Army Policy, and their 
attitude to the Air Defence of Great Britain was essentially no diff I erent 
Most crucially, like Deverell and HaIning, they wanted to equip a 
(IV) 
substantial Field Force for a European war A change In the role 
of the Army was nevertheless forced upon them. 
The New Army Polic 
In January 1938, the Treasury, in an effort to control the mounting 
rearmament expenditure of the Service departments, decided to allow 
them a ration of only El, 570 million to be spent over the five year 
period up to 1943(v). Of this figure the Army was to get E347 
million. But once the New Army Policy had been Introduced, Sir I 
(i) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 130. 
Proceedings of a meeting held in C. I. G. S. 's room, 23rd 
December 1937. WO/32/4445. 
Outline of the Opposition to the Development of the Anti-Aircraft 
Defence of Great Britain, 30th July 1938.11/1938/89. 
Liddell Hart Papers. 
(iv) ibis, also, was noted by Liddell Hart. 11/1938/89. Liddell 
Ha rt Pap ers. 
Peden, op. cit., p. 91. 
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7jbomas Inskip asked the War Cffice for a cut of f. 83'million. Hore- 
Belisha volunteered E70 million and this was accepted in April 1938. 
By that time Hore-Belisha had worked out the implications of the 
New Army Policy to his own satisfaction, though he drove his colleagues 
to distraction In the Process. Much of February and March were spent 
drawing up a paper for the Cabinet defining the role of the Army In 
the light of recent decisions. Pownall was amazed by Hore-Bellsha's 
working methods. On 7th February he recorded In his diary 
Agrain most of this week spent on that paper 
-a re-draft on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday 
discussions, ringings up on the telephone, 
slips of paper covered with red Ink notes. 
Never have I known such a belly-ache over a 
paper. Apparently he does this with all 
major questions and some minor too. Anyone 
less business-like would be hard to Imagine(i). 
The War Office paper defining the role of the Army in the light 
of the decision to put the Continent last was finally accepted by the 
C. I. D. on l7th-March 1938 and by the Cabinet Itself on 23rd March. 
This paper Incorporated a scheme for the Field Force which was 
"more limited in scope than had ever previously been contemplated". 
The Field Force was to consist"of 
(a) - two regular divisions and one mobile division 
with full war reserves of ammunition ready to 
embark In 21 days. 
(b) two regular divisions with war reserves of 
ammunition at half the scale of (a) ready to 
embark In 40 days. 
(c) provision of a pool of equipment and ammunition 
sufficient to permit despatch overseas four months 
after the outbreak of war of a further two divisions 
Bond, Chief of Staff, vol. 1, pp. 131-2 and pp. 141-3. 
-125- 
(regular or Territorial) with war reserves 
as (b)(O. 
In order to persuade the Cabinet to provide the funds to equip 
even this much reduced Field Force, the War Office was very 
concerned to stress the Importance of defending Egypt against the 
Italians. In the War Cffice view It was essential to equip the Field 
Force to a standard necessary for what was described as an "Eastern 
theatre" which meant Egypt. The Treasury, however, was thoroughly 
hostile to "an Eastern theatre" as a fqrm of words. Fisher thought 
the whole idea of a desert war "merely silly" and Hopkins and Bridges 
were most reluctant to allow the War Office to have the funds necessary 
to prepare the Field Force for a campaign In defence of Egypt. 
7bough the'substance of the War Office's proposals was approved by 
the Cabinet, the Treasury got Its own way over the form of words and 
the Field Force was declared to be for "general purposes" 
Contact with Continental General Staffs 
Following the introduction of the New Army Policy, the Cabinet felt 
it necessary to inform the French of the negligible military support 
on land which they could expect from Britain In the next war. The 
Foreign Office under Sir Anthony Eden tried to obtain the agreement 
of the Chiefs of Staff to formal staff talks All the Chiefs of Staff 
were very much opposed to this. They drew attention to the recrimin- 
Quoted, in, Tbe State of --Preparedness of-the Army In Relation to 
its Role (C. I. D. 1498-B), 13th December 1938. CAB 53/43. 
(il) Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, pp. 143-4. 
Copy of a letter dated 16th December 1937 from the Secretary 
of State, Foreign Office to the Secretary, C. I. D. CAB 53/35. 
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ations which had been going on since the end of the Great War about 
the staff conversations of 1912, and indicated that "the very term 
'staff conversations' has a sinister purport". As a result of the 
New Army Policy It seemed clear that Great Britain would have no 
troops to offer France. 7be Chiefs thought It better to Inform the 
French frankly but informally of this situation rather than contemplate 
formal conversations upon which they could "only embark empty 
handed"('). 
Attention has been drawn to the apparent paradox that while the 
British General Staff very much wanted -to prepare a 
Field Force to 
fight alongside Continental allies, they were reluctant to hold detailed, 
formal conversations with the French High Command"). But the 
General Staff's attitude to the staff talks Issue may seem on closer 
examination to be less irrational than it at first appears. Certainly 
Nbntgomely-Massingberd had not been -in the least Francophobe or 
parochial In his attitudes - quite the contrary. In his period, the 
General Staff assiduously cultivated contracts with the French High 
Command under Weygand and Gamelin("'). Mo ntgom ery -Mass Ingberd 
visited France as a guest of Weygand both In 1933 and In 1935. He 
explained in his "Handing Over Notes" for Deverell that "Personal 
touch such as I have had with the leading French soldiers, all men 
with great military experience and sound sense, Is In Itself an 
Staff Conversations with France and Belgium, Memorandumý 
by the Chiefs of Staff, January 1938. CAB 53/35. ' 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 122. 
Autobiography of a Gunner, p. 70. MM159/1, Montgomery- 
MassIngberd Papers. 
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education and in addition has had the result that we are now given 
information and shown things that are shown to no other nation"('). 
As part of the general orientation of the British General Staff under 
his regime towards the Continent, Montgomery-Massingberd initiated 
a series of -annual tours of Great War battlefields, beginning in 1933, 
(") 
which enabled senior officers to visit France and make contact with 
the French Army. It becomes increasingly obvious that Montgomery- 
Massingberd was very much a Francophile. His account of the origins 
of the weakness of French morale at the outbreak of war Is both 
extremely sympathetic and rather perceptive. 
Personally I date the origin al cause of all our 
disasters or even the outbreak of the war itself 
to the failure of the American Government to 
join us in a guarantee of the French frontiers 
in 1922. The French knew the Immense 
numerical superiority the Germans were building 
up. They felt that their Allies of the 1914-18 
War had deserted them and left them to face the 
German revenge unaided and the effect of this was 
shattering, to the Nation's morale(III). 
Montgomery -Mass ingberd had done everything in his power to 
ensure that the French were not deserted militarily and when the New 
Army Hypothesis was introduced he was horrified. He recorded 
in his memoirs that 
I did all I could to keep In touch with the French 
Higher Command during my time as C. I. G. S. In 
addition to the battlefield tours and my visits to 
the French frontier defences I obtained leave from 
Handing Over Notes, Part VII, Touch with the French Army, 
para. 34. MM158/9. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers. 
Handing Over Notes, Part VIII, Battlefield Tours, para. 35. 
MM158/9. Montgomery -Mass Ingberd Papers. 
Autobiography of a Gunner, p. 69. MM159/1. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. 
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the Secretary of State to invite General Weygand 
over to England for a short visit of a purely 
social nature - Ascot, the Aldershot Tattoo 
and Tidworth - as some return for all the 
hospitality the French ad especially General 
Weygand had shewn meM. 
In his visits to France, however, Montgomery -Mass Ingberd had 
certainly not spent all his time engaging In social activity. He told 
Deverell in his ff Handing Over Notes" that he had been able "to get 
a pretty clear Idea as regards French plans and Ideas In the event of 
a war with Germany"(11) . It Is obvious from his paper on 'Me 
Future Reorganization of the British Army" that he had devoted much 
thought to Continental military doctrine and had knowledge of the plans 
being laid not only by the French, but also (probably through French 
advice) by the Belgians and the Dutch. 7be General Staff under 
Montgomery-Massingberd had thought carefully about how the role of 
the British Field Force on the Continent fitted In with the military 
plans of likely allies(iii) 0 
Some parts of the British press, however, had reacted with 
alarm to Montgomery -Mass ingberd's contacts with the French High 
Command. 
Much to my amusement this visit (of Weygand 
to England) roused a veritable storm in the 
Yellow Press. ' I was accused by one corres- 
pondent of hatching another war and similar 
Autobiography of a Gunner, p. 69. MM159/1. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. See Also Gameltn to Montgomery- 
Massingberd, September Ilth 1937, giving thanks for hospitality 
MM158/10. 
Handing Over Notes, Part VII, para. 34. M-M158/9. 
Montgomery -Mass ingberd Papers. 
Future Reorganization, Part I, Probable Conditions of our Entry into a European War, 9th Sept. 1935. WO/32/4612. 
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foolish fancies(l). 
In view of the fact that Informal contacts could cause such a 
I 
stir, it Is understandable that the General Staff anticipated acute 
embarrassment, from more formal conversations(ii). lbough staff 
talks were In fact, held over the Rhineland crisis of 1936 they were 
confined to an exchange of Information at a relatively low level. At 
no stage In the 1930s, however,, did the General Staff lose Interest In 
developments In military doctrine, organization and planning on the 
(Ili) Continent The War Office maintained, contact, with the French High 
Command while Deverell was C. I. G. S. , 
Ov) 
and rather than rely on 
the reports of military attaches, Deverell personally attended the 
German -manoeuvres of 1937. Whereas Hore-Belisha, after visiting 
France in September of that year, came home claiming that he was 
confident that the French could defend themselves on land without 
British help, Deverell took a more accurate view of the situation. He 
was rightly worried by the growing power and efficiency of the German 
Army and believed Hore-Belisha completely mistaken In thinking that 
Autobiography of a Gunner, p. 70. M-M158/9. 
Montgomery -Mass Ingberd Papers. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 142. 
The Appreciation Files on Continental developments in the 
WO/190 series are extremely numerous. Particularly 
Interesting are those dealing with the development of German,, 
armoured forces. See, for example, WO/190/723 and 
WO/190/480. 
(tv) Deverell reported, on both the French and the German 
manoeuvres of 1937 both of which he attended personally, 
15th Oct6ber 1937. CAB 21/575. 
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the French could manage without British assistance on land(i). 
While, under the New Army Pblicy, Britain had virtually no 
Field Force to offer France, the Ceneral Staff's belief that formal, 
high-level staff talks would be more trouble than they were worth 
was certainly reasonable. The attitude of Pbwnall, the only member 
of Gort's Ceneral Staff to provide us with a detailed account of his' 
personal reflections was perhaps a little odd, but not necessarily 
illogical. He wrote on 4th April 1938, 
Great traffic resumed over Staff Conversations with 
France and Belgium. ... The C. 0. S. are opposed to formal Staff Conversations but welcome "Inter- 
changes of Information". Both sides can get all 
they want by the latter means. Formal Staff 
Conversations are terribly liable to lead to unwanted 
complications - e. g. leakages (once politicians get 
Into it), all sorts of misunderstandings, commitments 
real or implied or suggested by an Interested party - 
It Is odd that our politicians don't read their history 
books and note the recriminations that have gone 
on over the Staff Conversations of 1912. B ut th ey 
don't seem to. From the political view they seem 
to want them as a gesture to Germany of our 
solidarity with the Western Powers. A rather foolish 
gesture. 7bere were Staff Conversations in 1935 
vis-a-vis Mussolini and again in 1936 when Hitler 
occupied the Rhineland. I don't know If they were 
useful political gestures, I should doubt It 
militarily they were very little good(ii). 
Pownall seems to have had little affection for the French nation 
and did not want to see British policy tied to France In all respects. 
But on a strategic level he believed that the Integrity of France was 
so important to Britain that It could be equated with home defenceo"). 
Talk with Deverell 11/1937/94,18th November 1937. Liddell 
Ha rt Pap ers. 
Bond,. Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 140. 
(111) Ibid. , Vol. 1, pp. 135 and 129. 
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I 
When the New Army Policy was abandoned the reluctance of the 
General Staff to engage In high level talks largely disappeared. There 
were a few highly secret matters connected with chemical warfare 
which some senior soldiers in the War Office did, not wish to discuss 
with the French prior to the outbreak- of war. But the reason for this 
was clear. 7be British were not confident that French security was 
water-tight and did not want to give the Germans advance warning 
(1) 
of some technical developments . Generally speaking, however, the 
British General Staff under Cort went out of its way to prove Its 
loyalty to Its French ally. As early as 3rd July 1939, PbwnaII was 
able to write 
go * It Is practically agreed that the British Army in France shall come under. the command of the 
G. O. C. of the Armies of the North East (Georges), 
himself of course under Gamelin ... 7bus we 
shall get unity of command In the field from the 
outset instead of wasting 31 years trying to get 
there. It may beýa bold step but I'm sure Its 
right. Independent commands like that of 
French are all very well when times are good, 
fair or indifferent. But when times are bad 
they are most dangerous. 
We have learned a lot from the last war in these 
matters - It is good that we should so readily 
apply that knowledge and plonk for the right thing 
from the beginning. I'm sure the French for 
their part have learnt their lesson too. Allied 
co-operation Is always difficult and will always 
be full of pitfalls, but It is as well to start off 
in an atmosphere of goodwill instead of one of 
suspicion and hesitancy. Gort has been entirely 
sound and very knowledgable on this question(it). 
Chemical warfare conversations with France. Minute 2. 
WO/32/4572. 
(ii) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 211. 
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The Impact of the Czechoslovak Crises 
Even as early as April 1938 there were some indications that 
politicians were beginning to change their minds about the New Army 
Policy. Duff Cooper had never agreed with it and so it was 
hardly surprising when, at a C. 1. D. meeting on llth April, he 
commented on the impossibility of having three million young men In 
plain clothes in Great Britain while France was fighting for survival. 
But it was more remarkable that on the same occasion Chamberlain 
himself did not rule out the possibility of the Army going to the 
Continent at some stage In the war(ý. Spirits were somewhat raised 
In the War Office and Gort became quite confident of an early 
reversal of the New Army Policy. Pownall, however, correctly 
anticipated that it would be a "longish process"(10. 
1be prolonged period of International anxiety about the fate of 
Czechoslovakia which began as early as March 1938 was to play a 
significant part In redirecting the Cabinet's thinking towards the 
6 
possibility of the Army being Involved In a Continental campaign. In 
May the General Staff was told to begin low-level talks with the 
French conducted through the agency of the British Military Attache, 
and plans were worked out for the despatch of a Corps of two divisions 
to France("'). At a meeting on 25th May the Cabinet decided that 
C. 1. D. 319th Meeting, Ilth April 1938. CAB 2/7. 
(ji) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. l, 'p. 143. 
Staff Conversations with France and Belgium (C. 0. S. 727), 
paras. 5,11 and 16. CAB 53/38. 
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Our Military Attache should be Instructed to 
, 
make clear that only two divisions could be 
available at the outset of war for despatch 
to the Continent if circumstances elsewhere 
permitted; that it had already been made clear 
on the political side that no commitment to send 
them could be made In advance, but that he 
was prepared to enter on discussions on the 
hypothesis that such a decision might be taken. 
If the French were to ask for more divisions, he 
should state that at the outset'of war no more 
divisions would be ready and that before rein- 
forcements could be sent there would be plenty 
of time to discuss the detailed arrangements(i). 
In a General Staff paper of 18th July 1938 Gort pointed out to the 
Army Council that this Cabinet conclusion Indicated the possibility in 
wartime of formations additional to the two divisions Immediately 
available being sent to France. Even the. two divisions which were 
available for use as a Field Force under the New Hypothesis were, 
however, equipped only for general Imperial defence and their 
equipment was totally Inadequate for fighting the German Army. Giving 
help to Continental allies In wartime still rated last in the order of 
priorities laid down for the Army by Cabinet - after Home and Imperial 
defence. But Gort argued that "should Germany succeed In over-running 
any considerable part of French territory, operations designed to 
arrest any further advance might in fact be regarded as a measure 
of "home defence" and thus assume priority as our first objective"00. 
Gort's argument that under certain circumstances giving assistance 
to France could be equated with home defence echoed a remark which 
Cabinet 26 (38), Conclusion 4,25th May 1938. 
Limitations to the Possible E4ansion of the British Army 
in War. Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, para. 6.18th July 1938. WO/32/10326. 
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Pbwnall had confided to his diary In January. "My, view Is that 
support of France is home defence. If France crumbles we fall"('). ' 
it is quite likely that Gort's paper was Influenced by Pownall and 
Pownall may even have drafted It. 
lbough the General Staff was obviously anticipating a change, 
even the shock of ýthe Munich crisis did not secure an immediate 
reversal of the government's Army policy. , All the Chiefs of, Staff 
were opposed to going. to war for Czechoslovakia in September 1938. 
The General Staff was convinced of the Army's total unpreparedness 
for'war. . 
7be unsatisfactory state of the Air Defences of Great 
Britain was a cause for serious concern and theTteld Force was 
virtually non-existent. The Chiefs of Staff were forced to conclude 
that if war came In 1938, 
7be conduct of the war on land, would be the I, 
responsibility of the French ... 7be' most that 
we could do at the outset would be to provide 
a force of two divisions inadequately equipped 
for offensive operations(II). 
ý In addition to-the more obvious problems of a weak Field Force 
and poorly_equipped air defences, the War Office faced a major 
difficulty which has been rather neglected In this context by most 
historians. As late as December 1938 eighteen Infantry battalions 
were tied down attempting to suppress insurgency by the Palestinian 
Arabs which had started as early as 1936, and these were using 
equipment which was meant for the Field Force(110, 
Bond, Chief of Staff,. Vol. 1, P. 126. 
Appreciation of the Situation In the Event of War Against Germany. (C. 0. S. 767), paras. 21,23, and 29,4th 
October 1938. CAB 53/41. 
The State of Preparedness of the British Army In Relation to its Role (C. I. D. Paper 1498-B), para 4,13th Dec. 1938. CAB 53/43. 
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The Chiefs of Staff were apprehensive that the Muslim populations 
of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Persia might "catch the i4ection of 
lawlessness" and thus seriously endanger Britain's position In the 
Middle East(i). 
Towards A Continental Commitment 
Between May 1938 and November low-level staff talks 'conducted 
through the: agency of the British military attache were conducted In 
Paris and a review of the facilities for the disembarkation and 
reception of the two available British divisions In French ports was 
carried out by junior officers In plain clothes. By the middle of 
November this phase In the negotiations was almost complete and the 
General Staff was anxious to know whether to proceed further(")o 
definite decision on this by the Cabinet was a long time coming, h6wever. 
By December 1938 the General Staff was veryý anxious to have the 
-Continental role Aefinitely accepted. It was obvious that ministers' 
minds were moving in that direction and the General Staff wanted to 
start equipping the Army for the Continent as quickly as possible 
(111) 
0 
By this time Hore-Belisha's relationship with Liddell Hart had 
declined and he seems to have accepted the Inevitability of the 
Continental commitment. But he felt that the Cabinet was not yet 
ready to accept it and tried to persuade the'General Staff to ommit 
4 
Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War Against Germany. 
(C. 0. S. 765), para. 3(A) (vi). CAB 53/41. 
Staff Conversations with France and Belgium (C. 0. S. 727), 
paras. 5,11, and 16. CAB 53/38. Staff Conversations with 
France (C. O. S. 795), 18th November 1938 and Note by the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Appendix to Annex IV 
of the above. CAB 53/42. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 149. 
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the strategic arguments in its favour from a new paper on the role of 
the Army. Pownall told him that the General Staff felt duty-bound to 
drive home these arguments. Pownall was convinced that If there was 
a war in Western Europe, the Army would be called upon to provide an 
expeditionary force and if this proved grossly unprepared "there would 
be a first-class scandal". He added that "we wanted to make sure 
that If anyone was to hand on lamp posts It should not be the War " 
office"('), 
This apparently had Its effect on Hore-Belisha who produced what 
Pownall described as a "good paper" which, while avoiding the 
contentious Issue of the Army's role, in effect demanded back the 
970 million which he had relinquished following the introduction of the 
New Army Policy - and rather more. Hore-Belisha proposed to 
re-organize the armoured forces creating a second mobile division, 
to provide the whole of the Regular Field Force with equipment for 
war against a first-class power, and to begin preparing the Territorial 
(11) 
Army to support the Regulars The Chief of the Air Staff was 
somewhat unhappy with these Ideas because, according to Pownall, he 
felt that "if there was a sum of E80 million knocking about It would 
(m) 
be better devoted to his air force" Nevertheless, by 20th 
February 1939 the Cabinet Nad basically accepted Hore-Belisha's 
proposals though only E64.6 millions were allocated rather than the 
(i) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 172 and 173. 
7be State of Preparedness of the Army In Relation to its Role 
(C. 0. S. 1498-B), 13th December 1938. CAB 4/29. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 174. 
-137- 
full sum for which he had asked. 
even so('). 
The General Staff was quite pleased 
By this stage the Cabinet had accepted what amounted to a policy 
of informal military alliance with France. 7bis development was 
apparently precipitated by Intelligence reports Indicatingl that Hitler 
might make his next move In a Western direction against Holland 
_, 
or 
Belgium("). The details of the British military commitment to support 
4 
France in war were worked out in a series of very high level staff 
talks beginning on 29th March 1939, and the total authorized strength 
(fit) 
of the Army was raised to thirty-two divisions 
The doubling of the Territorial Army which was announced on 29th 
March 1939 was a political gesture of solidarity with France. It had 
not. been recommended by the General Staff and the decision was 
apparently taken by Hore-Belisha and Chamberlain without consultation 
with Sir 7homas Inskip. 7bough It was not a, particularly useful 
move, militarily, at this point, the General Staff was not unduly put 
out. Pbwnall recognized the need for a gesture of some sort to 
satisfy the French and to placate the British public opinion which was 
much disturbed by the German occupation In 
(I V) Prague 
The introduction of conscription In April 1939, a further step In 
the development of an Informal military alliance with France, was done 
mainly to assure Continental opinion, both friendly and hostile, 'that 
The State of Preparedness of the Army In Relation, to. Its 
Role (C. 1. D. Paper 1532-B) 3rd March 1939. CAB 4/29, 
and Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 188 and 189. 
(Ii) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 
'I, 
p. 183. 
(Ili) The Despatch Overseas of the British Field Force (A. F. C. 27), 
4th May 1939. CAB 29/159. 
(i V) Bond, Chief of Staff. VOL 1. DD 196-7 
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Britain meant business and to answer'a growing clamour from Right- 
wingers In the Press and Parliament. 7be desire to have sufficient 
personnel to keep the anti-aircraft defences of Great Britain perma-, 
nently manned was another, factor., The General Staff was not pressing 
for compulsory service at this juncture and their response to its 
Introduction was mixed. Conscription was Inevitable In the long run 
but low on the General Staff's list of priorities. In the 'short term it, 
gave the War Cff ice ýa great deal of extra work for little return. : But 
the administrative problems Involved had to be faced sooner or later, 
and, as Pownall conceded In his diary, it was probably better to 
tackle them before war broke out(! 
). 
Certainly the Adj utant- General, Lieutenant-General Clive Liddell 
must have been pleased. Liddell had warned as early as October, 1938 
that the Regular Army was facing a crisis of manpower. Increased- 
dangers all over the globe meant that the overseas garrisons had, in 
many, cases, to be maintained at greater strength. He pointed out that 
The advance of science since 1914 and the 
mechanization of the Army have altered old 
Arms (e. g. Cavalry) or created-new ones 
(e. g. Tanks). These take little or no share 
in the burden of drafting which has to be borne 
in increased measure by the other arms, 'especially 
Infantry, and the strain for them has become 
intolerable(tt). 
Minor campaign such as Palestine could create such a strain that 
the Field Force had to be robbed. 7he Cardwell system was on the 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 200-202. 
The British Regular Army and its Commitments, Paper by 
A. G., 26th October 1938, para. 3 (c), (d) and (e). WO/32/4612. 
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point of breaking down. Though recruiting had Improved somewhat, 
1937-38 being, with over 37,000 recruits the best year since the war, 
this was still not enough to meet the situation. A's early as October 
1938, therefore, the Adj utant- General saw no way out of the rfianpower 
crisis other than a drastic reduction In the Army's liabilities or some 
form of compulsory service('). 
7be introduction of conscription In April 1939 provided'a- long-term 
solution for the Army's manpower problem and the cement for a firm 
military alliance with France. It dramatically demonstrated Britain's 
willingness to give military help to Continental allies and effectively 
ended the debate on the role of the Army. 
Conclusion 
The General Staff's strategic view was Continentalist and remained 
remarkably constant under three successive Chiefs. 7he General Staff 
I 
argued that the Low Countries were strategically very important to' 
Britain(") and believed it vital to prevent the Germans decisively 
The British Begular Army and Its Commitments, Paper by 
A. G., 26th October 1938, paras. 3-15. WO/32/4612. 
Statement by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (D. P. C. 7) 
9th January 1934. CAB 16/109.7he Position of the Low 
Countries, Appendix 111 to the Report of the Ministerial 
Committee, 28th February, 1934 CAB 16/110.7he Future 
Reorganization of the British Army, Probable Condition of 
our Entry into a European War and forecast of the type of 
force required. WO/32/4612. Handing over Notes, Part 1, 
M-M158/9, Montgomery -Mass Ingberd Papers. C. O. S. 265th 
Meeting, 21st December 1938. CAB 53/10. 
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defeating and over-running France('). At no stage In the second half 
of the 1930s did the General Staff accept that It was a practicable 
policy to place the entire burden of fighting the German Army on the 
French("). The Foreign Office view that a limited liability stra . tegic 
policy would lead to political Isolation in Europe was accepted by the 
General Staff("'). The argument put forward by Liddell Hart that the 
defensive was so strong on land that It would be virtually impossible 
for the Germans to achieve breakthrough -was never accepted. . All the 
leaders of the General Staff'during this period maintained that a German 
breakthrough might prove practicable M the Germans -by-passed theý 
strongest of the Maginot line defences(lv)o As early as 1935 the 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part I, 
Probable Conditions of our Entry Into_a European War. 
WO/32/4612. Role of the British ý Army. Memorandum by 
C. I. G. S. Appendix to C. O. S. 192nd Meeting, 12th January 
1937. CAB 53/6. Limitations to the Possible Expansion of 
the British Army In War. Memo. by C. I. G. S., Section 6. 
18th July 1938. WO/32/10326. 
Autobiography of a Gunner, p. 66. M-M159/1. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. C. O. S. 192nd Meeting, 12th January 
1937, Item 2. CAB 53/6. C. 0. S. 265th Meeting, 21st 
December 1938. CAB 53/810. 
Future ]Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1,4. 
Forecast of the opening Stages of a War with Germany, 9th 
September 1935. WO/32/4612., 
(IV) Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1,4. 
Forecast of the Opening Stages of a War with Germany, 9th 
September 1935. WO/32/4612. Deverell views as reported 
to Inskip were recorded In Chamberlain's diary, 25th 
October 1936. Gort's Insistence on the possibility of a German 
armoured breakthrough supported by air forces was made 
plain in his correspondence with Liddell Hart over the latter's 
"Defence or Attack" articles In the "Times". Go rt's vI ew s 
are quoted In Bond, Liddell Hart, p. 118, Note 41. 
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General Staff was well aware that the German ýArmy was training for 
mobile operations and described very prophetically how air forces could 
be used to aid a breakthrough by mechanized ground forces(). 
7be General -Staff was never blind to the Importance of airpower, 
but never accepted that the next, war would, be decided by strategic 
bombing alone("). - German airpower was thought unlikely to be 
concentrated against Britain until thexictory, of the German Army on 
the Continent had been achieved("'). 71; e notion, shared by Chamberlain, 
Trenchard, and Weir, that German aggression could be deterred by the 
creation of a large British strategic bomber force found no favour with 
the General Staff. In'view of the, very, - limited range and payload of 
the bombers of the 1930s, It, was indeed rather unrealistic. The War 
Office's Director General of Munitions Production would not accept the 
otherý argument, put forward by Chamberlain, and Weir, that it was 
beyond the country's industrial resources to equip a substantial Field: _ 
Force for a, Continental role in addition to rearming the Navy and the 
.. 
R. F. 
F uture Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1,4. Forecast 
of the Opening Stages of a War-with Germany. 'WO/32/4612. 
Handing Over Notes, Parts I and X M-M158/9. Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers. C. 0. S. 192nd Meeting, item 2.12th 
January 1937. CAB 53/6. 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army,. Part 1, 
Forecast of the Opening Stages of a War with Germany, para. 5. 
WO/32/4612. Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirements 
Report, Appendix III, para. 6. CAB 16/110. Note on the Trend of German Rearmament. WO/190/281. 
(iv) The Role of the British Army. Memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for War. (C. P. 326 (36)), 3rd December 1936, 
para. 7. CAB 53/29. 
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Implicit in the thought of the General Staff, though seldom openly 
expressed, was the conviction that the fall of France'would spell 
decisive defeat for Britain(). Given that the General Staff was not, 
In a position to predict Hitler's attack on Russia In June 1941, or his 
declaration of war on the Lbited States In December, ýIrratlonal 
decisions which threw away a likely German victory) this belief was 
quite reasonable. It was obvious that Britain could not stop German 
expansion on the Continent alone, but only In conjunction with a 
Continental state possessing a powerful Army. France was the only 
state with a large Army and some inclination to resist German expansion 
with which Britain found it at all possible to co-operate. France, 
however, was not prepared to do all the ground fighting of a war with 
Germany 
(11) 
on her own Assuming that the British Government 
ultimately wished to curb German expansion, the General Staff was, 
therefore, right to advise that the preparation of a British Field Force 
for the Continent was a necessity. 
Hallsham and Duff Cooper both supported the Continentallst strategy 
of the General Staff against the dominant opinion in the Cabinet and for 
It was privately expressed by Pownall ("My view is that 
support of France Is home defence - if France crumbles 
we fall". Bond, C171ef of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 129) and strongly implied 
officially by Gort ( ... 'Who_Ud Germany succeed in over- 
running any considerable part of French Territory, operations 
designed to arrest any further advance might In fact be 
regarded as a measure of home defence and thus assume 
priority"). Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, section 6,18th July 1938. WO/32/10326. 
Major-General Sir Edward Spears to Liddell Hart 11/1939/6. 
Liddell Hart Papers. Spears had carried out a survey of French opinion. 
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this they deserve full credit('). Duff Cooper put up a particularly 
valiant resistance to Chamberlain's III-conceived strategic policy. 
, Hore-Bellsha, on the other 
hand, does not emerge from the strategic 
debate as an impressive stateman, being vacillating and for too long 
subservient to Chamberlain. It seems that Hore-Bellsha had little 
(ii) 
grasp of strategic matters, but unfortunately he behaved as if his 
grasp was better than that of his professional adviser4 and he was 
sometimes Inclined to treat his military colleagues with a humiliating 
lack of consideration and respect("') which eventually contributed to 
his downfall. 
Ministerial Committee Meeting, 17th July 1934. CAB 16/110. 
Cabinet Minutes, Sth May 1937. CAB 64/35. 
Bond, Liddell Hart, p. 111. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 130-132,149,209. 
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The Development of Industrial Capaci 
introduction 
7be. development of Industrial capacity for munitions production 
was the central problem of British rearmament. The British armaments 
industry, enormous in 1918, became In the twenties and early thirties 
the target of ill-judged journalistic attacks( 
') ahd the victim of a much 
more lethal Cabinet and Treasury determination to reduce expenditure 
on the armed forces. In order to keep a sizeable specialist arms 
industry alive. in the post-war period the Service departments wanted 
to provide it with a moderate but steady flow of orders. Cabinet and 
Treasury policies made this extremely difficult, orders dropped off 
sharply, and the arms Industry underwent a dramatic contraction 
(11) 
which, by the late thirties the country had good cause to regret. 
7be serious rearmament of the Army began only In February 1936, 
eighteen months later than that of the other two services, and the War 
Office was therefore confronted with the complex problem of expanding 
the industrial capacity available to Its service within a particularly 
short period of time. Moreover, while the Admiralty and the Air 
Ministry dealt mainly with specialist nautical and aeronautical suppliers, 
the War Office had to deal with an enormous variety of firms, the 
For examples of journalistic attacks on the arms Industry see 
Beverley Nichols, Cry Havoc:, (Jonathan Cape 1933), pp. 27-56, 
and the David Loiý--cartoon reproduced on p. 250 of W. J. 
Reader, 1. C. 1. ,A Histo , Vol. 11, (Oxford 1975). 
(11) M. NL Postan, British War Production H. M. S. 0.1952, pp. 1-8. 
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majority of whom had no expert knowledge of military requirements. 
7be problem facing the War Cffice had two aspects. It was necessary 
to establish a sufficiently large active arms Industry to repair 
recognized deficiencies in the peacetime strength of the Army, but 
it was also essential to develop a much larger latent potential for 
munitions production to meet the huge expansion of demand which 
could be expected at the outbreak of war. It was this latter problem 
which gave rise to the Shadow Industry scheme, recommended by the 
Prime Minister's industrial advisers and fully endorsed by the Master 
General of the Ordnance and the General Staff('). 
The purpose of this section of the thesis Is tb examine the effort 
made by the War Office to develop the Industrial sinews of war and 
to trace the Office's attempts to restructure its own Institutions so as 
to perform this task more effectively. We begin with a review of 
the state of the arms industry in 1936 and of the formation of the 
National Government's policy on the development of Industrial capacity 
for the Army. 7he way in which the War Office's supply apparatus was 
restructured to cope with the novel demands of the Shadow industry 
scheme are next considered. The Influences of some of the factors 
0 
alleged to be industrial limits on rearmament - machine tool supply 
and the supply of skilled labour are analyzed and the War Office's 
efforts to develop industrial capacity In a small number of key areas: 
cordite and T. N. T. manufacture, shell filling and gun production 
are examined. Finally an over-all assessment of the War Office's 
performance in the task of developing the industrial sinews of war Is 
(1) D. R. C. 37, paras. 91-93. CAB 16/112. 
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attempted. 
The War Cffice and Industry In 1936 
At the beginning. of 1936 the British Army was almost entirely 
dependent on three Royal Ordnance Factories - the Royal Arsenal 
(Woolwich), the Royal Small Arms Factory (Enfield Lock) and the 
]Royal Gunpowder Factory (Waltham) - and on a specialist private 
arms Industry which largely consisted of one firm - Vickers-, 
Armstrong('). For much of the Inter-war period the Army was living 
off stocks left over from the First World War, and the prevailing 
climate of financial stringency meant that orders for new equipment 
were few and smad"). The three Royal Ordnance Factorie's 
(R. 0. F. s) which survived into the 1930s employed only about a tenth 
of the staff which they had had In 1918 
(111) 
0 
7be country's capacity for T. N. T. production was almost. negll- 
gible"). Cordite capacity was also grossly Inadequate to fight even 
a small-scale war, and largely confined to the out-of-date Waltham 
works which was regarded as extremely vulnerable to air attack(v). 
The heavy chemical industry on which the Army depended for 
(1) Postan, British War Production, p. 8. 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of 
Trading In Arms, para. 71,24th September 1936. CAB 16/125. 
(111) Pbstan, op. cit. , p. 8. 
OV) Principal Supply Officers' Committee, Thirteenth Annual Report, 
Ist August 1935 - 31st July 1936, para. 25. WEIR 18/3 (Weir 
Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge). 
(V) C. 1. D. 269th Meeting, item 4,16th April 1935. CAB 2/6. 
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ammonium nitrate (a constituent of high explosives) and for chlorine 
(an ingredient of mustard gas) had been concentrated, to'an'' alarming 
degree in one massive complex - the 1. C. I. works at Btlllngham, ' 
and that, being on the east coast, was thought so vulnerable to 
German bombs that it could be discounted as a factor in Britain's 
wartime Industrial capacity(l). 
Britain's total expenditure on armaments was very limited 'up to 
1934 and only abo'ut a tenth o. f this was for the Army. 7be E2 million 
per annum which the War Cfflce was spending on munitions for the Army 
at this period was barely enough to keep the private arms industry 
alive("). The need 'to preserve the private arms Indust I ry', nevertheless, 
played an important part In the thinking of all the Service departmenti, 
and it was recognized to a lesser degree by the Cabinet and the 
Treasury As far as Its more modern weaponry was concerned, 
the British Army of 1936 was, as J. D. Scott points out, "a Vickers- 
(IV) 
armed Army" 7be ]Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture 
of and Trading in Arms noted'in 1936 that the Army was , getting 
practically all its tanks and the greater part of its shell from "trade" 
sources rather than from the R. 0. F. s. Items supplied by the trade 
for which the ]Royal Ordnance Factories had very little capacity Included 
gun forgings, heavy coast defence mountings, heavy calibre armour- 
William Hornby, Factories and Plant (H. M. S. O., 1958), p., -, 109. 
(10 Postan, op. cit., p. 6. 
(111) Report of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufactureý 
of and Trading In Arms, para. 72,24th September 1936. 
CAB 16/125. 
OV) Scott, Vickers, A_HIstory, p. 227. 
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piercing projectiles, predictors, fire-control Instruments, searchlights, 
sound-locators, tank engines, bullet-proof plate, armour plate, ý 
gun-shields, armoured car chassis, motor transport, machine guns, 
electric signalling lamps, hellographs and wireless stores('). 7he 
greater proportion of this equipment was supplied by Vickers. 
Even before 1936 the War Cff Ice did try to 4 encourage the specialist 
arms Industry to expand Its capacity, and Indeed Vickers -Armstrong 
and its associated companies incurred a capital outlay of 0,587P 000 
on developing armament potential between 1931 and, 1935("). But -, , 
Chamberlain's action In halving the War Office budget, recommended In 
the f Irst D. R. C. report meant that until 1936 the ý opportunities i for 
bringing new firms Into armament production were few. , 7be delay in 
the start of the Army's rearmament had very adverse consequences. 
In 1934 a large part of British Industry was still seriously depressed 
and a major rearmament effort at that stage would almost certainly - 
have had very beneficial effects on order books, business confidence 
and employment. By 1936, however, the Industrial situation had , 
changed markedly. Most of the Industries which the War Office's 
rearmament effort affected had already to a great extent climbed out 
of the depression. Armament orders which would have been a godsend 
a few years before were, to many firms, a not particularly welcome 
distraction from civil and export trade("'), 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture 
of and Trading in Arms, para. 72. CAB 16/125. 
Treasury Inter-Service Committee, Appendix to Minutes of 12t h Meeting, 12th May 1936. T161/1315. 
D. P. R. Minutes of the Ist Meeting, 30th December 1935. WEI R 17/1 (Weir Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge). 
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I 
"Business as Usual" 
In its November 1935 -report the D. Ro C. recommended a massive 
expansion of Industrial capacity for armaments production, bringing 
In large'numbers of new firms(O. But Lord Weir explained to the 
D. P. R. that In Deceffiber 1935 400,000 men were employed In the 
engineering Industry and with that, In his assessment, all resources 
had been fully drawn upon. 7here was already an acute shortage of 
highly skilled and growing shortage of less skilled men. 7he defence 
programmes called mainly for skilled men. Skilled labour was already 
becoming an Industrial bottleneck, as were machine-tools and gauges. 
In Weir's view these, bottlenecks 'were likely to get worse if the 
full def Iciency programme recommended by the D. R. C. were set In 
motion. 
Weir went on to summarize the situations of the major Industries 
which were likely to be affected by rearmament. 7be ordinary steel 
industry was at record output. Alloy steel was very busy and so 
were forging and stamping. The automobile, Industry was breaking 
production records, and machine tool output was held back only by 
the shortage of skilled labour. 7hough heavy general engineering 
still had some margin, light general engineering was busy. Weir 
therefore felt himself 
bound to state that the Programme recommended 
could not be carried out in the period envisaged 
unless a definite turn-over to a semi-war organ- ization was undertaken ... or alternatively a 
reduction was affected In normal civil activity 
and our export trade(ii). 
D. R. C. 37, paras. 91-93. CAB 16/112. 
D. P. R., Ist Meeting, 30th December 1935. WEIR 17/1 
(Weir Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge). 
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Hankey pointed out that Germany had already gope over to 
semi-war conditions In which Industrial capacity was placed under the 
control of the State, but Weir came down strongly against any such 
arrangement In Great -Britain. He remarked that although he had: had 
experience of production under war conditions, he "had never even 
considered the question of semi-war conditions in relation to this 
country". It was well known that such conditions existed in totalitarian 
states like Germany and -Russia, but Weir did not believe that 
such a system, Le. peace production with a 
war type of control could ever be carried out 
In this country. 
Weir advised that there were two possible approaches to the 
development of Shadow IndListxy. 
In the first ýplace It would be possibleý to go, 
to a big organization and inform them that In 
spite of being busy with their civil work, 
they must carry out a certain amount of 
national work, e. g. to lay out a factory for 
munitions ... which would belong to the State and be operated by the firm on behalf of the 
State. 
In the second place it would be possible to go 
to the same firm and Inform them that it was 
necessary for them to allot say half their 
facilities for munitions production. 7bts would 
involve a diminution of their civil sales and he 
could not contemplate how this could be done(l). 
Tbough he was presenting the options In an extremely crude and 
simplistic way, Weir's main point seems to have been to emphasize 
his misgivings about government interference with civil trade. Because 
of his record as an Industrial troubleshooter during the First World 
War, his close association with the Air Ministry, and his friendship 
D. P. R. Ist -Meeting, 30th December 1935. 'WEIR 17/1 
(Weir Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge). 
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with Neville Chamberlain, Weir had established himself as the 
National Government's foremost industrial consultant on rearmament 
matters('). -His advice became the basis of a "business as usual" 
policy of minimum interference with civil production. 7he adoption 
of this policy was of critical importance for the War Cffice because 
it placed a major restriction on the scope of the rearmament effort. 
7bere were many reasons for the adoption of the "business as 
usual" approach to rearmament. 7be National Government was . 
certainly in a serious dilemma. Since 1931 all. Its efforts had been 
directed towards the recovery of business confidence. just as these 
efforts were paying off, ýand much of Industry was becoming relatively 
prosperous agains the international situation faced the government- with,, 
the necessity of rearming on a considerable scale. If -capacity. were 
switched from normal civil production to rearmament, hard-won 
markets might be lost, the balance of payments adversely affected and 
industry thrown off balance. Had the government belleved, war 
inevitable, the loss of markets for ordinary commercial- products 
I 
would have seemed a regrettable but: unavoidable sacrifice. But by 
their appeasement poliCies, the Baldwin and Chýmberlain governments 
hoped to escape war. ]Rearmament was designed mainly to repair 
obvious deficiencies In the country's defences-and to deter aggression("), , 
Because , war was -not seen as an inevitable sequel to rearmament, the 
Cabinet, and the Treasury did not want to assemble greater-armed, 
forces than the country could afford to maintain over a considerable 
W. J. Reader, Architect of Air Power, 7be Life of the First 
Viscount Weir of Eastwood (CoMns, I-9F87-. 
Peden, op. cit., pp. 79-87. 
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period of time. At some date In the not-too-distant future the defence 
deficiency programmes were expected to come to an end and firms 
which had been Involved In rearmament would have to go back-to 
ordinary, commercial production. 7bis would be extremely, ý,, dlfficult 
If, In the meantime, markets had been lost and firms' available - 
capital consumed in creating, capacity 'useful only for making munitions. 
This is the most convincing rationale for the policy adopted by the 
Cabinet and the Treasury that rearmament should be carried on with' 
minimal Inteif erence with civil trade, and Its logic Is defended by 
G. C. Peden. 
But It seems clear that "business as usual" was more than a purely 
pragmatic- response to an uncertain present and an unpredictable future. 
it was an Ideological position. Everyone accepted that, In time of 
war, free enterprise must give way to massive state Intervention. 
But government Interference In the economy on a large scale In 
peacetime was highly suspect. It seemed like socialism and totalitarian- 
ism In contrast -with what had come to be regarded as the traditional 
British -values of capitalist economics and liberal politics. In the 
context of British society there was a clear distinction between what 
was legitimate In peace and what was acceptable In -war., One of the 
most alarming features of totalitarian societies like Germany and 
]Russia was that they- made no such clear distinction. Even in 
peacetime, their economies operated under controls which the British 
regarded as "semi-war conditions"(). But the National Government 
D. P. R. Ist Meeting, 30th December 1935. WEIR 17/1 
(Weir Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge). 
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no more wished to emulate the totalitarian -states In economic matters 
than it did In Political affairs, and indeed, regarded it as a point 
of honour not to do so. In its dealings with Industry over rearmament, 
the government endeavoured "at all costsif to avold compulsion(l). 
In keeping with his desire to minimize government Intervention In 
the economy, Weir'opposed- the creation in peacetime of a Ministry of 
Supply("). Weir has been praised by some historians for his insight 
(111) it and sense of urgency But by his advocacy of "business as usual 
and his opposition to a Ministry of Supply, he seems to have contributed 
to the half -heartedness of British rearmament as compared with the 
much more thoro. ughgoing and energetic German programmes. His role 
deserves a much more critical assessment than it has hitherto received. 
Weir's advice was not that of a dispassionate technical expert. 
He coupled the industrialist's natural reluctance to dislocate industry 
with strong personal views on strategy. His long association with 
the Air Ministry had induced him to accept the pure gospel of the 
most extrem Ie advocates of airpower(lv). He believed In the bomber. 
His conviction that the next war would be decided by airpower led him 
to attack the whole concept of a conventional military expeditionary 
force for the Continent(v). Having concluded that Industry could not 
Quoted in Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932-39, 
p. 96. 
Weir disapproved of the "clamant appeal for, an Independent 
Ministry of Munitions". Weir to Duff Cooper, 2nd June 1936. 
WEIR 17/8 (Weir Papers). 
See for example J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes, 7be Admin- 
Istration of War Production (H. M. S. 0,1955), pp. 23-27 
(iv) Reader,. Architect of Airpower, pp. 229-235. 
(v) Chamberlain's diary, 22nd July 1935. (Chamberlain Papers). 
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carry out the full D. R. C. programme without the semi-war controls 
to which he was opposed, Weir suggested the only course was to 
examine the menace In a priority sense. "What was the worst menace 
and how could it be meff'(') Weir himself believed that enemy 
airpower was the main threat and that the deterrent of a large British 
strategic bomber force was the only way to meet it("). In an attempt 
to offer the minimum disruption of normal trade while concentrating 
the available finance and industrial capacity on the R. A. F. , Weir 
successfully co-operated. with Neville Chamberlain In attacking the 
War Office's plans to rearm the Territortals 
(Ili) 
0 
In view of his rejection of a Ministry of Supply, Weir advised 
that major changes would be necessary In the Supply branches of the 
Service departments : Despite the much reduced Programme for the 
Army which he and Chamberlain Insisted upon, Weir believed that the 
War Office would face an exceptionally difficult and heavy task. 7be 
Admiralty's needs could largely be met by Its own professional con- 
tractors. The Air Ministry's rearmament programme had already 
been set In motion because that department had had large funds at its 
disposal since 1934, and had therefore already accumulated a good 
deal of experience. 7be War Office on the other hand had to face an 
entirely novel task for which its Supply machinery had not been 
designed, and for which In Weir's view It was "quite unsuitable". 7he 
D. P. R. Ist Meeting, 30th December 1935. WEIR 17/1 
(Weir Papers). 
Reader, Architect of Airpo'wer, pp. 229-30. ' 
Entry in Neville Chamberlain's diary, 19th January 1936 
(Chamberlain's Papers, the Library, University of Birmingham). 
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War office had "the task of turning the Shadow Plan In all its 
novelty into a reality". Weir gave as his "considered opinion" that 
there must come Into existence at the War 
Office a Munition Supply Department covering 
every phase of Supply, able not only to buy 
something which someone makes and desires to 
sell under normal commercial procedure, but 
a Department with suff Icient -technical, production, 
Inspectional, commercial and financial expertise 
coupled with the spirit of 'drive' to enter into 
and settle promptly effective business negotiations 
with, for example, 100 selected firms under which 
these firms will mainly In the spirit of national 
service, create new and adopt existing facilities 
to enable them to supply highly technical 
products of which they have perhaps no previous 
experience. In addition to -this the Department 
must make the fullest use of the Professional 
sources of supply and be responsible for the 
State factories and their expansion(i). 
The Restructuring of War Office Supply Apparatus 
Weir's recommendations did not fall on deaf ears. There was 
already an awareness within the War Office of the need to make changes 
in the department's supply apparatus. A committee under the chair- 
manship of Sir Victor Warrender, the Finance Member of the Army 
Council, was set up In the War Office early In 1936 to investigate 
the struct ure of the supply branches(II). 
rIbe various kinds of supply for which the War Office was 
responsible were classified according to their place in the Army 
Estimates: - 
Vote 6 Supplies and Boad'Transport 
Vote 7 Clothing 
Vote 8 General Stores 
Vote 9 Warlike Stores 
industrial Production. Memor-andurn by Lord Weir, 27th 
January 1936. WEIR 17/5 (Weir Papers). 
Report of the Committee on the Co-ordination of Armament Supply Functions, 6th February 1936. WO/32/4583. 
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Vote 6 was the responsibility of the Quarter Master Ceneral, 
Votes 7,8 and 9 were the responsibility of the Master General of the 
Ordnance. The term "Supplies" as It appears in Vote 6 may seem 
somewhat confusing as all the items listed were supplies of one kind 
or another, but the War Office used "Supplies" In a technical sense 
to mean food, f uel, petrol, 011, water and forage. 7be stores covered 
by Votes 6,7 and 8 were generally of types readily obtainable from 
private industry. Vote 9 stores, which appeared In the Army Estimates 
under the following sub-heads, were the main Procurement problem: - 
(1) Guns and carriages 
(2) Gun ammunition 
(3) Small arms 
(4) Small arm ammunition 
(7) Motor transport (tracked) 
(8) Anti-gas equipment 
(9) Searchlight, signal and bridging equipment. 
In 1936 most of these were obtainable only from the R. 0. F. and the 
small specialist armaments industry(). 
The responsibility for technical research the design and procurement 
of all the munitions or "warlike stores" for the Army lay with. the 
,. I Master General of the Ordnance who had a whole range of agency 
responsibilities to the other British armed forces and to India, the 
Dominions and the Colonies, for the supply of war material(' 7be 
NL G. 0. was assisted In his work by four directors: - 
War Office Production (C. 1. D. Paper 1240-B), paras. 3 and 4, 
19th June 1936. CAB 16/148. 
Ibld, para. 5. CAB 16/148. 
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7he Director of Artillery 
7be Director of Mechanization 
7he Director of Ordnance Services 
7be Director of Ordnance Factories 
The Director of Ordnance Services dealt mainly with "generalto 
rather than with "warlike" stores and was to a great extent concerned 
(i) 
with storage and repair rather than supply . 7he duties of the 
other three directors In the M. G. 0. 's branch, and also those of the 
Director of Army Contracts, were the subject of the Warrender 
Committee's inquiries In early 1936. The Director of Mechanization's 
function was defined as the supervision of design, experiment and 
research in connection with all mechanically propelled vehicles whether 
tracked, semi-tracked or wheeled; the Inspection and provision of all 
such vehicles other than those on the establishment of the Royal 
Army Service Corps; technical, engineer and signal stores; and the 
control of the Royal Engineers and Royal Corps of Signals research 
and inspection establishments. The Director of Artillery dealt with the 
design, development and supply of guns and gun ammunition; Royal 
Artillery Instruments and stores; technical questions relating to 
gunnery; questions relating to chemical defence; all questions relating 
to small arms ammunition; and with the administration of the Ordnance 
Committee, the Royal Artillery Committee, the Chemical Defence 
(Ii) 
Committee and various other institutions 
Ibe duties of these two directors had obviously become extremely 
onerous and complex. 7be Director of Artillery, Major-General H. A. 
Lewis, recommended that in future they should confine themselves to 
Scott and Hughes, Administration of War Production, p. 23. 
Report of the Committee on the Co-ordination of Armament Supply Functions, February 1936, para. 1. WO/32/4583. 
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their -inspection and research functions, and that the procurement 
and supply of all munitions should be taken over by a Director of 
Armament Supply who would work closely with the Director of Ordnance 
Factories. 7his proposal fitted In very well with Lord Weir's 
recommendations. Lewis clearly also intended seriously to weaken 
the position of the Director of Army Contracts, Mr. F. C. Bovenschen, 
by proposing to subordinate his office to that of the Director of 
Armament Supply(i). 
The office of Director of Army Contracts carried enormous power 
and responsibility. 7be D. A. C. was charged with the allotment of 
contracts to manufacturers and with seeing that these contracts were 
I 
fulfilled. He was responsible neither to Master General of the 
ordnance nor to the Quarter-Master General, but to the Finance 
Member of the Army Council *alone("). Thus, though the placing of a 
contract was a crucial ý part of the s upply f unction the Master 'General 
of the Ordnance, the War Office'sýPrincipal'Supply Officer, was totally 
dependent upon an official over whom he had no authority("'). 7be 
situation was not helped by the personality of F. C. Bovenschen "a 
stickler for financial purity", who found it difficult to take a broad 
view and respond to the necessity for rearmament with the flexibility 
and- sense of urgency which the situation demanded"). 
(I) Ibid, para. 11. WO/32/4583. 
(it) Ibid, para. 3. WO/32/4583. 
(Ili) War Cfflce Production. C. I. D. Paper 1240-B, para. 5,19th 
June 1936. CAB 16/148. 
Ov) Interview with Sir Ronald 
' 
Adam at his home, Carylls Lea, 
Faygate, Sussex, 18th November 1979. 
i 
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Until the second half of the 1930s the off tctal War Office position 
had been that the Director of Army Contracts should be independent 
of the production authorities, and the Treasury was Insistent that "the 
man who is forcing on production Is the last man to whom settlement 
of prices should be trusted"('). Weir's advice, however, ran contrary 
to this doctrine. He emphasised that 
... the word of the man responsible for supply 
must carry and the spirit and enthusiasm which 
he has evoked in the contractor's mind must not 
be chilled by delays of approval caused by 
financial control. 
7bough Weir did not Intend that "any loose disregard should prevail 
on the f Inancial side", the keynote should be that "the job. must go 
(11) ahead" 
7be weakness of the munition supply apparatus'was fully realized , 
by the M. G. 0., Sir Hugh Elles, himself, as well as by other soldiers 
prominent In this side of the War office's organization, Including, the 
Director of Artillery, Major-General H. A. Lewis. Elles has been 
severely criticized by some historians for lack of drive and energy 
but In 1935 and 1936 he was to be numbered amongst those pressing 
for the reform of the munition supply organization. Duff - Cooper also, 
as political head of the department, was anxious for reform(III). 'Ib e 
opposition to reform seems to have come mainly, from civilian 
OV) 





Scott and'Hughes, Administration 1 of War Production 
Industrial Production. Memorandum by Lord Weir, 
January 1936. WEIR 17/5. (Weir Papers). 




Robinson to Weir, 22nd January 1936. WEIR 18/4. (Weir Papers). 
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In September 1937, Elles, commenting retrospectively on reforms 
which had taken place the previous year explained that, 
Whilst the old organization was fairly adequate 
to deal with the supply of the limited require- 
ments of war material In peacetime and in a 
period of strict economy, it was In my judg- 
ment quite unsuited to war or to the rapid 
expansion of supply In peace. , The reason for this were: - 
(a) 7bat unity In the control of supply was 
necessary, the supply chain from end to end 
being controlled by one authority. 
jb) That although In theory M. G. O. was the 
principal Supply Officer and responsible for 
supply, in fact the Director of Army Contracts 
had control of the vital middle links of the chain 
and was Independent of M. G. 0. - 
(c) 7bat therefore design and Inspection were 
divorced from supply and planning was divided 
between departments. 
rIbe establishment of a committee to investigate the "Co-ordination 
of Armament Supply Functions", under Sir Victor Warrender, was 
partly the result of, Elles's recommendations('). Probably because 
this committee was chaired by Warrender, the Finance Member of 
the Army Council to whom. the D. A. C. was directly responsible, the 
proposal made by Major General H. A. Lewis to create a Directorate 
of Armament Supply, which would have, 
involved diminishing the 
authority of both D. A. C. and F. M., was rejected(M. But,, the 
committee failed to come to any general agreement and submitted two 
M. G. 0. to S. of S., 7th September 1937. WO/32/4197. 
Beport of the Committee on the Co-ordination of Armament 
Supply Functions, 6th February 1936. WO/32/4583. 
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minority statements(i)., 7be whole question of reorganizing supply 
was therefore still open. Duff Cooper, obviously much concerned, 
consulted Weir personally. Weir repeated his advice that 
You, must create and organize at the War Office 
an adequate Munition Supply Department capable 
of dealing with every phase of munition supply, 
covering not only War Office needs but also 
your agency responsibilities to the Admiralty 
and the Air Ministry. 
7bough Weir felt that he could not give Duff Cooper much help In 
laying out the detailed organization of the new department, he emphasised 
(it) 
that its head should be an Army Councillor 
Correspondence between Weir and Sir Arthur Robinson at this period 
confirms that the opposition within the War Office to the reform of the 
supply apparatus came not from Lt. General Sir Hugh Elles, the- 
M. G. 0., though the proposal to create a new Munition Supply Depart- 
ment would obviously, relieve him of, some of his functions, but from 




rIbe reorganization was eventually Introduced In June 1936 by a 
C. 1. D. Sub-Committee on Industrial Production under the chairmanship 
of Sir Warren Fisher, and also including Hankey, Creedy, Elles and 
Sir Arthur Robinson. This body recommended the creation of a 
separate supply, department for warlike stores (Vote 9), though the 
Q. m. G. was to continue to deal with Vote 6 and the M. G. 0. with 
Votes 7 and 8.7be -head of the new supply department was to,, be- 
Report of the Committee on the Co-ordination of Armament 
Supply Functions, 6th February 1936. WO/32/4583. 
(11) Weir to Duff Cooper, 2nd June 1936. WEIR 17/8. (Weir Papers). 
(Iii) Robinson to Weir, 22nd January 1936. WEIR 18/4. (Weir Papers). 
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relieved of all responsibility for the production and procurement of 
munitions though he was to retain his research, design and Inspection 
functions. 7he Director of Ordnance Factories was to be subordinated 
to the Director General of Munitions Production as were the Director 
of Army Contracts and those members of his staff dealing with 
munitions contracts. 7be D. G. NL P. was also to take control of the 
Supply Board Technical Establishment, a recent creation formed 
primarily to produce process specifications for new firms moving Into 
the armaments business and to undertake Industrial planning for war 
production. It was decided that the man appointed to this new post 
should be an engineer. 
He should have drive but should be able to 
work with the official staff without friction(l). 
On 23rd July 1936, the post was offered to Engineer Vice-Admiral 
Sir Harold Brown, the Engineer- In-Chief of the Navy. He accepted it 
and accordingly entered the- War Office as an Army Councillor. Tbough 
it was somewhat unusual to have a sailor In the War Offlceý the War 
office, (as Weir had pointed out), had a series of, agency responsibilities, 
including the running of all the Royal Ordnance Factories, to all three 
Services as well as its particular duty to the Army. It was therefore 
essential that the D. G. M. P. should be the best administrator available, 
but of little consequence from which Service he originated(lt). 
I 
War Office Production (C. I. D. Paper 1240-B, paras. 7-16, 
19 th j un e 19 36). CAB 16/148. 
7bis casts some doubt on D. C. Watt's claim that the appoint- 
ment of Sir Harold Brown was "to the Army's eternal shame". 
Personalities and Policies (Longman's, 1965), p. 113. 
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After taking up office Brown made some further rearrangements. 
From 14th September 1936, the duty of the Director of Ordnance 
Factories to plan the acceleration of munitions production after the 
outbreak of war was transferred to a newly-created Directorate of, 
I 
Industrial Planning to which the Supply Board Technical Establishment, 
re-named the Munitions Technical Planning Staff, was subordinated'). 
When these reforms had been carried out the War Office at last had an 
efficient supply organization. Brown's personal dynamism Is obvious 
from the documents Having moved to the War Office he apparently 
identified himself with the General Staff view on the necessity for 
rearming the Territorials, and fought very hard for the development of 
(111) 
industrial capacity for the T. A. against determined Treasury opposition 
r1be subordination of the most Important part of the War Office's 
contracts branch to Sir Harold Brown meant that opportunities for 
War office finance officers to put spanners In the supply works were 
greatly reduced. Indeed finance officers such as Mr. Kenneth 4yon 
fought in the front-line of the bureaucratic battles between the 
War ()ffice and the Treasury over the development of industrial 
OV) 
capacity 
When Sir Hugh Elles retired in December 1937, there was a further 
reorganization, this time initiated by Hore-Belisha. Previously 
Supply Board. Tenth Annual Report, Ist July 1936 to 31st May 
1937, Appendix D., paras. 1-3. WEIR 18/3 (Weir Papers). 
See for example, Brown's letter to the Chesterfield Tube 
Company. Enclos'ure 95A. WO/32/3663. 
T. I. S. C. 40th Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
Ov) T. 1. S. C. 37th, 40th and 52nd Meetings. T161/1316. 
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Brown had controlled munitions production only, leaving Elles, the 
NL G. 0. , In charge of research and development and the production of 
the non-munitions stores covered by Votes 7 and 8. After-'Elles 
retired, Brown became the head of virtually the whole of the War 
office's, supply apparatus, and the post of Master General of the 
Ordnance disappeared. Most of the work which Elles had previously 
performed was, however, delegated to a newly-created official, the 
Deputy Master General of the Ordnance, Lieutenant-General NL G. , 
Taylor,, so the real structure was not very much altered(P. 
But thouAb, -after Brown's arrival, civil service parsimony was 
not such a menace within the War Office, it still reigned supreme 
over-all. Indeed "Treasury Control" was the watchword of British 
rearmament. in-accordance with Weir's advice, the Cabinet did not 
create a Ministry of Supply until August 1939, and the Cabinet also- 
strongly resisted Churchill's demand for a Ministry of Defence. ý,. The 
C. I. D. -apparatus, though capable of making general pronouncements on 
policy, and of outlining plans, was ill-adapted to the day-to-day . 
executive decision-making necessary for the running of rearmament. 
Ibis left the Service departments and the Treasury. In September 1935, 
at the time of the Abyssinian emergency, an informal committee 
known as the Treasury Emergency Expenditure Committee had been 
set up to expedite financial approval for Service expenditure designed 
to meet a possible Italian threat In North Africa and the Mediterranean. 
As the Abyssinian war drew to a close rearmament was beginning to 
develop momentum and for administrative convenience the'Treas-ury 
R. J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Beltsha (Collins, 
1960), pp. 55-6. 
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Inter-Service Committee('). 
It would be difficult to over-emphasise the Impgrtance of this 
body. Unlike the C. 1. D. and its myriad sub-committees, the T. 1. S. C. 
did not concern itself with vague statements on "policy" or with 
approving plans "in principle". 7be business of the T. 1. S. C. was 
executive power. TbIs was the agency through which Treasury control 
over every aspect of rearmament was exerted. The system was simple. 
Representatives of the Service departments came cap-In-hand to the 
Treasury, asking for financial sanction to build government factories, 
subsidize the'expansion of private industry, and place orders for 
everything from bomber planes to poison gas and from clothing to tanks. 
Whether to give or to withold this sanction was entirely up to the 
Treasury and thus the Treasury exerted complete control over the 
development of industrial capacity for rearmament. If the Treasury 
officials at the T. I. S. C. felt unable to make a decision or wished to 
postpone one, they could refer any matter to 
j 
the Chancellor of the 
achequer and a number of very important decisions were postponed 
In this way("). 
The T. 1. S. C. held Its first meeting on Ilth March 1936. Sir 
]Richard Hopkins, the chairman, reminded those, present that, the 
committee 1 
took Its origins from the inter-departmental 
conference held on 6th February under the 
Chairmanship of Sir Warren Fisher, where It 
had been decided that the placing of contracts 
Peden, op. cit., pp. 36-38. 
The papers of the Treasury Inter-Service Committee. 
n6l/1315 - 7161/1335.1 1 
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for the deficiency programme would Involve 
many points of difficulty which unless care- 
fully treated might lay both the Defence 
departments and the Treasury up to public 
criticism. 
The deficiency programme contained in the report of the Defence Policy 
and Requirements Committee of February 1936 had already been 
approved by the Cabinet in general terms. But as Hopkins was quick 
to point out 
that did not mean that the three Service 
departments could then proceed to give effect 
, to the pro ramme without reference to the 
Trea 
Hopkins' remarks at the f irst meeting of the T. I. S. C. clearly 
Illustrate the enormous powers which the Treasury wielded over the 
armed forces in normal'peacetime circumstances. 
In the ordinary course after a decision had been 
reached by the Cabinet, the next stage would have 
been for the Chancellor to agree with the three 
departments'the totals of their financial pro- 
vision. The departments would then allocate these 
sums to votes, which would be submitted to the 
Treasury for approval; the Treasury would 
according to received doctrine, have the right 
to reserve any point for further consideration 
and the department could not proceed with any 
service until the Treasury had approved the 
vote. 
This normal practice procedure was to be considerably modified 
for rearmament but the Treasury was determined not to relinquish any 
of its power. Though, during rearmament, the Service departments 
were allowed to Incur expenditure before getting the approval of 
parliament, they were not permitted to treat the Treasury In such a 
cavalier fashion. Hopkins maintained that "in these abnormal 
(1) - T. 1. S. C. Ist Meeting, Ilth March 1936. T161/1315. 
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I 
I circumstances lf, with Parliarhent granting supplementary costs only 
after expenditure had been incurred, It was even more Important that 
Treasury control be maintained unimpaired., Before incurring 
rearmament expenditure of any kind the Service departments would first 
have to submit their proposals to the Treasury at the T. 1. S. C. 
(1) 
Contract Procedure 
One of the first problems to arise at the Treasury Inter-Service 
Committee (T. 1. S. C. ) was the arrangement, of -a satisfactory contract 
procedure. In normal peacetime circumstances the Treasury Insisted 
that the Service departments enter only Into single-year contracts, 
and always invite competitive tenders. Ibis was regarded as Impractic- 
able during rearmament. In order to persuade firms greatly to 
expand their capacity for armament production and, In many cases, to 
create armament capacity for the first time, it was essential to 
guarantee them a steady flow of o rders 
The Treasury was nevertheless determined to institute a contract 
procedure which would give the public the best value for money possible 
under the circumstances. The arrangement of a procedure which would 
satisfy the public was of particular Importance because of the 
unpopularity of the arms trade and the National Government's fear of 
politically dangerous allegations of profiteering., When, prior to the 
General Election of 1935, it became widely suspected that plans for 
rearmament were afoot, the National Government considered it 
(1) 1. S. C. Ist Meeting, Ilth March 1936. 
(11) D. R. C. 37, paras. 92 and 93,21st November 1935. CAB 16/112. 
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advisable to Include a guarantee about the prevention of profiteering 
In Its election manif elsto 
Following the National Government's election victory, the Defence 
Pblicy and Requirements Committee, decided on 30th January 1936 to 
appoint a'sp661al sub-committee toAnvestigate the problem of contract 
procedure. ' 7bis body was chaired by Neville Chamberlain and also 
Included Lord Weir. its terms of reference were: - 
To Investigate the 4uestion of what arrangements, 
shodld be made to provide against excessive 
'profits being made by contractors, having regard 
to the political considerations (including the 
statement on the subject In the Government's 
General Election Manifesto), the Importance of 
obtaining the goodwill of contractors, and 
other factors in the problem. 
The main issue was whether it was necessary for the Defence 
departments to have the right to Inspect their contractors' books. 
,, 
As the sub-committee's report pointed out, 
the circumstances will be unique - the State 
will be working against time In conditions of 
great difficulty. 7be situation will be 
complicated by the number of sources of supply, 
by the impossibility of fixing prices In advance, 
by the difficulty of exercising control over 
sub-contractors and by the necessarily non- 
competitive character of the arrangements 
7he report then proceeded to ask the'rhetorical question 
is there any alternative to a right of Inspection 
which will provide against excessive profits while 
retaining the goodwill of manufacturers; and 
further will reassure public and Parliamentary 
opinion that excessive profits are not being made? 
_-Report of 
C. 1. D. Sub-Committee on Industrial Production, -, 
para. 1,6th February 1936. CAB 16/149. 
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and answered Itself 
In our view there Is no doubt that It will be 
necessary for the defence departments to have 
right to inspect books. Parliamentary 
considerations alone would be decisive in 
favour of this course. 
it was decided that the right of Inspection should be guaranteed by 
the Insertion of a special clause In firms' contracts rather than by 
Act of Parliament(). 
But though these general principles -were decided by a special 
D. P. R. s ub-committee, the details of contract procedure were worked 
out by the T. 14 S. C. In Shadow Industry contracts which were designed 
both to help remedy existing peacetime deficiencies In the armed 
forces and to create reserve Industrial capacity for war production, 
it was decided that the government should offer to pay for any tools, 
plant and gauges which the contractor would require for war production, 
but which he could not turn to financial gain In peacetime. In such 
contracts the firm was required to quote separately expenditure 
necessary to give the required peace (one shift) and the required 
emergency (two or three shifts) capacity. The general principle In 
such cases was that 
capital assets paid for by the government 
should be owned by the, government as far as 
practicable(U). 
The contractor was meant to look after any government-owned 
assets In his factory and maintain them In working condition. But 
it was decided, after some discussion, not to make the contractor 
]Report of C. 1. D. Sub-Committee on Industrial Production, 
paras. 1-8. CAB 16/149. 
00 War Office Memorandum, no. 20,2nd June 1936.7161/1315. 
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responsible for insuring government assets. In practice most 
contractors were not prepared to pay the price of. Insurance, and the 
Treasury was equally unhappy about Incurring this expense. , -Con- 
tractors were allowed to Insure on their own account if they wished, 
but were not entitled to charge the premium to the government. It 
was decided that 
in cases where the contractor does not insure the' 
risk of loss by fire or accident will fall on the 
public, but the contractor will be res nsible for 
plant etc. missing from other causes? 10). 
I 7bough long-term contracts were routinely used In rearmament, 
the Treasury insisted on writing Into these contracts a break clause 
so that the flow of goods from a firm could be cut off after a year 
* (ti) if the goods were no longer required On 2nd June 1936 the War 
C(fice proposed to the Treasury that the following type of contract 
be employed In dealings with Shadow Industry: - 
(1) The contract will promise three successive 
orders in three successive years subject to 
(a) price and delivery and (b) the break clause. 
(2) The break clause will provide that the 
Department may decide to give as further 
orders after the first and/or the second 
order. 
(3) The contractor will be given notice as 
to whether the second and/or third order will 
be placed, the date of notice being circulated 
to him three months before the due date of 
completion of the current orderOll). 
7hough, as- G. C. Peden points out, 
. 
"the ideal of a completely'. 
War Office Memorandum, no. 22,4th June 1936. T161/1315. 
Brian Bond (ed. ), Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, (Leo Cooper, 1972) 
P. 111. 
(Ili) War Office Memorandum, no. 20,2nd June 1936. M61/1315. 
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uniform contract procedure did not prove to be practicable"('), this 
became the established pattern for most long-term War Office contracts. 
A contract of this type would normally specify a maximum price which 
could be revised at the end of each order. The fairness of the price 
actually charged by the contractor could be checked by the War Office's 
Contracts branch, which normally had the contractually agreed right 
to examine the firm's bc*ks. If the profit on the Initial order was 
considered excessive, the maximum price could be lowered for 
subsequent orders("). 
Machlne Tools 
It has recently been suggested that Industrial rather than financial 
restKictions were decisive in limiting British rearmament and that 
(111) 
machine tools were one of the critical Industrial bottlenecks 
Certainly when rearmament began, Lord Weir expected that machine 
'0 V) tool supply would be a major problem And on 20th March 1936, 
a War Mice representative at the T. 1. S. C. drew attention to what he 
anticipated as 
the most serious bottleneck, that of machine 
tools. There was a great need of co-ordination: 
already the War office had evidence that prices 
were rising and that firms were gambling on the 
effects of the programme. The Service Departments 
were going to place orders running Into millions 
In an Industry whose yearly turnover only amounted 
to some E7 millions and which from Its skilled 
Peden, op. cit. p. 48. 
(11) T. ILS. C. 15th Meeting, 5th June 1936 and War Cfflce 
Memorandum, no. 20,2nd June 1936.7161/1315. 
MO Peden, op. cit., pp. 179-80. 




and specialized nature was not capable of rapid 
expansion(i). 
The demand for machine tools which rearmament created was 
indeed enormous. According to the Director of Army Contracts, 
between Ist April 1936 and 31st May 1938, the War Office ordered 
British machine tools worth E3,968,000 and foreign machine tools worth 
91,182,000: the total cost being E5,150,000. 'Ibis did not f Include tools 
purchased by War Office contractors on their own account. ' The total 
value of the machine tools ordered by all three service departments 
over the same period was E11,191,761(u). Moreover, it does seem that 
slow delivery of machine tools delayed the programmes of all three 
Service departments to some extent. In January 1937, Sir Harold 
Brown told the D. P. R. that the new Royal Ordnance Factory at 
Scotswood would not be in full production until September 1938 and 
this would, be due to waiting for the necessary machine tools. The 
machine tools industry was doing well in keeping up to theii, deliveries, 
(111) 
but some deliveries were quoted at two years 
Nor was slow delivery the Service departments' only complaint 
against, the industry. In February 1938, the Director of Naval 
Contracts, on behalf of all three departments, sent a protest about 
the conduct of the machine tool trade to Sir Thomas Inskip, the 
Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. The main points of this 
protest were: - 
T. I. S. C. 2nd Meeting, 20th March 1936. T161/1315. 
Advisory Panel of Industrialists. Memo. from Sir Arthur 
]Robinson on Costing of Machine Tool Prices, paras. 10 and 11, 
February 1939. CAB 16/228. 
(iii) D. P. R. 33rd Meeting, 21st January 1937. WEIR 17/3 (Weir paýers).,. 
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(a) that the machine tool trade had with 
minor exceptions refused to afford facilities 
to government departments to check costs of 
machine tools purchased either directly or 
Indirectly in connection with the rearmament 
programme, or to furnish certificates of 
cost by their own accountants; 
(b) that In view of the quantities of tools 
ordered In connection with the programme, 
which had in fact necessitated the Importation 
of large numbers, truly competitive conditions 
did not exist and that, in view of the declared 
policy of the government, the checking of costs 
was therefore highly desirable; 
(c) that where cost Investigation had been 
possible, - the results indicated that an excessive 
rate of profit was being made in some cases; 
(e) that the defence programme had contributed 
largely to the prosperity of the machine tool 
trade, which also had the advantage of tariff 
protection, and that these facts placed a moral 
obligation on the indust to satisfy government 
departments as to cost'al. 
These Service department complaints were passed on by Inskip to 
the Chairman of the Machine Tool Trades Association, Sir William 
Lang, who was invited to give the Industry's side of the case. He 
replied that on the whole British machine tools were cheaper than their 
German or American equivalents even If Import duty were excluded. 
The British machine tool industry was highly competitive, he claimed, 
and there were no monopolies. Lang pointed out that his Association 
had co-operated with the government in agreeing that many foreign 
tools needed for rearmament should be Imported duty free. He argued 
f urther that: - 
Advisory Panel-of Industrialists. Memorandum from Sir Arthur''-- 
Robinson on Costing of Machine Tool Prices, para. 11, 
February 1939. CAB 16/228. 
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Practically all the firms In the Machine Tool 
Industry In this country have considerably 
extended their premises and plant at their own 
cost to meet the Increased requirements of 
the defence programmes. 7hese extensions 
provide a capacity which Is far In excess of 
normal requirements and when trade falls off, 
as it inevitably must, the makers will be 
placed in a serious position by having a wide 
margin. of surplus capacity Involving the locking 
up of large amounts of working capital and a 
serious Increase In overhead costs. Home 
orders have already fallen to approximately 
half what they were a year agoW. 
Ibe machine tool industry's case seems by no means unreasonable. 
7be rate of profit the manufacturers were making on their products 
probably was rather high, otherwise they would have had no objections 
to showing the Service departments their books. But In view of their 
heavy capital outlay on plant which might turn over-night from asset 
to liability, this was only to be expected. A report by Sir Arthur 
Robinson, the chairman of the Supply Board, tended to confirm that 
British machine tools were both cheaper and higher quality than most 
foreign imports. It seems that the government gave very little help 
with the extension of capacity to Its contractors In the machine tool 
industry. Lang admitted that In cases where the Service departments 
had provided firms with financial aid they had the right to Investigate 
cost and control profit. But he did not acknowledge such a right In 
most other instances. 
it is fully realized that In cases where the 
government provides finance for the purpose 
of carrying out government contracts on a 
Advisory Panel of Industrialists. Memorandum from Sir Arthur 
Robinson on Costing of Machine Tool Prices, para. 3(a), (b) 
and (d). CAB 16/228. 
time material and profit basis, cost 
investigation should be carried out. In 
many Instances, it has of course been 
necessary for the government to enter into 
contracts for work which Is entirely new 
and special to meet the requirements of the 
defence programmes and In which no previous 
standard prices are available. Here again the 
importance of a cost clause Is appreciated. 
In the machine tool trade, however, th 
*e 
position 
is entirely different as In the great majority 
of cases the machines supplied by the Industry 
are of their standard type and are sold at 
, 
competitive prices(l). 
7be dispute apparently remained unresolved until the outbreak of 
war. 7bough It was brought to the attention of Sir 7bomas Inskip 
in February 1938, he made no progress with It. After a year he 
(it) turned the whole matter over to the Advisory Panel of Industrialists 
That body had no executive authority whatever (slightly less than 
Inskip had) and therefore could hardly be expected to do anything 
effective. _, 
As far as the real business of preparing for war was 
concerned the dispute was something of an Irrelevance. It Is Important 
to note that the point at Issue was costing. The Service departments 
were protesting at the price they had to pay for British machine tools, 
not claiming that there were no tools to be had. This suggests that 
Treasury-imposed financial limits were of considerable significance 
even where the supply, of machine tools were concerned. 
By February 1939 the annual output of the British machine tool 
Advisory Panel of Industrialists. Memorandum from Sir Arthur 
Robinson on Costing of Machine Tool Prices, para. 3(e). 
CAB 16/228. 
Sir Arthur Robinson to Colonel Greenly, February 1939. 
CAB 16/228. 
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industry was valued at a minimum of 98,100,000. Britain' was 
exporting machine tools to the value of 92,500,000 and importing 
94,000,000's 'worth. At that date it was estimated that about "half" 
the effort'of the machine tool industry (manufacturing and Importing) 
was absorbed by the rearmament programmes of the three Service 
departments('). But considering that machine tools were regarded 
as an industrial bottleneck, half may not seem a very large proportion 
at so late aý'stage In the rearmament effort. 7be chairman of the 
Machine Tool Trade 'Association announced in a letter of 18th May 
1938 that orders had already fallen to approximately 5CP70 of what they 
had been the previous year 
(11) 
* 
7 he'main'problem with machine tool supply does not seem to'have 
been any'absolute shortage, but rather the adherence of the Cabinet 
and the Treasury to the principle of non-interference with civil and 
export trade. ' So concerned was the Treasury with the loss of, overseas 
trade that, 'in February 1936, Sir Warren Fisher and Str-Thomas Inskip 
arranged 
Iý ! I, , 
for a quota of the machine tool Industry's output 
to be reserved for exports, the balance of 
requirements being met from Imports until 
domestic production could be expanded(Iii). 
In January 1937 Sir Harold Brown advocated the Introduction of "a ,, 
system of priority" for government orders for machine, tools(' 
v), but 
Advisory Panel of Industrialists. Memorandum from Sir-Arthur' 
Robinson on Costing of Machine Tool Prices, para. 11, February 
1939. CAB 16/228. 
(10 lbid, para. 3(d). CAB 16/228. 
(111) Peden, op. cit., p. 176. 
OV) D. P. IR. 33rd Meeting, 21st January 1937. WEIR 17/3 (Weir Papers), 
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this was refused. it was 23rd March 1939 before production for the 
Army, was given priority over civil and export trade(), it is too 
easy to blame the constraints of Industrial capacity for the 
inadequacies of British rearmament. The Cabinet and the Treasury 
had the option of Intervening In the economy to ensure that the 
munitions industries got the lion. 4 share of the available tools, but 
they turned it down. Naturally a balance of risk assessment had to, be 
made between the economic dangers of diminishing civil trade and, 
losing overseas markets on the one hand, and those of war on the other. 
It was surely unreasonable, however, to give a priority so much higher 
for exports than for rearmament that British machine tools worth 
E2,250,000 continued to be sent abroad while machine tools continued 
to be regarded as potentially one of the most serious bottlenecks in 
the programmes of the service departments 
(11) 
0 
In defence of the Treasury's conduct of rearmament the argument 
has been employed that because of certain Industrial bottlenecks, 
notably machine tools and skilled labour, Indiscriminate and uncontrolled 
financial expenditure would have been Ineffective, Indeed possibly 
counter-productive. The existence of these bottlenecks meant that 
the flow of orders had to be carefully controlled and the Treasury 
(111) 
found financial restraints the most effective way of achieving this 
In the case machine tools, however, the Treasury did not merely 
Peden, op. cit. , p. 176. 
Advisory Panel of Industrialists. Memorandum on Costing 
of Machine Tool Prices, para. 11, February 1939. CAB 16/228. 
(Iii) Peden, op. cit., pp. 179-184. 
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0 discover a bottlepeck and adjust Its policy accordingly. When, at 
an early stage in the rearmament process, the Treasury pressed 
the machine tool industry to reserve for exports E21 millions worth 
out of a production not expec. ed to rise above E8 million, it was 
playing a crucial role In the creation of a bottleneck(). If machine 
tools were such a serious potential bottleneck In the rearmament 
process as has been suggested, then shipping abroad each year roughly 
a third of the machine tool Industry's product must have vastly reduced 
the country's industrial capacity to rearm. Yet E21 million was 
relatively trivial in terms of the country's balance of payments. In 
this case the Treasury is certainly open to the charge of "spoiling 
the ship for a ha'peth of tar". 
Labour Smul 
it Is one of the major paradoxes of the late 1930s that while 
unemployment was the most acute social problem, labour shortages 
were regarded as a critical Impediment to the rearmament effort. In 
1940 the authors of a celebrated polemic denounced Mr. Ernest Brown, 
the Minister of Labour, as one of the "Guilty Men" responsible for 
the shortcomings of the pre-war defence programmes. "All Germany 
had been at work for years", they claimed, but unemployment 
remained In Britain, 1,400,000 being idle as late as December 1939(11). 
, Ibe prima facie case for believing that the nation's manpower 
Memorandum by Bridges, Phillips and Hopkins, 10th November 
1936. (C. P. 339 (36)), p. 280. CAB-24/265. 
(11) "Cato" Guilty Men, (Victor Gollancz, 1946), pp. 102-4. 
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resources were not adequately exploited does seerp very strong. 
G. C. Peden, on the other hand, accepts the contemporary 
-view, 
expressed by the National Government and its advisers, that shortages 
of skilled labour were a major limitation on rearmament - the most 
important of the "Industrial bottlenecks" which the Treasury's "paper 
pounds" could not, In the short-term, remove('). Peden maintains 
that 
Britain's army of unemployed could not readily be 
used for rearmament work. During the long years 
of depression the number of apprenticeships had 
been reduced while new Industrial processes had 
rendered obsolete the skills of some of those 
who had served their time(ii). 
lbe extent to which the War Office's rearmament programme was 
impeded by labour shortages seems to be a subject worthy of Investi- 
gation. 
Lord Weir certainly told the D. P. R. In December 1935 that highly 
skilled men were already in short supply and that this situation was 
likely 6 get wOrse(iii). . 
The C. 1. D. took labour problems seriously 
enough to ensure that It received regular reports on the labour 
situations in the principal industries affected by rearmament. In 
September 1936 one of these surveys announced that 
Information collected from the employment 
exchanges Indicates that acute shortages of 
skilled work people - particularly precision 
workers, e. g. tool-setters, fitters, turners, 
machinists etc. and of sheet metal workers 
are being experienced throughout the country(tv). 
Peden, op. cit., P. 180. 
Ibid, pp. 81-2. 
D. P. R. 1st Meeting, 30th December 1935. WEIR 17/1. 
Fifth, Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 127), 
sub-heading "Engineering". CAB 16/141. 
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But one is struck" by the vagueness of the government's information. 
Though the Ministry Of Labour was able to- supply unemployment figures 
for particular Industries, these statistics were not broken down by 
trade except In the case'of the building Industry. Therefore the 
Government simply did-not know, " for example, how many tool-setters 
were out of work in any one month, nor where these men were to be 
found. With-reference to the engineering Industry, the Ministry of 
Labour was forced'to admit In September 1936 that "Precise Information 
is not now avallable'as to the number of skilled men registered as 
wholly unemployed". The Ministry of Labour was forced to rely on, 
guesswork('). 
Moreover, while Lord Weir was the National, Government's most 
respected adviser on the Industrial aspects of rearmament, the 
employment figures which he quoted at the D. P. R. In January 1936 
appear to bear no relation to Ministry of Labour sratlstlcs. ý'l Weir 
Indicated that there were 400,000 men employed in engineering at the 
beginning'of 1936 "'and with that all resources had been fully drawn 
upon". ý But though Ministry of Labour statistics show a steady decline 
in unemployment in engineering during the spring and summer of 1936, 
67,283 insured'-men were still unemployed In September including 
38,980 In "General Engineering" the part of the industry most 
affected by the War Office's rearmament programme 
Unemployment fell steadily In the major Industries affected by 
Fifth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R,. 127), 
sub-heading "Engineering". CAB 16/141. 
(ii) Ibid. 'CAB 16/141. ' 
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rearmament during 1936 and the early months of 1937, especially In 
engineering, 
(') but by September 1937 this situation was beginning 
to reverse itself. In February 1938 the Ministry of Labour reported 
that unemployment In engineering had Increased for the fifth successive 
month("). Between April and September 1938, unemployment actually 
rose In all the major Industries connected with rearmaments with the 
exception of chemicals and explosives, In which no labour shortages 
had been experienced anyway. By 12th September 1938 unemployment 
. In the engineering 
industry stood at 8.4 per cent -, a total of 
87,612 men("'). EvenAn January 1939 there were 82,574 Idle engineering 
workers, and it was only In the early spring of 1939 that jobless 




It is extremely difficult to come to an over-all assessment of 
the Influence of labour problems on the War Office's programme. Little 
evidence on this subject survives In the War Office papers themselves 
and, though skilled labour had been anticipated as an industrial 
bottleneck since January 1936, even In June 1939, the Ministry, of 
Labour was still unable to supply figures of unemployment in 
particular skilled trades, except In the building Industry(v)., 7bis lack 
of knowledge must have been detrimental to any effort to deal with 
Twelfth Report by the Ministry of Labour, (D. P. R. 191). 
CAB 16/141. 
00 Twenty-f irst Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 257). 
CAB 16/143. 
(Ili) Twenty-third Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 279) and 
the Twenty-fourth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 289). 
CAB 16/143. 
(iv) Twenty-sixth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 300) and 
the Twenty-eights Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 308) 
CAB 16/143. 
(V) Twenty-eighth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 316). 
CAB 16/144. 
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labour problems. Even more serious was -the Cabinet's chronic 
reluctance to take any kInd of unorthodox action. 7he National Government 
was not prepared to contemplate the application of controls to skilled 
labour, and, In accordance with the general policy of "business as " 
usual", was loath to divert skilled men from civil production Into 
rearmament work(O. 
An alternative to the conscription of skilled labour was the I 
deskilling of jobs or "dilution". Though In some Instances trades 
unions were prepared to relax their rules following agreements with 
management In particular firms the Cabinet waig extremely reluctant 
to make any general -approach to the T. U. C. 
(11) 
As early as 7th May 1936, Sir Tbomas lnskipý told the D. P. IR. that 
he had been "criticized for not having met the representatives of 
the Trades Unions" and for not discussing with them "the question of 
dilution and transference of labour". Inskip remarked that this was 
a "very thorny question", and that he had purposely avoided meeting 
the unions. Sir 7homas asked his colleagues' advice as to whether 
he should take steps In that direction. He had now met the great 
majority of the employers' organizations who had "expressed a 
preference that they should deal with their own men themselves"("'). 
Both Weir and Ernest Brown came down strongly against a 
government approach to the unions and no voice was raised In favour 
Peden, op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
lbid, pp. 82-3. 
D. P. R. 20th Meeting, 7th May 1936. WEIR 17/2 (Weir Papers). 
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of this course. Weir told Inskip that he would be ý "well advised 
not to approach the representatives of the Trades. Unions" until all the 
normal machinery had been tried and proved to have failed. At 
present "things were going very well on their existing basis" and he 
thought "it wo, uld,, be a pity to Interfere until real difficulties were 
experienced". Brown remarked that 
if a particular question in a particular trade 
were to arise It might be necessary to Intervene, 
but he was strongly opposed to any Interview with 
T. U. C. representatives at the present timeM. 
No general agreement was ever worked out between the National 
Government and the unions. 7bough In March 1938 Chamberlain 
finally Invited the General Council of the ýT. U. C. to meet him, the 0 
initiative achieved nothing.. Failure was -probably at least partly the 
result, of the Cabinet's fear that the unions would attempt to -influence 
100 foreign policy 
Before leaving the subject of labour it is worth looking more 
closely at the one Industry about which the Ministry of Labour had 
fairly detailed information - building. C. C. Peden makes much of 
labour shortages In building, claiming that these delayed the . 
construction of armament factories, barracks and other works related 
to rearmament. Peden admits that this was mainly the result of 
"business as usual", In the sense that the government was unwilling 
to bring about a decline in private house-building, which In 1936, was 
experiencing something of a, boom, for fear of the political reper- 
(1) 
, 
D. P. R. 20th Meeting, 7th May 1936. WEIR 17/2 (Weir Papers). 
(it) Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury_ 1932-39, P. 82. 
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cussions(l). Within the context of business, as usual, however, Peden 
regards building labour as a serious Industrial bottleneck, Indicating 
that In order to ensure an adequate supply of labour for the 
construction of munitions factories, the Treasury was compelled to 
delay the building of Army barracks("), IIý. 
Certainly Inskip'told the D. P. R. on 23rd July 1936 that he was 
apprehensive of the whole position, as the - 
capacity of the building industry in this 
country was almost fully absorbed already 
and unless industrial building slowed down 
there was no sign of any Improvement in the 
situation(iii). 
Ministry of Labour figures, however, show that even In March 1936 
there were 139,085 men in the building Industry recorded as 
unemployed (14.7 per cent of the workforce). 7bough this declined to 
jig, 180 (12.6 per cent) the following month, by March 1937 156,990. 
men (15.9 per cent of the workforce) were idle(lv). Even In the early 
stages of rearmament, therefore, It Is difficult to believe that an 
over-all shortage of building labour existed to a degree which was 
inevitably a significant restraint on rearmament. 
But It could be argued that even thoLgh a large part of the 
workforce as a whole was unemployed, there was an acute shortage 
of men skilled in particular trades. Indeed In July 1936, Weir 
pointed I to a serious shortage of bricklayers(v). Ministry of Labour 
Ibid,, pp. 83 -4. 
Ibid, p. 169. 
D. P. R. 25th Meeting, ý 23rd July 1936. WEIR 17/2. 
(iv) Twelfth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 191), 
p. 9. CAB 16/141. 
(V) D. P. R. 25th Meeting, 23rd July 1936. WEIR 17/2 (Weir Papers). 
-185- 
statistics, however, show that in March 1936, of 95,900 Insured 
bricklayers, 3,883 were unemployed, and at the same time the 
following year this had increased to nearly 9,000(t). 
By January 1938,20.1 per cent of the bullding workforce was , 
unemployed, and unemployment In skilled occupations had risen to 
nearly 50,000(11). 7be whole of 1938 appears to have been a time of 
recession in the building Industry, the effects of rearmament being 
more than offset by a decline In other kinds of activity. In February 
1939 the Ministry of Labour recorded that 
it Is plain that so far as ordinary civil work 
is concerned there has been a decline In 
building activity. The value of plans approved 
by 146 local authorities in Great Britain for' 
all categories of buildings during 1938 was 
E97.6m. this was over E13m. or 12 per cent 
less than In 1937010. 
Building activity was once more increasing by the summer of 1939, 
but 12.1 per cent of the workforce (including 30,000 skilled men) was 
Ov) 
still Idle In May 
Altogether the evidence that building labour was a major 
restraint on the War Office's rearmament effort, even In the context 
of business as usual, Is very slight. A Ministry of Labour report 
of July 1938 Indicated that 
Twelfth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 291). 
CAB 16/141. 
Twentieth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 231). 
CAB 16/143. 
Twenty-sixth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 300). 
CAB 16/143. 
(IV) Twenty-eighth Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 316). 
CAB 16/144. 
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the demands of the defence programmes for 
building labour have on the whole been satis- 
factorily met up to the present time(l). 
And despite the acceleration of the War Office's programme in the 
spring of 1939, the Ministry of Labour recorded In June of that year 
that, 
During the past two months satisfactory 
progress on the building programmes of the 
Government Departments continued to be made 
and, except for a few case of local shortage 
which were, for the most part resolved 
through departmental action or with the 
assistance of the building trade unions, 
no major difficulties were experienced 
on defence contracts on account of the 
shortage of skilled building operatives(II). 
It seems that labour shortage In the building Industry has been 
exaggerated as a limiting factor In rearmament. 7be same may well 
be true of engineering labour, though one must tread more cautiously 
here. Like building, engineering underwent something of a slump 
in late 1937 and 1938 and there was considerable unemployment In the 
Industry throughout the rearmament period. It must be recognized, 
however, that immobility of labour was always a problem with British 
industry In the inter-war years. Workers often could not be persuaded 
to uproot themselves and their families to seek work far from their 
0 
native districts and so labour shortage and unemployment could exist 
at the same time and in the same trades In different areas. It is 
Interesting, however, that the official historian concluded that labour 
Twenty-third Report by the Ministry of Labour (D. P. R. 279). 
CAB 16/143. 
Twenty-eighth Report by the Ministry of Labour, (D. P. R. 316). 
CAB 16/143. 
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shortage had not had any major, effect on the pre-war rearmament 
of the Army(l). 
I 
Though a massive amount of additional research on labour 
problems Is needed before really firm conclusions can be reached, ý 
the Treasury argument, endorsed by 00, C. Peden that skilled labour 
was a major Industrial bottleneck which would have rendered the 
expenditure of vast numbers of "paper pounds" to a great extent 
ineffective(") must be treated with considerable caution as, far as the, 
Army Is concerned. 7be relationship between, the scale of the 
rearmament effort and the amount of skilled labour required was by 
(hi) 
no means a simple one. In some cases greater financial flexibility 
and therefore a greater assured volume of orders would have justified 
the Industrialist In making a capital outlay sufficient to deskill a 
process, thus allowing greater production with less skilled labour., As 
N. H. Gibbs has pointed out, Sir Charles Craven Issued dire warnings 
of shortages of skilled labour at Vickers 
ýiv) 
Craven, however, 
explained to Sir Tbomas Inskip In connection with the production of 
anti-aircraft guns, that the volume of orders given was the governing 
factor In the acceleration of production. Because Vickers were 
"right down to bed rock" in terms of skilled labour, Craven explained, 
the only way of overcoming production problems was by deskilling 
Imnan, Labour In the Munitions Industries, (H. M. S. 0.1957), 
p. 17. - 
Peden, 'op. I cit., P. 180. 
R. A. C. Parker "British Rearmament 1936-39: Treasury, Trade Unions 
and Skilled Labour", English Historical Review, April 1981, shows how inadequate and confused our evidence on this topic is. 
(iv) Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Vol. 1, p. 310. 
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jobs and employing a large proportion of sem I-skilled -personnel. 
7his necessitated employing jigs to the maximum possible extent 
and was only practicable If a steady supply of orders over a 
considerable period of time could be guaranteed. 7he real obstacle 
to the placing of orders on a sufficiently large scale In this particular 
case was, as the M. G. 0., Sir Hugh Elles, pointed out,, lack, of . 
financial authority('). It Is clear that,, as In the case of machine 
tools, Treasury-imposed controls could sometimes exacerbate or even 
create, rather than relieve, industrial- bottlenecks. 
Artillery Ammunition and New Government Factories 
From the first D. R. C. report onwards, the War Office consistently 
placed strong emphasis on the need to ensure a substantial supply of ý 
artillery ammunition. -The influence of that old artilleryman 
Wntgomery-Massingberd is clearly discernible In the D. R. C. report, ý 
of February 1934 which states that 
The provision of an adequate supply of ammunition 
is vital to the success of a modern army and it 
is ýunthinkable after our experiences in the past 
that we should allow ourselves to get Into a 
position which would force us to go to war 
handicapped by a shortage of these essential 
munitions(U). 
7be f Irst D. R. C. report was not accepted by the Cabinet and the 
provision it made for the Army was drastically reduced by the 
influence of Neville Chamberlain. But as soon. as a real rearmament 
effort began, early in 1936, the War Off Ice made ýa determined effort 
C. 1. D. Minutes of 280th Meeting, Item 5v 10th July 1936. 
CAB 2/6. 
(it) D. R. C. ý 
14, para. 88. CAB 16/109. 
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to provide the necessary, ammunition. As early as 27th April 1936, 
the War Office was proposing to spend 921,000,000 on ammunition 
components alone. 7his did not Include the cost of the necessary 
cordite and T. N. T. nor the expense of building new government 
factories(l). 
In its emphasis on shell supply, the War Office was- obviously 
very much Influenced by the experience of the First World War when 
unpreparedness In this respect had proved nearly, catastrophic 
'rhough the supply of artillery ammunition was a less critical problem 
for the British Army In the Second World War it would be unjust to 
accuse the War Office of preparing for the last war Instead'of for the 
next, The fact that shell was not such a problem for the British Army 
In the Second World War as It was In the First was due partly to 
somewhat better pre-war preparation, and partly, to the swift collapse, 
of the Western Front In 1940. Between June 1940 and June 1944 the 
British Army did not have to face the main enemy In the main theatre 
of war. The War office's emphasis upon ammunition supply during 
rearmament was quite legitimate and cannot easily be criticized 
without taking undue advantage of hindsight. 
Many components of artillery ammunition, - such as shell bodies, 
cartridge cases 4 and fuses were produced In large numbers by private 
enterprise, but the production of the necessary cordite and T. N. T. 
was carried out. mainly In factories under government control("'). 
T. I. S. C. 8th Meeting, 27th April 1936. T161/1315. 
Statement by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
(D. 1R. C. 7), para. 3,9th January 1934. CAB 16/109. 
Hornby, Factories and Plant, pp. 91-120. 
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The development of Industrial capacity for the production of 
cordite "and T. N. T. and for the f Illing of shell became a major source 
of conflict between the War Office a-nd'the Treasury. The conflict 
arose from fundamental differences between Duff Cooper and the General 
Staff on the one hand and Chamberlain, Fisher, Hopkins and Bridges 
on the other as to the character which the rearmament effort as a 
whole ought to take. 7be programme which the Cabinet accepted In 
February 1936 made no provision for war equipment for the Territorial 
Contingents of the Field Force and postponed a decision on their 
rearmament for three years('). But the General Staff believed it 
essential that the First Contingent of the Field Force be reinforced 
quickly and substantially by Territorial Contingents and'that these should 
have adequate s-upplIes of ammunition. As late as Sth May 1937, shortly 
before his replacement by Hore-ýBellsha, Duff Cooper was still pressing 
this point on the Cabinet 
War office representatives at the T. I. S. C., Including Sir Harold 
Brown and Mr. Kenneth Lyon, Initially made a determined effort to 
obtain enough money from the Treasury to create reserve industrial 
capacity to provide the Territorials as well as the Regulars with 
ammunition for Continental warfare( 
"'). According to the War Office 
there was a distinction between providing war equipment and creating 
reserve industrial capacity. 7be Cabinet had decided against the 
D. P. IR. 9, pa ra. 21,6 th F ebrua ry 1936. CAB 16 /123. 
Cabinet Minutes, 5th May 1937. (26 (37) 4). CAB 23/88. 
T. I. S. C. 37th Meeting, 7th October 1936 and T. I. S. C. 40th 
Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
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provision of war equipment for the Territorials, but had not, In the 
War Office view, ruled out the establishment of reserve potential. 
The Treasury adopted a narrower interpretation and used Its 
financial control to restrict the building of factories so as to make It 
virtually Impossible for the War Office to provide for the Territorial, 
Contingents of the Field Force. The Treasury maintained that the 
War Office was entitled to create capacity to meet the needs only of 
the First (Regular) Contingent and of the air and coastal defences of 
Great Britain and ports abroad'). 
Filling Factories 
Before rearmament, filling capacity for shell and aircraft bombs 
was concentrated at one Royal Filling Factory, which was part of the 
Woolwich Arsenal complex("). As early as April 1935 It had been 
recognized that the Woolwich site was too vulnerable to air attack 
and plans for the removal of this capacity to Scotland were under 
discussion("'). But it was not until October 1936 that the Service 
departments had fully worked out their plans for the development of 
filling capacity during rearmament(lv). As the War Office was the 
department In charge of all the Royal Ordnance Factories It was a 
War ()ffice representative, Mr. Kenneth Lyon, who explained these 
W. 0. Memo., no. 54,23rd October 1936 and T. 1. S. C. 
40th Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
William Hornby Factories and Plant (H. M. S. O., 1958), pp. 91-2. 
C. 1. D. 269th Meeting, Item 4,16th April 1935. CAB 2/6.. 
War office Memo., no. 51,2nd October 1936. T161/1316. 
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plans at the T. I. S. C. 
I 
Lyon told the Treasury that the Services required three new, 
factories, two for filling shell and bombs for the Army and the 
B. A. F., and the third to undertake a variety of different kinds 
of filling for the Navy. 7be full requirements of the Army, (including 
the T. A. ), necessitated the building of a fourth factory, but as the 
Cabinet had decided to postpone the rearmament of the Territorials, 
the construction of this factory would have to be deferred, though the 
War Office wanted to buy the site for It at Oswestry In Shropshire. 
The factories which the War Office wanted to build at once were 




Naval Factory 5,250 1 000 E16,875 000(l) 
The War Office representatives Immediately ran Into difficulties 
with the Treasury over these proposals. Mr. Edward Bridges became 
alarmed at the increase In cost of the first two filling factories over 
that anticipated in the Bobinson report. When the Bobinson report 
was compiled In 1934, naval requirements had not been worked out,, 
but the estimated cost of the two factories which were Intended to 
cater for the demands of the Army and the R. A. F. had Increased 
from ETL million to over f. 11 million and Bridges demanded an 
explanation. Lyon explained that the rise was actually due to an 
increase in Air Ministry requirements for the first year of war. 
The B. A. F. 's needs were by this stage estimated at 1,000 tons of 
(1) T. 1. S. C. 37th Meeting, 7th October 1936. T161/1316. 
-193- 
bombs per week, a 50 to 60, per cent increase. Army requirements 
had actually gone down, Lyon claims, because of the decision not 
to-provide for the Terri torials 
(1). 
But Bridges suspected that with the whole of the programme for 
new government factories the War Office was trying to make some 
proviston, for the Territorial Army, and In this he may have been 
correct. In a Treasury internal minute commenting on the War 
Office's proposals, Bridges emphastsed that, 
What we have got to be sure of is that the War , 
Office are not getting around the Cabinet decision 
which deferred the rearmament of the Territorial 
Army for three years ... Why have all require- 
ments gone up so largely 
he asked 
and what is the hypothesis on which, they are 
based. (I should not be surprised to find 
that the War Cffice are contemplating warfare 
on the Intensive basis reached at the end of 
the last war, after years of effort. F ra nkly 
is it possible to be In a position to start 
off with land warfare at this Immense pressure, 
only reached In the last war after years of 
prepa ratio 00 0' 
At a, T. 1. S. C. meeting on 7th October 1936, the Treasury officials, 
Sir Richard Hopkins and Mr. Edward Bridges, decided that the policy 
on which the Service departments were basing their requirements was 
unclear. The Service departments were ordered to draw up a- 
reasoned and detailed account of their requirements for the Chancellor 
of the EXchequer 
T. 1. S. C. 
Bridge's 











7th October 1936. T161/1316. 
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By its Insistence on this detailed review, the Treasury succeeded 
In imposing a considerable delay on the building programme for, new 
government factories. Referral to the Chancellor was a favourite. 
Treasury tactic for reducing the scale of the Service departments 
demands. The Service departments knew that If they submitted to 
this procedure while sticking to their original proposals, Interminable 
delays could-be imposed upon them. The only way to minimize the 
delay was to reduce their demands. , The Treasury was always on 
firm ground when It told the War Office that the hypothesis on which 
its demands were based was unclear and not approved by higher 
authority. The War Office was never given any definite Instruction 
from the Cabinet about the kind of, war It was meant to be preparing 
for, and any hypothesis the department came up with of Its own accord 
could be declared "not approved" by the Treasury. 
On 27th October 1936, Sir Harold Brown, an exceptionally force- 
ful negotiator, came in person to the T. I. S. C. to lend support to 
Lyon. Brown tried to obtain the Treasury's agreement to the 
expenditure of 93 million on the Chorley factory before the general 
review of requirements was complete.. The War Cffice argued, that 
whatever the Chancellor concluded about the programme as a whole, the 
size of the Chorley factory was not likely to be reduced. If a 
reduct- Ion had to be made it would be made at Bridgend. ' The Treasury 
officials, however, only reaffirmed that no major expenditure should 
be incurred until the general review of requirements had been drawn 
up and endorsed by the Chancellor('). 
(i) T. I. S. C. 40th Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
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There was In fact a long delay In producing an estimate of the 
over-all Service requirements, but this was not, apparently, due to 
the War Office. 7be main problem seems to have been that "naval 
. (t) 
requirements were still under consideration" The Admiralty's 
slowness may have been the result of the prevailing uncertainty about 
the "standard" of naval strength at which 
(11) It was authorized to aim 
7bough the War Office did eventually obtain permission to go ahead 
with Chorley In December 1936, In advance of the completion of the 
general review, this agreement was only obtained by making a 
considerable conicession. The War Office agreed to defer some 
construction at Chorley "until an emergency arose", this reducing the 
estimated cost from E7 million to f. 534- million("') 4 
On 9th MY 1937, the War Office gained sanction to recondition 
the old Royal Filling Factory at Woolwich at a cost of over El, 000,000 
as it was obvious by this stage that Service requirements for reserves 
or filled shell could not otherwise be met by 21st March 1939, the 
target-date for the completion of the deficiency* programme. It had 
not originally been Intended to rely heavily on Woolwich for filling 
because it was considered too vulnerable to air attack. But the 
Treasury had delayed the building of Chorley, and, as Sir Alan 
l3arlow was forced to admit, 
T. I. S. C. 52nd Meeting, 17th December 1936. T161/1316. 
Peden, op. cit., pp. 115-7. 
T. I. S. C. 52nd Meeting, 17th December 1936. T161/1316. 
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it was'clear, that both the Army and the Navy 
programmes would be thrown badly out of 
balance If the capacity to meet the deficiencies 
In question was not provided at Woolwich(l). 
it was July 1937 before the Treasury's review of over-all Service 
requirements for new government factories was completed, and only on 
the 21st of that month did the War Office receive permission to go I 
ahead with the Bridgend factory and the factory for naval requirements 
at Glascoed on the Clyde. This was surely an unpardonable delay. 
Moreover, Treasury sanction was only granted on condition that the 
War office would consider deferring as much as possible of the con- 
struction at these factories until the onset of a national emergency. 
The result of this Treasury procrastination was that at the outbreak 
of war the Service departments were still heavily dependent upon 
Woolwich and upon an old First World War filling factory at Hereford, 
which In July 1937, the War Cffice was given permission to bring 
back into production at a cost of E804,000(u). 
The Czechoslovak crisis of September 1938 secured Treasury 
consent to the acceleration of work at Chorley at a cost'of E225,000(l"). 
The acceptance of a Continental commitment in February 1939 and the 
decision to double the Territorial Army In March revolutionized the 
situation. Not only was the building work at Chorley, Bridgend and 
Glascoed expanded and accelerated at greatly Increased cost, but, 
by August 1939, three entirely new filling factories were being planned 
T. I. S. C. 88th Meeting, Item 3,9th July 1937. T161/1319. 
(ii) T. I. S. C. 90th Meeting, Item 11,21st July 1937. T161/1319. 
(iii) T. I. S. C. 171st Meeting, Item 1,30th September 1938. T161/13'6117. 
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by the newly created Ministry of *Supply('). None of these'new 
filling factories was in operation In September 1939, however, and 
thus the War Office was well short of the filling capacity necessary, 
to provide for a large Field Force in a Continental war. 
Cordite Factories 
When, on 2nd October 1936, the War Office sent the Treasury its 
proposals for the development of new cordite factories, the Cabinet 
had already decided that the existing government cordite, factory at 
Waltham should be replaced by one at either Bishopton or Gretna, 
because Waltham was considered very vulnerable to air raids. The 
building of the new government cordite factory was expected to take 
two years. Sir Harold Brown believed It dangerous to rely entirely 
on a factory which would not be ready for such a long period and 
suggested that in the meantime an arrangement be made with 1. C. 1. 
to expand their cordite works at Ardeer, a task which It was estimated 
I. C. I. would be able to carry out within nine months. 7he capacity 
for cordite production available before rearmament- amounted tp 
250 tons per week at Waltham and 50 tons at Ardeer., 7be scheme for 
expanding Ardeer was intended to Increase capacity there to 300 tons 
and the War Cffice wanted to build the new government factory to a 
capacity of 500 tons, thus expanding the country's total capacity from 
300 tons to 800 tons 
(u) 
* 
(i) T. 1. S. C. 254th Meeting, 28th August 1939. T161/1335. 
(11) . War 
Office Memorandum, no. 51,2nd. October 1936.7161/1316. 
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Cordite was clearly causing the''War Office considerable anxiety. 
Ib e R. A. F. , diý not use"the substance In large quantities, ' and 'the 
Navy produced its own at Holton Heath. The new government factory 
and the Ardeer extension were thus obviously for Army purposes. It 
was therefore Impossible for the War Office to create extra capacity 
for the Territorial Anny without the Treasury noticing and so the 
War Office was forced to declare its position. 
If no war potential were to be created for the 
T. A., a portion only of the proposed new factory 
would be necessary, but the new factory is to be 
our, permanent cordite factory, and a cordite 
factory cannot be expanded with safety while 
operating, It Is proposed to build the new 
factory to Its full war capacity: this with 
Ardeer will give 7370 of full Army requirements. 







The Treasury, however, was not prepared to accept the War 
Office's proposals. Sir Richard Hopkins, the chairman of the T. I. S. C. 
suggested that If a cordite factory could not be expanded while In 
operation, the War Office should build a factory only half the proposed 
size, Le. 250 Instead of 500 tons, and then build an entirely 
separate factory for the T. A. when war broke out. Over the Ardeer 
extension, the Admiralty representatives strongly supported the War 
Office. The Admiralty's own cordite factory at Holton Heath was In 
an "area,. -.. vulnerable not to intensive, but certainly to sporadic---- 
(1) 1. S. C. 37th Meeting, 7th October 1936. T161/1316. 
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attack from the air". The Admiralty had no alternative source of 
supply If Holton Heath were out of action, and therefore welcomed the 
Ardeer proposal "as a measure of Insurance". But the Admiralty 
took the Treasury's side over the new government factory and supported 
Sir ]Richard Hopkins' suggestion that the War Office should plan two 
small cordite factories rather than one large factory and that the 
construction of the second factory, for T. A. requirements,, should be 
po s tpo ned., 
The full capacity of Holton Heath was 150 tons, 
and the experience of the Admiralty at Holton 
Heath was that on grounds of safety and 
economical working, the capacity of a single 
unit should not exceed 200 tons. 
The Treasury therefore decided that negotiations with I. C. I., concerning 
the Ardeer factory should continue, but urged the War Office to 
reduce drastically the proposed capacity of the government factory to 
be built In peacetime. The War Office's attempt to create at least 
some capacity for the Territorial Contingents of the Field Force was 
thus firmly rejected by the Treasury('). 
The War Office did not give up easily, however, and on 27th 
October 19369 Sir Harold Brown came in person to the T. 1. S. C. to 
re-open the whole question of new government factories. Brown was 
unable to avoid conceding that cordite capacity should be created 
for the Regular Army only In peacetime, and accepted that the new 
government cordite capacity should be built to a capacity of only 
250 tons initially. But Brown urged the 
(1) T. 1. S. C. 37th Meeting, 7th October 1936. T161/1316'. '-' 
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provision now of certain essential services 
and plant which would be required In war 
for ... expansion ... to 500 tons to provide for a proportion of Territorial Army require- 
ments. 
7be cost of a 250 ton factory with facilities for- expansion to 500 tons 
was estimated at 931 milliono). 
Sir Harold Brown pointed out, that the war requirements of the 
Army and the R. A. F. were 1,100 tons per week If the Territorial 
Army were included but only 320 tons If It were excluded. The 
War Office could not accept the delay involved In providing a 
separate factory. for T. A. requirements after the outbreak of war. 
Brown admitted that the War Office's original proposals had made some 
provision for the Territorials and recognized that no authority existed 
for providing the T. A. with war equipment. But the War Office 
did not consider building a reserve cordite 
factory as equivalent to providing war equip- 
ment for the T. A. 7bey considered It, 
having regard to the time factor, as a 
necessity without which the equipment, when 
provided would be useless. 
Brown pointed out that 
Although It has been decided not to provide war 
equipment for the T. A., there is no decision 
that It will not be used as part of the Field 
Force. it is already partly equipped with guns 
etc., and the War Office was not prepared to 
take the risk of providing nothing but a factory 
which, would only suffice for the Regular Army(10. 
This quoted passage can be seen as a serious attack on wha't the 
War. Office believed an illogical policy which the Cabinet and the 
Treasury were pursuing. in arming, the Pegular Army for Continental 
T. I. S. C. 40th Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
War Office Memorandum, no. 54,23rd October 1936. T161/1316. 
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warfare without preparing the Territorial Army to reinforce It, the 
War Office believed that the National Government was making a 
cardinal error. Sir Harold Brown and Mr. ý Kenneth Lyon argued this 
at the T. I. S. C. and the same view was put forward by Duff Cooper 
at Cabinet level('). 
Eventually, the War Cffice was not even allowed to build a 
250 ton cordite factory with capacity for expansion in war. 7be total 
cordite requirements for the Regular Army and the R. A. F. amounted 
to 320 tons per week. Bridges pointed out that Ardeer plus a 250 
ton government factory would provide much more than that("). 7be 
matter was referred to the Chancellor of the EKcheq uer, Sir John 
Simon, who eventually decided that approved Service requirements 
could be met by a factory planned either: - 
(a) with a capacity of 250 tons a week, but 
without further provision for expansion in war, 
or I 
(b) with a capacity of say 130 tons a week, or 
whatever'the smallest size compatible with 
economy and efficiency, but with provision 
for further expansion In war(III). 
The War Cffice opted for the second alternative and proposed 
that the factory be of 163 tons capacity - "this size being the most 
suitable from the point of view of economy and efficiency" - with 
the provision of facilities to enable expansion to 500 tons In war. 
The War Office gave an estimate of E3,000,000 as the cost of this 
Cabinet Minutes, Sth May 1937 (20 (37) 4). CAB 23/88. 
T. I. S. C. 40th Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
T. 1. S. C. 56th Meeting, 14th January 1937. T161/1316. 
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factory, the Treasury gave sanction for -it on 14th January 1937, and 
the site was settled at Bishopton by the decision of the Cabinet('). 
It Is interesting to note that by June 1938, ý the War Office's 
estimate, of the cost of the Bishopton factory had gone up by about 
5097.. An estimate of, E3,000,000 for the'building of a government 
cordite factory had been made as early as 1934, and as Bridges pointed 
out In June 1938 
although the estimate ... had not been revised 
since, no reference to this fact had been made 
when It was submitted for the Committee's 
approval in January 193701). 
it Is quite likely that the War Office had deliberately failed to revise 
the estimate upwards. Had the War Office given a more accurate 
estimate of cost, the Treasury might have Insisted on a further 
reduction In the amount of cordite capacity to be created or further 
postponed granting financial sanction. The Treasury missed this 
trick. By June 1938 it was too late for the Treasury to withdraw 
financial approval, and rearmament seemed much more urgent In view 
of the deteriorating International situation. Though the Treasury held 
most of the trumps, sleight of hand could still win the War Office 
an occasional game. 
In October 1936, the Treasury had agreed In principle to th e 
extension of I. C. I. 'S factory at Ardeer but the details had 
not then been worked out, and It was 19th March 1937 before the 
T. I. S. C. 56th Meeting, 14th January 1937. T161/1316. 
T. I. S. C. 148th 'Meeting, 16th June 1938. T161/1324. 
T. I. S. C. 40th Meeting, 22nd October 1936. , T161/1316. 
-203- 
entire scheme was placed before the T. 1. S. C. 
(1) It appears that 
the War Office had difficulty In negotiating a deal with I. C. I. which 
the Treasury would be likely to approve. Indeed, even In March 
1937, though -the Treasury officials accepted the War Office's proposals 
In most respects, they continued to question the size of the construc- 
tion'and agency fees to be paid to'I. C. 1. It'was, however, ' "I eventually 
decided that a total capacity of 300 tons per week was to be provided 
at Ardeer at a cost to the government of about El million("). ' In the 
crisis atmosphere of September 1938 the War Office had no trouble 
in gaining Treasury approval for the acceleration of work at Ardeer 
in order to complete the expansion of the factory In March 1939 
instead of July. The. Committee of Imperial Defence authorized this 
step before it was submitted to the T. I. S. C., and, during the 
czechoslovak crisis, even the Treasury was not disposed to argue, 
about it 
Oli) 
By the beginning of January 1939, largely due to the enormous 
expansion of the Air Defence of Great Britain which followed -the" 
Cabinet's adoption of the "Ideal Scheme" "on 7th Nbvember 1938, Army 
and R. A. F. requirement for cordite had-reached 795 tons''per week 
compared with 320 tons in October 1936. ' 7hd Cabinet's decision' 
greatly increased the authorized number of A. A. guns, and'inevitably 
resulted In a very much bigger demand for ammunition'reserves and 
War Office Memorandum, no. 73,17th March 1937. T161/1317. 
T. I. S. C. 68th Meeting, 19th March 1937. M61/1317. 
T. I. S. C. 167th Meeting, 22nd September 1938 and War Office 
Memorandum, no. 487,21st September 1938. T161/1326. 
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reserve industrial capacity(t) 
Following the acceptance of a Continental commitment In February 
1939, the decision to double the Territorial Army In March, and the 
introduction of conscription In April, Army requirements for material 
of all kinds escalated in accordance with the Treasury's worst fears. 
In January 1939 approved Army and R. A. F. requirements for cordite 
stood at 795 tons per week. By 8th June 1939 they had reached 
1,275 tons(' But by that time the era of tight Treasury control 
was almost over, and external as well as Internal realities had to 
be faced. It, Is Interesting that when, In 1939, the Treasury came to 
realize the gravity of the situation, there were no claims that the 
money could not be found. 7he situation proved that the War Office's 
original proposals in the'D. R. C. report of 1935, to provide capacity 
for the Territorials as well as the Regulars, were necessary, and 
the Treasury was forced tacitly to admit that they had been practicable 
all along. 
On 8th June 1939-the'War Office sought and gained Permission to 
make a detailed survey of a site for a second government cordite 
factory at Wrexham("'). Neither the Wrexham factory nor the 
Bishopton works was In production at the outbreak of war, however, 
and the War Mice was thus gravely short of the cordite capacity 
necessary to supply a mass army In a Continental campaign. Inskip 
recorded in his diary on 8th September 1939 that far reaching 
decisions on fresh factories for the Army had been taken that day. 
(1) War Office Memorandum, no. 606,4th January 1939. T161/1329. 
(10 T. 1. S. C. 228th Meeting, Item 25,8th June 1939. T161/1333. 
(ill) T. I. S. C. 228th Meeting, Item 25,8th June 1939. T161/1333. 
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It was expected that 32 divisions would be ready by October 1940, but 
capacity only for sixteen divisions. Cordite and explosives were 
the great needs('). 7his was the situation against which the War 
Office had been warning for three years. 
I T. N. T. Factories 
Before rearmament there was very little T. N. T. capacity avail- 
able in Britain, a situation which the Service departments regarded 
as extremely alarming because It was "virtually Impossible to wage 
war without ittf(ii). In October 1936, a 25 ton plant was under 
construction at Irvine in Scotland, 20 ton plant existed at Messrs. 
Athole Allen's works at Stockton, and Imperial Chemical Industries 
had a total capacity of 49 tons. The War Office Informed the Treasury 
that 
Full requirements for the Army, Navy and 
Air Force necessitate three T. N. T. factories. 
As it is not Intended to provide for the T. A. p it Is proposed to build only two factories, but 
also to buy land for the third factory now. 
The War Office wanted to establish the first large T. N. T. 
factory at Irvine In southern Scotland where a small plant was 
already under construction, and expected to build the second and third 
factories in Wales and Cumberland respectively. 7be cost of the 
two factories which it was Intended to construct in peacetime was 
estimated at: - 
Inskip's diary, 8th September 1939. INKP 2 (Inskip Papers, 
Churchill College, Cambridge). 
Principal Supply officers' 13th Annual ]Report, Ist August 
1935 - 31st July 1936, para. 25. WEIR 18/3 (Weir Papers). 
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Irvine 
Second Factory 1,100,000 
2,000,000(l) 
As we have already noted, on 7th October 1937 the Treasury 
decided to delay sanctioning the whole programme for new government 
factories on the grounds that the policy on which the Service 
departments were basing their requirements was unclear. The Treasury 
officials ordered the Service departments to draw up a detailed and 
reasoned account of their requirements for submission to the 
Chancellor (ii) * 
Sir Harold Brown believed that the War Office could not afford 
to wait until such a review was complete. On 27th October 1936 he 
asked Hopkins and Bridges, "on grounds of urgency" to give financial 
sanction for the first two T. N. T. factories In advance of the general 
review of requirements. By this time the War Office had decided on 
the site for the second factory, which was to be at Pembrey in 
South Wales. 7bough the third factory, for T. A. requirements, was 
not to be built until the outbreak of war, Sir Harold wanted to 
purchase a site for it at WhItehaven In Cumberland. 7he D. C. M. P. 
argued that whatever conclusion the Chancellor came to about 
over-all Service requirements, one 300-ton T. N. T. factory would be 
(fit) 
needed as an absolute minimum 
In the case of T. N. T. factories, the Treasury showed some 
willingness' to'compromise. Bridges decided to give peimission'f6i "' - 
work to start on the first factory, which was to be at Irvine, and he 
War Office Memorandum, no. 51,2nd October'1936. T161/1316. 
T. I. S. C. 37th Meeting, 7th October 1936. T161/1316'., 
T. I. S. C. 40th Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
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approved the -purchase of acid-making -plant for the Pembrey factory. 
7be War Cffice explained that the up-to-date acid-making equipment 
which It required for this factory "could only be got from Germany". 
7be War Cff ice was' now ready to go out to tender for it and - "feared 
serious delays unless tenders were Issued at once". 7be Treasury 
was not prepared, ' however, to give approval for the construction of 
the Pembrey factory. Brown was told to waid until the total requirements 
of the Services had been worked out and submitted to the ChancellorM. 
it was not until July 1937, over a year after the beginning of 
the rearmament effort, that the construction of the second T. N. T. 
factory was approved. In the meantime complaints were received" 
from the Office of Works (which was In charge of negotiations with 
building contractors) that lack of financial sanction was making, forward 
planning -extremely difficult("). On 21st July 1937 the Treasury at 
last sanctioned the building of a 350 ton factory at Pernbrey at a cost 
of 91,1009 000(111). As a result of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, 
the War -office was granted permission to accelerate the building of 
B. O. F. Pembrey, and this increased the cost so that at least E439,000 
(IV) 
had been added to the original estimate by the outbreak of war 
Following the acceptance of a Continental commitment and the ' 
deciston'to double the Territorial Army, the War-Office's demand 
for T. N. T. increased substantially. On 30th March 1939, Lyon 
T. I. S. C. 40th'Meeting, 27th October 1936. T161/1316. 
T. I. S. C. 81st Meeting, 29th May 1937. T161/1318. 
T. 1. S. C. 90th Meeting, item 11,21st July 1937. 
(IV) T. I. S. C. 165th Meeting, Item 4, September 1938 (precise 
date not recorded). T161/1326. 
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approached Sir Alan Barlow of the Treasury about the expansion of 
Messrs. Athole, Allen's works at Stockton. The Treasury and the 
Home Office were displaying concern about the safety aspects of 




On 28th August 1939, the recently created Ministry of Supply 
sent a delegation to the T. I. S. C. to demand a massive programme 
(it) 
for new government factories One of the Items on the Ministry of 
I 
Supply's list was a new T. N. T. factory expected to cost 92,008,000. 
By this stage R. 0. F. Irvine and R. 0. F. Pembrey each had a capacity 
of 300 tons per week and 160 tons were produced by private enterprise 
making a total of 760 tons altogether. But at least 1,122 tons per 
week were thought necessary for the first year of war("'). 7be new 
T. N. T. factory which the Ministry of Supply was demanding obviously 
could not have been in production by 3rd September 1939, and the 
Service departments were thus well below their requirements at the 
beginning of the war. Shortage of explosives was seen as a significant 
restraint on the 
(iv) 
expansion of the Field Army 
Gun Production 
From the beginning of rearmament the War Office was extremely 
concerned- by the inadequacy of the gun-making capacity available in 
Britain(v). Many aspects of gun-making Involved a high degree of 
T. L S. C. 214th Meeting, 30th March 1939. T161/1331. 
T. L S. C. 254th Meeting, 28th August 1939. T161/1335. 
Ministry of Supply Memorandum, no. 28/39. T161/1335. 
(IV) Inskip's diary, 8th September 1939. INKP 2 (Inskip Papers). 
(V) War Office Memorandum, no. 5,21st April 1936.7161/1315. 
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skill of a kind only readily available in the Royal Ordnance 
Factories and established armament firms. At the end of 1936 the 
War Office was still entirely dependent for the supply of gun forgings 
on the R. 0. F., Vickers and Beardmore's. According to Sir Harold 
Brown these organizations were being strained to the limit by the 
deficiency programme as early as October 1936, and their possibilities 
for expansion being "exploited to the full"(). 7be size of the orders 
which the War Office Intended to place soon became out of proportion 
to the capacity available and the huge expansion of the Air Defence 
of Great Britain which took place over the three years of rearmament 
made supply problems even more acute(II). 
The War Office first approached the Treasury about artillery 
equipments on 27th April 1936, requesting the expenditure of about 
E3,000,000 in the immediate future on orders for guns and on the 
expansion of gun-making capacity. 7be War Office indicated that 
another E3,000,000 would probably be needed over the next three 
years. It was thought best to concentrate Initially on developing the 
capacity of the Boyal Ordnance Factories and established armaments 
f Irms. Of the first 0,000,000 about 91,00o, ooo was Intended to be 
spent at the R. O. F. s. The Treasury's response was guarded. Barlow 
commented that the proposal 
was satisfactory on the assumption that it 
corresponded with the D. P. R. programme, but 
that on the figures available to the Committee 
that correspondence could not be established. 
D. G. M. P. to C. 1. G. S., M. G. 0. and p. U. S. . 23rd October 1936. WO/32/4243. 
(u) T- I. S. C. 180th Meeting, Item 1,4th 1%vember 1938. 
T161/1328. 
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The Treasury thus avoided giving a blanket approval for all the War 
office's proposals and forced the War office to return to the T. 1. S. C. 
for each individual item(l). 
On 28th May Mr. Kenneth Lyon, who had the unenviable task of 
representing the War Office at most T. I. S. C. meetings returned to 
the subject of gun production and requested sanction for the 
expenditure of 9137,000 on machinery for the main government gun 
factory at Woolwich. The Treasury "recognized the necessity for this 
expenditure" and agreed to the proposal("). The Woolwich gun 
factory, however, soon became Inadequate to meet the demands made 
upon it, 
("') and, in July 1936, the War Office successfully insisted upon 
the necessity for a new R. 0. F. at Nottingham. 7be Director of 
Ordnance Factories wanted to purchase an existing building for about 
E400,000 and install In it machinery worth F. 1,200,00000. 
The National Government had a general policy of using rearmament 
to alleviate unemployment by siting new government factories In 
depressed areas(v). it is interesting that In this Instance the 
War office felt it necessary to apologize for not doing so. I 
(i) T. I. S. C. 8th Mee,, ing, 27th April 1936. T161/1315. 
T. I. S. C. 14th Meeting, 28th May 1916. T161/1315. 
Nbte by the War office on the Prospects of Munitions Production 
for Anti-Aircraft Defence (C. I. D. Paper 233-A), para. 3(a) 
8th July 1936. T161/k315. 
OV) T. I. S. C. 24th Meeting, Item 2,17th July 1936.7161/1315. 
(V) Peden, op. cit. , p. ý 83. 
-211- 
7be-choice of site had been limited by the para 
mount urgency of starting production as soon as 
possible. Had It not been so the War Office 
would have preferred to build their own factory, 
say at Glasgow. As it was, the only suitable 
existing factory in which the machines could be 
Installed with a minimum of delay was the factory 
at ýbttingharn which they proposed to acquire. 
it was made clear to the Treasury that there were definite advantages 
In doing as much gun-making as possible In government factories. 
Messrs. Vickers price would be about 98,000 
for a 3.7 Inch gun, whereas the roposed 
factory would make It for E5,000110. 
By October 1936, Sir Harold Brown was anKlous to develop 
capacity outside the R. O. F. s and the established arms firms'as 
these were already fully stretched. 7be problem which most worried 
Brown was the supply of guns for the Air Defence of Great Britain("). * 
The Committee of Imperial Defence had recently brought forward a 
series of proposals for expanding and accelerating the air defence 
programme and the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence had 
recommended that "productive capacity of A. A. and other gun 
equipments should be increased 'by 50(70 to 100(70"(111). 
Brown commented 
I think It Is quite clear that the outstanding 
problem (in the expansion of, the Air Defence 
of Great Britain) is and will be guns. Without 
the additional A. D. G. B. we shall have dLff I- 
culties In meeting requirements of 3.45", 
3.7" and 4.5" guns; with the additional 
requirements we should, failing some major 
addition to the home supply, be driven to 
T. I. S. C. 24th Meeting, Item 2,17th July 1936.7161/1315. 
D. G. M. P. to C. 1. G. S., M. G. 0. and P. U. S., 23rd October 
1936. WO/32/4243. 
I 
Quoted by Sir Harold Brown at T. I. S. C. 44th Meeting, Ilth 
11, bvember 1936.7161/1315. 
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foreign purchases, and even then probably fall 
to meet the situation. 
Taking the question of gun supply as the major 
Issue, 
he continued 
I have felt It necessary to concentrate first 
on forging capacity, which has long been 
recognized as fundamental to the main problem 
of Increasing gun production. It will of course 
be necessary to provide for the finish-machining 
of guns, for mechanisms and mountings, but I 
have no doubt that these problems can be solved, 
and, if the worst came to the worst, we should 
not lose by any steps which provided a stock of 
gun forgings ... 
Sir Harold Indicated three possible sources of gun forgings 
outside the R. 0. F. s and the specialist arms firms. 
a) Firms with experience and capacity who had been out of the 
gun trade since the First World War 
b) other firms, who with assistance in the way of machines and 
advice, might ultimately help each In a small way 
c) Foreign sources of supply. 
Brown was loath to place. any reliance on foreign supplies, and 
commented In a minute to the C. 1. G. S. that 
this should obviously only be a last resort; 
apart from all other objections, I am sure 
it would be expensive and unreliable and Intro- 
duce difficulties in the field. 
Neither was he happy about relying on firms who had never previously 
been Involved In the gun trade because, "in this matter experience 
counts a great deal". He thought It best to concentrate on persuading 
D. G. M. P. to C. I. G. S., M. G. O. and P. U. S., 23rd 
October 1936. 
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firms which had been In' the gun trade In the Great War. ' but left it 
since to redevelop their capacity for the purposes, of rearmament. 
He commented, 
this in effect means going to Sheffield. 
There we have three large firms - Ftrth-Brown, 
Hadftelds and United Steel, all of -whom have 
suitable buildings and plant, (forging and 
heat treatment) and staff familiar with this 
class of work. Two of these firms made guns' 
In la e quantities up to the end of the last 
war(P. 
I 
Brown therefore contacted the managing director of Firth-Brown, Mr. 
A. J. Grant, and received a provisional off er for his, f trm to produce, 
In conjunction with Hadfield's and United Steel,, and, within three years 
of receiving an order, 2,450 forgings suitable for 3.45 Inch, 3.7 inch 
or 4.5 Inch guns. These firms would also rough-machine, bore and 
test the forgings, and supply certain accessories. such as breech- 
' 7he work would be evenly divided between the rings and jackets. 
three firms involved. 
I "This is a much better off er than I had ever hoped to get", 
Brown remarked. 
Even If the deliveries quoted proved optimistic, 
the scheme would still give us much more than 
we could hope to get elsewhere and In much 
shorter time. 7be three firms involved have 
the standing and the experience and the over- 
riding capacity to handle a job of this size(IO. ' 
The C. 1. G. S., Sir Cyril Deverell, and the M. G. 0., SIr, Hugh 
Elles, w ere extremely Impressed when Brown Informed them of the 
D. G. M. P. to C. 1. G. S., M. C. 0., and P. U. S., 23rd 
October 1936. 
D. G. M. P. to C. I. G. S., M. G. O. and P. U. S., 23rd 
October 1936. 
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Sheffield companies' offer. 7bey were glad to have a source of , 
supply not only for A. A. guns but also for the new 3.45 inch 
25 pounder field gun('). Deverell and Elles also concurred lnýBrown's 
assessment of ý the situation when he wrote - I'll I 
In this matter even days are of Importance. , 7be supply of steel for example will undoubtedly 
offer Increasing difficulties, as also will the 
supply of the necessary tools. Further, I happen 
to know that, z even In a month's time, the 
firms' order books will be In such a state that 
they will hesitate to take on further orders(II). 
On Ilth November 1936 the, matter came before the T. 1. S. C. - - and 
Brown in person argued that War Office's case. Brown tried to 
impress Bridges'with the-urgency,, of-the situation and-insisted that it 
was vital that orders be placed at once. He proposed an order for 
550 forgings. Bridges, though he agreed, in principle to the ' 
government-aided expansion of gun-making capacity- by the three 
(III) Sheffield firms, would not sanction Immediate orders Though 
advocating a, higher priority for A. D. C. B. than for any of, the Army's 
other, dutles, even on matters connected with air defence the Treasury 
lacked urgency and could be extremely obstructive. - 
As late as December 1936, when the War Office proposed ordering 
300 3.7 Inch-A. A. gun barrels fromý Sheffield, 
(lvý this met with a 
variety of objections. The War Office pointed out that -ýthe, Defence 
C. 1. G. S. to D. G. M. P., 26th October 1936, and M. G. 0. to 
D. G. M. P., 29th October 1936. WO/32/4243. 
D. G. M. P. -'to'C. 1. G. S., NL G. 0. and P. U. S., ' 23rd 'October 
1936. WO/32/4243. 
T. 1. S. C. 44th Meeting, 11th November 1936. T161/1316. 
(IV) War Office Memorandum, no. 64,13th December 1936. T161/1317. 
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Policy and Requirements Committee had recommended the ordering 
of these guns at a meeting on 26th November 1936(l). But the 
Treasury apparently saw this demand as the thin end of the wedge of 
expenditure on A. D. G. B. Bridges pointed out that "guns represented 
roughly one fifth of the total estimated cost of the A. D. G. B. 
programme . and that "the addition of 300 guns at a cost of f. 2j 
million would appear to involve further heavy commitments". Despite 
the prior approval which the D. P. R. had given to the War Off Ice's 
proposals, the Treasury officials decided to allow the War Office to 
order only 100 of 300 guns for which it was asking 
(11)4 
7he Introduction of the New Army Policy In December 1937 put a 
check on the demand for guns for the Field'Force and until the Cabinet 
belatedly approved the "Ideal Scheme" for A. D. G. B. In Niovember I 
1938, the demand for the heavier types of anti-aircraft gun - 3.7 Inch 
and 4.5 Inch - was also restricted. From November 1938 onwards, 
however, the War Office was at last allowed to place orders for very 
large numbers of guns and demand quickly outran production. 
On 4th November 1938, the War Office, anticipating a Cabinet 
decision to adopt the Ideal Scheme for A. D. G. B. (which included 
1264 heavy guns), put forward a proposal for ordering an additional 
320 3.7 Inch A. A. guns. In order to obtain these, further gun-making 
capacity would have to be developed. Tbough extra mountings and 
barrel-forgings were obtainable from existing sources of supply, not 
D. P. R. 30th Meeting, 26th November 1936. WEIR'17/1 
(Weir Papers). 
T. I. S. C. 52nd Meeting, 19th December 1936. T161/1317.,, 
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enough capacity existed for the finish-machining of barrels. Sir 
Harold Brown came to the conclusion that 
the quickest and most satisfactory production 
under present circumstances would be obtained 
if the production were carried out in a factory, 
under R. O. F. control. 
On condition that the Cabinet actually did adopt the Ideal Scheme, the 
Treasury gave Its approval for ordering the guns and finding a 
site for the new f. actory(O. 
By 21st December 1938, the War Office had found a suitable site. 
According to Lyon, the location of the new factory was Influenced by 
the following factors: - 
(I) it was essential to find an existing 
building suitable for the purpose - there 
was no time to build. 
(U) there must be a suitable'pool of skilled 
labour. 
(III) the site should be in a relatively safe 
area. 
(iv) the area should be one acceptable to 
the Ministry of Labour. 
7he War Office wanted to buy 
certain existing works at Dalmuir on the north 
bank of the Clyde about 7-L miles west of 2 
Glasgow, which location satisfies all the above 
conditions(ii). 
The works were the property of Beardmore's and it was believed that 
they could be obtained for- about E200,000. Repairs to the buildings, 
and the provision of plant and machine tools would bring the total 
cost of establishing the factory to. about El, 180,000. In view of thý-' 
Cabinet's decision on Ideal Scheme the Treasury had little choice 
(i) T. 1. S. C. 180th Meeting; jtem 1,4th November 1938.7161/1328. 
T. 1. S. C. 191st Meeting, Item 7,21st December 1938. 
n6l/1328. 
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other than to agree to this expenditure. 
Though, on 4th Nbvember 1936, the Treasury had consented, ' to 
the ordering of 320 heavy- A. A. guns In, anticipation of the Cabinet's 
adoption of the Ideal Scheme, the'War Off! ce'belleved 'that, this, was 
nowhere near enough to fulfil the scheme's demands. - , On 17th January 
1939, Lyon asked for authority to order a further 366 3.7 Inch guns(i). 
At this-point the Treasury officials became alarmed at the'exPenditure 
involved. 
, Much enlightenment 
has been claimed for the Treasury In, -Its 
attitude to the Air Defence of Great Britain 
(11) 
and the War Office 
has been subjected to a, good deal of criticism on the same subject 
(111)0 
it is, , however, quite clear that while f rom - 1936 'onwards ý the"War 
Office consistently pressed for increased, production of, A. A. guns, the 
Treasury's response, was frequently very unhelpful 
It is remarkable that as late as January 1939, Treasury, officials' , 
at the T. 1. S. C. were trying, to put a brake on air defence expenditure. 
Sir Alan Barlow became worried that-the, War Office was -trying to 
make provision for, more A.. A. guns than had been envisaged by the 
Cabinet when it approved the ý Ideal Scheme. ý Brigadier Loch of the 
General Staff explained that "theideal Scheme was now, regarded In 
the War Office as an under-insurance" - clear proof that the War, 
Office was ahead of the, Treasury'ln: Its thinking about'A. Do Go, B. 
T. 1. S. C. 196th Meeting,, Item 1,, 17th- January 1939. T161/1329. ' 
Peden, op. cit., p. 182. 
Outline of the Opposition to the Development of Anti-Aircraft 
Defence of Great Britain. 11/1938/80 (Liddell Hart Papers, 
King's College London) and Pile, Ack-Ack (Harrap 1949), p. 77. 
I 
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Barlow informed the War office that In view of the magnitude of VCL 
the commitment, and the scale of A. D. G. B. which was not assumed, 
the decision must be referred to the Chancellor of the Exchequer"('). 
Fortunately, after consultation with Inskip and'Hore-Belisha, the 
Chancellor quickly decided that the, War Office's proposals'Must be 
approved"). 
Following the acceptance of a Continental commitment In February 
1939, the General Staff became Increasingly concerned byý the state of 
the field artillery, which had suffered from the much higher IndustrialL 
(Iii) 
priority accorded to anti-aircraft guns It was obviously 
necessary- to place large orders for new field guns In order to equip 
the Field Force for a Continental campaign. But by June 1939 all 
gun factories were working to capacity and were still unable to cope 
with demand. Early in June the War Office gained authority -to 
establish a new Royal Ordnance Factory for gun manufacture at Leeds. 
This factory was, not In operation at- the outbreak of war, howevert 
and at that time there was an acute shortage both of guns and of 
(IV) 
gun-making capacity 
7broughout the rearmament period of the War Office, and 
particularly the D. G. M. P., Sir Harold Brown, demonstrated a real 
sense of urgency about the production of guns and the development of 
gun-making capacity. -In' his dealings with the Sheffield firms, Brown 
(1) T. I. S. C. 196th Meeting, Item 1,17th January 1939., T161/1329. 
T. I. S. C. 206th Meeting, Item 13,2nd February 1939. T161/1329. 
T. 1. S. C. 209th Meeting, Item 9, 9th March 1939. 7161/1330. 
T. 1. S. C. 228th Meeting, Item 30, 8th June 1939. T161/1333. 
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accomplished what I was potentially a great coup(O. ' The Army and 
the country's air defences failed to reap the full benefit of his 
success because the Treasury refused to allow the development of 
capacity at Sheffield to be accompanied by sufficiently large orders 
Despite the fact that It wanted to give A. D. G. B. top priority for 
Army expenditure, the Treasury In practice drastically restricted its 
growth. The Treasury limited the placing of orders for 3.7 Inch guns 
until Nbvember 1938, when the Cabinet belatedly approved the Ideal 
Scheme, and by that time It was too late to produce the necessary guns 
by'the outbreak of wI ar 
(lit) 
0 
The War Office and Industry In 1939 
How far had the War Office succeeded In creating an industrial 
war potential for the British Army by September 1939? How well had 
the War Office's supply machinery performed? 
In June 1939, Hore-Bellsha reported that over the course of the 
rearmament programme the War Office had placed orders valued at 
E141-41 million for munitions and97-1 million for machine tools and, new 4 
plant. A further973 had been spent on works and land for contractors 4 
and a total of E391i million on the construction of the new R. O. F. s. 
But following the massive and extremely rapid expansion In the Army's, 
demands in the early months of 1939 Treasury -approved orders for 
munitions worth E801 million had not even been placed, presumably 4 
D. G. M. P. to C. I. G. S., M. G. 0. and P. U. S., 23rd 
October, 1936. 
(ii) T. I. S. C. 52nd Meeting, 19th December 1936. T161/1317. 
Army Gun Production Capacity. Memorandum by the 
Ministry of Supply, 3rd June 1939. CAB 16/144. 
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because the necessary capacity was not immediately available(l), 
It had been, the Intention when rearmament began to relocate 
the capacity of the Royal Filling Factory Woolwich ý and the Royal 
Gunpowder Factory Waltham, so that no reliance need be-1placed on 
these over-'vulnerable works at the outbreak of war("), Treasury- 
imposed financial restrictions hampered the War Office's plans, 
however, so that the Army was still heavily -dependent on Woolwich 
for filling and Waltham for cordite tný September 1939(111), 
The Treasury had, as we have already noted, delayed giving approval 
for the start of work on the main government cordite factory- at 
Bishopton until January 1937, and even then had given financial 
sanction for only one of three units originally planned('v). ý Only In 
January 1939 was a second unit sanctioned(v)., Me situation was - 
made even worse by exceptionally bad weather In the winter of 1938-39 
which delayed work on Bishopton 
(vi), 
so that even-the first unWwas 
not in operation until June 1940(v"). The War Office had warned 
from the outset, that the building of a new government cordite factory 
could take; up to three years and had -taken the precaution of organizing 
Twenty-eighth ProgressýReport by the War Cffice, (D. P. R. 314), 
para. 19. CAB 16/230. 
(I i) C. I. D. 269th Meeting, Item 4,16th April 1935. CAB 2/6. 
Oil) William Hornby, Factories and Plant, pp. 95-7 and log. 
Ov) T. I. S. C. 56th Meeting, 14th January 1937. T161/1316. 
(V) T. 1. S. C. 194th Meeting, Item 8.9th January 1939.7161/1329. 
(vi) Twenty-eighth Progress Report by the War Wice (D. P. R. 314), 
para. 25. CAB 16/230. 
(Vii) Hornby, op. cit. , p. 117. 
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an'expansion scheme at I. C. l. 's works at Ardeer, which on 15th 
June 1939 Hore-Belisha believed would be completed by the end of the 
month('). But Waltham Abbey which had, been described as old- 
fashioned and strategically misplaced as early as. 1934, was still- the 
only government factory making cordite when war broke out("). A 
similar situation had arisen with filling factories. Part of the massive 
new Chorley filling factory was In operation by June 1939, but both 
Bridgend and Glascoed were expected to be completed only In March 
1940. Meanwhile heavy reliance had to be placed on the Royal 
Filling Factory Woolwich and on a revitalized. First World War 
works at Hereford("'). 
The position with regard to T. N. T. was somewhat better, 
though, as we have already noted, the country's total capacity was , 
still well below Service requirements. Virtually no capacity had 
existed In 1936('v), but one unit at R. 0. F. Irvine was prodUcing 
100 tons a week by 15th June 1939, and another (150 ton) unit was 
expected to be In operation by the end of the month. It was antici- 
pated that the first of two 150 ton T. N. T. units at R. 0. F., Pembrey 
(V) 
would be working by the end, of July . Considerable progress had 
also been made with the duplication- of ammonia- and ammonium nitrate 
Twenty-eighth Progress Report by. the War Cff Ice (D. P. R., 314), 
para. 15. CAB 16/230. 
Hornby, op. -cit. p. 109. 
Twenty-eighth Progress Report by the War Office (D. P. R. 314), 
para. 22,15th June 1939. CAB 16/230. 
OV) Principal, Supply officers' 7birteenth Annual Report. - lst August 1935 - 31st July 1936, para. 25. WEIR, 18/3 (Weir Papers). 
(V) Twenty-eighth Progress Report by the War Office (D. P. R. 314), 
paras. 23 and 24. CAB 16/230. 
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capacity which'had -previously been concentrated at I. C. L's 
BIIlIngham complex. In' April 1937'the Treasury gave appro%iaffor 
an ammonia plant at Bishopton and In 1938 work began on a second 
factory at Dowlats in"South Wales. ' ''Two large ammonium nitrate 
plants were also constructed, one at Huddersfield and the other 
adjacent to the T. N. T. works at Pembrey, both run on an agency 
Hingham, however, was still o basis by I. C. 
01) BI f crucial Importance 
In the early years of the Second World War 
A necessary complement to the production of explosives and 
propellants was th Ie man I ufacture of'-ammunition components. ' Scores 
of engineering firms were Involved in this trade by the outbreak of 
war. Cartridge cases were being manufactured In large numbers 
(17, ^000 a week) by Messrs. Curran and Co. of Cardiff and-by I. C. I. 
at Swansea (10,000 a week). A government cartridge 'case'factork' 
had'been established by the War office at Birtley which was In full' 
production, employing about 1,000 people by June 1939. ' 'A government 
fuse factory, R. 0. F. Blackburn, wag expected to be fully operational 
by the- end of July 1939, and a major scheme for producing mechanical 
fuses for A. A. ammunition was being Initiated by Messrs. Ferranti 
ribus the War Cffice had undoubtedly had some' success In 
developing the Industrial sinews of war. ' The system of Shadow Firms 
trained In munitions work by, educational contracts, and possessing the 
(j) 
, 
Reader,, 1. C. I., A Histo , Vol. 11, p. 263. 
(11) M. IvL Postan, op. cit., p. 46. I 
Twenty-eighth Progress Report by the War Office (D. P. R. 314), 
paras. 9,10 and 11,15th June 1939. CAB 16/230. 
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capacity to expand rapidly from peace-scale to war-scale production, 
meant that even In the heaviest fighting a 1914-15, type shell shortage 
was unlikely to recur. But the financial and political restrictions on 
the development of armament capacity, which only disappeared In 
February 1939, meant that production In some key areas was completely 
Inadequate. 
We have already traced the frustrations which Sir Harold Brown - 
and his colleagues had encountered in negotiations with the Treasury 
over the development of gun-making capacity. These diff Iculties '' 
were relected In'the gun production figures. Until February 1939 
field gun production had been a low priority, having suffered from, the 
over-riding claims of A. D. G. B. of 1,774 new 25 pdr guns for which 
the War Office had received financial sanction by June 1939, only 22, 
had been delivered and only 122 were expected to, arrive by September. 
Even the output of A. A. guns was completely Inadequate. of 1,323 
1 
approved 3.7 Inch weapons- only 422 had arrived by the middle of June 
and only 630 were expected by the end of Septemberm. R. 0. F. 
Nottingham had. been In full production since the beginning of 1938, but 
the newly-approved gun-making R. O. F. at Dalmuir was not expected. 
to be complete until June 1940. - In the private sector Vickers- - 
Armstrong's, Beardmore's and the-Sheffield group of firms continued 
to be'the most important suppliers and Messrs. Harland and Wolff 
(11) of Belfast were also beginning to develop facilities for gun production 
Twenty-eighth Progress peport by the War Off Ice (D. P. 1R. 314), 
Appendix 1,15th June 1939. CAB 16/230. 
Twenty-eighth Progress Report by the War Office (D. P. R. 314), 
paras. 9,10 and 11,15th June 1939. CAB 16/230. 
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. Tbe problems which arose with the development of armoured 
forces will be dealt with In greater detail In a later chapter. Suff Ice 
it to say here that the development and production of tanks was 
perhaps the most acute and persistent Industrial problem affecting the 
British Army during rearmament and duringý the Second World War('). 
The War Cffice had nevertheless played a major role in, laying 
the foundations of Britain's war Industry In the critical period between 
February 1936 and August 1939, when the Ministry of Supply came into 
existence. - Whatever the failings of the War Office's supply services 
before Sir Harold Brown was appointed as D. G. M. P., after his advent 
most of the evidence points to a dynamic - munition production organ- 
ization determined to supply the British Army in a war In which the 
concept of limited liability would have no place. Brown's attitude to 
rearmament is best summed up in the first sentence of a letter to 
the Chesterfield Tube Company which he wrote in the summer of, 
1937 , ItAn urgent job which you 
have got, to take your coat off to. '"(11) 
When the Ministry of Supply was created, on Ist, August 1939, the 
War office's existing supply organization was transferred to that 
department, - but remained In the same building and continued to operate 
in much the same way. It Is Interesting that much of the support for 
the creation of the Ministry of Supply came from the War Office("') 
and, It Is to Hore-! Bellsha's credit that he personally played a major 
part in advocating this step 
(iv) 
0 7hough Its Immediate effect was not 
(1) Pbstan, op. cit., pp. 183-195. 
(11) Enclosure 95A. WO/32/3663. 
(Ili) Scott and Hughes, op. cit., p. 78. 
(IV) Minney, op. cit., p. 192. 
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very great, the decision to form a Ministry of Supply was a milestone 
on the road from a free-market civil economy to a system of State 
control In which defence had absolute priority. 
Conclusion' 
But If lethargy and inertia within the War Office's supply 
organization cannot be accepted as the major factor In the Inadequacy 
of industrial capacity for the Army, what alternative explanation can 
be found? Many of the obstacles which the War Office encountered 
9 have emerged quite clearly already. The late start to the rearmament 
of the Army relative to that of the other two services was a serious 
factor. So too was the very low industrial priority accorded to the 
Army. The most significant restraint on the War Office's programme, 
however, was probably the Cabinet's decision that rearmament should 
be carried on without significant disruption of civil trade. 
7be detailed interpretation and execution of this policy was In the 
hands of the Treasury. Dr. Peden has convincingly shown that the 
Treasury's attitude to rearmament was not totally hostile and that 
indeed Sir Warren Fisher, P. U. S. at the Treasury, was one of the 
earliest advocates of rearmament In British Government circles. 
Peden's very optimistic view of the Influence of the Treasury's 
financial control over rearmament Is, however, rather more open to 
question. Peden believes that the Treasury used Its financial control 
to enforce priorities and minimize the effect of potential Industrial 
bottlenecks, and that British rearmament might have been more 
chaotic and less fruitful without such controls(O. Evidence we have 
(i) Peden, op. cit., pp. 179-184. 
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already produced indicates, however, that the Treasury may have 
done much to create the machine tool bottleneck(') and greater , 
financial flexibility and a greater assured volume of orders would 
certainly have aided at least one of the major contractors, working 
for the Army to deskill processes and thus helped to relieve the 
pressure on skilled labour("). The Treasury quite clearly used its 
financial powers to restrict the development of Industrial, capacity for 
rearmament and war production purposes as well as to determine 
priorities for the use of what capacity was available. TheAnfluence 
of potential bottlenecks s6ch as -skilled labour and machine tools' Is- 
not a sufficient explanation for the Treasury's action. The Treasury 
restricted the building of cordite and T. N. T. factories even though 
such factories did not require large quantities of machine'tools and 
though there was never any shortage of labour In the chemical and 
explosives industries("'). The financial motive was clearly "prominent. 
One must agree with the remark that, "It cannot be said that the 
Treasury officials showed themselves over-anxious that new RoyaL 
ordnance Factories should be completed In the shortest possible time", 
but some doubt must attach Itself to the conclusion that, the Treasury 
Memorandum by Bridges, Phillips and Hopkins, 10th 
November 1936, (C. P. 339 (36)), p. 280. CAB 24/265. 
C. 1. D. Minutes of 280th Meeting, Item 5,10th July 1936. 
CAB 2/6. 
Twelfth Report of the Ministry of Labour, (D. P. R. - 
191), 
CAB 16/141. Twentieth Report, (D. P. R. 231), Twenty-third 
Report, (D. P. R. 279), Twenty-sixth Report, (D. P. R. 300), 




"had grasped the importance of industrlaf capacity'*). 
The Cabinet's ruling that rearmament must not Interfere with 
civil trade was open to a wide variety of Interpretations In particular 
cases. it is clear that in some cases the Treasury's Interpretation 
was extremely rigid as when it tried to stop the War Office broadening 
the basis of Its supply by - bringing new firms Into gun production 
(11) 
0 
Perhaps the most damaging Treasury ruling was the Interpretation of 
the Cabinet's decision to delay the rearmament of the Territorial Army 
for three years as a ban on the creation of reserve Industrial capacity 
for the Territorials('11). The War Office was consequently officially 
restricted to planning war potential for a five division Field Force 
o nly. Until the second half of 1938 the development of Industrial 
capacity for the Army was thus kept within narrow limits by financial 
restraints. The Munich crisis had a beneficial effect on the availability 
of funds for new factories and plant, but this may have proved 
merely a 
'temporary relaxation of funds had it not been for the 
acceptance of a Continental commitment in February 1939 and the 
consequent decisions of March and April which greatly Increased the 
size of the Army. The political restrictions on the use of industrial 
capacity for the Army may have been the most serious restraint 
on the War Office's rearmament effort but It would be wrong to discount 
the importance of narrow and unhelpful Interpretations of Cabinet 
policy made by Treasury officials. 
Peden, op. cit., pp. 171 and 180. 
Informal Army Council Minutes, Item 2,20th July 1937. 
WO/163/47. 
Bridges, "Note on Filling Factories", 27th October 1936. 
T161/1316. 
PART THREE 





That It failed to appreciate the revolutionary Impact of the, tank 
on war and did not adequately develop British armoured forces Is 
peihaps the most common allegation directed at the War Office of the 
1930s(l). The purpose of this chapter Is to examine War Office- ý- 
policies and actions with regard to armoured forces from the mid- 
thirties to the outbreak'of war. ' It Is intended to examine armour 
organization and doctrine, the technical aspects of tank development 
and the financing of the tank programme. I 
Before Rearmament 
The British had, of course, invented the tank and until the early, " 
thirties Britain'led the world In tank design and In the training and 
tactical handling of armoured forces. The story of IDcperimental ý 
Mechanical Force, the world's first fully mechanized formation, '", which 
carried out exercises on Salisbury Plain in 1927 and 1928 has been 
told in detail by Liddell Hart. - TbIs experiment attracted worldwide 
interest. Liddell Hart ý suggests, however, that after the end of the 
experiment was announced on 27th November 1928, ' a reaction against 
mechanization set In amongst high ranking officers. 
The actual progress made during the years 
that followed the first trial of an armoured force 
in 1927 was disappointingly slow compared with 
the promise of that Great, Experiment. 1,16thing 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, pp. 256-8, Liddell Hart, 
The Tanks, VoT. 1, pp. 338-339, A. J. P. Taylor, rIbe Origins 
of the Second World War, (Penguin 1974), p. sq. - 
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at all might have been achieved If the tank 
cause - and the future of the Army - had not 
been very well served byýthose few Indomitable 
P. T. C. officers who occupied posts of a key 
nature, though not very high status and who had 
a grasp of the War Office 'machine' to match 
their vision of mechanized warfare ... A mere'' handful In numbers these enthusiasts for armoured 
mobility proved too much of a handful for the 
mor6 pedestrian minded seniors who sought to 
restrain themM. 
Liddell Hart, however, produces very -little evidence to support 
his contention that senior soldiers in the War Office were seeking, to 
reduce the pace of mechanization,. and the fact that the encouraging 
experiments with armour In the late twenties were not fully exploited 
In the early thirties is easily explicable In financial terms. Army 
expenditure remained fairly constant at about E44 million per annum 
for most of the 1920s but, - In 1928, It dropped to just lover E40 million 
and In 1932 It reached Its nadir for the inter-warý period, at- 
05.8 million("). --Armoured fighting -vehicles tended -to, be expensive 
and the financial stringency of the, late twenties and early, thirties 
produced a virtual ban on the ordering of new military equipment which 
had ý extremely damaging consequences -for the development of armoured 
forces. But financial restrictions did not prevent the General Staff 
from giving instructions for a series of exercises with an experimental 
Tank Brigade In the early thirties which culminated in the permanent 
establishment of the lst Tank Brigade R. T. C. in April 1934(111). In 
Liddell Hart, "Ibe Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 227. 
Hampden Gordon, 'ne War Office (Putnam, 1935), p. 319. 
Peden,, British Rearmament aFF-the Treasu (Scottish Academic 
Press, 1979), p. 205. 
Macksey, Armoured Crusader, pp. 97-111. 
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October 1934 the decision was taken to form the British Army's first 
armoured division even though there was no Immediate prospect of 
being able to equip such a formation('). 
7he foremost advocates of the tank within the Army In the 1930S 
were George Lindsay, Charles Broad, Giffard le Quesne Martel, 
Percy Cleghorn Hobart and Frederick Pile. An analysis of the careers 
of these men scarcely bears out the contention that those at the top 
of the Army were overwhelmingly prejudiced against enthusiasts for 
armoured forces. All filled Important War-Office posts during the 
inter-war period and all eventually became general officers 
(it) 
. 
The Technical Development of Tanks 
up to the establishment of the Ist Tank Brigade on a permanent 
footing-in April 1934 the British Army led the world In the development 
of armoured forces. The financial crisis of the late twenties and 
early thirties slowed the pace of the technical development of tanks 
in Britain, however and prevented the ordering of new equipment. 7be 
rise of Hitler, revolutionized the situation. By the time the rearmament 
of the British Army began In 1936, the British had already lost their 
initial technical advantage,, the Germans having designed and ordered 
two machines - the Panzer III and the Panzer IV - which were superior 
to any British design("'). 0 
Nbntgomery-Massingberd to fellow Army Councillors, 15th October 
1934. WO/32/2847. 
Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, pp. 206-207,246 and 208. 
General Sir Freaerick Pile, Ack-Ack, (Harrap 1949). PP. 13,26-29, 
and 39. Martel, Outspoken Soldier, (Sifton Praed 1949), pp 52-53, 
125,126 and 152. Kenneth Macksey, Armoured Crusader, 
- (Hutchinson 1967), pp. 79,98,108,148,153. - 
H. C. B. Rogers, Tanks in Battle (Sphere 1972), pp. 91 and 92. 
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In response to the financial crisis of 1931 the National Government 
cut the Army Estimate from 940 million to 9361 million in the 
financial year 1932-33 and it was not until 1934-35 that the Estimate 
returned to the 1931-32 level. In 1932-33 the sum devoted to tracked, 
vehicles fell from 9357,, 000 to E309,000 and, as In the case of Army 
expenditure generally, the 1931 level was only exceeded, in 1934-35. 
The delay in the start of the Army's rearmament caused by the 
rejection of the first D. R. C. report meant that expenditure on tracked 
vehicles climbed only slowly in the mid-thirties. In 1934-35 the 
figure was E501,000 and though this had risen to E842,, 000 by 1936-37 
it was not until 1937-38 that expenditure on th6se Items found an 
entirely new (rearmament) level at 93,625,000(l). 1 
When the War Office at last had the chance to begin a serious 
rearmament effort, following the D. P. R. report of February, '1936 Duff 
Cooper admitted to the C. 1. D. that the state of the armoured forces 
was extremely unsatisfactory. The Secretary of State explained that 
In the years 1927-1936 the sum available annually for experimenting 
with tanks varied from 922,500 to E93,750, whereas the cost of a 
single experimental medium tank could be as much as E29,000. The 
financial restrictions on the placing of orders for tanks had resulted 
in the confinement of research and development to two organizations 
only, Vickers and the R. 0. F. s and even these could only afford to 
maintain very small design staffs. The money available annually 
for expenditure on tanks had barely sufficed to keep these two main 
contractors occupied. . It was Impossible'to interest other firms In--,, 
(1) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 29. 
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tank design and development without giving a definite guarantee of, 
orders later, and this had not been practicable until the beginning 
of the rearmament effort. There had consequently been a "dearth of 
ideas" and a "very narrow field of research and experiment". The 
situation had been made even worse by the untimely deaths of some 
of the most experienced tank designers employed by the civilian firms. 
Sir George Buckham died In 1928; F. R. Smith In 1920-, and Sir John 
Carden was killed in a plane crash In 1935(l), 
Duff Cooper also claimed that the development of British tanks 
had been handicapped by the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference 
which had attempted to lay down limits on tank tonnage. 
For several years sixteen tons was regarded as 
the limit, and our research was restricted 
accordingly, though other nations did not consider 
themselves bound by this restriction(II). 
In the mid-thirties it was taking about, two and a half years to 
develop a tank prototype and Duff Cooper warned that It would be 
impossible to expedite development and production without a system 
of industrial priority for government orders which did not operate under 
(lit) 
the existing "business as usual" rearmament policy 
Technical research into and design of vehicles was a crucial 
factor in the development of armoured forc, es, and It Is necessary , 
briefly to examine the War Office's apparatus for,. this purpose. , 
The 
General Staff's requirements were specified forýt4e benefit of the 
M. G. O. 's department at meetings of the C. I. G. S. 's Specification 
The Tank Situation, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
War, 15th October 1936. WO/32/4441. 
(11) lbid, para. 6 (c). WO/32/4441. 
(Ili) The Tank Situation. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
, War, 15th October 1936, para. 7. WO/32/4441. 
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Committee. The section of the M. G. O.. 's, department responsible 
for vehicles was the Directorate of Mechanization., Under the over-all 
supervision of the Director of Mechanization there was an organization 
known as the Mechanization Board, which In 1933, replaced the earlier 
Mechanical Warfare Board, and which consisted of seven military 
officers and a civilian engineer. The Board met as a Board only 
occasionally. Its everyday work was Oelegated to two committees, one 
for armoured f ighting vehicles - 
(A. F. V. s) - and the other 
for motor 
transport vehicles. The A. F. V. committee had eleven members 
including the Assistant Director of Mechanization at the War Offi, ce, the 
Superintendent of Design, and the, Chief Inspector of Armaments from 
Woolwich Arsenal('). 
The committees of, the Mechanization Board controlled the work 
of the corresponding sections of the Mechanization Experimental - 
Establishment at Farnborough where prototypes were tested. When the 
Mechanization Board was -set up in 1933 it was suggested that the 
section of the Design department at Woolwich Arsenal which dealt with 
vehicle design might be split off from the rest of the department and 
incorporated into the Mechanization Board. In the end this did not 
happen and though the Mechanization Board had over-all control of the 
direction of research and experimentation with vehicles the production 
of engineering drawings of vehicles remained, the responsibility of the 
Design department under the Superintendent of Designol). 
Brough to Elles, Minute 1,14th December 1933, and Instructions 
--for the Mechanization Board, Enclosure IA. WO/32/4310. 
Instructions for the Mechanization Board, Enclosure IA. 
WO/32/4310. 
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The vehicles section of the Design department came In for a 
good deal of criticism in the mid-thirties, not least from the 
Director of Mechanization, General Brough, who believed that the 
organization did not make enough use of civilian engineers, relying 
too heavily on serving officers who had Insufficient training In design('). 
The Director of Artillery, FLA. Lewis, the other War Office Director 
who had to work closely with the Design department, did not 
altogether share Brough's view. He rejoined that there was generally 
only one serving officer In each section of the Design department and 
that it would not be possible to manage with less, as user experience 
and advice was vital. Lewis believed that on the Armaments side, 
with which he was mainly concerned, the Design department generally 
peiformed well. On the Vehicles side the main problem was the 
difficulty of recruiting the best designers, but this in his view was 
inevitable. 
In that line of country it Is obvious that the 
Design Branch cannot compete with the outside 
world any more than Elstree can compete 
with Hollywood; we can't pay the money. Even 
supposing we had the money I feel we ought 
to have the user somewhere at the top e. g. I 
cannot see the production of'a successful "Blue 
Bird" or a "Miss England" without a Campbell 
or a Scott Paine somewhere well In the foreground 
Lewis was no doubt right In thinking that money was at the root 
of the design problem as of so much else. Nevertheless,, Elles, the 
M. G. 0., accepted Brough's arguments in favour of a major inquiry Into 
the Vehicles sections of the Design department. 7he inquiry was led 
Brough -to Elles, Minute 1,10th December 1935, W. O. file 
86/General/4212. WO/32/3660. 
I 
(li) Lewis to Elles, Minute 2,12th December 1935. WO/32/3660. 
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by Colonel A. E. Davidson, a Mechanical engineering expert who, was 
later to replace Brough as Director of Mechanization. Davidson 
recommended a number of reforms to expedite design Including a 
simplification of drawing office procedures, the allocation of an 
additional Deputy Superintendent of Design for the A. F. V. section, and 
the appointment of additional civilian engineers for A. F. V. design('). 
Davidson's suggestions, with Some modifications, were put into practice 
after Elles, had held a meeting to discuss his report in June 1936(11). 
How far these changes In the Design department organization 
speeded up the design process for tanks Is not easy to tell from the 
available evidence. By 1936 the lead in tank development had ýalready 
been lost to the Germans and was not regained-before the outbreak 
of war. During the twenties and early thirties problems In the Design 
department have slowed the pace of technical development in tanks to 
some extent. However, the main problem the department faced,, 
that of attracting the best mechanical engineers, In view of the higher 
salaries offered by civilian firms, was probably unavoidable at a time 
of severe defence cuts. (The very tight financial controls under which 
' 
the Design -department operated are Illustrated by the fact that the - 
ceiling of expenditure on material to which It could go without 
(111) special permission from the Director of Army Contracts was ZlOO) 
Report to Colonel A. F. Davidson on the A. F. V. and Vehicle Sections 
of the Design Department, 10th March 1936, W. 0. f Ile 
86/General/4212. WO/32/3660. 
Proceedings of a Conference at the War Office on June 16th, 1936, 
to consider proposals contained in the "Davidson Report" regarding 
the Design Department and the reorganization of the R. O. F. Drawing 
Office. Enclosure 29A, W. 0. file, 86/General/4212. WO/32/3660. 
(III) Report by Col. A. E. Davidson on the A. F. V. and Vehicle Sections 
of the Design Department, para. 10,10th March 1936, Enclosure 
13A, W. 0. file 86 /Genera 1/4212. WO/32/3660. 
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I 
' This problem had led to very heavy reliance on the design staff of 
Vickers, particularly Sir John Carden. - 
Until 1933 only two categories of tank were envisaged by the 
War Office: - the light and the medium. Light tanks were intended to 
be fast and highly manoeuvrable but were thinly armoured and armed 
only with machine guns. They were intended mainly for reconnaissance 
and screening and were not designed to be capable of fighting enemy 
tanks. In October 1936 the Army had a total of 209 light tanks all 
Vickers machines of various marks. Their numbers were barely 
adequate for the peacetime training requirements of existing units and 
did not suffice for-the creation of any of the new units envisaged in 
G6neral Staffs rearmament plans. Even the existing units lacked 
war reseryes. 
Two-thirds of the light tanks which the Army possessed when 
rearmament began were of a pattern produced In the early thirties 
which carried only two men. The two-man tank had gone out of 
favour by 1936 as it was no longer believed possible to drive, navigate 
and fight a tank effectively with such a small crew. The armour on these 
early types was also regarded as grossly Inadequate, as they were 
liable to be penetrated even by high velocity rifle bullets. The other 
third consisted of Vickers Light Tanks Mark VI. Duff Cooper 
described this machine as superior to any light tank yet produced by 
other nations and planned eventually to have 608 most of which were 
expected to be delivered by April 1938('). 
Of medium as of light tanks there was an acute shortage. One 
hundred and sixty-four of the 166 medium tanks which the Army 
The Tank Situation, para. 4(a), WO/32/4441. 
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possessed In October 1936'were Vickers Medlums'Marks I and II, 
made between 1923 and 1930. When first introduced the Vickers 
Medium had had many virtues-. Compared with its First World War 
predecessors it was fast (15-16 m. p. h. ) and It had an Impressive radius 
of action (150 miles) which -encouraged progressive minds to think in 
terms of long range strategic penetration. It was mechanically reliable 
and incorporated some significant technical innovations Including sprung 
tracks, an all-round traverse turret, and geared elevation-for the gun. 
But having only 8mm of armour., these tanks were considered far too 
vulnerable for tank-to-tank fighting by the mid-thIrties and' I their 3 pdr 
guns had Inadequate powers of penetration for this purpose. 7be 
Vickers Mediums which the Army possessed in 1936 were worn out by lo ng 
service and were frankly stated to be "obsolete and unfit for war"('). 
The remaining two medium tanks ý In service at the begin , ning of' 
rearmament were of an experimental'type known as the Sixteen Tonner. 
This machine had been designed by Vickers -Arm'stron .g In 1928"as a 
successor 'to the Vickers Medium. I, The Sixteen Tonners we're 
probably the'most advanc I ed medium tanks In the I world - at the begi nning 
of the 1930s, but they cost 916,000 each and In an adverse financial 
climate the Director of Mechanization, General A. Brough, des I paired 
of being able to re-equip the Tank Corps with such an expensive 
machine. 7be Sixteen Tonners were consequently never produced In 
large numbers and all development work on them was ýstopped 
(1 [1) 
a. 
The Tank Situation. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 15th October 1931, para. 4(b). ' WO/32/4441. 
(it) Martel's Notes on Fighting Vehicles 1, para. 2, February 1937. 
9/28/69. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
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In October 1936 the War Office was experimenting with three new 
prototype medium tanks. The design of the A7 series had started 
as early as 1929 and eventually three successive prototypes were 
built at the Royal Arsenal Woolwich. The version undergoing trials 
in 1936 was known as AM. 7bIs vehicle was very modern in 
appearance and had some good points in design which were later Incorporatec 
into the successful "Matilda" tank of 1939. But A7E3 developed a series 
of mechanical troubles so. numerous that it was never Itself put into 
production('). 
Early in 1934 Sir John Carden, probably the greatest tank designer 
of the inter-war period, was asked by General Brough to design a 
medium tank which would employ a commercial engine and which would 
be so much cheaper than the Sixteen Tonner that the War Office could 
afford to put it Into production even iný a harsh economic climate 
Two tanks of this type were undergoing trials, in 1936: - the-A9 and the 
A10. The A9 was the first tank to mount the newly designed high 
velocity 2-pounder gun and with a maximum speed of 23 m. p. h. it 
was reasonably fast. But the prototype had a series of minor technical 
faults including a tendency to pitch badly on undulating ground. 7be 
AlO was basically very similar to the A9 and had the same initial 
problems. But, having been designed to be capable of close support 
to infantry, It had 30mm of armour compared with the 14mm of the A9, 
Report on Dcperimental Medium Tank A7E3,18th May 1937. 
WO/32/3349. 
(U) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, pp. 368-9. 
- 39- 
and was consequently reduced to a maximum speed of 16 M. p. h. 
(1) 
Had Carden lived, the mechanical problems with the prototypes might 
have been eliminated fairly rapidly, but Carden's death in an aeroplane 
crash In 1935 was a blow from which British tank design took many 
years to recover. In October 1936 Duff Cooper was forced to admit 
that it was unlikely that any of these new medium tanks could'be put 
Into service before 1938. 
More significant than the Initial mechanical difficulties with A9 and 
AIO was the factor of power/weight. ratio. 7be A9 had only 14mm of 
armour and in the late thirties this came to be regarded as 'Inadequate 
(11) 
for a medium tank The first models of the German Panzer III 
were similarly thin-skinned, but the Panzer III was a sufficiently 
powerful vehicle not to be crippled by the additional weight when the 
(Lit) 
thickness of armour was increased In subsequent models When, 
in 1938, the armour on the A9 was Increased to 30mm the speed was 
reduced to a maximum of 18 m. p. h. - very slow for the medium 
role(lv). 7his was the price which had to be paid for the decision 
taken in 1934 to order a cheap tank using a rather low-powered 
commercial engine. Moreover, while the first Panzer Ills were In 
service by 1937, the A9 did not start coming off the production' lines 
Martel's Nbtes on Fighting Vehicles II, para. 3, March 1937, and 
notes on Tank Rearmament, para. 5, April 1938.9/28/69 
(Liddell Hart Papers, King's College, London). 
(11) The Tank Situation, para. 13,15th October 1936. WO/32/4441. 
(ill) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 370. 
Martel's Notes on Fighting Vehicles IV, para. 3. March 1938. 
9/28/69. Liddell Hart Papers. 
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until March 1939(1)., When rearmament began, the War office had 
no medium tank with which it was ready to go -to production: - a 
direct consequence of the design and development difficulties which had 
occurred In the financially straitened period of the early thirties. 
The War Office's Director of Mechanization for most of the 
rearmament period was Major-General A. E. Davidson who was appointed 
in June 1936. His Assistant Director,, Colonel Giffard le Q. Martel., 
arrived at the War Office at about the same time. Davidson, who had-, 
been President of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers, was a highly 
respected technician, but Martel was the acknowledged expert on tanks. 
Martel's success In securing the adoption of an entirely new class 
of tank not long after his appointment is proof of the very considerable 
authority which he wielded at this period("). 
in September 1936 Martel attended the Red Army manoeuvres In the 
company of Major-General A. P. Wavell. He was not particularly 
impressed with the tactical handling of armour by the Soviets, but the 
sheer. number of tanks on display was Impressive (on one occasion 
Martel saw 1,000 tanks In a single march-past) and the mechanical 
performance of some Soviet vehicles was excellent. The Soviet B. T. 
"light medium"' tank proved itself capableof speeds up to 30 m. p. h., 
could traverse rough country at 20 M. p. h. with ease, and had a 
(lit) 
remarkable obstacle-crossing ability 
(i) Sir Ronald Adam to D. G. M. P., 27th March 1939. 
(u) Martel, op. cit., pp. 126t 127,128. 
(ili) Ibld, pp. 135,143 and 146. 
WO/32/4445. 
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Martel was aware that the obstacle-crossing ability of British 
light tanks tended to be rather poor because of the shortness of 
their tracks. Ibis had proved a major difficulty when light tanks and 
mediums had attempted to cooperate closely In Tank Brigade exercises. 
The Soviet B. T. tank employed a suspension system of a type Invented 
by the American designer Mr. J. W. Christie. 'Martel began to think 
seriously about adopting Christie's suspension system for British tanks. 
Initially he seems to have envisaged a British Christie as a replacement 
for the existing types of light tank as a reconnaissance machine In the 
Tank Brigade. But after seeing the B. T. he also commented 
Unless we can improve the A9 to a considerable 
extent I cannot help feeling dismay at the Idea 
of our building any large number of these tanks 
which will be Inferior to existing Russian tanks. 
So he may have been thinking of developing a British Christie tank 
for the medium role as well('). 
immediately after his return from' Russia, Martel set about 
obtaining a Christie tank for development In Britain. There proved to 
be political' obstacles to the purchase of a Soviet machine and so 
Martel was obliged to make contact with Christie himself. Christie 
had not done well from the invention. 7bough It was Ingenious In 
principle he had never succeeded in eliminating all the mechanical 
snags. He had built three prototypes. One had been bought by the 
American military who had not succeeded in developing It. Another 
had been purchased by the Russians with better results. 
By the time the British War Office became interested in Christie's 
idea he had only, one tank left and that was mortgaged. Christie 
Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 371. 
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agreed over the telephone to sell this remaining tank for 98,000. 
Martel had to persuade War office Finance not only to find the f. 8,000 
but also to pay off the mortgage. ISbr did Martel's troubles end 
there. The American government tried to prevent the deal on the 
grounds that the export of war material was forbidden and eventually 
the tank had to be smuggled out of America . 
In crates labelled 
"tractor" and "grapefruit". 
While still arranging to oýtain a prototype from, America Martel 
and Davidson. were already in contact with Lord Nuffield's Industrial 
organization. Lord Nuffield agreed, to form a new company, Nuffield 
Mechanisation, which In collaboration with the War Office eventually 
produced the first British Christie: - A13. These Nuffield Christies 
were given the entirely new classification of "cruiser" tanks. 
Martel certainly acted with great speed and detenmination., , He 
rpturned from Russia on 26th September and by 17th ýbvember Christie's 
tank had arrived in England. Though much of the credit for this 
operation must go to Martel himself, It is worth noting that no 
objection seems to have been raised to these unconventional proceedings 
by his colleagues in the M. G. 0. 's department or by the General Staff. 
War Office Finance also provided the cash remarkably quickly though 
not without considerable discussion 
(i)e 
7be cruisers were not the only new class of tank under development 
when rearmament began. Major-General Sir Hugh Elles, who had 
been M. G. 0. since 1934, had commanded the Tank Corps in the First 
Wo rld Wa r. He believed It essential to have a tank capable of giving 
close support to infantry. This tank would need to be more heavily 
(i) Martel, oD. * cit., p. 128. 
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armoured than any hitherto built. He Instructed Sir John Carden of 
Vickers to design a -tank with armour capable of withstanding the fire 
of any existing antkank weapon ind yet cheap enough to mass produce 
In peacetime. 7be pilot model of the first "infantry" tank, All'appeared 
In September 1936, It had a 60mm armour basis, making It probably 
the best armoured tank In the world at that time. it was small, 
weighed about 10 tons, and carried a crew of only two. It was slow, 
capable of'only 10 m. p. h., and armed only with a machine gun, but 
was mechanically extremely reliable('). 
Liddell Hart Is implicitly critical of Elles in The tanks 
(ii. ) but 
Martel regarded the decision to design an Infantry tank as a "very 
progressive step"("). Martel believed that armies had always 
consisted of two types of troops. 
There were the lighter and more mobile troops, 
whose duty was to push out, gain touch with 
' 
the 
enemy and then work around his flanks or rear. 
This had always been the role of the cavalry. 
Then there were the slower-moving harder- 
hitting troops whose duty it was to close with 
the enemy, fix him, and If necessary assault his 
defences. This had always been the infantry 
role. We realized that tanks would be needed 
to assist in both these roles; the faster tanks 
for the Cavalry role as light cavalry, and 
heavier tanks for the slower role to be used 
in much the same way as hea cavalry had 
assisted infantry In the past(W. 
7bere was thus no essential disagreement between Elles and 
Martel. Both officers believed that two kinds of tank were needed, 
(1) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 372. 
(U) Ibid. 
(iii) Martel, op. cit., p. 127s 
(tv) Ibid, p. 142. 
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one for mobile operations as part of an armoured formation and the 
other for close support to the Infantry. Both were moving. away from 
the concept of, a medium tank which could perform either role. Martel 
praised Elles' efforts with the "Infantry" tank. 
, 
Martel's own work 
on the, developrrýent of a cruiser tank was, carried out from within 
Elles' department In, the War Office and it could. not have proceeded 
as rapidly as it did without his approval. 
The actions of Elles and Martel In the mtd-thirties diverted 
British tank designers away from the attempt to develop an all-purpose 
medium tank and concentrated their efforts on two different specialist 
types. Was this the best ýollcy? It was certainly not the course - of 
action adopted by the Gernýans. In the Panzer III and the Panzer IV 
the Germans developed two good all-purpose. medium tanks. Both 
came into service while the rearmament of the British Army was 
just beginning and together. they were the mainstay of, the German, 
Panzer arm for much of the. war(). It could well be argued that Elles 
and Martel were wrong to relinquish the goal of developing a multi- 
purpose medium tank at the beginning of rearmament. Despite the 
advantages of Improved speed and performance which the Christie 
suspension offered, Martel perhaps erred In diverting funds and human 
resources to this new type of vehicle as late as September 1936. 
The British Christie tanks were Indeed fast (the first of them, 
A13, was capable of up to 45 m. p. h. ), but perhaps owing to the haste 
with which they,. were developed they -were plagued with. mechanical 
troubles which to a great extent offset the advantages of high performance. 
(1) Rogers, op. cit. , p. 92. 
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Moreover the armour'oh 'early models (14mm on A13 Mark 1) was 
recognized as Inadequate for combat with German'medium'tanks'by 
the outbreak of war('). Elles' Infantry tanks on the 'other handt' had 
armour which could stand up to almost anything, . but their road speed. 
was r so low (8 m. p. h. ' In the case of Infantry Tank Mark I and 12 m. p. h. 
in the'case of Iffantry Tank Mark that they were unsuitable for 
long-range, strategic penetration'and, were Incapable of keeping up: with 
the high tempo of operations of which a German Panzer division 
was capable("), 
In October 1936, therefore, while dissatisfied with all of -its 
experimental medium tanks, and while still trying to develop cruiser 
and infantry tanks, the War Office was ready to go 'to production only 
with the Light Tank Mark V1. Ibis situation was obviously grossly 
unsatisfactory and the purchase of tanks In bulk4rom abroad had 
consequently been considered. But as Duff Cooper explained to the 
C. I. D. this presented great difficulties. 
Not only are foreign countries very averse to 
showing their latest patterns of tank, and still 
more averse to selling them, but also the supply 
of spares etc. in wartime would be precarious. 
Moreover, if we purchase abroad, education In 
tank design In this country would be proportionately 
reduced. 
Ddff Cooper therefore concluded that 
For'these reasons the purchase of models'from 
abroad for improvement and adaptation Is a 
more desirable course to pursuilit). 





Notes on'Fighting Vehicles 111, para. 2, January 1938. Notes on Fighting Vehicles V, May 1938, para. 2.9/28/69 (Liddell 
Hart Papers). 
(it) Martel's Notes on Fighting Vehicles 11, para. A. Notes on Fighting Vehicles IV, para. 4.9/28/69 (Liddell Hart Papers). 
(Ili) 7be Tank Situation, paras. 4 and 16. WO/32/4441. 
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The organization of Armoured Forces 
Having examined the state of the technical development of British 
tanks at the beginning of rearmament, It Is now proposed to review 
the organization of, British armoured forces and the General Staff's 
policy on their further development. It was under Montgomery- 
Massingberd's regime that the decision was taken to establish the 
Ist Tank Brigade as a permanent formation In November 1933. Hobart 
the Tank Brigade's commander informed Liddell Hart that 
most of the great ones scoff 'of course, but we 
are lucky Indeed In at least having so far- 
seeing, resolute and open-minded a C. I. G. S., 
who Is giving us a chance to try and is so 
remarkably understanding(O. 
In a minute dated 15th October 1934, Montgomery-Massingberd - 
explained to his colleagues on the Army Council that 
I have recently been considering the suitability 
of the present mobile element in the Field Force 
in the light of conditions likely to obtain In the 
Western Plan (the despatch of a Field Force to 
the Continent) and I have reached the provisional 
conclusion that instead of having an independent 
Tank Brigade and a Cavalry Division, a more 
suitable organization would be a Mobile Division 
consisting of the Tank Brigade and one mechanized 
cavalry brigade together with an adequate proportion 
of reconnaissance and supporting troops(II). 
Following the decision to substitute a mechanized Mobile Division 
for the old horsed Cavalry Division experiments began with various 
(iii) 
types of mechanized cavalry This was the beginning of the end 
of the traditional horsed cavalry in the British Army. 
Ii 
Hobart to Liddell Hart, 24th July 1934.1/376/7 (Liddell Hart Papers). 
(ii) Minute 1, 15th October 1934. WO/32/2847. 
(iii) War Office Letter 20/Cavalry/83,8th December 1934 and accom- 
panying memorandum on Organization of Mobile Troops. WO/32/2847. 
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Further evidence of the progressive trend of M6ntgomery-Massingberd's 
thought Is to be found In the plan'he presented to Duff Cooper on 
9th September 1935 for a modern Field Force for a European war. 
By this stage Montgomery -Mass I ngberd had decided that the Field'Force 
should definitely Include a Mobile Division which would consist of, two 
Armoured Car Regiments, one or two Mechanized Cavalry Brigades, 
probably two; one Tank Brigade, two mechanized Poyal'Horse Artillery 
Brigades and other supporting units. ' 7be roles of the Mobile Division 
were provisionally defined as reconnaissance before the main torces 
gained contact, the protection of the Field Force's flanks, the seizing 
and holding of Important positions, movement against the enemy's 
communications, and co-operation in battle either by outflanking manoeuvre 
or by exploitation of success if, the enemy's main resistance broke 
down(')*, 
In addition to the armour included in the Mobile Division 
Wntgomery-Massingberd planned to have a total of four "Arniy Tank 
Battalions" (I. e. one per Infantry division) in the'First Contingent 
of the Field Force. 7he Army Tank Battalions manned by the IR. T. C. 
and equipped with the heavily armoured Infantry tanks, were Intended 
for close co-operation with the infantry divisions. Montgomery- 
Massingberd argued that 
the provision of Infantry tanks ... will un- doubtedly increase the offensive power of the 
divisions for the main battle whilst the pro- 
vision of armoured M. G. (machine gun) carriers 
should also strengthen the offensive power of 
r Infantry brigades in loose fighting-(11). 
0 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army Part 1, Section 6, 
sub-section 2(111), "Mobile Troops". 9th Sept. 1935. WO/32/46M 
(Ii) 7be Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1, Section 6, 
sub-section 2. 'Me infantry Division and Its Supporting Units", 
para. (e), 9th September 1935. WO/32/4612.. 
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Mechanization was the key-note of Montgomery -Mass I ngberd's 
whole Field' Force policy. Traditionally, horsed' cavalry- regiments 
had been attached to infantry divisions for reconnaissance and screening. 
Montgomery -Mass I ngberd. had Introduced a policy of mechanizing the 
transport of the infantry and providing"' enough motor transport with 
the First Contingent to lift a complete division If required., The 
problem had therefore arisen of providing a suitable substitute for 
horsed'divis tonal cavalry to work with infantry columns carried In 
M. T. Though the General Staff had not yet decided how this problem 
was to be solved, it was hoped that experiments with mechanized 
cavalry would provide the answer 
Like many senior officers of this period, 'Montgomery-Masslngberd 
had earlier exhibited a degree of attachment to the horse which perhaps 
has to be- explained In terms of social background rather than military 
logic(")o But by 1935 he had accepted the "gradual disappearance" of 
the horse from both civil and military life""" . From this time 
onwards the General Staff moved relentlessly towards the complete 
mechanization of the Cavalry of, the Line. 'This may not seem 
particularly far-sighted until it is realized that, at'the outbreak of 
war, the American Army still maintained a substanti al horsed a c valry 
arm and that-the Polish, German and Russian Armies went on using 
(i) Mid, part 1, Section 6, Sub-section 2 (1). 
(11) B. C. 14, para. 100. CAB 16/109. 
WO/32/4612. 
(iii) The Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1, Section 3, 
"Tendencies Between 1918 and 1935", para. 4,9th September 1935. 
WO/32/4612. 
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horsed cavalry during the war Itself('). The transport of a high 
proportion of the German Army remained horsed throughout the war 
(it) 
0 
Montgomery-Massingberd's -1935 plan would probably have established 
the British Army as the most highly mechanized in the worWand the 
one with the highest proportion of armour. 
The General Staffs policy of mechanizing the cavalry was fraught 
with difficulties. The funds necessary to carry out this task became 
available only gradually and. it Involved complicated , negotiations -with 
both the Treasury and the Government of India. There were, five 
regiments of British cavalry stationed in India and the Indian Government 
was for some time undecided as to its policy on their mechanization. 
Buys the Adj utant-General pointed out In Nbvember 1934, as cavalry 
regiments at home were progressively mechanized It would be Increasingly 
difficult to find drafts for horsed units stationed overseas 
(111) 
0 
7bere was, moreover, a natural tendency for R. T. C. officers to 
believe that any increase In armoured forces should be accomplished 
entirely by the expansion of their own Corps([V). There were strong 
arguments In favour of this course. Though the 3rd Kings Own 
Hussars volunteered for experimental mechanization in the 1935 training 
season(v), and though some of the more intelligent cavalry officersI, 
Brereton, The Horse In War (David and Charles 1976), pp. 146-7. 
M. Cooper, The German Army 1933-45 (Macdonald's and Jane's 
197 8), pp. 16 =-. 
(ili) Minutes 3 and 4. WO/32/2847. 
(iv) Liddell Hart, -The Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 340. 
(v) War Office Letter 20/Cavalry/831. WO/32/2847. 
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had by this stage recognized the need to accept mechanization or face 
extinction, the majority clung with atavistic fervour to the horses 
they knew and loved. In 1937 the Colonel of the Scots Greys made 
a public protest against the possible mechanization of his regiment('). 
Though this made no difference to General Staff policy, patriotic feeling 
in some parts of Scottish society apparently ran quite high on the 
issue and a great deal of commotion was generated. 
With reference to the General Staff's policy of mechanizing the 
cavalry rather than putting all armoured vehicles under the control of 
the R. T. C., Liddell Hart comments that the 
official mind rolled Itself up like a hedgehog 
on the advance of any suggestion that the one 
corps already ex 
' 
perienced In mechanized mobility 
was the medium through which mechanization should 
be extended. That defensive posture was prompted 
not only by care for old established interest but 
by fear that, if the Tank Corps was allowed its 
head the pace of progress might become too fast to 
be controllable(ii). 
Liddell Hart produces little evidence to support this statementý however, 
and falls to give an adequate explanation of the General Staff's dilemma. 
7be abolition of the cavalry, had it been attempted, would have 
created a virtual civil war situation within the Army. Even If the 
reformers had won the aftermath of bitterness would have long endured. 
The Army had felt itself almost squeezed to death by hostile external 
forces in the disarmament period, and the General Staff had no 
stomachý during rearmament for creating serious Internal rifts. 7be 
cavalry therefore could not be destroyed. But nor was It realistic to 
(1) Talk with Hore-Bellsha, 3rd November 1937. ll/HB. 1937/76-7b. 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
(11) Liddell Hart, The, Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 342. 
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preserve it in its existing form. Cavalry mechanization seemed the 
o nly way o ut. Early In the Inter-war period Liddell Hart himself had 
produced strong arguments In favour of this course. He wrote- In , 
1928 
It Is the cavalryman's training which has given 
him the Instinct of manoeuvre and rapid decision 
and the increasing vulnerability of his mount has 
helped to develop these instincts. The best hope 
of using armoured vehicles aright Is to put more 
cavalry men In charge of them. 7be infantryman 
or gunner gifted with unusual Imagination may 
acquire the art. 7be good caval man Is by his, 
past training a ready-made artisWO. 
But by the beginning of rearmament, when the funds were at 
tI, 
last becoming available to put cavalry mechanization finto practice, 
Liddell Hart had changed his mind. ' He wrote In December 1937 that 
some doubt must remain until experience has proven 
to the contrary as to the ability of horse-minded 
* soldiers to become mechanically minded, and to get 
as much out of their machine as a corps of national 
enthusiasts for the machine. Past experience as a 
whole does not lessen this doubt(II). 
Liddell Hart may have been nearer the truth In the second quotation 
than the first, but the two taken together show that he was certainly 
not preaching an unchanging gqspel throughout the Inter-war period. 
II 
The evolution of the General Staffs plans for the Mobile Division 
is worth tracing in some detail. 7be division which Montgomery- 
Massingberd proposed in late 1934 was intended to include two 
Armoured Car Regiments, one Mechanized Cavalry Brigade would 
Liddell Hart, Armoured Forces in 1928. - Article In the R. U. S. 1. 
journal LXXIII., Nbvember 192K 
(it) Liddell Hart, 7be Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 357. 
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consist of one "Armoured" Cavalry Regiment and three "Mechanized" 
Cavalry Regiments. The Armoured Cavalry would consist of light 
tanks'and would resemble a Light Tank Battalion 'R. T. C. 7be 
composition of the Mechanized Cavalry Regiments had not been worked 
out in detail, but they were to be equipped with scout cars, light 
trucks and lorries. Their role was'apparently envisaged as similar 
to that of mechanized Infantry and they were to be supported in it by 
mechanized artillery and -machine guns mounted in armoured carriers 
By September 1935 Montgomery -Mass I ngberd was considering the 
possibility of having a second Mechanized Cavalry Brigade In'the'Mobile 
Division("). As a result of a wargame held in the spring of 1935 the 
General Staff definitely decided to include a second Cavalry Brigade 
but also to reduce the size of the Brigade to three regiments, two 
motorized and one of light tanks. At the same time a decision was 
taken to form a Mechanized Cavalry Brigade in Egypt which was 
provisionally intended to include one Armoured Car Regiment, one 
(111) 
Cavalry Light Tank Regiment and one Motor Cavalry Regiment 
As early as September 1935 Montgomery-Massingberd noted the 
"important necessity" of appointing a commander and staff to train the 
Mobile Division even though there was as yet little equipment available 
I 
for this new formation. The following month, as the General Staff 
clarified its conception of the structure of the division, It was suggested 
W. 0. Letter 20/Cavalry/871 and accompanying memorandum on 
Organization of Mobile Troops. WO/32/2847. 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1, Section 
6, Sub-Section 2(Iii). Mobile Troops. WO/32/4612. 
(Iii) W. 0. Letter 20/GENERAL/5512, paras. 2 and 3. December 1935. 
WO/32/2826. 
: w: ý- 
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that the Inspector of Cavalry and his. staff -might form a suitable 
nucleus for the divisional headquarters(l). 
Wntgomery-Massingberd- never wavered in his belief in, the 
importance of'the Mobile Division. Tollowing a, visit to Franceiin the 
summer of 1935, -when he witnessed one of the new, French armoured 
divisions on exercise, - he wrote to his Secretary of, State ;. 
I do feel that, we - should, be getting- on with 
our Mobile Division as quickly as we can, and 
the sooner we can -appolm a ýcommander to 
supervise Its Instruction and the necessary changes 
the better. That suchý a- formation is a powerful 
engine of war I have not the slightest doubt 
after what I have seen and- It, would be Invaluable 
at the beginning of a campaign(H). 
The creation of the division was delayed by lack of equipment, 
however, and it was not until September 1937, after Nlontgomery- 
Massingberd's retirement, that It became worthwhile to appoint a, 
commander. 7bis appointment became the source of acrimoniousý 
dispute between Deverell and Hore-Bellsha. -, Deverell nominated 
Major-General Blakiston-Houston, the inspector of Cavalry. In this he 
was merely following the course of action proposed as early as October 
1935 that the Inspector of Cavalry and his staff should be formed Into 
the nucleus of the Mobile Division headquarters. Encouraged by 
Liddell Hart, Hore-Belisha objected to the appointment of Blakiston- 
Houston. 'Ibough the bulk of the Mobile Division was to be composed 
The Future Reorganization of the'British Army, Part 1, Section 6, ' 
Sub-Section 111, "Mobile Troops", 9th September 1935. WO/32/4612. 
The Mobile Division and Cavalry Mechanization,, para_. 6 (a), 
14th October 1935. WO/32/2826. 
(11) Montgomery -Mass Ingberd to Halifax, 17th August 1935. (Montgomery- 
Massingberd Papers, King's College, London). MM/158/5. 
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of cavalry regiments, Liddell Hart was eager that the new formation 
should be commanded by one of three officers from the -Royal, Tank 
Corps: Pile, Broad and Hobart. , Pile and Broad had both recently been 
promoted to Major-General and were seeking appropriate employment(O. 
After Interviewing Blakiston-Houston, Hore-Belisha told Liddell 
Hart that he had not been Impressed. Blakiston-Houston was a 
"typical cavalryman". Hore-Belisha was disinclined to give him the 
Mobile Division and on the whole most inclined to Broad("). 
In a telephone conversation with Liddell Hart on the evening of 
5th October 1937 Hore-Belisha said that he was puzzled over how to , 
deal with Deverell. , Liddell Hart recorded that 
He feels' that he cannot name an Individual unless 
the C. 1. G. S. will mention his name among the 
nominees, as if he does they will say he is putting 
his friends Into jobs as they are already ready to 
say If any chance is given. I quite agreed. 
H-B went on to say that the C. I. G. S.,, obstinately 
avoids mentioning the name of any Tank Corps - 
officer - If he would only mention Hobart, Pile 
or Broad H-B would jump on to the chance. I 
said that he ought to make his stand on princIpI 
and insist first that as the cavalry had been pur- - into tanks It was essential that a man who had 
experience of tanks should be given command(M). 
Against Broad there were, perhaps, some real objections. , Hore- 4W 
Belisha told Liddell Hart that Broad was regarded, within the War 
Office, as "quarrelsome" and Liddell Hart himself noted that Broad 
(IV) 
lacked both humour and tact 7he latter quality would ý undoubtedly 
Liddell Hart, The Tanks, 
Talk with Hore-Beltsha, 
(Liddell Hart Pap-em). 
(lit) Talk with Hore-Belisha, 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
Vol. 1, pp. 388-9. 
12th September 1937. ll/HB 1937/43b 
5th October 1937. '- Il/HB 1937/50b, 
(iv) lbid, and II/HB 1937/29 (Liddell Hart Papers). 
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0 
have been necessary in a Tank Corps officer appointed to adjust the 
cavalry to the requirements of modern war. Hobartwas a superb 
trainer of men and had outstanding tactical ability In the handling of 
armour. But Gort, who at this time was Hore-Belisha's Military 
Secretary, drew the Secretary of State's attention to the'fact that ten 
years previously Hobart had been involved in a somewhat unpleasant 
divorce case which might make him socially unacceptable to the 
cavalry('). Pile had by this stage dropped out of the picture as he 
(ii) 
had been selected to command lst Anti-Aircraft Division 
Gort therefore suggested Major-General Alan Brooke, the Director 
I 
of Military Training, as a compromise candidate. In a discussion' 
with Deverell on 3rd ýbvember 1937 Hore-Belisha finally agreed thatý 
Brooke should command the Mobile Division provided that Brooke's 
old job as D. M. T. should go to an officer from the Tank Corps. - 
Deverell suggested Hobart., whose high abilities he recognized, and 
this prolonged and frustrating ýIspute was at last brought to an end"'). 
Liddell Hart's and Hore-Belisha's viewpoint on this Issue Is easy 
to appreciate. It did indeed seem logical to give the command of the 
British Army's first mechanized division to an officer experienced in 
the training and tactical handling of mechanized forces. Consequently, 
historians who have discussed this affair have generally done so In a, 
manner favourable to Hore-Belisha and Liddell Hart 
(iv) 
* ýbwever, all 
ii/HB/1937/47b. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
(u) Pile, op. cit., p. 39. 
(iii) Talk with Hore-Belisha, 3rd ý, bvember 1937. Il/HB/1937/76-77b. 
, 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
(iv) See, for example, P. J. Minney, op. cit., pp. 61-63. 
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our knowledge of the dispute comesý--from Liddell Hart's memoirs and 
private papers and allowance must be-made for this in attempting 
to reach a balanced assessment. Deverell seems to have been 
rather inarticulate and according to records of the dispute kept by 
Liddell Hart he did not argue his own case very well. But the Idea 
of making the Inspector of Cavalry and his staff the nucleus of the 
Mobile Division headquarters must have seemed logical to Deverell' 
in view of the fact that the Mobile Division was primarily a cavalry 
formation, and Liddell Hart himself had earlier argued that the 
cavalry officer's training naturally suited him to the command of 
annoured fonnations. 
Another controversy concerning the Mobile Division arose at the 
same time. A major programme to train mechanized cavalry for the, 
Mobile Division had been initiated by the General Staff and In the 
summer of 1936 the 2nd Cavalry Brigade held a series of exercises 
under the supervision of Major-General Sir John Burnett-Stuart. 
Following these exercises Burnett-Stuart told his officers that 
... for lack of official guidance he had had to make up his mind as to the proper role of 
the Mobile Division before he could start the 
study at all. He had taken it to be exactly 
the same role which the old Cavalry Division 
had, been intended to perform for the pre-war 
Expeditionary Force. Only the Instrument was 
being remodelled, not the purpose for which it 
was wanted. it was to provide the same kind 
of protection and reconnaissance for the, force, 
to clear away the enemy's mobile troops and 
minor-centres of resistance and to follow up 
the enemy if heretired. 
'' 
When a- battlefront 
was formed it would slip aside to cover the 
flank or lie up in readiness. 
He had made up his mind that the Mobile 
Division was not to be regarded as a force, to 
be sent on independent strategic missions, nor 
as an armoured mass of manoeuvre on the 




heavy assaulting power, and for that reason he 
thought that the Tank Brigade should be left -out. 
The Tank Brigade would be held back for 
great occasions, and It had no part in the 
normal day's work of the armoured light 
cavalry. It was because he had formed this 
view that he kept the Tank Brigade out of the 
picture in this year's trials. 
Liddell Hart had a high regard for Burnett-Stuart's abilities. But 
he correctly pointed out that the concept of the Nbbile Division having 
exactly the same role (basically, reconnaissance, screening and, pursuit) 
as the old horsed Cavalry Division was a dangerous one. Any move 
towards the exclusion of the Mobile Division was likely to produce a 
formation lacking in offensive and even counter-offensive power('), it 
is odd. that Burnett-Stuart should have complained of lack of official 
guidance. Montgomery-Massingberd had set out the role of the NIobile 
Division very clearly in a major General Staff paper and he had 
specifically included the Tank Brigade In the division 
Following Burnett-Stuart's statement It seemed for a while that 
Deverell was likely to adopt Burnett-Stuart's conception of the Mobile 
Division rather than Nbntgomery-Massingberd's. Deverell even . us ed 
the possible exclusion of the Tank Brigade as a reason for not appointing 
an R. T. C. officer to command the division 
(111) 
* At some point Deverell 
must have changed his mind,, however, and when the composition of the 
Mobile Division was announced in Nbvember 1937 It Included the Ist 
Tank Brigade as well as two Cavalry Brigades and supporting units of 
I (IV) other arms 7be inclusion of the Tank Brigade was confirmed when 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, pp. 450 4& and 47., 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part -1,. Section 6,, Sub-Section 2(iii) "Mobile Troops". WO/32/4612. 
(lit) Talk with Hore-Belisha. ll/HB/1937/48b. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
(tv) Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 59. 
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a detailed account of the Mobile Division's composition was dr-awn 
up for the purposes of the Army List in March 1938('), -- 
Nevertheless, the concept of the Mobile Division as a simple 
substitute for the old, horsed Cavalry Division was not, easily , 
eradicated. A detailed Jist of the, units,, of the Mobile Division, drawn 
up in-December 1937, shows that by this stage all six-'of the regiments 
included in the Ist and 2nd Cavalry Brigades were Intended to be 
converted to light tanks. ?, bne of the Cavalry Regiments in the Mobile 
Division was now intended to act. as mechanized infantry though two 
mechanized infantry battalions had been introduced into the Mobile ,, " 
Division as divisional troops. The Mobile Division was Intended, by 
December 1937, to include six regiments of light tanks compared with 
only four units of the better-anned medium and cruiser tanks. The 
British light tanks of this period were armed only with ý machine guns 
and were unsuited to any purpose other than reconnaissance and 
screening: - the traditional roles of the cavalry In the Immediately 
pre-1914 era. Liddell Hart, therefore, was absolutely correct to 
advise that the division's bulk was becoming disproportionate to its 
f ighti ng power 
But the advice which Liddell Hart was giving to Hore-Bellsha at 
this period was by no means entirely beneficial to_the Army. From 
1937 onwards he became increasingly obsessed with three main ideas- 
the enormous power of the defensive on land In modern war; the 
Headquarters, Southern Command, Salisbury to Under Secretary of 
State, The War Cff ice, -Monthly Army List Amendments, 4th March 193 
(ii) Liddell Hart, Memoirs., Vol. 11, pp. - 57 and 58. 
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importance of avoiding a repetition of the horrors of the Somme and 
Passchendaele; the danger of air attack and the consequent necessity 
of vastly expanding the country's anti-aircraft defences('). His 
conviction that the defensive was supreme on land emerges very 
clearly from a series of articles entitled "Defence or Attack" which 
he wrote for The Times. He emphastsed the great effectiveness of 
defensive firepower and gave the Impression that the General Staff, was 
totally and wrongheadedly devoted to an offensive doctrine. The general 
message of the articles seems to have been the grave danger of the 
General Staff blundering Into repetitions of the Somme and Passchendaele. 
Attack Is so'deeply rooted In the military 
tradition that its power to succeed as a 
natural result of the offensive spirit 
properly directed is the first article of 
the soldier's creed. Tbus despite the 
warnings of a century of increased machine 
warfare culminating In 1914-18, It Is still 
a normal tendency, indeed a habit to assume 
that an attack will succeed so long as the 
executant has a numerical superiority which 
would have sufficed when men fought with 
hand weapons,, mainly at short ranges(11). 
Commenting on a tactical exercise Involving the Mobile Division 
which was held in September 1937 Liddell Hart remarked that "the lot 
of a commander who is charged with an offensive role under modern 
conditions is not an enviable one. It requires almost a superman to 
make a good show". ' The German Nnzer leaders of the Second World 
War were thoroughly competent professionals but they were by no means 
supermen. Liddell Hart was a long way from foreseeing the types of 
operation which they: were to conduct 
(I) Bond, Liddell Hart, pp. 94,97,104,109. 
(ii) Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 24. 
(III) Ibid, p. 92 and Bond, Liddell Hart, p. 98. 
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Because of his belief that the British Anny, was obsessed with 
the off ensive and yet III-equipped to adopt It in the face of the 
defensive firepower of modern weapons, Liddell Hart became Increasingly 
opposed to the whole idea of sending an expeditionary force to the 
Continent. 7bis tendency was beginning to emerge as early as June 
1937 when Liddell Hart wrote a memorandum entitled "Suggestions on 
the Future Reorganization of the British Army" which Indicated that 
participation In a campaign on the Continent should be considered the 
"least likely"role 
- 
of the Army(', 
)* 
As the 1930s wore on, Liddell Hart's opposition to the Continental 
commitment became even more marked. 7be General Staff insisted that 
a German breakthrough on the Western Front was a definite possibility 
in the event of war and that a British Field Force might be required 
to protect the Channel Ports while the French Army regrouped. Liddell 
Hart's response to this suggestion shows that his conviction of the 
supremacy of the defensive was unshakeable and that he was very far 
from believing In the possibility of "Blitzkrieg" operations by armoured 
forces. He argued that the possibility of even a temporary collapse 
of the French Army's front was so remote as not to be worth 
preparing for. 
In preparing defensive measures It is wiser to 
base them on, the balance of probabilities rather 
than to attempt the Impossibility of being equally 
prepared for every possibility ... There is no sign at present of any new development 
In military technique so potent as ý to promise, 'an 
attacking army a reasonably good chance of breaking 
through the front of a defending army of more or 
Suggestion on the Reorganization of the Army, Part C, The 
infantry Division, para. 5. WO/32/4614. 
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less' similar strength ... Even If -a -- particular, - 
part of the front should be penetrated by a 
surprise onslaught before the defender-had 
mobilized, experience provides little ground 
for believing that the thrust can be pressed 
far enough to produce a general collapse(i). 
In The Tanks Liddell Hart makes It seem by selective quotation 
that he was arguing against sending an old-fashioned infantry force 
to the Continent but In favour of sending armoured divisions 
Actually he was arguing against sending any kind of Field Force at 
all. Though he believed that the French would "undoubtedly welcome 
the promise of any mechanized divisions we could send", he emphasised 
that In his view by the time they arrived on the Continent any German 
I 
thrust would have been brought to a ha4t and stalemate reestablished. 
If the British sent armoured forces, the French would only waste them 
in suicidal offensives. He concluded thatl 
The only serious chance of the French resistance 
collapsing completely Is as-. Ia- sequel to -a rash offensive on their own part,, and the; crippling 
of their forces in it - as -In 1914. , Nlothing could 
be more likely to encourage them to repeat this 
folly than the pre-war promise of a force from 
us(Iii). 
The General Staff consistently refused to believe that a German 
breakthrough on the Western Front was Impossible and continued its 
efforts to prepare a Field Force, Including a substantial proportion of 
armour, for the Continent. Liddell Hartfs position became Increasingly 
contradictory. On the one hand he advocated the Creation of two or 
even three Mobile Divisions, though tank production was not proceeding 
(I) 1, bte on the Question of the Channel Ports and the need of a 
--, -, 
Britislh Tield Force. II/HB/11937/23., 
-(Liddell 
Hart Papers). 
(it) Liddell Hart, ', The Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 387. 
(iii) Il/HB/1937/23 (Liddell Hart Papers). 
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rapidly enough adequately to equip one. On the other, he attacked the 
need for a Continental Field Force, thus to a great, extent undermining 
the War Office's rationale for the development of armoured forces, 
and insisted that the War Office spend an ever-increasing proportion 
of its meagre funds on anti-aircraft defence. 
By the middle of 1937 Liddell Hart's attitude to armoured forces 
was in some ways less positive than Deverell! s.. His study of the 
fighting In Spain had further convinced him of the superiority, of the 
defensive and the limited ability of armoured forces to overcome it. 
Of a conversation which heheld with Deverell on 29th June 1937, 
Liddell Hart recorded'that, 
As regards tanks, while admitting their limited 
effect In Spain, he (Deverell) insisted that they 
had been too badly handled there to draw any 
lessons ... The main need of tanks as he saw it 
was for the breakthrough. I suggested that there 
was cause to doubt whether this would prove 
practicable but that tanks were most valuable for 
mobile defence and counter-stroke and that their 
advantages In these respects were sufficient to 
justify their maintenance whether attack proved 
feasible or not(O. 
This passage seems to stand on Its head the usual ýview of the 
relationship between Liddell Hart's Ideas and those of the General Staff 
on the subject of armour. Deverell Is advocating the use of armour 
to achieve breakthrough whereas Liddell Hart is doubting its offensive 
power. After witnessing the, German manoeuvres In -October 1937-- 
Deverell became extremely worried that the quality of the German Army 
was so high that the French "'could not stand against them" and that 
a German offensive would have a good chance of success. According 
(1) 11/1937/56 (Liddell Hart Papers). 
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to Liddell Hart this was "contrary to H-B's impression", Hore-Bellsha 
was "sick of that old man (Deverell)"(1). As things turned out, of 
I 
course, Hore-Belisha was wrong and "that old man" proved quite 
correct. 
In Nbvember 1937 the Cabinet appeared to be moving towards, the 
"disco nti nuation of a Field Force for the Continent". Hore-Belisha 
-, 
asked Deverell what changes he would make if a Continental role were 
ruled out. Deverell said he would not make any. Hore-Belisha, on 
the other hand, suggested the abolition of the Tank Corps, though 
fortunately he was talked out of this by Liddell Hart("). 
The following month Hore-Belisha finally decided to sack Deverell 
and at the same time he introduced the New Army Policy which 
relegated fighting on the Continent to the least Important role of the 
Army. This, as we shall see, had a very detrimental effect on the 
'development of British armour. The War Office was compelled by the 
Treasury to make substantial reductions In Its tank programme at a 
critical period. We must now trace the course of these negotiations 
between the War Cffice and the Treasury over the financing of the 
tank programme. 
The Financing Of The Tank Programme % 
By Nbvember 1936 the War Office's proposals had reached a fairly 
mature form and were sent to the Treasury for approval. The tank 
units of the British Army were to be as follows: - 
(i) 11/1937/57b (Liddell Hart Papers). 




6 Light Tank Cavalry Regiments 
4 Divisional Cavalry Regiments 
I Light Tank Battalion R. T. C. 
3 Mixed Tank Battalions R. T. C. 
4 Army Tank Battalions 
I 
Unit Establishment 
58 Light Tanks 
58 Light Tanks 
59 Cruiser Tanks 
23 Cruiser Tanks 
4 Light, 15 Medium and 
40 Infantry Tanks 
Tank Brigade H. Q. 4 Cruiser and 3 Medium Tanks() 
, When this programme was 
discussed at the T. 1. S. C. on'13th, 
Nbvember 1936, Mr. J. A. N. Barlow of the Treasury's Supply division 
challenged it, on the grounds that, It was based on a decision to change, 
the composition of the Field Force (by Increasing the proportion of -ý 
armour) "which had been taken by the Army Council but which, had not 
been endorsed by the D. P. F. or any other Ministerial body outside the 
War office". Mr. Kenneth Lyon-agreed that this was the case but 
argued that the General Staff did not envisage ý Increasing the size of, - 
the Field Force, they merely- wanted to equip It more appropriately 
for its role. 
The Treasury officials next quizzed the War, Office -representative, 
as to whether these proposals were framed with a particular enemy or 
a particular theatre of war in mind. The Diiector of Staff Duties, 
Major General E. K. Squires, skillfully and sensibly dodged this question. 
The General Staff evidently had Germany in mind -as -the enemy of, 
Western Europe as the theatre of war, but it was much more convenient 
not, to say so. A Continental commitment had never been definitely 
decided upon by the, Cabinet and some influential politicians were very. 
reluctant to incur one. Squires maintained that the tank programme 




for a Continental theatre alone, but for action 
against any civilized or semi-civilized opponent 
and hence for any theatre for which, the Field 
Force might be Intended. 
The Treasury suggested that there was no point In giving financial 
sanction Immediately because, except in the case of the light tank, 
the War Office and Its Industrial contractors were not yet ready to 
go to production on any of the types of tank required. Squires agreed 
that in most cases orders could not immediately be placed for the 
finished product but pointed out that while design and development work 
was still in progress orders could be placed for the necessary armour 
plate. Financial sanction was also necessary In order that the War 
Office could take steps to reserve Industrial capacity. 
Finally Squires emphasised that the whole of the General Staff ,s 
planning for the modernization of the Army was very much dependent 
upon'the acceptance of Its tank programme. 7be programme should 
therefore be approved as soon as possible and Its consideration should, 
not be deferred until such a time as the new types of tank were ready 
to go into production. These pleas fell on deaf ears, however, and 
the Treasury officials adopted their standard delaying tactic of referral 
to the Chancellor('). 
it Is thus evident that the Treasury adopted a very negative attitude 
to the tank programme. In the Treasury view the Field Force was 
a low priority which could only be considered when-the demands of -- 
home defence and trade protection had been fully complied with, and 
(i) T. I. S. C. 45th Meeting, 13th November 1936. WO/32/4441. 
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which also had to defer to the need for financial stability('). 
The War Office had been ready to go to production with the Light 
Tank Mark VI since October 1936("). Butfinancial approval even for 
the light tank part of'the programme was'delayed until March'1937 and 
only then released after strong protests that further delay would place 
Inj eopardy the General Staff 's pla ns for the f uture of the* cavalry. 
The War Office had entered Into negotiations with the'lndla Office 'and 
the Government of India in o rder to persuade them of the necessity of 
cavalry mechanization. TheVar Office's negotiating position would 
obviously be seriously weakened, Its representatives claimed at' the 
T. T. S. C., if it lacked financial approval'for Its proposals 7bis 
protest led to the granting of Treasury sanction for the production of 
light tanks but the rest of the programme was still'be-ing -held up in 
July, when the War Office was forced to object once again. 
lbough the design work on the medium, cruiser and Infantry tanks 
was not yet complete, there were certain components Including gun 
mountings, power traverses and periscopes, which the War Office needed 
to order at once, and which otherwise would cause Industrial bottlenecks 
when tank production actually began. Financial sanction was also needed 
in order to arrange with Nuffield Mechanization to prepare drawings and 
obtain jigs and tools for the manufacture In'Britain of ah engine of the 
American "Liberty" type which was intended to provide the power for 
(j) Peden, GD. cit. , pe 138. 
The Tank Situation, 15th October 1936. ' wo/32/4441. 
(iii) War office Memorandum no. 95, para. 5,19th March 1937. 
WO/32/4441. 
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the cruiser tank(). ýThe Treasury . conceded'the force'of these 
arguments and at a, meeting on 27th July 1937 r1iost of 'the programme 
was released("). 
But having apparently gained Its objectives in these negotiations 
within a few months the War Office"found Itself in difficulties' once '" 
again. It was obvious that the tank programme was primarilY designed 
to meet the Field Force's requirements for a European war. Following 
the introduction of the New Army Hypothesis In December 1937'the 
War office was ýmeant to be planning the Army's rearmament on the basis 
of a new order of strategic" priorities on, which fighting on the Continent 
came extremely low. It therefore became necessary to decide"what 
line to-take in discussions with the Treasury and what concessions to 
make. If the tank programme were not"to be abandoned or 'vastly 
reduced, ' what rationale could be found for its continuance? Inevitably 
it would have to be modified, but how little modification could the 
War Office get away with? These questions were discussed at a meeting 
of the military members of the 
Army Council and the General Staff 
directors held in the C. 1. G. s room on 23rd December 1937("1). 
Gort opened the meeting, saying that now the Continental 
commitment was officially ruled out it was necessary to decide igainst 
whom the army was most likely to fight In the event of war. He pointed 
to the Middle East as, the "obvious danger spot". 7bLi role of the 
Field Force in the event'of an attack on Fgypt would be initially 
War Office- Memorandum no.. 145, 26th July 1937.. WO/32/4441. 
T. 1. S. C. 92nd Meeting, Item 4. WO/32/4441. 
(iii) Proceedings of a meeting held in C. I. G. S. 's room, 23rd December 
1937. WO/32/4441. 
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defensive but with local co unter- attacks. On the basis of an Egyptian 
role they had to decide of which types of tank to continue the development 
and conversely which could be most safely abandoned In the face of 
mounting Treasury pressure. 
The greatest financial concession to the Treasury which came out 
of this meeting was the decision to create only three rather than four 
of the Army Tank Battalions which were equipped with teavily armoured 
and expensive Infantry tanks. Major-General Z K. Squires, the Director 
of Staff Duties argued that the number of ranks In the Army Tank 
Battalion could also, be reduced provided that Infantry Tank Mark II 
(AI2) was put into production quickly. The A12 was so ýmuch better 
than its predecessor (All) that twelve of them could be -regarded as 
equivalent to fifteen Alls. . 
Sir Harold Brown suggested that the 
development of A12 could be accelerated, 
if necessary taking a chance with it by 
omitting the normal pilot model trials 
before placing orders and cutting, those, 
trials down to a minimum required to ensure 
suitability of detalls(i). 
In December 1937 the War Office had a total of three experimental 
models of medium and cruiser tanks under development: A14, AIS and A16. 
At this stage it was, decided that all work on A15 should be, stopped 
and that prototypes-of A14 and A16 should be-produced. If one of 
these tanks proved successful jigs should be made so that, it could be 
(11) put into production as soon as war broke out 




Proceedings of a meeting held in C. 1. G. s. s room, 23rd December 
1937, Conclusion 3. WO/32/4441. 
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Woolwich and a prototype was built by the London Midland and -, - 
Scottish Railway Company, but It became clear that the pilot model ý 
would not be ready before 1939. Eventually development work was 
abandoned and the tank was never put Into mass production. 7be, A16 
was the lqtest development of the original cruiser tank ýconcept and 
was based on a modified Christie's suspension system. -Martel, hoped 
that it would prove a successful "battle-cruiser" combining the 1ýý 
advantages of high speed and cross-country performance with adequate 
armour for tank-to-tank fighting. Like A14, however, AI6 was, never 
itself put into ptoduction though some of its features were Incorporated 
into the successful; "'Crusader" tank which went Into service In 1940( 
1). 
At a meeting of the T. L S. C. in February 1938 It became clear 
that, as the War Office had anticipated, the Treasury wanted a 
considerable reduction In the expense of the tank programme. Bridges 
demanded "particulars of the effect on the tank programme of the, 
review of requirements In the light of the New ý Army, Hypothesis 
Mr. Kenneth. Lyon, representing the War Office announced that the 
review had so far resulted in a substantial reduction ý In theý estimated 
cost from 929 million to E24 million 
(11) 
By abandoning one Army 
Tank Battalion, agreeing to reductions in the numerical strength of 
I 
some tank units and cutting back some of the development work on, 
medium tanks, the War Office had reduced, this total to E221 million - 
by 2nd May 1938("'). Even this reduction was not really commensurate 
(i) Liddell Hart, 7he Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 377.. 
_. 
(ii) T. I. S. C. 126th Meeting, Item 7,24th February 1938. WO/32/4445. 
(iij) War Office Memorandum 343,2nd May, 1938. ý -, 
WO/32/4445. 
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with the contraction In the Army's role, however, and the War Office 
only escaped with so small a cut by emphasising the threat to EgyPt(t). 
7be Tank Programme Under Limited LtabilLty 
In spite of the change in the Army's role the General Staff was 
determined to press ahead with the policy of cavalry mechanization. 
it was planned ultimately to have a total of twelve Cavalry Light 
Tank ]Regiments: - two as part of a mechanized Cavalry Brigade in 
F, gypt, six for the Mobile Division and four as'Divisional Cavalry for the 
Field Force's infantry divisions("). 7bough the planned numerical 
strength of some of these units was reduced, the proportion of light 
ranks to more heavily armed and armoured machines in the British 
Army became absurdly high. There were several reasons for the 
development of this Imbalance. Most Important of these was the 
fact that the Light Tank Mark VI was the only tank with which the War' 
office was ready to go to production when rearmament began, so that 
it was manufactured in large numbers while design work on other types 
was still In progress. But the confusion over the Army's role was 
probably also a contributory factor. 7be light tank was adequate for 
many imperial defence duties though unsuitable for roles other than 
reconnaissance and screening in a European war. 
In 1938, British medium tank development had still not recovered 
from the drastic financial squeeze of the early, thirties, nor from the 
deaths of some of the country's leading tank designers. Though the 
initial mechanical troubles with A9 and. AIO had been eliminated, the 
Peden, op. cit. . p. 143. 
(11) War Office Memorandum no. 242,18th January 1938. WO/32/4445. 
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fundamental problem of power/weight ratio remained. 7he 14mm 
armour basis which had been specified in A9's original design was 
considered inadequate for fighting enemy tanks by 1938, -but the armour 
could only be substantially increased at the cost of drastically reducing 
the speed. A10 which was originally designed with an armour basis of 
30mm had a maximum speed of only 12-14 m. p. h. which was, considered 
inadequate for the operations of the Tank Brigade and, the Mobile 
Division(l). Nevertheless, because Martel's brainchild, the Nuffield, 
Christie cruiser tank was still not fully developed, the decision had to,. , 
be taken to go to production on these models. A batch of 50 A9's was- 
, ordered at the end of 
1937 and by May 1938 orders had been placed for 
a further 50 A9's with an Increased armour basis of 30mm, and 
100 A9's("). The A9 and the A10 were not regarded as truly 
satisfactory medium tanks and during 1938 their classification was,, 
somewhat misleadingly, changed to "heavy cruiser". But Ag and A10 ý 
were merely stop-gaps until a more suitable cruiser tank was ready 
(tit) 
for mass production 
The A13, the first of the Nuffield cruisers, appeared In November 
1937, a remarkably short time after Its development had been initiated. 
following Martel's return from Russia In September 1936. But A13 also 
ran into a number of diffIculties. When he began the development 
Martel's Notes on Fighting Vehicles 111, para. 3, January 1938, 
ýbtes on Fighting Vehicles IV, para. 3, March 1938, Notes on 
Tank ]Rearmament, para. 5, April 1938, and Notes on Fighting 
Vehicles V, May 1938.9/28/69 (Liddell Hart Papers). 
(ii) Notes on Fighting Vehicles 111, para. 3, January 1938,1%tes on 
Fighting Vehicles IV, para. 3, March 1938 and Notes on Fighting- 
Vehicles V, para. 3,9/28/69 (Liddell Hart Papers). 
(! it) Dbtes. on Fighting Vehicles V, para. 9, May 1938.9/28/69 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
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of this'fast cruiser, Martel had specified a 14mm armour basis only. 
This was inadequate for a battle tank by the late thirties and steps 
were taken to increase the armour to 30mm In later models. There 
was also a problem of mechanical unreliability due to difficulties in 
adapting"Christie's suspension system. Martel pointed to the "vezýr 
rapid rate at which this, tank has been developed and produced", and 
hoped that the Initial mechanical difficulties would prove to be merelyý 
"teething troubles"('). Many of these problems, were indeed eliminated 
later, but all the British Christie tanks developed a reputation for being 
somewhat unreliable and difficult to maintain and this to a great extent 
detracted from their advantages of high speed and good cross I country 
performance. The A13 Mark Lwith an armour basis of 14mm was put 
into production early In 1938 and began to arrive In January 1939. But 
A13 Mark 11, with a 30mm armour basis, did not come Into service until. 
after the outbreak of war though it eventually saw action with the Ist 
Armoured Division in France in May-June 1940 and 7th Armoured 
Division In Libya in 1940-41("). 
Tank production at this period was suffering seriously from the 
low industrial priority which the National Government and the Treasury 
accorded to Field Force requirements. When'the War Office began 
the development of infantry Tank Mark 11 at the beginning of rea rmament 
it was found that no work could be done on this machine at Woolwich 
Arsenal or at Vickers -Armstrong's because they were "full up with 
work for the Navy and the Air-Force which had, priority, over, Army- 
Martel's Nbtes on Fighting Vehicles V, para. 9, May 1938. 
9/28/69. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
(H) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, pp. 377-q - 
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requirements"('). In 1936 there was a minor boom In the engineering 
industry and the War Office had great difficulty in finding- a 'firm with 
the necessary skill, willing to accept this kind of work. Fortunately, 
Davidson, the Director of Mechanization, possessed a thorough knowledge 
of the engineering Industry and enjoyed the respect of, industrialists. 
He eventually entered into negotiations with the Vulcan Foundry which 
led to their undertaking the task in co-operation with the Mechanization I 
Board. Vulcan's lack of experience proved a major problem, however, and 
this was aggravated by-shortages of designers and draughtsmen("). 
The infantry Tank Mark 11 was rather slow (maximum speed 12 
m. p. h. ) and was not easy to mass-produce. But with a 60mm armour 
basis it was invulnerable to any existing anti-tank weapon and its 
2-pounder gun was a perfectly adequate main armament at the, start of 
the war. Vulcan, however, were not ready to go to, production with 
the "Matilda", as this tank became known, until early In 1939, and It 
was still not in service when war broke out 
OH) 
Preparing For The Continent, Feb-Sept. 1939 
Following the acceptance of a Continental commitment In February 
1939, the General Staff viewed the tank situation with mounting alarm. 
This is well Illustrated In a memorandum from the Deputy C. I. G. S., 
Sir Bonald Adam to the D. 0. M. P., Sir Harold Brown. The- dilemmas 
which faced the War office are stated -with admirable clarity but with 
a note of pure desperation breaking through between the lines. 
I (j) Martel, op. cit., p. 130. 
(H) A Chronology and Description of Progress in the Design7 and Production 
of Infantry Tank AMU, bbvember 1937. WO/32/4441. 
(ill) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, pp. 372 and 373. 
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... two horns'of the 
dilemma are: - 
(a) if orders for known and tried equipments are 
not placed we may be caught short of tanks In the 
near f uture. 
(b) Immense progress is being made In both 
anti-tank weapons and tanks In other countries, 
particularly in Germany, with the result that 
If we do not press ahead with new designs we 
shall find ourselves with tanks which are quite 
Incapable of coping with German standards, and 
which instead of being assets are death traps. 
(2) We have ordered, purely as Insurance, tanks of 
the type of A9, and we are faced with the fact that 
although the. first of these orders was placed in 
early August 1937, hardly any of these machines, 
have been delivered up to last week, some twenty 
months later 
(3) In order to cope with the problems with which 
we are faced the factor which is of paramount 
importance is to speed up the time between acceptance 
of the specifications and delivery of the tanks. This 
is not a temporary difficulty but the whole future 
of our successful employment ... of tanks depends on 
this; If Germany can carry out this process far more 
quickly than we can the prospect of our successful 
employment of tanks Is indeed dismal(t). 
In addition to the suspected obsolescence of A9 and A10 for, the 
I 
purposes of a European War, the first British Christie tank A13 Mark 
1, which had an armour basis of only 14mm wasl now reckoned to be 
faced with great difficulties. I 
]Recent trials of the German 20mm gun.. which is 
being fitted even in the light tanks and into some 
of the armoured cars, show that Its projectile can 
not only pass through the armour carried on the 
A13 Mark I but that it can burst effectively after 
penetration of -the armour, ... 
(ii) 
But the most serious problems were faced by the light tank units'. 
Thinly'armoured and armed only with a' machine gun, the British light 
D. C. 1. G. S. to D. G. M. P. 2 27th March 1939. WO/32/4445. 
(ii) lbid, Section 4(f). WO/32/4445. 
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tank was acutely vulnerable to hostile armour. Adam pointed out that 
at the very leas4 light tank units would need "a stiffening of 2-pounder 
guns". 7be General Staff's ultimate Intention was to provide each 
light tank unit with a squadron of cruiser tanks and to fit the high 
velocity 15mm Besa gun to all light tanks. But these measures were- 
obviously going to take a long time especially as there was ý already 
an acute shortage of criiisers. As a stop-gap measure It was 
decided to order a batch of 2-pounder guns on light tank chasses, 
but these vehicles lacked overhead protection and were thus under a 
. grave disadvantage('). The General Staff had ý thus recognized the 
unsuitability of the light tank for thb purposes of a European war and 
In March 1939, shortly after the acceptance of the Continental commitment, 
it was decided not to reserve any industrial capacity for their production 
In wartime("). 
Shortage of Industrial capacity for tank production was still, a major 
problem. In March 1939,211 financially sanctioned cruiser tanks had 
not even been ordered because no firm was yet ready to produce them 
There was now no capacity for tankproduction available In the R. O. F. 's 
(IV) which were occupied with higher priority work for -the other services 
Though General Davidson, the Director of Mechanization, had been 
successful In Introducing the Nuffield organization and the Vulcan 
(i) D. C. 1. G. S. to D. G. M. P., 27th March ý 1939, Section 6, WO/32/4445. 
Meeting on the Tank Programme, para. 4,15th March 1939. 
WO/32/4445. 
(ill) Ibid, para. 1. WO/32/4445. 
(iv) Hornby, Factories and Plant (H. M. S. O. 1958), p. 87. 
-ý276 - 
Foundry to the tank business, their inexperience Inevitably caused 
serious problems. In a desperate attempt to expand the fndustrial 
base the London, Midland and Scottish Railway had also been Introduced 
to tank manufacture('). But on 27th April 1939, - Sir Harold Brown 
informed the C. I. D. 'that until recently the'Industrial priority accorded 
to tank production had been so low that the manufacture of railway 
engines had seriously Interfered with It. 
Cf 1,277 light tanks which were financially approved by June 1939, 
1050 were scheduled to arrive by the end of September. ' But as we 
have noted already, the light tank was unsuited to armoured warfare 
on the Continent. Of 1062 cruiser and medluim'ý tanks approved by 
June 1939 only 125 were expected by the end of September, a'nd only 
115 of 369 infantry tanks. The Army was' thus acutely short of, tanks 
i 
capable of meeting the requirements of a Continental campaign("), 
At the end of 1938 the General Staff took the decision to form, ' 
around the nucleus of a mechanized cavalry brigade stationed In 
F2VDt, a secorxi Mobile Division. Hobart was chosen for the task of 
raising and training the new formation. Hobart was in many ways an 
ideal choice but the main reason for his selection may have been to 
remove him from the War Office where he was Director of Military 
Training. ' Though we, do not know Its exact cause there appears to have 
been considerable friction between Hobart and Gort. According to 
Liddell Hart, Gort had several times requested Hore-Belisha to remove ,- 
Hobart even before the decision to form a Mobile Division was 
Martel, - op. cit., 1). 131. 
28th Progress Report by the War Office, 15th June 1939, 
Appendix 1, Annexe A. (D. P. B. 314). CAB 16/230. 
-277- 
takeno). 
At the same time it was, decided to reduce the bulk of the 
British-based Nlobile Division, a step long advocated. by Liddell Hart. 
The, number of infantry battalions In this formation (renamed Ist 
Armoured Division) was reduced 
- 
from'two to one, and one of ý the two 
Armoured Cavalry Brigades was also removed. This left one 
Armoured Cavalry Brigade, 
- which was renamed the 
Light Armoured 
Brigade, the Tank Brigade, which was now designated the Heavy Armoured 
Brigade, and a Support Group consisting of one-motorized rifle 
battalion and a motorized artillery Regiment 
At the outbreak of war, however, the new armoured, formation In 
Egypt, whIc4 eventually became 7th Armoured Division, was a mere.. 
skeleton. . 
Even the Ist Armoured, Division, stationed ý In England, was 
acutely short of modern equipment and was consequently unable to take 
the field until May 1940, shortly before the collapse of the Western 
Front 
Nevertheless Martel points out that by the time he left the War 
Cffice tn February 1939 the General Staff's plans for the development I 
of annoured forces had become very ambitious. They Included a 
total of three Armoured Divisions, five Army Tank Brigades equipped 
with infantry tanks, and eleven Armoured Divisional Cavalry Begiments 
Ov) 
equipped with, light ta. nks . There Is thus no doubt that the General 
Liddell Hart, 
Pogers, op. cit., 
(it! ) Liddell Hart, 
(iv) Martel, op. cit., 
Memoirs, Vol. 11. 
p. 103. 
Memoirs, Vol. 11, P. 280. 
p. 13 1. 
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Staff realized the, importance of armour In modern war. Indeed,, this 
importance was fully recognized in the highest quarters when 
rearmament began. The General Staff began laying plans, for the 
creation of the British Army's first armoured division, and for the 
great expansions of armoured forces in the Army generally, even at 
a time when lack of funds made these mere pipe-dreams('). 
It is interesting to note, -also, the very considerable Interest which 
the General Staff seems to have taken in the development of armoured 
forces in Germany, both In the technical aspect and In strategic and 
tactical employment. 7be Intelligence appreciation files of the War 
office contained numerous reports on this subject, compiled- by M. 1.3, ' 
es mainly on the basis of military attach"' ' reports and German publications, 
throughout the 1930s Th ese appreciations tended to lack detail on 
the technical side b ecause of German security, measures but contained 
detailed analyses of German armour doctrine Including several accounts 
of Guderian's views. it is clear that these views were taken very 
seriously by the General Staff fs Intelligence analysts and that the 
intelligence appreciations were studied at the highest levels within the 
War office. Montgomery -Mass i ngberd's thoughts on the Future 
Reorganization of the British Army show clear evidence of the study 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army, 9th September 1935. 
WO/32/4612. 
For examples: - Appreciation By The Military Attache' Berlin of the 
Views of the German General Staff on Future War, Together With 
a Summary of Information Regarding Recent Developments In Germany, 
Enclosure 56A, (1934). , 
WO/190/283. Appreciation Report from 
Military Attache Berlin to M. 1.3,21st June 1936, Mechanized Forces 
in Germany. W. O. 190. German Tank Design, M. 1.3/4368, - 7th ' 
April 1937. WO/190/534. ýbte on the origin of tank organization in 
Germany, M. 1.3 b, 14th January 1938. WO/190/591. Precis of , Section 4 of "Der Durchbruch" (The Breakthrough) by General Kraft 
von Bellmensingen. WO/190/638. Light and Armoured Divisions In 
the German Army, Appreciation, 28th Nov. 1938. WO/190/7; 7. 
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of German doctrine and Gort minuted to Hore-Belisha In November 
1938 that, I 
*9* there Is no doubt that the German General Staff have great expectations from armoured forces. 
There are a number of interesting publications by 
responsible military authors on the strategy and 
tactics of armoured, formations which giveýa, reason- 
ably clear picture of the present German doctrine 
on this subject. 
The Germans believe that the power of penetration 
and mobility of the older arms Is not sufficient 
to enable them to carry an attack so rapidly and. 
to such depth Into the enemy organization that 
he will not have time to take counter-measures. 
This.. the Germans claim, can only be achieved 
by armoured formations. 
G&rman principles of employment of such 
formations are based on three requirements: - 
(a) suitable ground 
(b) surprise 
(c) large masses 
A tank attack Is envisaged in successive waves, 
biting deep Into the enemy defences. Speed is 
the essence of such an attack. 7be Germans 
Insist, however, that the role of the armoured, 
formations is to clear the way for the other arms 
and that only by co-operation with them can , decisive results be achieved. The armoured units 
punch holes through which the other arms can 
Conclusion penetrate(i). 
7be impediment in the development of British armour did not come 
from any lack of conviction of its Importance on the part of the General 
Staff but rather from technical and industrial difficulties in tank design 
and production. Until 1931, despite the small size of the British 
specialist armament Industry, Britain led the world --not only in the'" 
theory of armoured warfare and the training and tactical handling of 
armoured forces but also (with the Sixteen Tonner) in the technical 
Gort to Hore-Belisha commenting on aýconversation involving the German military artache in Prague, 21st Nbvember 1938. WO/190/723. 
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development of tanks('). ,ý The government expenditure cuts of 1931 
were primarily responsible for the abandonment of, the Sixteen Tonner 
and the complete disruption of medium tank development In the critical 
first half of the 1930s. The late start to, the rearmament of the Army 
offered very little time in which to recover from this retardation of 
development. The Germans had already gained a considerable lead(").. 
The low industrial priority which the National Government and the - 
Treasury accorded to Field Force requirements meant that It was 
difficult to produceýtanks quickly even when the design was clear. 
Finally, the problem of getting an adequate priority for tank production 
ývas made absolutely insuperable because of the complete uncertainty 
which prevailed over the Army's role* until February 1939 
(111) 
0 
The British Army at the outbreak of war nevertheless showed many 
signs of the progressive policies of the General Staff. -- The proportion 
of armoured divisions was higher than in any foreign army even though 
these were short of modern tanks. 7be Infantry was well equipped 
(IV) 
with armoured carriers In terms of transport vehicles the British 
Army was probably the most highly mechanized in the world. Though 
no armoured division was able to go to the Continent until May 1940,, 
the Field Force did Include an Army Tank Brigade composed of heavily 
armoured Infantry tanks. This brigade played the most Important role 
Martel's Nbtes on Fighting Vehicles 1, February 1937.9/28/69 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
Martel, OT). cit., pp. 126,127. 
Bond, Liddell Hart, p. 108. 
(iv) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. 1, p. 399. 
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In a counter-attack at Arras which unnerved the Germans and was 
probably at least partly responsible for the survival and successful 
evacuation of most of the Field Force(). 
7bough the absolute strength of Britain's armoured forces was,. vastly 
less than that of the German Panzer arm, this was only to be expected. 
The German General Staff did not have the British Cabinet or Treasury 
to contend with. The rearmament of the German Army began as soon 
as Hitler came to power, not In 1936. Hitler actually forced the pace 
of German rearmament, faster than his own General Staff wanted to go. 




in German rearmament, and "guns before butter" was the 
theoretical opposite of "business as usual". When all this Is 
appreciated the relative unpreparedness of Britain's armoured force, 
Is quite easy to understand and it Is evident that the War Office bore 
only a small part of the responsibility for this unfortunate situation. 
(I) Rogers, op. cit. pp. 9Q-100. 
(ji) Matthew Cooper, The German Arm , pp. 49-50. 
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7be Air Defence of Great Britain 
Introduction 
In terms of sheer scale of expenditure the anti-aircraft defence 
of Great Britain came to be one of the largest items In the War Office's 
budget., rivalling the expenditure on the whole of the Field Force. It 
Is nevertheless one of the most damaging allegations levelled at the 
General Staff by Its critics that it failed to appreciate the new 
dimension brought to warfare by strategic bombing and that it 
apportioned very Inadequate resources to the air defence of the 
homeland'). it is Important, therefore, to examine very carefu 
I Ily the 
War Office's part In the development of the air defences of Great 
Britain and to see how much justice there Is In these claims. 
Early Developmen 
Britain had, of course, experienced strategic bombing in the 
First World War. Tbough the anti-aircraft defences were totally 
dismantled at the end of the war, by 1922 pressure was building up 
from the air-minded for the drawing up of a carefully thought out 
air defence sch4ýme. The reports of the Steel-Bartholomew 
and Romer committees have been discussed at some length in the 
Cfficial History and there is no need to go over this ground here. 
Certain basic concepts employed fn these reports were, however, 
to have a lasting impact on the development of the air defences 
and these must be briefly outlined. Tbe' defences were 
Liddell Hart's notes on his talks with Pile, 11/1937/107,11/1938/11, 
11/1938/40 and Outline of the Opposition to the Development of the Anti-Aircraft Defence of Great Britain, 11/1938/89., (Liddell Hart 
Papers). Also, General Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack,, (Harrap 1949), 
pp. 67 and 74-85, and Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (Faber 1939), pp. 163-87. 
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organized in three main sectors: an Outer Artillery Zone, an ' 
Aircraft Fighting Zone and an Inner Artillery Zone. The Inner 
Artillery Zone consisted of guns and- searchlights designed to protect 
Greater London itself against enemy aircraft which succeeded in 
penetrating the otherýzones. 7be Aircraft Fighting Zone was the area 
In which fighter'interception was meant to take place. 7bis was to be 
15 miles wide and would extend in an, arc around London from the ' 
middle of Salisbury Plain to Duxford In Cambridgeshire. It, was lit by 
searchlights but contained no guns. - Aircraft were to be aided in 1, 
making their Interceptions by signals relayed from sound detectors on 
the coast and from Observation Posts'further inland. On the outer 
edge of-the Aircraft Fighting Zone itself there was to be an Outer 
Artillery Zone consisting of guns whose purpose was to break'up -enemy 
formations and indicate by shell bursts the positions of-'enemy 
aircraft to 1R. A. F. fighters 
it was the Porner Committee of 1924 which 'recommended the 
establishment of a Command designated Air Defence of Great'Britain 
(A. D. G. B. ). This command was Intended to control not only fighters, 
searchlights, and anti-aircraft guns but also the* bomber, component 
of the Metropolitan (i. e. home-based)'Air Force which was Intended 
to be much larger than the fighter component. The whole of -the 
purely defensive side of - A. D. G. B. was'to be delegated to, a subordinate 
command known as, Fighting Area. -Operational control of the entire. __ 
air defence apparatus was to be vested in an 1R. A. F. officer : C-in-C 
Fighter Area, but anti-aircraft gun and searchlight units were to 
Basil Collier The Def ence of the United Kingdom, (H. M. S. 0.1957), 
pp. 11-16. 
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continue to be provided by the Army and administered by the War 
Office(l). 
The Steel-Bartholomew and Bomer schemes originated manyof the 
concepts employed in A. D. G. B. throughout the Inter-war period, but 
they had a characteristic in common which meant that they were,, 
not fully adequate as a basis for planning in the deteriorating 
European situation after 1933. - The way in which the defensive, zones 
were laid out In these schemes clearly demonstrates that they-were 
planned with an attack from the. south - In mIhd.:,, - They bear, the marks, 
of having been designed when France was the,, only country with, the power, 
tc) launch a serious invasion of-Brifish airspace("), 
The Beorientation Plan, 1935-36 - 
Reports of German air rearmament inevitably led to a fundamental 
reappraisal of the country's air defence situation. Tbe-Air Staff- 
referred the question to, the Home Defence Sub-Committee of the C. 1. D. 
on 30th July 1934. As Is customary with British government, a further 
sub-committee was formed to deal with this special issue. This 
sub-committee, which became known first as the Reorientation Sub- 
Committee and later as the A. D. G. B. ý Sub-Committee, was established 
under the chairmanshiP of Air Chief Marshal Sir Pobert Brooke- - 
Popham the air officer Command! ng-I n-Chlef, Fighter Command'-"), 
In drawing up Its report the Brooke-Popham Committee worked on 
lbid, pp. 16 -18. 
Beorientation 
, of 
the Air Defence System of Great Britain. 
Memorandum by the Home Defence Sub-Committee Of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence (C. I. D. Paper 205-A), para. 1, Ilth April 1935. 
(iii) lbid, paras. 1 and 2 CAB 3/6. 
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the assumption that the war would be against Germany with France as 
Great Britain's ally,, but that the Germans, might succeed In capturing 
aerodromes In Belgium and Holland In the early stages of the war. 
it was assumed that attack would be concentrated mainly against 
I, ondon, but that Important industrial areas in the Midlands and the 
North could not be left unprotected(i). 
7be Air Staff advised the Committee that In view of the continuously 
increasing range of aircraft, even If the German Air Force were 
operating entirely from bases In Germany the British defensive system 
would need to be extended 100 miles to the north In order to give 
reasonable protection to the Industrial Midlands and Isbrth of England. 
However, it was up to the Brooke-Popham Committee to decide whether 
the form of defence for the Midlands and North should consist of-an 
extension of the existing Aircraft Fighting and Outer Artillery Zones; 
i. e. "a continuous defence line placed between the attacker and his 
objectives"' or- of "a discontinuous system of defence providing more 
direct cover for the most important centres only'00. 
While trying to decide between the continuous and discontinuous 
systems., the Brooke-Popham Committee had to pay careful attention to 
meteorological and topographical factors. The terrain, in the ýLeeds-- 
Sheffield area made it difficult to find suitable sites for aerodromes -and 
Home Defence Committee, Sub-Committee on the Reorientation 
of the Air Defence of Great Britain, Interim Report, 31st 
January 1935, Terms of Reference, CAB 3/6. 
(H) lbid, para. 2. CAB 3/6. 
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the atmosphere In that area is at times so 
thick and smokey that even if aircraft were 
able to leave their aerodromes there would be 
considerable uncertainty of their ability to 
land again. The meteorological conditions 
frequently render the details of the ground 
indistinguishable when viewed from the air and 
make it Impossible for aircraft to ascertain 
their location by direct observation(l). 
7be peculiar climate and topography of this part of the Industrial 
Nbrth seems to have been one of the main factors which influenced the 
Brooke-Pbpham Committee In its decision to opt for a continuous 
defensive system rather than the concentration of defences on the main 
industrial areas. It was considered very important to push the line 
of defence well east of the Leeds-Sheffield area In order that co- 
operation between A. A. defences and fighter aircraft would be effective. 
A discontinuous system was bound to leave large gaps In which the 
enemy could operate with comparative impunity and it was considered 
important to engage enemy aircraft as early as possible after crossing 
the coastline rather than waiting until they were In the vicinity of a 
major Industrial area("), 
It was therefore decided that the most effective system would be 
a continuous defence zone running from Portsmouth round the eastward 
of London to the Tees, though It would probably also be necessary to 
create some local defences at. the more important centres of industry 
and at certain ports. The Increased speed of aircraft since the 
Steel -Bartholomew and Romer reports of the 1920s led the Reorientation 
Committee to recommend an increase in the width of the Aircraft 
lbid, paras. 25-26, CAB 3/6. 
lbid, para. 27, CAB 3/6. 
-287- 
Fighting Zone from 15 to 20 miles to give the fighters a better chance 
of Intercepting and engaging the enemy. The- Outer Artillery. -Zone ý was 
also to be extended - to a, depth of six miles. -The Reorientation 
Scheme unlike the Steel-Bartholomew -Plan provided searchlights for 
the, outer Artillery Zones as well -ýas the Aircraft Fighting, Zone so 
that the total width of the illuminated area was 26 miles('), 
The deployment of the searchlight, and anti-aircraft -units for which 
the War Office was responsible was discussed In great detail In the-- 
Reorientation Report but it seems unnecessary- to -I elaborate on this , 
here. Suffice it to say that the local defences of all major conurbations 
other- than- London were left extremely weak. The total Army 
contribution to A. D. G. B. was to be 57 A. A. batteries and 90 search- 
light companies manned by a total of 43,000 men. 7be War Cffice 
estimated that to raise and train these units would cost 95,500,000 over 
and above the financial provision (92,250,000) which-was recommended for 
the Army's part In A. D. G. B. In the first D. P. C. report(II). 
However, this extra money would only become available after 1940. 
For the first stage of its plan the Brooke-Popham Committee was. 
forced to stay within the existing financial provision, -, and consequently 
it was impossible to recommend any A. A. defences at all for the 
industrial- Midlands and North. Even the provision for London would 
be completely inadequate. ý Yet despite the fact that, there, would be 
very little equipment available by 1940 for most of the units which the 
War office-. was -required to raise and train, the Brooke-Popham Committee 
(1) 
ý Ibid, . paras. 
28-32, CAB 3/6. 
(R) Ibid, paras. 38-40, CAB 3/6. 
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wanted the War Office to 
I 
go ahead with their creation immediately(l). 
The Brooke-Pbpham Committee pointed out that'even'In 1950, the 
projected date for the completion of the full scheme, there would 
be many weaknesses. The Reorientation Plan made virtually no 
provision for defence against attack by low-flying daylight raiders and 
none for the anti-aircraft defence of aerodromes. 7be Plan Included no 
specific recommendations for the defence of ports and even In 1950 
Bristol and Liverpool, for example, would be completely without local 
defences. 7be Brooke-Popham scheme still envisaged using most old 
First World War 3-inch A. A. guns which by the mid-thirties were 
obsolescent weapons, and its early warning system still relied on 
sound locators and the vigilance of a volunteer Observer Corps, as the 
development'of radar had scarcely begun 
(it) 
. 
With hindsight, therefore, the Reorientation Plan seems to have 
been ludricrously inadequate. The War Office's reaction even to this 
limited scheme, however, seems at first glance extremely cautious 
and somewhat negative. When the Plan was discussed by the C. I. D. 
on 16th April 1935, Lord Hallsham, the Secretary of State for War 
"agreed that a case had,. been made out In principle for the proposed 
extension of the Home anti-aircraft defences", but was obviously 
unhappy about some of the report's implications. Hailsham pointed out 
that the defences recommended would require a total of 43,000 and' 
that it was proposed to find these men from the existing Territorial' 
Army. The authorized peace strength of the T. A. was 165,000 and 
the actual strength only about 130,000. The Secretary of State was 
Mid, paras. '-0, 45-" CAB 3/6. 
Mid, paras. 53,58, 59 and 60, CAB 3/6. 
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understandably concerned that I 
If the War Office were now required to convert 
43,, 500 of these (to A. A. duties) the remainder 
would be insufficient to make the Territorial 
Army effective and In a position to carry out 
the war duties assigned to it. 
it must be remembered In this context that the War Cffice was almost 
obsessively and quite rightly concerned that the Field Force should 
be promptly and substantially reinforced by Territorial Contingents. 
Hailsham felt that It was "difficult to contemplate" any such wholesale 
conversion of units to A. A. duties without appreciating that It would 
-practically destroy the Territorial Army as It at present existed". 
He further pointed out that the cost of providing the anti-aircraft ' 
defences proposed "could hardly come out of the existing Army' Eiti mates-N, 
The C. I. G. S., Montgomery-Massirgberd, supported Hallsha'mts 
points and added some of his own. He reminded the C. 1. D. that the 
War office had originally asked for a 940 million deficiency programme 
over a five year period but that this had been cut E20 million. ' As 
a result the equipment of the Regular Field Force'would not be com- 
pleted for eight or nine years, and it had been necessary to extend 
the renovation programme for the coast defences of the U. K. from 
40 to 160 years. 'The War Office had nevertheless retained an 
allotment of Ej million per annum towards the provision of Home 
anti-aircraft defences. In Montgomery -Massingberd's estimation, the 
implementation of the Peorientation Plan would add an average of E2 
million per annum. to what the War Office already had to find. Tjjjs 
clearly could not be done without further delaying the equipment'of the 
(I) C. 1. D. 269th Meeting, Item 6,16th April 1935. CAB 2/6. 
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Field Force. As Liddell Hart later pointed out, the General Staff 
was consistently unwilling totally to sacrifice the Field Force to the 
requirements of A. D. G. B. But the General Staff was certainly not 
engaging In pure reactionary obstruction of the kind Liddell Hart's 
writing suggested, and Mo ntgomery -Mass Ingberd was able to give a 
carefully reasoned statement of the War Office's, position at the C. I. D. 
(1) 
In the General Staff view, providing- fighters, searchlights and 
anti-aircraft guns was only one aspect of air defence strategy. The 
other was striving to keep the enemy's air bases as far away from 
Great Britain as possible. Montgomery-Massingberd had already 
emphasised the strategic importance of the Low Countries from the 
airpower point of view In the discussions on, the f Irst D. R. C. Report. 
If the Low Countries could be kept out of German hands, this would 
be an enormous advantage for the Air Defence of Great Britain. Above 
all, the General Staff considered it vital to keep France In the war 
because. until the Germans had obtained decisive victory on the Continent 
they would be most unlikely to concentrate their airpower against 
Great Britain. Montgomery-Massingberd pointed out that If theproviston 
of A. A. guns and searchlights for Home defence were to be at the 
expense of the Field Force, and if the Field Force was consequently 
reduced to "low dimensions and poor equipment", the country might 
well end up on a worse position from the air attack point of view., He 
suggested that the D. E. C. Report had "balanced affairs" as between 
Field Force and A. D. G. B. requirements and that any Proposal which 
would upset-that balance must be given "most careful consideration"("). 
(I) lbid, GAB 2116. 
(ii) C. L D. 269th Meeting, item 6,16th April 1935. CAB 2/6. 
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In view of the War Office's reservations the C. 1. D. decided- to 
refer the Reorientation Peport to the Ministerial Committee on Defence 
Policy and Requirements. On the advice of the D. P. R. the Cabinet accepted 
on 24th July 1935 that the Brooke-Pbpham Plan was "the scheme to, be 
aimed at". But the recommendation that the War Office should 
immediately begin to convert 43,500 Territorial troops to A. A. duties 
regardless of the supply of equipment was reserved for further 
discussion by the Chiefs of Staff('). 
The Chiefs of Staff report on the Reorientation Plan explained that: 
The War Office are prepared to convert the 
equivalent of two Territorial Divisions out 
of fourteen, giving thus some 18,000 men who 
were formerly available for the later contin- 
gents of the Field Force. Beyond this they 
cannot hope to go In the way of conversion 
without denuding the later contingents. 
The Chiefs emphasised that the Territorial Army as a whole, but more 
particularly the A. A. units faced very grave recruitment difficulties. 
Anti-aircraft work was not generally considered a very glamorous aspect 
of soldiering and it was by no means certain, that the Territorial, Army 
could find by ordinary recruitment the men required, to complete the 
air defence system. 
The actual strength of existing 'Anti-aircraft 
units is only 41 per cent of their peace establish- 
ment. This leads to the conclusion that the 
Government will probably have to undertake a 
national campaign to secure the necessary additional 
recruits for the Territorial Army and If this falls 
to make provision for obtaining the men by other 
means(it). 
(i) lbid, Conclusions, CAB 2/6. 
Reorientation of the Air Defence System of Great Britain, Report 
of the Chiefs of Staff, (D. P. R. 2), para. 6, CAB 3/6. 
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Tbough the War Office's attitude to A. D. G. B. may seem somewhat 
negative on the evidence so far presented, the department was being 
placed In an Impossible position. Alone of the Service departments 
(I). 
the War Office had had its deficiency programme cut in half Both 
the Regular and the Territorial Armies were well below establishment 
with little immediate prospect of an improvement in their manpower 
situations("). At this stage It 
*was 
still generally assumed that a 
Field Force would be required for the Continent in war and that It Would 
need to be reinforced from the Territorial Army But while the 
Field Force was still desperately short of both equipment and manpower, 
the War office was effectively being asked to make further cuts In 
these areas for the sake of the air defence of the homeland, Defence 
against strategic bombing was obviously a growing requirement and the 
General Staff did not deny its Importance. But the Army was not being 
relieved of its more traditional duties of garrisoning the Empire and 
fighting in the field, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire against attack 
by modern bombers was an unknown quantity, and the War Office was 
surely right to point out that there was a limit to what it 'could do for 
(IV) 
A. D. G. B. within a grossly inadequate budget 
7he General Staff, moreover, was certainly not unwilling to take 
the initiative in air defence when the occasion presented itself. In 
Def ence Requirements ý Report C. P. 205 - (34), 31st July 1934, ý 
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations, CAB 16/110. 
(11) Minney The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (Collins 1960), p. 39. 
Def enc e Requirements Report, C. P. 205 (34), paras. 30-35. 
CAB 16/110. 
(iv) C. I. D. 269th Meeting, item 6,, 16th April 1935. 
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December 1935, the- War Office drew the attention of the C. 1. D. to the 
problem of protecting "points of importance" against pinpoint attacks 
by low flying aircraft('). 7be Br6oke-Popham Plan, like the Steel- 
Bartholomew and Romer schemes was designed mainly to Interpose, a 
screen between the attacker and his objectives and it depended for 
result on "taking a toll of the attacker". It had to be taken for granted 
that the defences would be penetrated and It was Important to minimize 
the effects of this penetration. The War Office was particularly concerned 
to protect essential Industries where material damage was likely to 
cause a serious dislocation of production. It was suggested that a list 
of "points of importance" should be compiled and that they should be 
classified according to the scale and type of attack which they would 
be likely to attract: - Class A where protection against the penetration 
of heavy bombs was essential, Class B where a lower scale of protection 
could be accepted("). 
The War Cffice recommended that all new factories and installations 
of military or governmental importance should be constructed on sites 
rendering them as immune as possible to air attack,, though it would not 
always be practicable to move existing establishments. Such places were 
to be camouflaged, where possible, and made secure against fire, 
blast, splinters and gas. Passive defence measures of this sort would 
primarily be a Home Office responsibility. The War Office was 
concerned to, limit the implementation of the active defence measures 
Memorandum by the'War Office on the Protection of Points of Importance against Air Attack, 10th December 1935. Enclosure 
I to C. 1. D. Paper 222-A. CAB 3/6. 
(Ii) Ibid, paras. 1,2 and 3 CAB 3/6. 
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for which it was itself responsible to places of "the utmost Importance". 
Otherwise the department would find Itself involved in a "prodigal" 
financial outlay which it was'Mbst reluctant to undertakew. 
For active defence against low-flying or dive bombing attacks the 
best weapon the War Office could offer at this stage was the 0*5 
inch heavy machine gun, but Deverell told the C. 1. D. 'on --25th June- 1936, 
that this weapon was not considered fully satisfactory. He thought It 
necessary to Investigate the Possibility of providing some better 
weapon, and mentioned the naval pom-pom In this context 
(11). 
Ultimately a variety of 40mm artillery equipments were adopted, 




In the early months of 1936 the government's scientific advisers on 
the C. I. D. 's Air Defence'-Research Committee came to the'conclu'sion 
that a major change was needed in'the lay-out of 'the A., 'A. defences 
which ' Involved the abolition of A. A. guns in the Outer Artillery' 
Zone(lv). , The role of the anti-ýaircraft gun had earlier been defined as 
the destruction of hostile aircraft 
co-operation with fighter aircraft by disorganizing any' 
formations so that our fighters can engage them with the best 
possible chance of success. 
(J) lbid, para. 4, CAB 3/6. 
(it) C. 1. D. 279th Meeting, Item 2,25th June. CAB 2/6. 
Hogg, Anti-Aircraft (Macdonald. and jane's, 1978), p, 80. 
Abolition of the Anti-Aircraft Guns In the Outer Artillery' 
Zone (C. I. D. Paper 229-A), 9th June 1936. CAB 3/6. 
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(Iii) to deny the hostile aircraft opportunities of detailed 
observation and accurate bombing by forcing them to fly high and 
alter course at critical moments"(). 
The Air Defence Research Committee came to the conclusion that 
the third role was inapplicable to the guns of the Outer Artillery 
Zone. This zone contained few worthwhile urban or Industrial targets 
and aircraft crossing It on their way to more distant objectives 
would not need opportunities for detailed ground observation and would 
certainly not wish to drop their bombs 
(11) 
0 
For A. A. guns to score a hit with the primitive fire-control of -, 
the mid-thirties it was essential that the target should be, visible from 
the ground for several minutes so that data about height course and 
speed could be collected - and fed to the guns. Moreover,, the target 
had to stay within -range until It was' hit. 7bis was a good deal to , 
hope for at the best of times. But in Great Britain, In fifty per cent 
of the daylight hours of, an average year, mist and cloud would make 
it virtually impossible for an A. A. battery to engage an aircraft 
effectively. Even in clement weather enemy aircraft would not offer 
good targets-while crossing the Outer Artillery Zone because, as 
they would not be bombing, they would not need to maintain constant 
height course and speed nor. to fly low enough for effective A. A. fire. 
it was therefore considered that theprobability of actually destroying 
enemy aircraft with the guns of the Outer ýArtillery Zone was very, 
Abolition of Anti-Aircraft Guns In thevOuter Artillery Zone, 
(H. D. C. 198), para. 3,19th May, 1936. CAB 3/6. 
(ii) Jbid, paras, 4 and 5. CAB 3/6. 
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small('), 
The role of breaking up enemy formations which had originally 
been assigned to these guns was considered much less important by'1936. 
7be air raids on London during the 1914-18 war indicated that bomber 
aircraft flying In formation could produce a defensive firepower 
sufficient to beat off fighters. At that period the armament of the 
fighter was, if anything, inferior to that of the bomber and the fighter 
relied on greater manoeuvrability. Since this manoeuvrability could' 
be best exploited against an Isolated bomber, it was important to break 
up formations. But by 1936 It was considered generally better from the 
defender's point of view if attacking aircraft stayed In formation. It 
was- easier to intercept a relatively small number of formations "rather 
than a much larger number of scattered aircraft, and this 'Consideration 
was particularly Important because of the development of radar which 
offered much better prospects of Identifying and tracking enemy 
- 
formations. The increased firepower of the fighter which, by 1936, 
gave it'a definite advantage over the bomber, meant that it was also 
mu . ch less important from the fighter pilot's point of view that enemy 
(10 
formations should be broýen 
It therefore appeared obvious that the guns of the Outer'Artillery 
Zone no longer served a useful purpose, and the Air Defence Research 
and Hoffie Defence Sub-Committees of the C. I. D. decided that in 
future, heavy A. A. guns should be restricted to the important urban 
and industrial areas "where the conditions of flight necessary for 
aimed bombardment i. e. visual observation of the ground, steady' 
(i) Ibid, paras. ' 6-8, CAB 3/6. 
lbld, paras. 9-11, CAB 3/6. 
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course, height and speed (were) likely to be realized". It was in 
such circumstances that A. A. gun fire was most. likely to be, , 
effective and ground defences In the major urban areas would have a 
great morale boosting effect which was unimportant In the sparsely 
populated Outer Artillery Zonew. On the assumption that the guns of 
the Outer Artillery Zone were no longer required., the Aý D. C. B. - 
Sub-Committee was asked to reconsider the Brooke-Popham Plano 1). 
The Sub-Committee took the opportunity to recommend very large 
increases in the total provision of A. A. guns and searchlights. ' Since 
the 1935 atr defeýce report German rearmament had become even 
more menacing and In February 1936 the British government had at 
last decided upon a relatively serious rearmament programme for the 
Army. The creation of 76 anti-aircraft batteries and 106 searchlight- 
companies was recommended compared with the 57 batteries and-. '93 
companies which had been proposed In the 1935 Reorientation report. 
These would require 608 guns and 2,547 lights("'). 
It was also finally decided that the 3-inch anti-aircraft gun of, - 
First World War vintage was no longer adequate. As Its replacement 
the choice lay between a 3.7 Inch gun which was being developed by 
the War office and a 4.5 Inch weapon which theAdmiralty had under 
trial. Though, the 4.5 Inch gun was technically superior, it -was so 
heavy that, unlike the 3.7, - it had to be mounted on a concrete 
(i) lbid, paras. 12-13. CAB 3, /6. 
Redistribution of the Defences of the Air Defence of Great Britain, (H. D. C. 199), para. 1,17th June 1936. CAB 3/6. 
lbid, para. 2. CAB 3/6. 
1 
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platform and was therefore effectively Immobile. Mobility was thought 
highly desirable in anti-aircraft weapons because the defences might 
require redistribution, depending on the kind of target which the enemy 
was selecting and the varying Importance of particular objectives -at 
different stages In the war. Mobility could lend an element of surprise 
to the defence, enabling large numbers of guns to be concentrated in 
a particular area at short notice and thus keeping the enemy guessing 
about the over-all strength of the defences. Eventually it was decided 
to compromise and have 288 guns of the super-heavy type, either the 
4.5 inch or some equivalent, and 320 3.7 Inch guns(') 
Supply Problems 1936-37 
When the Committee of Imperial Defence examined these -proposals 
on 25th June 1936, Deverell explained that Britain's entire anti-aircraft 
defences consisted of 60 guns and 120 searchlights compared with the 
608 guns and 2,, 457 lights In the latest scheme. Furthermore, the 
only guns available in 1936 were reconditioned 3-. inch. weapons. 
Duff Cooper explained that It was the War Office's policy to recondition 
old 3-inch guns while waiting for the modern 3.7 Inch and . 4.5 Inch 
types to become available. He confessed that this was not an 
economical programme as it was the ultimate intention to replace the 
3-inch gun completely, but It would be ridiculously dangerous to 
(li) leave a time gap during which there were no guns_ at all 
The War Office's attitude seems to have been compounded of a 
readiness to admit Inadequacies in the defences and a determination to 
rectify the situation so far as possible despite the obvious difficulties 
lbid, paras. 3 and 4. CAB 3/6. 
lbid, para. 21. CAB 3/6. 
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of poor financial provision and limited industrial capacity. The' 
Treasury's response was much less positive. Chamberlain''felt that 
the report must be accepted in principle but he regarded the financial- 
commitment Involved as "a serious matter". Reasons had been given 
for continuing to recondition 3-Inch guns but Chamberlain was "alarmed 
to hear" that expenditure on this might amount to E6 million, and 
"hoped every endeavour would be made to keep the cost as low as 
possible"('). 
In view of the enormous demands upon industry which the new air 
defence proposals made, and the vastly greater financial outlay 
necessary, Duff Cooper sent a forceful memorandum on the "Prospects 
of Munitions Production For Anti-Atrcraft Defence"' to the D. P. R. 
Duff 'Cooper pointed out that the only mandate the War Office had yet 
received for A. D. G. B. was for putting the original Brooke-Popham 
proposals Into -effect. Under these proposals the defence of the London 
area only would be completed by 1940 and the date for the completion 
of the rest of the defences had still not yet been specified. 7be War 
Office had been'given approval for only 90 modern anti-aircraft guns 
compared'With 608 in the latest report. To provide the defence which 
were nowrecommended, the War Office estimated It would need to spend 
a total of E3,000,000. Even this sum did not make SIlowance for the 
construction of new factories and It was thought that at least one more 
(ii) 
gun factory would have to be brought into production 
C. 1. D. 279th Meeting, item 2,25th June 1936. CAB 2/6. 
Prospects of Munitions Production for Anti-Aircraft Defence, 
ýbte by the Secretary of State for War, (D. P. R. 101), ist 
July, 1936. CAB 3/6. 
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Once again Chamberlain showed himself very reluctant, to incur 
large scale public expenditurd on A. D. G. B. He "thought that ,-, 
decisions were being asked for at rather short notice" and Insisted that 
the financial aspects of the proposals be subjected to close scrutiny 
by the Treasury Inter-Service Committee. Elles, the Master General 
of the Ordnance, explained that the War Office could not get more than 
the 90 modern guns already on order unless financial sanction was 
givem It was precisely this financial'sanction, which the'War Office 
wanted ministers to secure for them. 'Chamberlain was evading the 
real issue. He admitted In principle the, necessity of extending the A. A. 
defences. But he was delegating the all-important, practical decisions, * 
on giving or withholding the necessary funds, to his civil servants at 
the T. I. S. C. 
(')' In the circumstances this was grossly Irresponsible. 
Characteristically, Duff Cooper would not let the matter drop and 
(10 
the War office produced another paper on the same subject Lord 
Swinton the Secretary of State for Air was apparently sympathetic to 
the War office's position and pointed out, when, this paper was 
discussed at the C. 1. D., that at the present rate of Industrial, production 
there would be no modern A. A. guns until 1938 at the earliest. , Sir 
Thomas Inskip suggested that the rate of production seemed to depend 
on accelerating the completion of the designs of the 3.7 Inch, andý 4.5 
inch guns and pointed out that the 3.7 inch gun was not yet through Its 
trials. Sir Charles Craven of Vickers had explained that the volume 
Production Aspects of Gun and Searchlight ]Requirements, (C. -I. D. - paper, 232-A), 3rd July 1936. CAB 3/6. 
ýbte by the War Office on the Prospects of Munition Production For 
Anti-Aircraft Defence (C. I. D. Paper 233-A), 8th July 1936. CAB 3/6. 
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of orders that could be given was the governing factor in the acceleration 
of production. Vickers were "right down to bed-rock" in terms of 
skilled labour. The only way of overcoming production problems wasý 
by de-skilling jobs and employing a large proportion of sem. 1-skilled 
personnel. This necessitated employing jigs to the maximum possible 
extent and was only practicable if a steady supply of orders over a 
considerable period could be guaranteed. The question was 
1whether 
Vickers could now be given definite orders which would enable them to 
take the requisite steps. Inskip, however, was under a misapprehension 
In thinking that design problems were holding up production of the 3.1 
inch gun. The War Office was sufficiently satisfied with the 3.7 Inch 
design to go to production before the gun's trials were complete. The 
real obstacle to the placing of orders on a sufficiently large scale 
to warrant the de-skilling of jobs was, as Elles pointed out, lack of " 
financial authority 
On 7th October 1936, Inskip held an extremely important discussion 
on A. A. matters with the Chiefs of Staff. 7bough this discussion was, 
informal and no record exists of it, a vital decision was taken which 
was to have a lasting impact on the development of the air defences. 
From this point onwards it was decided that 
Our plans for Anti-Aircraft Defence in the event 
of war with Germany should be made on the 
assumption that Germany may attempt a knock- 
out blow from the air and that this blow would 
be delivered with maximum intensity at the 
moment of the declaration of war(U). 
(i) C. 1. D. 280th Meeting, item 5,10th July, 1936. CAB 2/6. 
Anti-Aircraft Defence (C. I. D. Paper 24U-A), 7th October 1936. 
CAB 3/6. 
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Why Deverell agreed to this is rather puzzling. It ran clean contrary 
to General Staff doctrine as expounded by his predecessor -Montgomery- 
Massingberd, and In some ways the assumption was contrary to'common 
sense. German air attack on Great Britain would clearly not develop 
"maximum" Intensity until the Germans had secured bases In the-Low 
Countries and they could not do that until some time had elapsed after 
the outbreak of war. It Is possible that Deverell was runder considerable 
pressure from Inskip and the Air Ministry, but an alternative 
explanation is that the C. I. G. S. was positively In favour of proceeding 
on the basis of worst case analysis because without this kind of a. larmism 
it would be Impossible to obtain any significant amount of money from 
the Treasury. 
The War office was facing enormous difficulties. Despite a 
continuous stream of recommendations from the C. I. D. 's Home Defence 
and A. D. G. B. sub-committees for the expansion of the air defences, 
recruiting for T. A. anti-aircraft units was still very slow, there was 
a serious shortage of suitab, le firing ranges to give the Territorials the 
practice they needed, and many T. A. drill halls were considered 
antiquated, unsuited to modern conditions and wrongly located for A. A. 
work. After reviewing the munitions situation for A. D. G. B., Inskip 
became so alarmed that he recommended an increase of between 50 and 
100 per cent In the industrial capacity devoted to A. A. gun and 
searchlight production(). 
When Inskip explained to the C. 1. D. his principle that the air 
defences should be consýructed to meet the possibility of a German attempt 
(I) Anti-Aircraft Defence (C. 1. D. Paper 241-A), 7th October, 1936. 
CAB 3/6. 
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at a knock-out blow, and recommended a major increase In A. A. 
expenditure, Chamberlain once more demonstrated extreme 
reluctance to commit the Treasury. The Chancellor was concerned 
at the rapidity with which the situation altered In air defence. 
There seemed to be no permanence and the speed 
of change in requirements was alarming. In 1934 
the cost of providing an air defence for Great 
Britain had been estimated to amount to about 
E3 million. In 1935 this estimate of cost had 
risen to 0311 million. In 1936 the estimate had 
again been revised and had then come to 930 
million(l). 
Chamberlain wondered aloud "whether It could be said with certainty 
that these huge sums were best spent on air defence. Would it not 
possibly be better to spend It on the offensive? " As we have already 
noted, Chamberlain was given to chasing the chimera of a cheap 
deterrence strategy, relying on building up a big bomber force which 
would somehow deter war and make an expensive and Inconvenient 
rearmament programme for the Army unnecessary. On this occasion he 
tried to cast doubt on whether "in view of the continuous advance of 
technology" it was necessary to have'guns for A. A. defence at all. 
"There was the possibility that scientific investigation might reveal an 
alternative". Duff Cooper was inclined to agree with Chamberlain that 
there was a danger of spending too much solely on def'ence. But his 
main concern was that In view of the 100 per cent increase which 
Inskip was recommending In the productive capacity devoted to A. D. G. B. 
there would be virtually none left for the Field Force. 7bough Sir 
Harold Brown had found a major new potential source of guns In 
(I) C. 1. D. 283rd Meeting, Item 1,29th October 1936. CAB 2/6. 
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Sheffield, Deverell did not think there could be even a 50 per cent 
increase in the capacity used in anti-aircraft production without serious 
Interference with other requirements('). 
The C. I. D. decided nevertheless to approve Inskip's, principle that 
I 
the'defences should be developed against the possibility of a., knock-out 
(ii) blow 7bis decision became all the more significant In view of the 
Air Staff's assessment of the power of the German, Air Force. In 
January 1937 it was estimated that If the German attempted a knock-out 
blow against England, employing the whole of their Air Force,, "although 
this scale of attack may not be maintained subsequently,, a total I 
approaching 2,000 tons of bombs, might, In 1939, reach the selected 
objectives on the first day of hostilities"("'). This estimate of German 
capabilities turned out to be ludicrously exaggerated but there can be 
little-doubt that it exerted a considerable Influence on A. D. G. B. planning 
which was probably beneficial in the long run. 
7be Ideal Scheme, 1937 
- Having accepted Inskip's 
knock-out blow principle, the C. 1. D. - 
authorized, its A. D. G. B. Sub-Committee, under the Chairmanship of 
Air Chief Marshal FL C. T. Dowding, to draw up a scheme for the 
"Ideal" Air Defence of Great Britain which would, make theý country 
capable of resisting any scale of attack which Germany 
(IV) 
could mount 
The Ideal Scheme involved recommendations which If accepted would 
have more than, doubled expenditure on the Army's part In A. D. 0. B. 
Ibid, CAB 2/6. 
1 
C.. I. D. 283rd Meeting, Conclusion to item 1,29th October 1936. 
CAB 2/6. 
(III) C. 1. D. 300th Meeting, Item 
_, 
3,, 28th October 1937. CAB 2/6. 
C. I. D. 283rd Meeting, item 1,29th October 1936. CAB 2/6. 
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7be Aircraft Fighting Zone which was lit by T. A. operated searchlights, 
was to be extended to Blyth a few miles north of Newcastle. Lighted 
zones were to be provided for the local defence of the Forth and the 
Clyde, areas which had not previously been allocated defences. , -A' 
single lighted area was to aid the defence of Derby, Nottingham, 
Leicester, Birmingham and Coventry, a similar zone was to be provided 
for Leeds, Bradford and Sheffield and a lighted belt 15 miles wide-was 
to connect the defences of the Forth and the Clyde. The recommended 
number of heavy A. A. batteries was Increased from 76 (608 guns) to 
158 (1,264 guns); the number of searchlight companies from 108 (2,547 
lights) to approximately 196 (4,704 lights); and the requirement for short 
range A. A. guns was increased from 300 to 600(l). 
The War Office was by no means entirely happy with the Ideal 
Scheme and pointed out that It would be impossible while "business as 
Usual" was in force to procure guns and lights In the quantities 
suggested before4941 at the earliest. Nor did It seem likely that - 
personnel could be provided to man defences on this scale under the 
purely voluntary system then In operatiod"). The Committee of 
Imperial Defence examined the Ideal Scheme at a meeting on 17th June 
1937 and accepted that It was by no means an over-insurance, ý that it 
was desirable in principle and that its implications in terms of 
manpower, material and money should be worked out. However, - the, 
-. 
C. I. D. made no move towards securing-the financial sanction for the 
Service departments which would be necessary In order to put the 
"Ideal" Air Defence of Great Britain (C. 1. D. Paper 255-A), 
paras. 11-14,8th May 1937. CAB 3/6. 
"Ideal" Air Defence of Great Britain (H. D. C. 220), 9th 
February 1937. CAB 3/6. 
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scheme Into effect, and it was another eighteen months before this 
kind of approval was forthcoming(l). 
By November 1937 the supply situation for the Air Defence of - 
Great Britain was obviously so far behind the various -schemes projected 
that Chamberlain held a special meeting to discuss it. Chamberlain 
as Chancellor, had been most unhelpful In his attitude towards A. D. G. B., 
but as Prime Minister he was apparently much alarmed at the prospect 
of air attack. 'He had always harboured grave doubts about the wisdom 
of committing an Army to the Continent and on 8th Nbvember 1937 he 
decided to instruct the War Office that anti-aircraft- defences was-to 
have absolute priority for the supply of war material, over every other 
commitment of the Army 
The Pbsition, of the Territorial Army, 1938 
In January 1938, a momentous question was raised of direct concern 
to the War Office. Doubts were being expressed whether so, vital a- 
matter as the anti-aircraft defence of Great Britain could be realistically 
entrusted solely-to the part-time soldiers of the Territorial Army(Iii). 
Such doubts were by no means unreasonable. - Even as, late as August 
1938, Lieutenant General Pile, commanding lst A. A. Division discovered 
at a summer exercise that his men were "depressingly bad" particularly 
in the tactical control of guns, -, and that their aircraft recognition was 
C. I. D. 294th Meeting, item 8,17th June 1937. CAB, 2/6. 
Anti-Aircraft Def epce (C. 1. D. 
. 
Paper, 241-A), 4th December 1937. 
CAB 3/7. 
The organization of the Anti-Aircraft Defences of Great Britain 
(C. 1. D. Paper 278-A), para. 1,24th January 1937. CAB 3/7. 
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"insufficiently good to identify friend or foe before the target , 
disappeared out of range"('). These problems were no doubt partly 
due to insufficient equipment, even for training purposes, and to, the 
shortage of Permanent Staff Instructors from the Regular Army, but 
the limited number of hours which Territorial soldiers could devote 
(11) 
- to training was also an Important factor 
The original decision to give the Territorial Army responsibility 
for A. D. G. B. had been made by the Cabinet In 1928 at a time'when 
the ]Regular Army was being "cut to the bone". ý When reviewing the 
situation early In 1938, Gort, and Newall, the Chief of the Air Staff, 
pointed out that "the Cabinet undoubtedly accepted a grave responsibility 
in relying on territorial troops for first-line duties"' which had to be 
performed "not only from the very moment when war breaks out but 
also probably during a precautionary period,. According, to Gort and 
Newall the technical efficiency of T. A. anti-aircraft units was cardully 
watched,, but It is difficult In view of Pile's remarks quoted above, to 
credit their. statement that, 
From results achieved in Practice camps, up to date there Is every reason to hope that these 
units will attain the required standard(III). 
Gort and Newall explained that even when the Territorial A. A. 
units had reached, the necessary level of efficiency, reliance on them 
would still pose serious problems. Territorial units could never be 
held at the same degree of readiness as Regular units because their 
(i) Pile, Ack-Ack, p. 80. 
The Organization of the Anti-Aircraft Defences of Great Britain 
(C. I. D. Paper 278-A), paras. 2 and 3. CAB 3/7. 
Jbid, CAB 3/7. 
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peace establishment was well below the strength required in war. 
Though T. A. anti-aircraft personnel's igned a special undertaking to 
enable them to be'-called out in a'period of high international t6nsion, 
it was Inevitable that there would be a' time lag'between their being 
summoned and the defences being fully manned. The War Office had 
devoted a good deal of attention of minimizing the delay, however, and - 
had come up with a scheme for deploying the defences within twelve 
ho I urs which had been approved by the Committee of Imperial Defenc .e 
The alternatives to manning; the anti-aircraft defence with 
Territorial troops were 
(a) manning by Regular units 
(b) transferring the ground anti-aircraft 
defences from the Army to the R. A. F. 
The recruitment of Regular soldiers into the Royal Artillery and 
]Royal Engineers was far from adequate to supply the 50,000 men needed 
for A. D. G. B. without destroying the Army's capacity to carry out Its 
other functions. Clearly A. D. G. B. could not become a Regular Army 
responsibility without a vast Increase In recruitment which was most 
,, 
likely while a purely voluntary system was maintained. e, only real 7b 
possibility for improving the manpower situation of T. A. anti-aircraft 
units with the aid of the Regular Army was to invite Regular soldiers 
who had completed their normal service with the Colours to stay on 
in A. D. G. B. This method was expected to be very expensive but 
it was clearly favoured by the Chiefs of Staff(M. 
The Organization of the Anti-Aircraft Defences of Great. Britaln 
para. 2,24th January 1938. CAB 3/7. 
lbid, para. 3, CAB 3/70, 
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Though the Chiefs recognized that there was "undoubtedly to 
the young men of today a special attraction In the air and all things 
connected with the air" and though it was accepted that "recruiting 
might be more brisk in a sky-blue uniform than It was In a khaki 
one", they felt that the difficulties involved In giving the R. A. F. 
responsibility for manning A. D. G. B. ground defences would be enormous. 
The War ()ffice believed that the conversion of large numbers of T. A. 
units from infantry to A. A. duties involved quite enough of an 
adjustment for their personnel without asking them to change Services 
as well. Nbreover the General. Staff considered It administratively 
important that personnel should be interchangeable between Home Defence, 
Stations Abroad, and the Field Army. This condition obviously, could 
not be met if A. D. G. B. were completely taken over by the 1R. A. F. 
The Chiefs eventually- came to the conclusion that, 
we are now committed too deeply to the present 
system to justify the Immense dislocation, con- 
fusion and delay that would be caused by any attempt 
to recast the whole Anti-Aircraft defensive 
organization at this stage. A great deal of 
preliminary spade work has been done and this 
work is now showing tangible results. It would 
seem to be unsound in the present International 
situation to risk the delay which would be the 
Inevitable result of any revolutionary change 
even if such a change were practicable, which,, 
is doubtful(i). 
There is some conflict of evidence as to the exact manpower 
situations of the T. A. anti-aircraft formations in January 1938. 
I 
According to Gort recruiting was "fairly satisfactory". The Ist 
Anti-Aircraft Division which had been formed two years previously 
was said to be over 60% of establishment and the 2nd A. A. Division, 
(i) lbid, paras. 4-6, CAB 3/7. 
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formed in December 1936 at nearly 1 56 per cento). But Pile, 
commanding Ist A. A. Division, ' claims in his memoirs that his own 
formation was only just over 50(70 of establishment and the 2nd A. A. 
Division slightly over 45970. Pile and Gort, 'however, are in agreement 
that lack of suitable drill halls was a major obstacle to recruitment. 
Pile was willing to concede In his memoirs that "the voluntary system 
had in fact not done so badly"("), 
Pile apparently believed that lack of equipment was a more'serious 
problem and claims that on New Year's -day 1938 there we're*'only 180 
guns and 800 lights available for the air defence of the whole'kingdom 
whereas 216 guns and 1,056 lights were needed for London alone. "Though 
he recogniz6d the problems of "Treasury neglect and public apathy" Pile 
seems both at the time and In his memoirs to have Implicitly blamed 
the War Office for the situation, agreeing with Liddell Hart that the 
General Staff gave too high a priority to the equipment of the Field 
Force("'). Pile's reaction Is understandable as It was with the War 
office that he personally had to deal. He was not, however, Ideally 
placed to understand the problems which the War Cffice itself faced. 
War Office Opposition to E#ansion 
If 
These problems were very well illustrated In the discussion at 
the Committee of imperial Defence on 17th March 1938. In a memoran- 
dum on the role of the Army, Hore-Belisha had argued against any 
further increase In the approved plans for A. D. G. B. Instead he had 
(i) lbid, para. 7, CAB 3/7. 
(it) Pile, Ack-Ack, p. 73. 
(iii) Ibid, pp. 67# 73,74,77. 
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suggested that the War Cffice should confine itself to the plan which 
the Cabinet had already accepted -a modified version of the Brooke- 
Popham scheme. Hore-Belisha placed more emphasis on A. D. G. -B. 
than had his predecessor. But this was a period of great economic 
apprehension In the Treasury and the Chancellor was insisting upon 
major cuts in the War Office's expenditure programme('). -,, 
Hore-Bellsha, pointed out that If the requirements of theldeal 
Scheme nevertheless remained a possible commitment for the. War 
Office, the department would have to retain a sum of 07,000,000 In 
its estimate of over-all expenditure over the next five years in order 
to provide for them. This would mean that a corresponding saving 
would have to be madeAn some other part of the War Office's 
programme. Whatever decisions were taken It would not accelerate 
the completion of the existing programme for A. D. G. B. as "the 
bottleneck (was) Industrial capacity". - Hore-Belisha argued 
that the question now at Issue was whether the 
priority of home defence was so absolute that 
the extension of the air defences of Great 
Britain was to be pressed forward without any 
regard -whatsoever for every other commitment 
of the Army(ii). 
The C. 1. D. however refused to rule out the Ideal Scheme as a 
possible War Office commitment( 
111) 
and proposals coming from the 
Home Defence and A. D. G. B. Sub-Committees went beyond even that plan. 
By April 1938, the Air Staff had come to the conclusions that both 
(1) C. 1. D. 313th Meeting, 17th March 1938. CAB 2/7. 
(H) lbid, CAB 2/7. 
oll) C. 1. D. Conclusions of the 313th Meeting, 17th March 1938. CAB 2/7. 
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the length and the breadth of the Illuminated zone were inadequate and 
would have to be Increased('), 
The illuminated zone as planned In the-Ideal Scheme was Intended 
to stretch from Portsmouth, around the eastern part,,, of Creater 
London and as far north as Blyth. The Air Staff advised that the 
"constantly increasing speed and range of the bomber" made it possible 
that both ends of the lighted zone could be outflanked, lat night and 
enemy aircraft would thus be able to reach their objectives without 
passing through an illuminated -area. In order to prevent this, the 
A. D. G. B. Sub-Committee decided that the zone should be extended 
from Portsmouth to Bristol and from Blyth to the westýcoast. 7be Air 
Staff also wanted the width of the Aircraft Fighting Zone extended from 
25 to 50 miles to give the R. A. F. 's fighters a better chance of 
interception. Altogether the A. D. G. B. Sub-Committee recommended 
that the War Office raise an additional 44 searchlight companies and 
40 A. A. batteries 
(it) 
*I 
once more Hore-Belisha, who had Initially been Impressed with 
Liddell Hart's arguments in favour of concentrating on Home defence, 
was moved to object Though he agreed that these proposals were 
highly desirable he felt that to approve them completely would be "unfair 
I 
to the War Office". When in January 1938, the Treasury had decided 
to ration the War office to a rearmament expenditure of E347 million 
over the five year period up to 1943, the War Office had allocated 
Eloo million of this to A. D. G. B. But In view of the New Army 
Survey of the Air Defence System of Great Britain (C. I. D. 
paper 282-A), Ist April 1938. CAB 3/7. 
00 Ibid, para. 11, CAB 3/7. 
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Hypothesis the Treasury was now demanding an E82 million cut in 
the War Office's programme and at the same time the War Office 
was being asked to provide an Increased amount of money for air 
defence. If Home Defence were to be given such absolute priority 
in all things, Hore-Belisha argued, there would have to be drastic 
reductions in the programme of equipment for the Field Force and in 
barrack construction. Hore-Bellsha found little sympathy for his case 
from other ministers at the C. 1. D. , however, and the A. D. G. B. 
Sub-Committee's proposals were approved). 
The Administration of Air Defence Units, 1938 
During 1937 and 1938 criticism mounted of the War Office's 
handling of A. D. G. B. Liddell Hart believed'that one of the main 
problems with T. A. anti-aircraft units was over-complicated and 
inefficient War office administration("). He suggested that A*. A. units 
were served by too many different War Office departments and that 
this divided responsibility meant that their needs were never adequately 
understood as a whole and thus never met. The Directorate of 
Military Operations and intelligence was responsible for the location 
of guns and searchlights, but mobilization plans came under the Quarter 
Master General's department. The Director General of the Territorial 
Army was responsible for the routine administration of T, 'A. anti- 
aircraft units but the responsibility for trainirg these units lay with 
the Directorate of Military Training. The supply of equipment was the 
responsibility of the Director General of Munitions Production, but 
C. I. D. 318th Meeting, Item 3,7th April 1938. CAB 2/7. 
ýbte on A. A. Co-ordination, 26th January 1938 11/1938/14. 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
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technical research was dealt with by the R. E. Board. 
Divided responsibility also existed outside the War Office where 
for administration and training the two A. A. divisions came under, 
the General Officers Comma ndi ng- In-Chi ef of the various regional 
commands in which their drill halls were situated, but for operations, 
under the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Fighter Command. 
There was also the problem of A. A. divisional commanders having to 
deal with a whole host oflocal T. A. Associations on matters connected 
- with recruitment and welfare. Liddell Hart's solution to these 
administrative difficulties was to form an entirely new War Office 
department under a Director General of A. A. 
(') 
Tbough In some ways an attractive proposition this might have ended 
up merely adding another layer of bureaucracy to an already complicated 
administrative structure. After all, It was not only A. A. units, that 
were served by many different War Office departments. 7be Infantry 
also came under the Q. M. G. 's department for mobilization, the D. M. T. 's 
for training and the D. G. M. P. 's for the supply of equipment. - W--one 
suggested that there was anything to be gained by forming a new War 
Office department under a Director General of Infantry. It was 
generally agreed that the main problem with A. A. units was lack of 
equipment, particularly guns("). The procurement of equipment was 
the direct responsibility of the D. G. M. P., Sir Harold Brown. Brown 
was an exceptionally able and forceful administrator and he certainly 
(1) Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain, pp. 167-70. 
Pile, op. cit., p. 73, and Prospects of Munition Production for 
Anti-Aircraft Defence (D. 'P. R. 101), Ist July 1936, CAB 3/6. 
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tried very hard to Increase A. A. gun production it Is difficult to 
believe that any Director of A. A. would have been more successful 
at persuading the Treasury to make money available for the purchase 
of guns and the expansion of gun making capacity. 
In mid-1938 Hore-Bellsha decided to make major changes In 
A. D. G. B. On 28th June, the Secretary of State announced the creation 
of three new A. A. Divisions, making five altogether, and the appoint- 
ments of an A. A. Corps Commander, and a Deputy C. 1. G. S. with 
special responsibility for A. A. affairs("). The changes In A. D. C. B. 
had been the cause of what Plownall des6ribed as a "Battle Royal" 
within the War Office("')* All the military members opposed the 
creation, for which Hore-Belisha pressed, of a Di rector- Genera I of 
A. A. with a seat on the Army Council, and Hore-Bellsha settled on 
a new Deputy C. I. G. S. very much as second best. Liddell Hart, 
moreover, was very critical of the War Office's choice In making the 
new appointments"). The two obvious candidates for the post of 
Corps Commander would seem to have been Pile and Harrison, 
commanding Ist and 2nd A. A. Divisions respectively(v). In fact It 
went to Alan Brooke who thereby attained the rank of full General. 
Though Liddell Hart's belief that the post should have gone to someone 
(1) D. G. M. P. to C. 1. G. S., M. G. 0. and P. U. S., 23rd October 1936. 
WO/32/4445. - 
(u) Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain, pp. 175-176. 
(Ili) Brian Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. I (Leo Cooper 1972), p. 149. 
OV) Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11 (Cassell, 1965), pp. 155-6. 
(V) Talk with Sir John Brown, 16th May 1938 11/1938/54 and Talk with 
Pile, 18th May 1938,11/1938/55. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
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with A. A. experience was quite reasonable, Pile admits that there 
was In fact an acute shortage of "Generals in any rank experienced 
in A. A. ". Pile himself, Liddell Hart's favourite for Corps Commander, 
had only been In A. D. G. B. for a year, and even Harrison had been at 
his post only for two years. General Tompson, the Army's most 
senior and experienced A. A. officer had died in 1937(l).. 
Alan Brooke was surely not a bad choice for Corps Commander. 
Brooke had been Commandant of the Artillery School at ý LarkhIll, and 
though he had no specialized knowledge of A. A. It Is difficult to, 
believe that so intelligent and versatile a soldier could not-have learned 
his job fairly quickly. The new D. C. I. G. S. Lieutenant General Sir 
J. Marshall -Cornwall was also a very talented officer, a, notable 
linguist and later a prominent military historian("). The War Cffice 
may not have made the choices which Liddell Hart, thought Ideal, but 
it was certainly not appointing Blimps or fools. Marshall -Cornwall, 
like Brooke was not an A. A. specialist("'), but the General Staff ,, 
probably wanted someone who could take a broad view, balancing the 
very real claims of Home anti-aircraft defence against the Army's 
other responsibilities. 
it appears that both Liddell Hart and Pile were by this stage so 
concerned with Home defence that they were prepared virtually to Ignore 
(IV) 
Field Force requirements Even without a Continental commitment, 
the Army still had an obligation to defend the Empire, and the General 
(i) Pile, op. cit., P. 74. 
Ibid,, p. 74. 
Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain, p. 176. 
(iv) Ibte on the Air Defence Situation, 15th September 1938. 
11/1938/99. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
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Staff could hardly be expected to share this outlook. It is clear 
from Pbwnall's diary that there was considerable Irritation within the 
General, Staff at those who were so obsessively concerened with 
A. D. G. B. that they could not see wider strategic realities. It Is by 
no means impossible that the General Staff thus became prejudiced 
against A. A. specialists('). 
The Sandys Storm 
Hore-Belisha, had hoped to impress public opinion with his reform ' 
of A. D. G. B. but untoward events "took -the gilt off the ... gingerbread 
which the S of S had so carefully, baked "(11). Duncan Sandys, an M. P.,, 
Winston Churchurs son-in-law, andýa subaltern In 51st A. A. Brigade 
was provoked, by Hore-Belisha's over-optimistic public statements on the 
air defence -situation to lead a serious political attack upon him. in 
some speeches Hore-Belisha had certainly painted a ridiculously rosy 
picture and had not stayed within the bounds of strict factual accuracy. 
While opening an A. A. H. Q. in Regent's Park In May 1938, Hore-BelLsha 
claimed that 
A year ago there was not a single new Anti-, 
Aircraft drill hall nor an old one suitably 
adapted ... The searchlight units were then 
short of searchlights. Every unit now has its 
quota and we have a surplus store. The gunner 
have their 3-inch guns. These guns which are 
the present effective base of our defence have 
all been renovated in such a way as to be the 
equivalent of new guns, and we have manufactured 
for their use a new and better kind of ammunition' 
to increase their power. 
Hore-Belisha indicated that the 3-inch guns were perfectly adequate 
Bond. -Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 147. 
Ibid, p. 153. 
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for their purpose and were equipped with the latest fire-control 
Instruments. The 3.7 inch gun which had - been approved little over. a 
year previously was coming off the production lines faster, than any 
estimate he had ever seen recorded(i). 
, Pile charitably suggests that Hore-Belisha was concerned to make 
a good impression on foreign audiences("). But Hore-Belisha was also 
vain and a great self-publicist. He certainly seems to have been at 
pains, to glamorize his own part In rearmament and to emphasise the 
energizing effect he, had had on the War Office("'), 
As Liddell Hart correctly noted shortly after Hore-Belishals speech, 
the 3.7 Inch gun "was complete In design over. two years ago when 
rearmament was first adopted". Production had been ordered about 
18 months previously. On -the original schedule 140 guns were to be 
delivered by Ist March 1938, but in facv only eight had arrived(lv). 
Though Hore-Bellsha had tried to give the impression that the 
3-inch gun provided an acceptable defence, this was believed neither 
by the gunners, nor by the War Office', s own experts. Hore-Belisha's 
rash statements damaged the War Office's credibility with T. A. anti- 
aircraft personnel. (Pile records In his memoirs, "At that time the 
War Office view was that the 3-inch gun-was quite adequate. It was 
not our- view ... "(v)). But the War Office's Director of Artillery, 
(0 Pile, op_. cit., p. 7/6. 
lbid, pp. 76-77. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 147. 
(IV) increase of A. A. authorized May 1938.11/1938/61. (Liddell 
Hart Papers). 
Pile, Op. cit. , p. 77. 
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Major-General FLA. Lewis had written as early as 1935 that "We are 
quite clear that the needs of A. D. G. B. and of Defended Ports at home 
and abroad can only be met by a powerful equipment of the 3.7 Inch 
type with a high muzzle velocity, a powerful shell and an effective ceiling 
between 20,000 and 30,000 feet. 
M. 
Liddell Hart certainly realized how misleading were Hore-Belishals 
remarks about the adequacy of the 3-inch gun. He noted In his private 
papers that the "so-called modernization" of this weapon "consisted 
principally of the fitting of a different liner (inner tube)" and had býgun 
many years previously. That this alteration did not bring the gun up 
to the same standards as a genuinely modern weapon is shown by some 
comparative statistics of performance which Liddell Hart also recorded. 
The maximum ceiling of the 3.7 Inch gun was 40,000 feet and its 
effective ceiling over 30,000 feet compared with the 22,000 feet and 
15,000 feet respectively of the 3-inch gun. The time of flight of the 
shell to a target at 15,000 feet was nine seconds for the 3.7 Inch gun, 
but fifteen seconds for the 3-inch. 
was four times as effectivem). 
Moreover the 3.7 Inch shell burst 
Many officers In T. A. anti-aircraft units were understandably 
irritated by the misleading statements which Hore-Belisha made both 
to the public and to Parliament. Some of these off Icers were also 
M. P. 's. The upshot was that Hore-Belisha found himself subjected to 
Lewis to D. s. D., 22nd May 1935. WO/32/3476. 
increases of A. A. authorized May 1938.11/1938/61. (Liddell 
Hart Papers). 
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aggressive questioning In the House. To questions by Major Whitely 
and Mr. Duncan Sandys on 24th May 1938 Hore-Belisha replied that 
modernized 3-Inch guns complete with the 
requisite scale of Instruments sufficient for 
training are held by all gunner units of Ist 
A. A. Division. They are ready for immediate 
use In emergency. 
The general opinion amongst T. A. off icers in A. D. G. B. was that the, 
amount of equipment held was Inadequate even for training. On the 
same day Duncan Sandys spoke privately to Hore-Belisha, voicing these 
anxieties. Hore-Belisha replied in reassuring terms but was foolish 
enough to make another statement about the suitability of the 3-Inch 
guns on 15th June at Leigh-on-Sea and tlius further provoked damaging 
attacks('). 
The story of the "Sandys Storm" Sandys' Parliamentary attack on 
Hore-Belisha against which Hore-Belisha reacted by a witch-hunt against 
the offending officers, has been outlined elsewhere. Its main , 
significance was as a demonstration of, Hore-Belisha's tendency to make 
enemies unnecessarily a tendency which ruined him In the end. The 
Secretary of State emerged from thecase weak and almost Isolated. 
His relationship with the General Staff had been bad for a long time 
because of disagreements about strategy and his general tactless ness(it). 
His attitude to A. D. G. B. had generally been extremely favourable, 
however 
(111). 
and he should have been able to make badly needed allies 
amongst air defence officers and men to counter-balance the hostility 
he aroused elsewhere. Instead he destroyed confidence In himself by 
pile, op. cit. , pp. 77-78. 
Ibid, pp. 130-1, and 136. 
Minney, The Private_Papers of Hore-Belisha, pp. 62-3 and 66. 
I 
-321- 
his apparent complacency over a situation which they regarded as 
alarming('). He made this worse by over-reacting against Sandys. 
The atmosphere in Sandys' unit apparently became almost mutinous 
at the height of the affair. When Pile went to see 51st A. A. Brigade 
on 29th June, he found them "all up In arms and determined to -, 
present a common front In defence of the Adjutant Hogan". The'C. 0. 
said that though he did not know Hogan had leaked Information to" 
Sandys he would have approved if he had known 
(11)9 
and his relationship with Liddell Hart also underwent great strain. It 
is clear from Liddell Hart's papers that he disapproved of Hore-Bellsha's 
conduct("') and this certainly contributed to the termination of the 
partnership"). Paradoxically, Hore-Belisha's most constant ally In 
adversity was one of the officers he had wanted, to suspend - Pile. - 
Though Pile thought that ý Hore-Belisha had been "foolish" over the Sandys 
case, he told Liddell Hart that "'the Army could not afford to lose him - 
If he went any Secretary of'State they would be likely to get would be' 
not nearly as good"(v). 
Hore-Belisha's relationship with A. D. G. -B. units obviously suffered, 
Certainly Pile had strong reasons of his own for not wanting a 
change of Secretary of State. Pile owed his Position as Commander 
of Ist A. A. Division to Hore-Belisha 
(VI) 







Pile, op. cit., pp. 77-8. 
Talk with Pile, - 11/1938/75. (Liddell Hart Papers). -- 
11/1938/61 and 11/1938/75. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 157. 
Talk with Pile, 11/1938/75. 
Pile, op. cit., p. 72. 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
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terms with the General Staff(). Had Hore-Bellsha been ruined 
politically this would have left Pile devoid of powerful allies ý. a 
disaster for an ambitious General. 
Munich and -the Approach of War 
While the Sandys case was still raging, the C. 1. D. was pressed 
by Its Home Defence and A. D. G. B. sub-committees to endorse yet 
larger schemes for air defence("). , These sub-committees had already 
recommended the extension of the lighted zone from Portsmouth to 
Bristol and from Blyth to Liverpool In order to "refuse flanks" to the 
enemy bombers. But by June 1938 the Home Defence Committee had 
come to the conclusion that even these extensions would leave'a- gap In the 
west which enemy bombers could find. The only solution was a 
"perimeter defence" which would enclose mosr of the major English, 
industrial areas In a lighted belt. It would not, however, be possible to 
include the Tyne, the Tees and the Clyde areas In this general system 
and they-would have to rely on their own 
(III) local defences The' 
perimeter, defence scheme required the War Office to Provide far greater 
numbers of searchlights. At the same time, the A. D. G. - B. Sub-Committee 
recommended very large increases In the ammunition scales for 
Ov) 
A. A. guns 
Yet despite all the political scandal of the Sandys case and ýthe- - ,- 
mounting pressure for Improvements In A. D. G. B. from within the 
C. I. D. apparatus, it was 7th ISbvember 1938 before the Cabinet even 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 131 and 148. 
Revised Layout of Searchlights and Guns for the Air Defence of Great Britain, (C. I. D. Paper 288-A), 9th June 1938. CAB 3/7. 
Revised Layout of Searchlights and Guns for the Air Defence of Great Britain (C. 1. D. Paper 288-A), 9th June 1938. CAB 3/7. 
(iv) Ibid, paras. 8 and 20. CAB 3/7. 
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gave positive approval for the implementation of the Ideal Scheme - 
which had been drawn up as long ago as June 1937(). ' The Munich 
Crisis provided the final stimulus. On 23rd September, at the height 
of the emergency the mobilization of A. D. G. B. was ordered and the 
troops were only stood down after Chamber. lain had, achieved "peace 
for our time , 
(It) 
0 
Retrospective feelings about the mobilization were mixed. Pbwnall 
commented "it all went much more smoothly and quickly than we had 
dared to hope"("'). Pile, also, - felt that "In general we gave an 
external impression of a fair-degree of efficiency" and that "the general 
impression created among the public was reassuring". However, "by 
the time the Crisis came to an end on 14th October, and the men 
returned to civilian-life, the ugly stories of which we In ýthe defences 
were only too well aware began to spread"('V). It Is perhaps no accident 
that the Cabinet's approval for the Ideal Scheme came within four days 
of a vote of censure being moved against the, Government In the'House 
of Commons(v). The approval of th e Ideal Scheme Increased the 
requirement for heavy anti-aircraft guns from 608 to 1,264 and, the 
War office was told to find 1,000 light anti-aircraft guns from any 
(vi) 
available sources, British or foreign But the Cabinet made no 
Peview of Arrangements for the Anti-Aircraft Defence of Great 





Pile, op. cit., P. 81. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, 
Pile, op-cit., p. 81. 
Vol. 1, P. 163. 
lbid, p. 82. 
Beview of Arrangements for the Air Defence of Great Britain 
(C. I. D. Paper 308-A) Introduction, 7th February 1939. CAB 3/7. 
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move to alter the system of Treasury Control and as late as January 
1939 the Treasury was still trying to restrict A. D. G. B. expenditure(i). 
In the early months of 1939, though the Cabinet was gradually 
Moving towards the acceptance of a Continental commitment, there was 
little sign of any, Inclination on the part of ministers to give a lower 
priority to Home A. A. defence. While the General. Staff was desperately 
concerned at the state of equipment of the Field Force which It was 
increasingly likely to have to despatch to face a first class enemy, as-, 
late as March 1939, Pbwnall was able to comment "'Tbe only thing - 
P. M. worries about Is A. D. G. B. "("). Moreover, though the A. D. G. B. 
Sub-Committee of the C. 1. D. stated In July 1938 that the "perimeter" 
defence scheme "represented finality "("'), In fact they went on pressing 
for qualitative improvements such as the Introduction of the 150cm 
searchlight which was "a considerably more powerful illuminant" than 
the 90cm type(lv). Inevitably such qualitative Improvements though 
highly desirable, meant a greater financial outlay for the War Office. 
Nor did these sub-committees confine themselves to recommending 
Increases in quality. TheAir Staff now believed that the power of 
the German Air Force was even greater than the vastly Inflated estimates 
produced when the Ideal Scheme was compiled. This led the A. D. G. B. 
T. I. S. C. 196th Meeting, item 13,17th January 1939. T161/1329. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 195. 
Review of Arrangements for the Air Defence of Great Britain 
(C. I. D. Paper 308-A), para. 9,7th February 1939. CAB 3/8. 
(iv) Ibid, para. 11. CAB 3/8. 
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Sub-Committee to Increase the recommended number of heavy A. A. 
guns from the 1,264 of the Ideal Scheme to 1,584. The extra guns 
inevitably created a greater demand for ammunition a net increase 
of 1,248,000 rounds('), 
it was fortunate that the Germaný Air Force's range and bomblift 
turned out to be very much more restricted. than the British Air 
Staff thought, for Great Britain's. air defences In 1939 were still 
perilously weak. On Ist March 1939 Pile estimated only 570 heavy guns 
and 1,950 searchlights would have been capable of going Into. action 
compared with the 1,264 guns and 4,, 700 lights of the Ideal Scheme("). 
There were, however, some hopeful signs.. , Under the scheme which 
Gorr and Newall had earlier discussed, a nucleus of Regulars was 
being provided in Territorial A. D. G. B. units which greatly facilitated 
the mobilization arrangements. The first 4.5 Inch gun was emplaced 
before a large Press gathering in February. And In April another 
major reorganization of A. A. was undertaken increasing the number - 
of divisions from five to seven and creatinj a new A. A. Command to 
replace. the old A. A. Corps. Alan Brooke became the f Irst General 
officer Comma ndi ng-i n-Chief A. A. Command, but when he was moved 
to another job in July Pile took over and held the same post throughout 
Oil) 
the war 
Hore-Bellsha. apparently took to heart the criticism levelled at 
him over the Sandys case and the Munich mobilization, and became 
rather fanatical In his attitude to A. D. G. B. In a Cabinet paper of 
lbid, paras. 23 and 24. CAB 3/8. 
Pile, op. cit., p. 8. 
Mid, pp. 88-9 and 92. 
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February 1939 he proposed to establish a- 72 gun density(') for London 
and demanded an increase of 1,144 guns or rocket projectors over and 
above those already authorized"). Such exaggerated demands could In 
reality accomplish nothing. Gun-making capacity, which Cabinet and 
Treasury policies had kept very restricted until ýbvember 1938, would 
take time to expand. Though It was Important to guarantee firms a 
steady flow of orders, this was already accomplished once the Ideal 
Scheme had been definitely approved by the Cabinet. 
Even the Home Defence Committee which normally led, the cry for 
the expansion of A. D. G. B., would not back up Hore-Belisha's demands. 
The Committee believed that the aim of establishing a 72 gun density 
for London was unreasonable and that 36 gun density was quite 
(lil) 
s uff icient However, the Committee did agree to an extra 328 guns 
for the country as a whole and a "new requirements reserve" of 368. 
This meant an Increase of E27 million in overall A. D. G. B. expenditure(lv), 
but as Pile points out, it remained strictly "in the realms of planning" 
until well after the outbreak of war(v). 
As 1939 wore on tension mounted in the Cabinet about the possibility 
of a massive surprise attack on Great Britain. As early as March, 
Pownall recorded that ministers were "playing" with the idea of having 
Gun density: - a technical term meaning the maximum number of 
guns which could be brought to bear on any one target. 
Pilep 01). cit., p. 87. 
Future Requirements In Anti-Aircraft and Light Anti-Aircraft 
Guns for the Air Defence of Great Britain (C. 1. D. Paper 319-A) 
Appendix A, 15th May 1939. CAB 3/8. 
(iv) lbid, para. 42. CAB 3/8. 
(V) Pile, Op. cit., p. 88. 
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A. D. G. B., partially deployed on a more or less permanent basid). 
Both the War Office and A. A. Command believed this administratively 
impossible for T. A. units. 7be T. A. consisted of part-time soldiers 
who had normal civilian jobs to do. When A. D. G. B. had been 
mobilized at the time of the Munich crisis It had been discovered that 
there was "a hard core of bad employers who refused to make up the 
wages of their employees and even refused to re-Instate, the men when 
mobilization came to an end"("). As Pbwnall put it 
The T. A. will come out gladly If there Is an 
emergency but not merely because H. M. G. can't 
decide whether there Is an emergency or not. 
H. IVL G. see In front of them that under the 
present arrangements they would have to make 
a difficult decision (as last September) and 
they are baulking their fence, half-way across 
the field. Incidentally blaming H-B and the 
'rigid military mind' because the fence is there. 
They are a lot. t Oli) 
By the end of March, a bad atmosphere had apparently developed In 
the Cabinet and ministers were "distinctly snappy to each other". 
The Prime Minister apparently shared this mood and "got at" 
Hore-Belisha because It took twelve hours to deploy A. D. G. B. 1, even 
though that had "long been the time accepted by the C. 1. D. 
*). 
From late April 1939 the Cabinet decided, against War Office 
advice, to have part of the A. A. defences permanently manned. The 
system of permanent manning was known as the Couverturem. it 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 193. 
Pile, op. cit., P-90- 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol.. 1, pp. 198-9. 
(iv) Mid, pp. 194-5. 
Pile, OD- Cit-so Pe 90- 
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involved 1,000 officers and 22,000 other ranks and was an administrat I ive 
nightmare for the War Office, especially as It coincided with the 
introduction of conscription. The Couverture could not initially be 
manned by conscripts because the conscripts were untrained and therefore 
it had to be accomplished by calling out the T. A. In four successive 
contingents each for one month. it was hoped that at the end of four 
months sufficient conscripts would be trained to take over. But in the 
meantime, as Fbwnall recorded 
the difficulties of accommodation and training 
are tremendous. The equipment for Instance, and 
th&re is still none too muO of It, has to be 
divided Into three different lots, the 'couverture' - 
T. A. drill halls (for the -42 of the T. A. who are 
not out) and the conscripts ... 
(1) 
Tbough from February 1939, Industrial capacity was 
'being 
expanded 
without significant Treasury restraint, A. D. G. B. was still very short of 
guns at the outbreak of war. Only 695 heavy A. A. guns were deployed 
compared with 1,264 in the Ideal Scheme and 2,232 on the latest 
approved scale. Of these, only, 425 were modern 3.7 Inch or 4.5 Inch 
types. The supply of searchlights had never been quite such an acute 
problem and though far from adequate In September 1939 was In advance 
of the supply of heavy guns. The light (I. e. 40mm) gun positior4 
though probably the least significant factor, was worst of all(M. 
Since April, Cabinet ministers had Insisted upon the administratively 
complicated and rather ill-conceived Couverture, but much to Plownall's 
disgust, they postponed a formal mobilization as long as Possible because 
of the diplomatic difficulties and popular anxieties they thought It would 
(i) Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 201. 
Oi) Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, P. 74. 
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entail('). it was the War Office which took the Initiative'In deploying, 
(Ii) bit by bit, almost the whole of A. D. G. B. by the end of August As 
there was no sustained air offensive against Great Britain until after the 
fall of France, the Cabinet's slowness In reaching a decision 
fortunately turned out to be of little consequence. The virtual absence. 
of the German Air Force from British skies In the early months of the 
war created an overwhelming sense of anti-climax In a public educated 
(111) 
to expect Immediate and massive bombardment Th e Pho ney Wa r 
had begun. 
Conclusion 
The General Staff was not by any means blind to the Importance of 
the air defence of the homeland, and the War Office devoted a high 
proportion of the resources at its disposal to A. D. G. B. In the year 
ending March 1938,98 million was spent on A. D. G. B. compared with 
913 million on all the requirements of the Regular Field Force. 
Comparable figures for the following year were f. 13 million for A. D. G. B. 
and *E22 million for the Field Force. The production of field guns 
and medium artillery pieces suffered very seriously from the much 
higher industrial priority accorded to anti-aircraft artillery(IV). 
The General Staff, however, differed from the Cabinet and from 
Liddell Hart in being unwilling totally to sacrifice Great Britain's ability 
Pownall commented "I don't know which they are most afraid of,, 
the German Air Force or the deployment of A. D. G. B. 
Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, p. 195. 
lbid, pp. 218-9 and 222. 
(iii) A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-45 (Pelican 1977), P. 554. 
(iv) Postan, British War Production p. 33. 
1 
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to put an Army in the field. Though the Cabinet never off iciany 
denied that some sort of Field Force was, necessary, If only for 
imperial defence., the finances allocated to the War Cffice were so 
small and the proportion earmarked for A. D. G. B. so large that, at the 
time of Munich, Great Britain was Incapable of making any significant 
contribution to land warfare In Europe(O. 
The policy controversies over air defence were to a great extent 
bound up with the debate on the Continental commitment. As we have 
already noted, the General Staff believed that the Germans would 
concentrate on victory on the Continent first, that Great Britain needed 
an alliance with France in order successfully to prosecute a war with 
Germany, and that the French needed, and would demand, British 
forces as part of such an alliance. The General Staff had prophesied 
as early as September 1935 that In the early stages of the next war 
air forces would be used to help effect a breakthrough by mobile land 
forces rather than In the strategic bombing of cities This Idea 
made It seem unlikely that German airpower would be concentrated 
against Britain until German victory on the Continent had been achieved. 
The General Staff, moreover, regarded keeping German air bases as 
far away from Britain as possibleas an Important element In air - 
defence strategy. In this a British Field Force had an important part 
(Ili) 
to play 
Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War Against Germany 
(C. 0. S. 765) 4th October 1938. CAB 53/41. 
The Future Reorganization of the British Army, Part 1: 
Organization of the Field Force, sub-heading: Forecast of the 
opening Stages of a War with Germany, para. 5,9th September 
1935. WO/32/4612. 
C. I. D. 269th Meeting, Item 6,16th April 1935. CAB 2/6. 
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TbIs over-all General Staff strategic appraisal seems to have 
remained remarkably consistent from Montgomery -Mass I ngberd's 
period tc) the outbreak of war('). If this appreciation was reasonable, 
as we have argued in an earlier chapter, then the' General Staff's 
reluctance completely to sacrifice the Field Force to the demands 
of A. D. G. B. also has considerable validity. 
#ibis consistency was commented upon Unfavourably by ' 
Liddell Hart. outline of the OPPosition to the Development 
of the Anti-Aircraft Defences of Great Britain. 11/1938/89. 
(Liddell Hart Papers). 
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Preparations for Chemical Warfare 
Introduction 
Great Britain's preparations for chemical warfare In the late 1930s 
provide a fascinating area for historical and strategic study which is 
still largely unexplored. Most British people old enough to remember 
the Second World War have vivid recollections for the ubiquitous gas 
masks. It Is well known that, In the early years of the war, - the 
authorities took the threat. 9f gas attack extremely seriously and that 
I 
extensive defensive preparations were made. But It 
A 
perhaps less 
generally realized that Great Britain made very considerable preparations 
for offensive chemical warfare, not only for retallationý against. the ,, 
enemy's armed forces, but also for sustained attack on his civil population, 
A comprehensive treatment of this subject cannot be attempted here, 
because of the three main government departments Involved: - the War 
Office, the Home Office and the Air Ministry, we are concerned 
with the first, but It Is Intended to analyze the War Office's role In 
some depth. 
it was to the Home Office that the gigantic task of preparing the 
civil population for gas attack fell and the effort In this respect appears 
remarkable. 7be entire populace was equipped with respirators and 
the Air Raid Precautions service seems to have received a very 
thorough training in anti-gas techniques('). The Air Ministry meanwhile 
had the grim task of preparing the B. A. F. to subject the civil Population 
13asil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, (H. M. S. 0.1957) 
p. 69. 
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of enemy countries to gas attack In retaliation for any, such attacks on 
British civilians. For historical reasons however, the role of the 
War Office was of central importance. In the First World War the 
Army alone had encountered chemical attack(') and so; Inevitably, the 
War Cffice became the first department to develop anti-gas equipment, 
gas weaponry, chemical research programmes and a chemical Intelligence 
service("). During the rearmament period, the Air Ministry relied on 
the War Office for chemical research and weapon development, the Home 
Office depended on the War Office for the technical knowledge on which 
to base its defensive preparations, and the factories In which gas was 
manufactured were a War Office responsibility. 
The scope of this chapter is restricted not only by its concentration 
solely on the War Office, but also by the. continued reluctance of 
government to release some of the relevant documents to, public Inspection. 
Though many documents on chemical warfare preparations are now 
available to the public under the Thirty Year Rule, quite a high proportion 
are still being held back("'). A coherent picture of British chemical 
warfare policy does seem to emerge from the available documents but 
it is possible that this will have to be considerably modified when the 
contents of the closed papers become known. The caution with which 
government Is still handling this subject is probably a reflection of the 
For the Initial impact of gas on the British Army In the First 
World War see early chapters. of Foulkes, Gas. ' The Story of the 
Special Brigade, (Blackwood 1934). 
On the crucial importance of chemical intelligence see Thullller, 
Gas in the Next War, pp. 26-31. 
For example, of six files on chemical warfare preparations In the 
1930s listed In the W032 series at the P. R. 0. , three are still closed. 
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presumed sensitivity of public opinion with regard to'chemical warfare, 
a sensitivity which was thought especially acute In the period under 
review('). 
Offensive Preparations 
of all the novel and sinister horrors of the Great War, a war 
which saw the Introduction of unrestricted submarine attacks and-the 
first aerial bombardment of civil populations, poison gas was, perhaps, 
the one that left the most reminders. Thousands of men survived the 
war with damaged lungs and throats and most people In Britain knew 
somebne who had been gassed. Gas even made an impact on art and 
literature, of which Sir John Sargent's painting "Gassed", which still 
hangs in the Imperial War Museum, and Wilfred Owen's poem "Dulce 
et Decorum Est", are perhaps the most notable examples. 
The introduction of polsongas at Ypres In'1915had damaged the 
credibility of Germany as a civilized nation and. contributed to a 
sometimes hysterical hatred of the "Hun"', though the Allies were soon 
using gas ý on an even bigger scale. Yet despite any feelings of revulsion 
against the horrors of the First World War, the basic policy of the 
British government with regard to the use of gas In a future war was 
laid down as early as February'1925, when the Committee Of Imperial 
Defence decided, 
That all Service schools and commands be authorized 
to study the employment of offensive gas, since the 
study of offensive. gas is necessary to the study of 
protection against gas, and also that we may be In 
a position to retaliate should the use of gas be 
forced upon us by our opponents, 
According to A. J. P. Taylor, "Fear of gas attack from the air 
was an acute element in the apprehension before 1939". EnElish 
Historv 1914-45 (Penguin 1975), P. 524. 
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7bar steps should be taken to ensure the bulk 
production of gas should the need arise and that 
stocks should be provided and held sufficient to 
bridge over the period required to brin the 
machinery of production into operation(LI. 
For financial reasons very little was done about this until the 
beginning of the rearmament programme in 1936("). Even during the 
disarmament period, however, the War-Office ran a Chemical Defence 
Experimental Station at Pbrton and maintained an Intelligence interest 
in chemical warfare developments abroad. 
The Importance of gas in the Great War meant that It had to be 
taken very seriously when another major European conflict seemed to 
be threatening. The Abyssinian Crisis of 1935-36 played a major role 
in inducing the British government to begin a relatively serious rearmamer, 
programme, and the atrocity of the Abyssinian war which most outraged 
politically conscious people In Great Britain was the gassing and gas 
bombing of a primitive people by what was perceived as an aggressive 
Fascist state. The Italian use of gas In Abyssinia certainly did not 
escape notice In government and defence circles In Great Britain. The 
Committee of Imperial Defence was informed by Sir Ernie Chatfield, 
First Sea Lord and Chairman of the Chiefs Of Staff Committee, on 3rd 
April 1936., that the Chiefs of Staff had been "told of the use of gas 
by Italy, an event which had been proved by the examination at Home of 
some of the liquid from an Italian bomb'*"). This raised Important 
military considerations. Chamberlain recorded In his diary on 24th 
April 1936 
Quoted In The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use In War (C. I. D. 
paper 1465 B) para. 1. CAB 4/28. 
Ibid, para. 2. CAB 4/28. 
C. I. D. Minutes of the 276th Meeting, item 4, CAB 2/6. 
-336- 
The German problem has for the moment receded 
into the background in view of the striking success 
of the Italians who have by the use of poison gas 
demoralized the Abyssinians and are now within 
a short distance of Addis(i). 
By this time,, German rearmament and -the obvious decline in 
European security had already- led the Army Council to authorize, a 
programme of, training for chemical warfare in- both, Its offensive and 
def ens 1 ve, aspects, though the manufacture of poison gas, did not -begin 
on a_, large scale In Great Britain, until after it had been used In - 
Abyssinia. - - Tbe, Army Council decided on 30th July, 1935 -that. -- 
I) The study of the gas offensive should be 
pursued as far as possible without stultifying 
the Government policy as laid down In the Draft 
Disarmament Convention. 
II) The following measures should be taken 
forthwith- - 
a) Liaison should be established with the 
Air Ministry. 
b) The Royal Engineers should become the 
"parent arm" for all offensive and defensive 
gas warfare in the Army except gas shelling. 
C) The gas offensive should be studied as part 
of the curriculum of the School of Military 
Engineering. 
d) Tactical exercises for the study of the 
gas offensive should be Introduced. 
e) Projectors should be brought into use as 
smoke proj ectors. 
f) The study of capacity for gas production In 
war should be undertaken. 
g) Arrangements should be worked out for the 
provision of chemical staff officers (1) In peace 
and (2) In war(10. ,II 
At the-same-time, the Air Ministry was becoming Increasingly 
Neville Chamberlain's diary, entry under 24th April 1936. ý 
(Chamberlain Papers, Library of the University of Birmingham). 
(it), Minute i. WO/32/4315. 
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concerned with the problem of chemical warfare. The development of 
gas weaponry was largely a War Office responsibility, the War Office 
being in charge of the Design and Research Department at Woolwich, 
the Chemical Defence Research Department, and the Chemical Defence 
EXperimental, Station at Pbrton. The-Air Ministry, therefore, contacted-, ', 
the War office, asking for the initiation of a development programme 
for aerial, gas weapons. - The Air Council was mainly, interested in 
developing more efficient types of aerial, gas bombs, apparatus for 
spraying gas from- the air and gas storage accommodation. 7be Air 
Ministry- explained that "the ultimate object of these proposals Is the 
provision of stocks of equipment, to enable retaliatory measures to betaken 
immediately in the event of the use of gas by an opponent" 
(1) 
0 
'The War Office'was "glad to note" that the Air Ministry was 
"taking up the problem of chemical, warfare ýso energetically"("), but 
did, not, want the Air Ministry's programme to clash with its own. The 
War Office had not yet fully -worked out its, own, requirements and 
priorities, and it was decided to hold a, meeting at Pbrton, In order to 
do, so("'). The main chemical weapon available to, the Army apart 
from-gas shell for the artillery was the Livens projector. -, Invented 
in the First World War, it was a rather crude device capable of -- 
hurling a 601b drum of mustard gas, in liquid form, - over'distances of 
up to 1700 yards. It was suggested at the meeting at Pbrton on Ilth 
September 1935 that the "most important Items requiring development" - 








Minute 4. WO/32/3663. 
AN 
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1) Livens projector to be developed 
a) to give a range of 2,500 yards 
to operate from a portable stand . 
c) to be adapted to gas and toxic smoke. 
2) Chemical lorry for bulk contamination with FLT. "ý, (a form of mustard 
gas). 
3)- Large size of contamination bomb for use as, a land mine. 
4) 'Development of vesicant grease mixture and means foremploying. 
5) Mustard gas shell with large burster to give fine spray effect 
aga I ns t- perso nnel. 
6) Toxic and lachrymatory smoke candles for use from tanks. 
7) Development of ... 4-Inch mortars for gas 
*and smoke to be used 
from mechanical vehicles. 
8) Development of toxic smoke and lachrymatory for projection from 
discharger. 
7be Director of Artillery, Major-General FLA. Lewis thought this 
list too long and likely to overburden Pbrton. He advocated a -simpler 
programme reduced to the development of only four items of equipment. 
Naturally he placed more emphasis on artillery as a means of delivering 
gas and was particularly keen on the development of a more efficient 
gas shell, the so-called double-ejection shell. Lewis doubted the, , 
feasibility of turning the old First World War Livens projector Into a 
mobile weapon and, instead, wanted a 6-inch or a 9.45 inch Stokes-Newton 
mortar for the projection of gas and toxic smoke. He agreed on the 
need for a. chemical lorry for the bulk contamination., of ground and for 
a hand contamination apparatus for use where the lorry could not go, 
and double-ejection toxic smoke shells for the 6-Inch and 4.5 inch 
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howitzers formed the remaining Items on his list(). Lewis's 
abbreviated list of requirements gained general acceptance In the short 
term though It was eventually considerably modified. The*War ()ffice 
finally adopted the Livens projector in preference to the Stokes-Newton 
mortar, _ 
The Army had considerable stocks of Livens projectors, but 
none of this type of mortar, and the mortar, moreover, was a more 
expensive weapon, the manufacture of which would have placed an 
additional, strain on the country's limited gun-making capacity 
While the War Office sorted out Its own requirements the Air 
Ministry, Intensified, the pressure for the development of aerialýgas 
weapons. The Air Staff settled on four items, a "small" gas bomb, 
a 3501b gas bomb, a spraying apparatus and a spraying sight, and 
came to the conclusion that these must be ready on Ist January 1937 at 
the latest. In a letter of 4th July 1936, the Air Ministry suggested to 
the Master-General of the Ordnance, Lt. General Sir Hugh Elles, that 
In orderý-to expedite matters, the staff of the War Office's Chemical 
Defence Research Department should be enlarged. The extra staff 
employed in this department specifically to work on the Air Ministry's 
requirements, could, if the War Office approved, be paid for from Air 
Ministry funds 
(III) 
. The Chemical Defence Research Department responded 
very well to the Air Staff's sense of urgency and announced that "the 
acceleration of the Air Ministry Items ... has been discussed with the 
Commandant Pbrton ... and immediate steps have been taken to intensify 
the work on these problems with a view to complete specifications 
Minute 6. WO/32/3663. 
Minute 64, para. 3(d). WO/32/3663. 
Air Ministry letter of 4th July 1936. Enclosure 17A. WO/32/3663. 
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being'ready at least-'one month prior to Ist January 
By mid'1936 the Chiefs of Staff had become Insistent that Great 
Britain must develop a very serious chemical -warfare capability for 
retaliation. On 25th June Chatfield Introduced a Chiefs of Staff paper 
on the possible use of gas as a retaliatory measure in war at the 
Committee of Imperial Defence("). Chatfield explained that the Chiefs 
of Staff were asking for authority to implement the C. 1. D. 's decision 
of February 1925 to provide for the manufacture and storage of reserves 
of gas, a decision which had not yet been put into effect because of 
financial restrictions. Lord Swinton, the Secretary of State for Air 
Air -strongly endorsed" the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff and 
pressed for "urgent action" in the matter. He pointed out that In a 
year's time, when it was anticipated that the country might be passing 
through a period of serious danger, the defensive arrangements against 
air attack would be by no means complete. it was at that time that 
Oreat Britain would be most In need of a capability to retaliate with 
gas. He considered it "vital" not only that the Services should have full 
authority to press forward with experiments and to train their personnel 
in the offensive use of gas but also that they should be assured of 
reserve stocks of gas. In his opinion it would be 
wholly unjustified, if, in the case of necessity, 
we were unable to retaliate with the utmost 
efficiency which could be achieved within the 
time and resources available. 
The C. I. G. S., Deverell, clearly agreed and explained that it was the 
intention of the War-Office to proceed with the manufacture'of'the most 
Minute 19. WO/32/3663. 
C. 1. D. Paper 1237 -B. CAB 4/24. 
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potent form of gas which was now available as soon as the necessary 
authority was given. But a note of caution was sounded by the 
Chancellor of, the achequer. Chamberlain thought it would be 
most undesirable to parade our Intentions In 
this matter, not only because of the political 
repercussions at home, but also because it might 
start a race in preparations for gas warfare. 
He asked what the proposals were for the construction of the necessary 
factory. If a State factory were proposed It would be almost impossible 
to conceal the fact whatever steps were taken to ensure secrecy. it 
might therefore be better for some firm of chemical manufacturers to 
take on the work. Such a firm would have a trained staff of technicians 
immediately available, He understood that commercial technical plant 
could be converted to the manufacture of gas with comparative ease and 
he I anticipated less difficulty If this course were adopted('ý. 
Chamberlain's attitude is rather difficult to understand. The policy 
of the Chiefs of Staff seems to have been one of deterrence based on an 
impressive capacity to retaliate. Chamberlain expressed no disagreement 
with this and was obviously In favour of developing Industrial capacity for 
poison gas manufacture. But the essence of a strategy of deterrence is 
to publicize the existence of the deterrent, whereas Chamberlain seems 
to have been keen to keep it a secret. Perhaps Chamberlain had in 
mind to let Germany know through diplomatic channels,, that Great 
Britain had the capability to retaliate, while keeping this knowledge from 
the British public for as long as possible. 
By- July 1936, the War office had decided to prepare a pilot''plant 
for the production of a new improved form of mustard gas called H. T. 
(1) 1. D. 279th Meeting, item 1. CAB 2/6. 
-342- 
H. T. had two advantages over the old First World War variety - H. S. 
it froze at a lower temperature which meant that it was better for 
spraying from the air, and it was more easily stored. 7be War Office 
contacted Imperial Chemical Industries In order to enlist their help with 
the development of a pilot H. T. plant and to find out whether they ý would 
subsequently be willing to set up and run poison gas plant on a large 
scale, acting as agents'of the War Office and the Air Ministry. Imperial 
Chemical Industries offered their "whole-hearted co-operation in the 
development of the pilot plant" and the War Office concluded that "there 
was no reason to doubt" that the Company would be "prepared to 
collaborate to the extent of their resources In the development of 
subsequent, production plant"('). On 10th July 1936 the C. 1. D. agreed 
that -"a pilot plant for the production of H. T. should be developed with 
the assistance of experts from 1. C. 1. " 7be War Office decided to - 
build the plant to a capacity of 50 tons and to locate it at Sutton Oak 
near St. Helens, Lancashire. It was estimated that It would take between 
ninelgmonths and a year to develop the production process to full 
(ii) I efficiency 
By the beginning of November 1936, the General Staff had formulated 
fairly clearly its chemical warfare policy. On the third of that month 
Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, C. 1. G. S. addressed a paper on 
"The Development of Gas Weapons and Appar-atus for offensive Purposes" 
to some of his more senior colleagues. 
I 
Policy with Regard to the Possible Use of Gas as a Retaliatory, 
Measure in War. (C. 1. D. Paper 1237-B), 8th July 1936. CAB 4/24. 
(ii) C. I. D. 280th Meeting, item 6,10th July 1936. CAB 2/6. 
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To ensure that research Is conductedýon the most 
profitable lines I consider that we should have a 
clear policy as to the gases we intend to have 
ready. for use at the outbreak of war and the 
methods by which we shall use them(i). 
Deverell explained that there were four main types of gas - choking 
gases such as phosgene, which were volatile and lethal, lachrymatory 
gases, which were not lethal but had a harrassing effect, and nose 
gases, such as arsenical gas which were volatile and also harrassing 
but'not lethal. Phosgene and mustard gas were two of the most 
common gases used in the First World War and there was, no -need for 
the, C. I. G. S. to explain their physiological effects and tactical uses, 
to his colleagues. Lachrymatory gases had also been used extensively 
to harass the enemy and reduce his efficiency by forcing his troops to 
wear gas masks. But arsenical gas was less familiar. Deverell 
explained that of all types of gas this was the most difficult to defeat 
with a respirator and It could be breathed for some minutes before the 
effect was felt. Adjusting a respirator w6uld not, therefore, bring 
immediate relief, and this might cause inexperienced troops to think their 
respirators had failed them and so cause panic. Deverell considered 
it best to concentrate on having two gases only ready at the outbreak 
of war. One of these was certainly to be mustard gas because of its 
proven military value. At this stage the General Staff considered that 
the other should be an arsenical gas. Experiments were to continue with 
choking gases "so that if required, production of such gases could start 
without delay at the outbreak of war" 
Minute 45, para. 2. WO/32/3663. 
lbid, para. 3. WO/32/3663. 
. 0-01 
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It cannot be said that the General Staff displayed enthusiasm 
for the development of specialist chemical weaponry. The significance 
of chemical- weapons in mobile warfare was an unknown quantity and 
DeverelL seems to have been reluctant to divert any large part of the 
scanty financial and industrial resources available to the War Office 
away from areas of more certain need. He emphasised that, "our 
policy should -be to utilize existing weapons as far as possible In 
addition-to'gas shell for the artillery, Deverell had authorized the "" 
development of four types of chemical weapon: - a chemical lorry, a' 
hand, contamination apparatus, a gas hand grenade for clearing houses 
and dug-outs, and a 6-inch mortar for gas projection. Deverell believed 
that, to'use these weapons to their full potential; It would'be necessary, ' 
to form special chemical warfare units and explained that 
It was largely for this reason that the Royal 
Engineers were made the parent arm for gas 
and that the 58th (Porton) Company R. E. are 
being reorganized and separated from the 
personnel of the E5cperimental Establishment 
at Pbrton(i). 
If artillery were to play its part in future chemical warfare it was 
necessary to decide what percentage of the artillery shell held In peace 
should be gas. For the 25 pdr Field Gun, the General Staff considered 
that 75% of the shell reserves should be H. E., 15% smoke and 10% gas. 
Cf the 10% gas, 75% was to be mustard and the remaining 25% either 
lachrymatory or arsenical. The medium artillery was to hold 3CP70 of 
its reserves for the 6-inch howitzer as gas shell but a decision on the 
percentage for other artillery equipments was postponed(il). 
Jbid. ýýpara. 4. WO/32/3663. 
Ibid, --para. 5. WO/32/3663. 
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Having explained the General Staff's proposals for developing the, 
British Army's chemical weaponry, the C. I. G. S. drew the attention of, 
his colleagues to the gas warfare methods of certain foreign powers 
The states of preparedness of the three countries Great Britain was 
most likely to fight, Germany, Japan and Italy were obviously of crucial 
importance. Comparatively little was known about Germany's preparations 
because of the, very. strict security enforced there. It was known, 
however, -that the Germans believed an improved form of mustard gas 
the best gas to use offensively. They probably also had phosgene and 
some arsenical gases but these seemed to be of lesser importance. 
The Germans thought to possess gas spraying equipment capable of 
throwing a spray up to 160 yards. Means of spraying from vehicles and 
aircraft had been developed and these techniques were apparently tending 
toý supersede gas shelling In German military doctrine. Two or possibly 
three offensive gas battalions were reported, each about 1,200 men 
strong, and "chemical factories syndicated under the name of Farben 
I. G. --" were "known to be capable of producing large quantities of poison 
gas within a short time if required"('). 
Much more was known about Italian preparations, presumably 
because their security was not so good, and because they had already, 
demonstrated some of their techniques in the Ethiopian War. The 
Italians -envisaged using lewisite, mustard, phosgene and c'loropicrin. 
Methods of -projection included ground spray from chemical lorries and 
man-pack apparatus, grenades and mortar bombs. Gas shell. was 
known to be available for six types of gun, varying in calibre from. the 
Offensive Gas Warfare Methods (Germany). Enclosure 45A, 
7th September 1936. WO/32/3663. 
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75mm to the 305mm. Units equipped for offensive gas warfare Included 
Chemical Regiments each of two battalions of special chemical service 
troops, and Chemical Service Companies, with Army Corps. Aerial 
spray was considered the most effective form of gas attack. As Italy 
had taken steps to equip herself In all forms of chemical warfare It 
was concluded that In a further war she would employ the gas weapons 
"unless special circumstances render such a course inadvisable"('), 
The Japanese were thought to have a large range of poison gases 
including chlorine, phosgene, mustard, bromoacetone and cyanic acid. 
They were believed to have developed gas shell, aerial bombs, and 
spraying apparatus, mines and hand grenades. ney possessed a 
gas projector, their equivalent of the British Livens, which was reported 
to have a calibre of 16cm and a maximum range of about 2,500 metres 
and gas mortars of 16cm and 20cm in calibre and maximum ranges, of 
1,500 metres and 3,000 metres respectively. For bulk contamination, 
the Japanese had both portable apparatus, and their equivalent of the 




In 1936 the mood of Britain was still essentially pacific and 
anti-military. most people's Image of the War Office was summed up 
, 
in David Low's character - Colonel Blimp. Gas warfare preparations 
were guaranteed to bring back the worst memories of the last war, 
and precipitate the worst fears about the next. But the War Office was 
extremely lucky in having, at this period, an exceptionally strong 
Ibid, (Italy), WO/32/3663. 
Ibid, (Japan), WO/32/3663. 
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minded Secretary of State, prepared to risk unpopularity, but not 
to evade- responsibility. After being shown the General Staffs analysis 
of the preparations necessary for chemical warfare Duff Cooper 
minuted on 26th 1, bvember 1936: 
I am strongly in favour of the most rapid progress 
being made In every form of defensive and offensive 
gas warfare - and shall always be repared to 
defend it In the House of Commonsli). 
In 1936, this was surely a stand of considerable political courage. 
When, in mid-1937, Hore-Bellsha took over from Duff Cooper as 
Secretary of State, it -was obviously necessary to inform him of the 
preparations for chemical warfare which were in progress. Hor e-Belisha 
replied on 25th June "I have seen. I endorse my predecessor's 
(it) 
view" 
Hore-Belisha was to cause much upheaval at the War Office and 
arouse an enormous amount of ill-feeling, but he made no difficulties 
over this issue. Chamberlain's principal motive in making Hore-Belisha 
Secretary of State seems to have been to force the War Office to fit 
In with a Cabinet/Treasury policy which Involved strict financial 
control of the whole of rearmament and giving the bulk of the funds to the 
Air Ministry and the Admiralty to detriment of the Army. Hore-Belisha 
was therefore expected to keep the War Cffice on a very tight budget, 
a nd, after the introduction of the New Army Policy In December 1937, he 
was even forced to make major cuts in expenditure programmes which 
had already been approved. Money was the real root of much of the 
acrimony between Hore-Belisha and his military colleagues. There was 
Minute 52. WO/32/3663. 
Minute 71. WO/32/3663. 
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very little money involved in the Army's chemical weapons programme() 
and, perhaps for that reason, he never tried to obstruct it, and thus 
no friction was generated. 
In the first half of 1937, the War Office held a series of trials 
to' determine'the comparative value of arsenical smoke and a 
persistent lachrymatpry gas'known as B. B. C. (brombenzylcyanide). 
Before these trials the General Staff had-been Inclined to favour the 
arsenical compound. ' In the trials It fared badly and was consequently 
abandoned. Deverell minuted to the Master General'of the Ordnance, 
Lt. General Sir Hugh Elles: 
I wish to confirm my proposal that we should have 
only two gases ready on mobilization and that one 
of these should be mustard gas. ' 
As for arsenical smoke, In view of the unsatis- 
factory results obtained from this gas In recent 
trials, and as a result of the comparatively 
better performance of persistent lachrymatory gas 
as a harassing agent I consider the latter should 
replace arsenical smoke as the second of the 
gases to be ready on the outbrek, of war(II). 
As Deverell commented, the persistent lach7matory gas had fared 
rather better at the Porton trials. A trial of this gas was conducted 
against a gun detachment on 6th April 1937. The detachment was , 
exposed to gas for ten minutes, though the men wereprotected from 
droplets which might have seriously damaged their eyes, by, the wearing 
of goggles. Five of the six menof the detachment managed to carry out 
their tasks without having to wear respirators, but the sixth whose job 
(1) Treasury letter T. 1. S. C. 116/13 approved an expenditure of only 
E28,900 on specialist delivery system for gas. Enclosure 16A. 
WO/32/3663. 
01) Minute 64, para. 3. WO/32/3663. 
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entailed facing into the wind was gassed so severely that he found It 
otherwise, impossible to continue. 7bough the gun detachment managed 
to complete Its fire-task in the ten minutes allowed, the gas produced 
a puzzling and unexpected build-up effect. When the detachment tried to 
move its gun an hour after the gas had been released, the men found 
that-they-were "forced to don respirators as lachrymation became 
intolerable". The area was still sufficiently contaminated 24 hours later 
to cause, acute discomfort to anyone not wearing a respirator 
Until mid-1937 the chemical weapons which the General Staff wanted 
to develop were: 
a) A chemical lorry for bulk contamination with mustard gas. 
b) A hand contamination apparatus for use with mustard gas -where 
the chemical lorry could not go. 
C) A hand bomb of arsenical gas. 
d) A 6-inch mortar for gas projection. 
By mid-1937 it was thought that the requirement for a bulk contam- 
ination vehicle could be met by a chemical trailer towed by the existing 
15 cwt. truck or 30 cwt. lorry, thus saving the development of a 
specialist lorry. 7be necessity for having a hand contamination apparatus 
was removed by the development of a large mustard gas hand bomb 
which was simpler to operate and just as effective. As arsenical gas 
had gone completely out of favour by this stage, no further effort was 
made to develop an arsenical hand bomb, and the development of a 
6-inch chemical mortar was aba doned when It was found possible to 
make the Livens projector reasonablY mobile 
Trial of B. B. C. against a gun detachment carried out at Pbrton 
on 6th March 1937. Enclosure 62A. WO/32/3663. 
-350- 
The War Office was trying to develop an improved Livens'with a 
range of 2.500 yards, but was having trouble finding a firm which would 
agree to-manufacture prototypes in reasonable time. To start with, 
the General Staff wanted some pilot models for pilot model trials,, 
followed by troop trials In the 1938 training season. The Chesterfield 
Tube Company tad tendered for the production of six prototype projectors 
but had quoted a delivery date about eight months after the placing of 
the order. The War Office did not want to wait so long, and Sir 
Harold Brown, the Director General of Munitions Production, sent the 
company a letter of exhortation written in his usual forceful manner. 
An urgent job which you -have got to take your 
coat off to. I understand that you have ten- 
dered for 6 Livens projectors, deliveries being 
quoted being 30 to 36 weeks. This is a very 
urgent matter and it is essential that we have 
these projectors by the coming training season. 
I shall be eternally grateful If you would 
drop me a line letting me know the best you 
can do and any suggestions you may have for 
_expediting the manufacture either of this 6 or future deliveries which will probably be 
considerable ... for the love of Mike let us have these 6 projectors quickly. 
The Company replied, 
In view of possible mass production it may 
be necessary to charge the method of 
manufacturing these projectors. 
I am arranging therefore for a new design 
which if approved would considerably ease 
the position. 
I do not know when your training season 
actually begins, but the arrangements I 
am making are such that we should have the 
six Livens projectors ready b the end of 
May, possibly a little earlieWO. 
i 
(i) Enclosure 95A. WO/32/3663. 
-351- 
The War Office was apparently satisfied with this and In the 
meantime was prepared to make do with old First World War Livens 
projectors, considerable stocks of which existed. New drums and 
stands'for these projectors had to be ordered, but unlike the production 
of aý new, mortar, this would put no strain on the armaments ý Industry. 
As Deverell commented In a minute to Elles, 
... It is apparent that the construction of Livens drums and stands can be undertaken with 
little interference with other production(l). 
Elles confirmed Deverell's analysis of the chemical weapons programme. 
The only stores required apart from stocks of gas shell and hand 
contamination bombs were 3,000 stands for Livens projectors and 10,000 
drums, the cost of which he estimated at a mere 942,250 
During the course of 1937 the War Office worked out a provisional 
organization for a Chemical Warfare Company Royal Engineers. and 
prepared notes on the tactical handling of such units. Chemical Warfare 
Companies were to be G. H. Q. troops allocated normally on the scale 
of one company per division. Their weapons were to be the Livens 
projector, capable of lobbing a 601b drum of mustard gas in liquid form 
over distances up to 1,700 yards, the bulk contamination trailer carrying 
100 gallons of mustard gas in liquid form capable of spraying a belt 
20 yards wide, and'the mustard-filled hand contamination bomb weighing 
61b and capable contaminating an area of 12 square yards. The total 
personnel of the unit would be 5 officers, 1 warrant officer and 170 
other ranks. Each company was to have three sections each of three 
sub-sections and'was to be commanded by a major. Each section would 
Minute 64, para. 3(d). WO/32/3663. 
Minute 68, para. 3(d). WO/32/3663. 
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have fo ur' 15 cwt. trucks In which Its pro ,j ecto % rs would be carried. 
Altogether, the Company would have 288 Uvens projectors, 5 bulk 
contamination trailers and 760 hand bombs, When -carrying out a 
chemical attack In support of a division two men could erect eight 
projectors in carrying distance of the truck which transported them In 
thirty minutes. The projectors were to be laid by prismatic compass 
on a previously determined bearing and, on the assumption that each 
projector would cover a' front of 10 yards with persistent gas, it was- 
held that the Chemical Warfare Company could support a divisional attack 
on a- 'frontage of up to 3,000 yardb(i). 
A'document entitled "Notes"o In theý'Handling of"Chernical Warfare 
Companies R. Z in Mobile and Semi-Mobile Warfare" explained thai 
Broadly speaking ... the three normal roles of Chemical Warfare Companies are: - 
1) The projection of gas in preparation for or 
In support of an attack. 
II) In defence, the contamination of ground to 
deny its use to the enemy. 
III) In withdrawal, the preparation of chemical 
obstacles. 
When employed on such roles it would seldom be advantageous to use 
less than one complete company, while conditions might warrant two or 
more companies being grouped for a single operation. The Chemical 
Warfare Company would have three chemicals at Its disposal: - 
mustard gas, lachrymatory gas and smoke. The lachrymatory gas was 
a persistent irritant but not lethal. Smoke was useful only for covering 
the mOiiements of one's- own troops. Mustard gas was the truly " deadly 
Enclosure 60A. Experimental organization for a Chemical Warfare Company P. Z WO/32/3663. 
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weapon- iný the Chemical Warfare Company's armoury. Mustard gas 
was -not only- dangerous when breathed In, it had a blistering effect on 
any exposed area of skin and could damage the eyes inducing temporary 
or even permanent blindness. Contamination of the enemy's defences 
by means of drums charged with liquid mustard gas would'compel his 
troops to wear both respirators and anti-gas clothing In order to avoid 
serious casualties. in defence and withdrawal the enemy's advance 
could be Impeded by the contamination of areas with high concentrations 
of mustard gas In liquid form and projector drums could be used as 
chemical mines. Mild weather was best for b, ulk , contamination. In cold 
weather the substance might linger for a long time up to two months, 
but the vapour effect, so injurious to troops moving In the area3would 
be slight, whereas In hot weather, 
(I) 
evaporate within a few hours 
the substance might completely 
By October 1937, the War Office was planning to have at least four 
Chemical Warfare Companies to support the four div I isions of the Field 
Force, though only one of these was yet In existence 
(it) The General 
Staff wanted to spend money on equtpment for four such untts In 1938, 
but Sir Frederick Bovenschen, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, 
was worried that the War Office had not obtained Treasury sanction 
for three of them and did not expect the Treasury would sanction 
expenditure on units whose existence was not recognized. 
( M, ajor- 
General E. K. Squires, the Director of Staff Duties explained that the 
W lbid, Appendix B. WO/32/3663. 
(it) Minute 76', para. 4 and Minute 75. 'WO/32ý3663*' 
(iii) Minute 75, Ist September 1937, * WO/32/3663., 
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General Staff did not Intend to raise the three additional chemical 
warfare companies in peacetime. He thought that they could be raised 
and trained very quickly after the outbreak of war. 
Very little tactical and technical training Is 
required for the handling of these weapons 
and the three remaining companies could 
probably be raised and trained in six weeks('). 
The original requirement for four Chemical Warfare companies 
was scaled down to two at the end of 1937 in accordance with the New 
Army Hypothesis. The size and composition of the Field Force under 
the New Hypothesis had not been determined when the War Office 
Lý ýt W" VGX, 
approached the Treasury 
A 
that at least two Chemical Warfare Companies 
W ould be required "even on the most limited Field Force assumptions". 
One of these was already in existence. The other would be raised on 
mobilization. The War Office wanted financial sanction to provide 
(11) 
equipment for both of these units, and the Treasury agreed to this 
Meanwhile plans were being laid for the production of poison gas 
on a very large scale. Though the War office was to some extent 
interested In other varieties, the great bulk of the gas required by the 
Service departments was mustard. Indeed the Air Ministry never 
seems to have displayed much Interest in other types. An Inter- 
Departmental Committee set up to investigate combined War Office 
and Air Ministry requirements estimated as early as August 1936 that 
in the event of an outbreak of war in January 1937,67 tons of mustard 
gas would be needed. But with the expansion of the Royal Air Force 
and the progres. s of the deficiency programme for the Army, these 
(I) Minute 76, para. 2. WO/32/3663. 
(Ii) T. I. S. C. War Office Memorandum no. 328,30th December 1937. WO/32/3663. 
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requirements would increase to rather more than 500 tons a week for 
the first six months of a war breaking out in or after Apr il 1937 
As we have already noted the War Office began In 1936 to build a 
pilot plant for the production of H. T. at Sutton Oak. As early as 
March 1937 work had also begun on what was eventually to be a much 
bigger poison gas factory at a place called Kemet near Runcorn, also 
on Mers eys Id e. At a C. 1. D. meeting on 23rd March 1937 Duff Cooper 
asked what answer should be given to any questions on the purpose of 
the new gas factory at Kemet. He'pointed out that It might be considered 
undesirable to make a statement that the factory was for the purpose of 
manufacturing gas, but it would be difficult to avoid giving an answer. 
Questions had already been put to the Foreign Secretary who had been 
able to say with truth that gas had hitherto been produced only for 
experimental purposes, but this statement would not represent the true 
position of the future. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald thought that It was 
very inadvisable to make any statement and that the matter should be 
kept quiet at any rate until It was raised. But Sir Maurice Hankey 
suggested that the use of poison gas against Abyssinia by Italy had 00 
furnished a justification for providing the necessary manufacturing 
facilities, which could if necessary be Invoked("). 
The Committee of Imperial Defence eventually decided that no 
Parliamentary question should be deliberately provoked nor formal 
announcement made as to the purpose for which the gas factory at 
Kemet was being used and that Imperial Chemical Industries 
T. 1. S. C. War Office Memorandum, no. 39, para. 2,10th 
August 1936. T161/1315. 
(it) C. 1. D. 291st Meeting, Item 3, CAB 2/6. 
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should be asked to limit any disclosure, 
should the need arise, to a general statement 
that the factory was for the production of 
materials required for chemical defence(i). 
By December 1937, the War office and the Air Ministry had 
developed very ambitious plans for creating Industrial capacity for the 
production of poison gas. It had earlier been thought that the newer 
variety of mustard gas - H. T. would completely replace the, old First 
World War type - H. S., but H. T. turned out to be much more expensive 
to produce. It was considered important that the Air Ministry should 
have a plentiful supply of H. T. for spraying from the air, but ELS. 
was adequate for most other purposes and so it was decided to build 
some new manufacturing capacity for both types. On 16th December 




290 tons a week 
4 tons a week 
330 tons a week 
H. T. 
180 tons a week 
2 tons a week 
182 tons a week 
In addition to the relatively small 50 ton H. T. plant at Sutton Oak, 
the Services wanted two large factories - the one at Kemet, on which 
work had already begun, and another at a site which had not yet been 
decided. Both of the large poison gas factories were to be set up and' 
run by Imperial Chemical Industries for which that company was to be 
paid construction and agency fees. 
production was: - 
The War Office's scheme of 
(1) lbid, Conclusions (a) and (b). CAB 2/6. 
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Sutton Oak One 50 ton H. T. 
unit 
Kemet One 50 ton H. T. 
unit 
One 40 ton H. S. 
unit 
Two 80 ton H. S. ) 
units 
Second Two 50 ton H. T. 
units 
Factory Two 80 ton H. S. 
units 
I-L S. H. T. TOTAL 
50 50 tons 
50 
200 250 tons 
100 
- 
160 - 260 tons 
360 200 560 
The War Office Informed the Treasury that the factory at Kemet was 
expected to cost more than 91,400,000 and the secondý factory about 
91,600,000 The Treasury was clearly rather staggered by the cost 
of all this and suggested that the Service Departments were exceeding 
their brief In demanding so much gas. The bulk of the capacity 
required was for the Air Ministry, and Mr. Edward Bridges of the 
Treasury demanded an explanation from that department of the hypothesis 
on which Its requirements were based. The Air Ministry replied that 
The hypothesis was that gas bombs would be 
used in retaliation against an enemy who 
resorted to gas as a weapon of attack 'on this 
country: 1. e. the bomb loads would consist 
of other types of bomb (high explosive and 
incendary) but in addition provision would 
be made for introducing gas bombs into the 
load in a proportion of 25 percent in the 
event of this country being subjected to a 
gas attack. 
A Chiefs of Staff's Peport of June 1936 had recommended that 
T. I. S. C. War office Memorandum no. 228,14th December'1937, 
and T. I. S. C. 114th Meeting, item 4,16th December 1937. 
T161/1321. 
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immediate steps should be-taken to provide 
stocks of the latest and most potent forms 
of gas so that If necessary we may be able 
to retaliate without a day's delay. To 
produce these stocks and to form a nucleus 
for production on a war scale, a factory will 
have to be set up -and possibly some enlarge- 
ment of the existing experimental establishments 
will be required. 
7be Committee of Imperial Defence had"approved the, Report. But the 
Treasury maintained that the War Office and the AlrMinistry were 
"breaking fresh ground" in asking 
not only for the stock of gas which would 
enable this country to retaliate without 
delay, but also for the production of 'gas 
In wartime at a rate of 512 tons a week 
which assumes that gas would be used. ' 
continuously In bombing, operations (I). 
An Internal minute signed by Mr. Z G. Compton, the Secretary of 
the T. I. S. C.,. clarified the Treasury's position 
Hitherto our gas production has been represented 
to the public as being 'for defensive purposes' 
1. e. that we might experiment how to protect 
ourselves. In July 1936 the C. 1. D. decided on 
a further step viz: the provision of gas to 
enable us to retaliate without delay and the 
formation of a nucleus of production, to be 
used In war if retaliation called for it. 
But under the present proposal the Kemet 
factory alone would produce 200 tons a week 
for the Air Ministry, 1. e. preparations are 
being made for extensive gas attacks on the 
civil population In the enemy country. Such 
extensive preparations could not hope to 
escape notice and would need to be justified on 
political grounds(ii). 
The whole matter was referred to the Chancellor, Sir John 
Simon, who decided that for the time being the War Cffice could go 
T. I. S. C. 114th Meeting, item 4,16th December 1937. T161/1321. 
Treasury internal minute signed by Z G. Compton, Secretary of 
the T. 1. S. C., 21st December 1937. T161/1321. 
I 
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ahead with building the Kemet, factory but that not all the individual 
production units should be constructed In peacetime. The Chancellor 
insisted that reference be made to the Cabinet and the political 
implications considered before any further. steps were taken. 
A memorandum for the consideration of the C. 1. D. was therefore 
prepared jointly by the War Office and the Air Ministry which reviewed 
the whole of British policy on the use of gas and paid special attention 
to political considerations The questions considered in this 
memorandum were: - 
1) Since gas will only be used by us as a 
retaliatory measure, the extent of our preparations 
for Its manufacture and employment must be 
conditioned by the degree, of preparedness In- 
possible enemy countries. What knowledge do 
we possess on this subject and does it justify 
us in Initiating immediate measures to enable 
us to retaliate If gas is used against this country? 
ii) Is gas In the latest view considered'to be 
as effective against the civil population as H. E. 
and incendiary bombs? 
ill) Assuming. that an enemy, has used,. gas against 
us, is gas the most suitable weapon with which 
to retaliate? 
iv) What are the strategic considerations which 
should govern the amount of gas required for 
retaliatory purposes, and the proportion of our 
war effort which should be allotted to the gas 
off ensive? 
V) What will be the political reactions at home 
and abroad to our preparations for the manufacture 
of gas? (ii). 
The War Cffice and the Air Ministry took the view that Germany 
was the "yardstick" by which British preparations for chemical warfare 
should be measured. The latest intelligence summary indicated that 
The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use in War. (C. I. D. Paper 1465-B). CAB 4/28. 
lbid, para. 4. CAB 4/28. 
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Germany was -making rapid advances in this, field and was 'well ahead 
of Britain('). 
In particular there has been a considerable 
development in the technique of spraying 
mustard gas from aeroplanes, and a glass bomb 
filled with mustard gas, probably for use from 
aeroplanesý has been developed and large quantities 
are being ordered. , 
The form of Germany's preparations showed, they believed, -that 
Germany "will possess the ability (though not necessarily the intention) 
to employ gas against the civil populatic in , 
(11) 
0 
It is sometimes suggested that aerial gas attack was not employed 
In the Second World War simply because it was generally believed 
that ton for ton high explosive was more effective. Clearly this js 
an over-simplification. The Air Ministry's view In 1937 was that 
High explosive bombs, Incendiary bombs and gas 
provide the Boyal, Air Force with three weapons 
which are entirely different in their characteristics 
and limitations(iii). 
Gas employed against cities In conj'unction with high explosive 
I 
bombs and incendiary bombs would extend 
the effect of high explosive and the Incendiary ' 
bombs by hampering the work of rescue, repair 
and fire-fighting parties. Practical experience of 
this form of attack Is happily non-existent, but 
from numerous experiments It is possible to form 
a reasonable forecast of its efficacy. A crowd of 
unprotected persons such as workmen leaving a 
factory might suffer even as much as 100 per cent 
casualties if subjected to gas spray attack from 
the air. Large areas can be contaminated and'will' - 
remain a source of danger to all persons passing 
through until the difficult work of decontamination 
The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for, Use,, In, War (C. 1. D. Paper 
1465-B), para. 5. CAB 4/28. 
(it) lbid, para. 6. CAB 4/28. 
(Iii) Ibid, para. 8. CAB 4/28. 
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has been completed. Heavy and sustained attacks which 
Include the use of gas might well, at the worst, 
render the life of the community intolerable, and 
at best would cause the most serious Interference 
with normal activities., An Important factor in 
such attacks, Is the delay which occurs In the , development of the effects of mustard gas which 
will result In large numbers of people being left 
In uncertainty whether they have an effective dose 
of the gas. The cumulative effect on the civil 
population of such attacks Is likely to produce 
a profound deterioration of national morale which 
In default of adequate counter-preparations might 
well approach a state of panic. 
If a belligerent were to- resort to a heavy and 
sustained offensive entailing the use of gas 
against an unprotected civil population, the 
result might be to bring all normal activities 
for the time being to a standstill. Protective 
measures are therefore a vital necessity and will 
throw a very heavy burden on" the national re- 
sources. The possibility of gas being used against 
the civil population has already compelled the 
Government to provide gas masks for the entire 
population of the United Kingdom. Great numbers 
of decontamination squads will be needed who will 
require large quantities of decontamination material 
for their work. Anti-gas measures therefore make 
considerable demands on the industry and manpower 
of the country ................................... 
To summarize, therefore, gas Incendiary bombs and 
high explosive, are In no sense alternatives: rather 
they are complementary. The incendiary bomb extends 
the destructive effect of the high explosive bomb, 
while gas, if employed in conjunction with these 
weapons, will add seriously to the strain on the 
morale of the civil population. Furthermore, defence 
against gas will certainly necessitate the diversion of 
a considerable portion of the available manpower, 
effort and resources from offensive to defensive 
activities(O. 
The Service departments also believed that gas attack from the air 
against the enemy's Army could be very, effective. - It seems that gas 
spraying rather than bombing was the type of - attack most lavoured 
The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use In War (C. 1. D. Paper 1465-B), paras. 13,14,15 and 16. CAB 4/28. 
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for this purpose. The War office believed that 
It High gas spray used against all echelons of an Army 
in the field, with the exception of the foremost 
areas will seriously reduce mobility. Apart 
altogether from any casualties which may be 
produced considerable delay will be caused by the 
necessity for changing and decontaminating 
clothing, and for observing the necessary passive 
defence measures such as taking cover and wearing 
anti-gas clothing. An army subjected to frequent 
attack with high spray will suffer severe dis- 
location and loss of fighting value. Low gas 
spray attacks on concentrations of troops at base 
ports, entraining or embussing centres, or in 
columns on the march would cause considerable 
casualties., Add to these the contamination of 
areas through which the troops have to pass, and 
the dislocating and delaying action of gas on an 
army in the field is likely to be very serious 
indeed. It Is obviously imperative that we should 
be in a position to use gas from the air against 
the enemy ground forces immediately It is employed 
against our armies. If we are not in a position 
to do this the advantage which will accrue to the 
enemy from the use of gas may well prove decisivem. 
Yet despite a resolute defence of the usefulness of gas, the 
Service deparnnents were forced to yield to Treasury financial pressure. 
If It were a question of priority as between gas and other requirements, 
gas would have to give way because 
It would be illogical to reduce our offensive 
or defensive capacity in more Important 
directions In order to include an ideal scale 
of provision for a weapon which It Is hoped 
will never be used. Gas provision is therefore 
an area In which some risk may legitimately 
be taken(ii). 
7be Air Ministry decided to settle for roughly half the capacity for 
mustard gas production which it had originally specified, though the 
War Office's requirements did not change. ' It was decided that a total 
The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use in War 
. 
(C. 1. D. Pýper 
1465-B), para. 17. CAB 4/28. 
(il) lbid, para. 21 (a). CAB 4/28. 
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output of 300 tons per week would be acceptable at the outbreak of 
war. Of this 50 tons would be guaranteed to the War Office and the 
rest would be for the Air Ministry(l). 
7be question of the political advisability of chemical warfare 
preparations was also discussed. The Service deparnnents guessed, 
perhaps rightly, that the masses were neither as timorous, nor as 
squeamish as their political leaders seemed to think. 
Official pamphlets are on sale to the public '' 
explaining the precautions which householders 
should take to protect themselves and their 
families against gas. The nation has even been 
Informed that special gas masks are being made 
for children. Public reaction to these grim 
realities far from being alarmist or panicky has 
been somewhat apathetic. if the general public 
are so little affected by such far-reaching 
precautions, they are perhaps unlikely to be 
perturbed by the knowledge that we have the 
means of retaliating effectively should an 
enemy employ gas against us. Indeed, there 
seems some reason to expect that the knowledge 
would be welcomed. 7be provision of gas with 
which to reply to enemy attacks, is after all 
a natural corollary to the provision of gas masks 
for our own protection. 
The Service departments thought the political effects of British 
preparations for gas manufacture on foreign countries might be positively 
beneficial for Great Britain. 
]Reaction abroad to our preparations for manufac- 
turing gas will depend upon the way in which 
it becomes known and the characteristics of the 
various countries. If the knowledge Is confined 
to Governments and their military advisers then it 
can do nothing but good. In the event of war 
such countries as Germany and Italy would be 
reluctant to initiate the use of gas because of the 
reaction on their own nationals - which our counter- 
7be Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use In War (C. 1. D. Paper 
1465-B), para. 22. CAB 4/28. 
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offensive would produce. Positive knowledge that 
we did not possess gas, however, might have just 
the opposite effect, since the enemy might well be' 
tempted to use It at the outbreak of war In the hope 
of gaining surprise and of forcing us into submission 
before we had time to develop our manufacturing 
resources. As pointed out earlier, these manufacturing 
resources cannot be developed quickly without 
preparation beforehand. The provision of gas for 
own retaliatory purposes should therefore act as 
a powerful deterrent against its employment by other 
nations at the outbreak of war. 
Should our preparations for the manufacture of 
gas become a matter of general knowledge abroad 
world reaction may well follow the course It took 
when the rearmament programme was announced. 
Doubtless It also would be regarded as a wise measure 
forming part of a general policy of rearmament 
which has already been welcomed as a powerful 
guarantee of peace. Dictator Governments may 
deliberately misrepresent our Intentions and use 
it as a bogey with which to frighten their own, 
people Into further sacrifices in the cause of National Defence. But the Governments will never- 
theless know that should they engage in war with 
us their best protection against gas will be to 
abjure the use of it themselves. Indeed they may 
well be forced to make a public declaration of 
policy on the lines of our own. 
It is Important, however, that our preparations 
should be kept secret until we are actually In 
possession of factory resources for the manufacture 
of gas. To say that we Intend to manufacture 
gas to be used In retaliation would be dangerous. 
To say that we 22ssess gas with which to retaliate 
should It be used against us, will be a powerful 
deterrent(i). 
7be Cabinet apparently accepted these arguments and, at a meeting 
on 2nd November 1938, approved in principle the creation of industrial 
capacity for the production of 300 tons of mustard gas per week and 
a reserve of 2,000 tons. However, the detailed running of the 
rearmament programme on a day to day basis was in the hands of the 
The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use In War (C. 1. D. Paper 
1465-B), paras. 27 28 and 29. CAB 4/28. 
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Treasury officials at the Treasur ,y Inter Service Committee. The 
Treasury did not give financial sanction for the full amount of capacity 
and reserves approved by the Cabinet until the beginning of February 
1939, though it approved a 220-ton capacity and a 500-ton reserve as 
early as 21st October 1938. It seems likely 'that most of the Cabinet' 
approved capacity was in existence on or shortly after the outbreak 
of wa r(l). 
The Treasury acted in much the same way towards proposals for 
poison gas factories as It did towards proposals for propellant and 
explosive factories. . Its conduct was characterized by the use of 
financial restraints to delay and restrict the development of Industrial 
capacity. Why the Treasury wished to do this Is not entirely clear. 
Machine tools were not required in poison gas factories and nor was a 
large amount of skilled labour. Though it has' been suggested that the 
Cabinet and the Treasury may have been influenced by a desire not to 
divert labour from the socially important occupation of building private 
homes(") to the building of munitions factories, this argument was not 
used at the T. I. S. C. It Is of course possible that the Treasury was 
genuinely worried about the political morality and political advisability 
of preparing for chemical warfare, though such concern only became 
apparent when, In December 1937, it was faced with demands for heavy 
expenditure("'). It seems likely, however, that the Treasury's main 
concern was financial. 
I 
T. I. S. C. War-Office Memorandum no. 648,2nd February 1939. 
T161/1330. 
00 Peden, op. cit., p. 84. 
Oil) T. I. S. C. 114th Meeting, item 4,16th December 1937. T161/1321. 
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Though the Treasury did succeed in forcing a substantial reduction 
In the plans of the Service departments, the Cabinet clearly accepted 
the argument that It was essential to have an impressive chemical 
warfare capability for retaliation. Once this had been unequivocally 
accepted by the highest authority there was no attempt by the Treasury 
to impede the War Office In developing capacity., for polson. gas production 
up to the 300 ton limit. A substantial supply of gas was available 
to the Services at the outbreak of war and this was backed by an 
impressive productive potential. Had gas attack from the air been used 
against British cities, and had the decision to, retaliate been taken, the 
supply of gas would not have been a problem though the R. A. F. 's 
capacity to deliver It might have beenw. 
it is difficult to. assess with real certainty the degree of 
preparedness of the British Army for offensive chemical warfare In 1939. 
Half the relevant War Office files on chemical warfare are still closed. 
Certainly in 1938, there was some uneasiness in the Army about the 
gap between chemical warfare theory as taught In training exercises 
' 
and the ability to put it Into practice. On 28th March 1938, the 
Commandant of the School of Military Engineering at Chatham wrote 
to the War office drawing its attention 
to cases in which it appears from my Information 
that the present performance and effects of our 
offensive gas weapons and of our protective 
equipment lag very considerably behind the standards 
assumed In the Provisional Memorandum on the 
employment of Gas and in other memoranda etc. 
which have been Issued(ii). 
T. 1. S. C. War Office Memorandum, no. 648, para. 1, 
ý 
2nd 
February 1939. T161/1330. 
(ii) Enclosure 102A. WO/32/3663. 
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In particular, more efficient types of shell giving a higher yield of 
gas were still not ready, and neither was the new longer range LIvens 
projector. He thought the Army's mustard gas detector was completely 
inadequate'and yet'no replacement had been found. 7be Directorate 
of Artillery, however, expected that the new Improved gas shell would 
be ready for the start of the next training season and neither'was It 
so unhappy about the mustard gas detector which It suggested that the 
School of Military Engineering'was not using properly 
By October 1938 though a Continental commitment had not officially 
been accepted it had been decided to have a four division Field Force. 
The War Office therefore pressed the Treasury for equipment for four 
chemical Warfare Companies to go with it, though only one of these 
was to be raised In peacetime, and the Treasury gave financial sanction 
on 21st October. Nevertheless in terms of expenditure, chemical 
weaponry remained a minor Item In the War Office's rearmament programm 
In summer 1938 the provision for offensive gas weapons In the War 
Office's budget was: - 
f. 
Livens projectors and stores 57,500 
Hand Contamination Bombs 25,000 
Other requirements 200,000 
282,00001) 
- still a trifling amount. 
7be War Office was In a position to raise three new Chemical 
Warfare Companies at the outbreak of war making a total of four 
(i) Minute 104. WO/32/3663. 
(ii) Minute 110,8th August 1938. WO/32/3663. 
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altogether. Some of these troops may have been equipped with the 
new longer-range Uvens, but most probably had the older type. A 
supply of 50 tons of mustard gas per week was assured to the Army- 
and this covered most of its requirements(l). As,, we have seen the 
War Office had also been experimenting with lachrymatory gas, though 
it is not clear whether large scale manufacture of this had begun 
by September 1939. There Is some evidence to suggest that during 1939 
the manufacture of lewisite was being undertaken("). The artillery _ 
probably had some gas shell available in 1939, but It. is not clear how 
much was In stock when war broke out. Nor is it clear from the 
open War Office files whether the more efficient double-ejection gas 
shell was in production at that date. It may be surmised that the Army 
was probably not in a position to wage chemical warfare effectively In 
September 1939, but thepre-war preparation accelerated in wartime 
would probably have been sufficient to enable It to build up a considerable 
retaliatory capability as the war progressed. 
Defensive Prepa_rations 
Preparation for chemical warfare in the British Army in the 1930s 
was Initiated by an Army Council decision of 30th July 1935 which 
stated among other things that the Royal Engineers should become the 
"parent arm" for all- forms of gas warfare except gas shelling(111). 
However, very little was done to train even the Royal Engineers for 
gas warfare until March 1936 when the C. I. G. S., Montgomery-Massingberd, 
decided to begin "advanced Instruction for ]Royal Engineer officers during 
Minute 121. WO/32/3663. 
(ii) Minutes 135 and 136. WO/32/3663. 
(Iii) Minute 1, para. il(b). WO/32/4315. 
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the winter of 1936-37" and to follow this up with "collective training 
for all regular divisional engineers in the summer of 1937". it was 
decided to start the Instruction In gas warfare at the School of Military 
Engineering at Chatham which had facilities for people attending courses. 
Pbrton lacked such facilities at this time though the C. I. G. S. was 
contemplating eventually forming there a Gas School with both "R. E. 
and "All Arms f? wings(i). 
A War office letter of 12th December 1936 addressed to all British 
commands at home and abroad, laid down responsibility for anti-gas 
defence between the ]Royal Engineers and the Individual unit. This 
explained that 
Anti-gas defence Is to be considered primarily a 
personal and unit responsibility to meet with 
which certain anti-gas clothing, equipment and 
stores will be Issued to the individual soldier 
as personal equipment and to the unit as unit 
equipment. 
The responsibility for anti-gas protection and 
decontamination within the unit area of all 
personnel vehicles and materials other than 
clothing on the unit establishment will normally 
rest with the unit. 
In principle the relationship between the Royal 
Engineers and the remaining Arms In anti-gas 
measures will be similar to that which holds 
good for the other tasks of that Corps. The 
Royal Engineers will thus be responsible: - 
a) For large decontamination measures on routes, 
areas, or inside those areas If the work Is beyond 
the scope of the units concerned. 
b) For the gas proofing of dumps, such as perishable 
stores that may be affected, and for the construction 
of anti-gas protection at Headquarters, Docks, 
Hospitals, Depots and similar places which is be , yond the resources of the establishments concerned(U). 
Minute 2. WO/32/4315. 
Enclosure 3A. War Office Letter 86/Chemical/646 (S. D. 2), 
12th December 1936. WO/32/4315. 
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On the 22nd October 1936 the new C. I. G. S., ý Deverell, addressed 
a memorandum on "Anti-gas Policy" to his colleagues In the War 
Office. A technique was being developed impregnating clothing with 
a secret substance which made the clothing Impervious to mustard gas. 
Though this was still In the research stage the results obtained so 
far had been promising and indicated that a high degree of protection 
could be expected against spray attack. A pilot plant was In the course 
of construction at Pbrton and Deverell was arranging for "large-scale 
wearing and storage trials" of Impregnated clothing the following summer 
both at home and abroad. If the trials were successful Deverell expected 
that the War Office would be able to go to production In 1938. The 
General Staff's policy would be to ensure that whole of the Ist contingent 
of the Field Force was issued with anti-gas clothing by the outbreak 
of war. Though the General Staff had decided against the Inclusion 
within units of special anti-gas sub-units, some personnel In every unit 
were to be trained for light decontamination duties and equipped with the 
"light protective outfit" which included mustard-proof suit, hood, gloves 
and over-boots. The personal anti-gas equipment of each soldier was 
to include a respirator, a 4-ounce tin of anti-gas ointment for the 
protection of exposed areas of skin, eye-shields and a gas detector 
Deverell's proposals received the general agreement of most of his 
senior War ()ffice colleagues, but the Quarter-Master General minuted 
on Ilth November 1936 that 
our aim should be to equip every soldier In the 
Army and not only the Ist contingent with Impreg- 
nated clothing. Gas spraying may arrive in 
England on the same day or perhaps the day before 
it arrives in the field and if our troops at home 
(i) Minute 18. WO/32/4315. 
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are not wearing impregnated clothing, re-inforcement 
will be delayed ... and morale will be badly 
affected. He agreed that the immediate aim should 
be to provide the Ist Contingent with anti-gas clothing 
but Insisted that this policy should be rapidly 
extended to the rest of the Army(i). 
On ist January 1937 a meeting was held at the EXpertmental 
Station at Pbrton with Sir Hugh Elles, the Master General of the Ordnance, 
in the chair. By this stage, the War Office was considering whether 
it might be possible to use civilian dry-cleaning firms for the deconta- 
mination and reimpregnation of clothing on a large scale, and the names 
of two big firms Eastmans and Achille-Serre were mentioned in this 
context. it was estimated tentatiVely that it might be necessary to 
decontaminate and reimpregnate as many as 21,000 suits of clothing after 
a series of major chemical attacks. 7be experimental Impregnation 
unit which had been set up at Porton was capable of processing 300 suits 
a day, so it was estimated that It would be necessary to have ten such 
(11) 
units in order to deal with 21,000 suits In a week 
The General Staff was anxious to know whether It would be necessary 
to issue oilskin anti-gas capes as a stop-gap measure until impregnated 
clothing became available. Mr. N. K. Johnson, Chief Superintendent of 
the Chemical Defence Research Department was asked how long It was 
likely to take before impregnated clothing became available for the 
whole of the Army. He thought It "doubtful If full equipment of such 
clothing for the Army would be available before two years". Even 
when Porton had got the hand of operating the impregnation process on 
a large scale, they would have to acquaint civilian dry-cleaning firms 
Minute 20. WO/32/4315. 
Enclosure 66A. WO/32/3663. 
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with it and large quantities of the necessary chemicals would have to 
be manufactured. Decision was postponed on the issue of anti-gas 
capes while the Chemical Defence Research Department produced a 
considered estimate of the time required to equip the Army with Im- 
pregnated clothing, and meanwhile the General Staff undertook to supply 
Porton with figures of the number of impregnated outfits required by the 
Ist Contingento). 
A meeting held at the War Cffice on 19th April 1937 returned to the 
same issues. The General Staff was interested in establishing a giant 
plant for the combined process of decontamination and re-impregnation 
of 'clothing, but Johnson pointed out that "a plant to deal with clothing 
on the scale envisaged would weigh approximately 1,000 tons and occupy 
an area of 90,000 square feet, and 200,000 man hours would be required 
to erect it assuming all the necessary buildings were available". It 
was thus I quite evident that any such giant plant'could not be made 
mobile'. 
(") 
Elles asked whether plant of this capacity was already available In 
commercial dry-cleaning firms in Britain. Johnson considered this 
likely and suggested that the War Office approach suitable firms such as 
Eastmans and Achille-Serre for further information and attampt to find 
out how much dry-cleaning plant was available in Northern France. 
Still- no definite decision was taken on whether or not to Issue oilskin 
anti-gas capes. The capacity for the production of oilskin In Great --' 
Britain was limited. if capes were to be produced In quantities sufficient 
to equip the whole of the Army any sooner than impregnated clothing 





became available, new Industrial capacity would have to be laid down, 
and Johnson considered this very much In the national interest. 7be 
meeting eventually decided that the Director of Staff Duties Major General 
E. K. Squires should settle the question of the adoption of the anti-gas 
cape 1ras early as possible"('). By the beginning of 1938 It was 
provisionally Intended to issue It on the scale of two or three capes per 
man, one to be carried by the man himself, the others in unit transport 
Meanwhile gas warfare education and training were stepped up. In 
February 1937 the Small Arms School was made responsible for running 
courses to teach officer and N. C. O. instructors of arms other than the 
Royal Engineers about anti-gas measures. This Instruction was meant 
to complement that given to the Royal Engineers by the Engineering 
School at Chatham. The Instructors trained at the Small Arms School 
(Ili) were then intended to pass on their knowledge to the troops 
To supplement the theoretical knowledge thus diffused through the 
Army, the 7th Infantry' Brigade held a chemical warfare exercise In 
summer 1938 which was Intended to add a dimension of practical 
experience. Perhaps partly as a result of this experience the School 
of Military Engineering eventually reached the conclusion that large 
scale decontamination of ground was probably not going to be possible 
in war conditions owing to the large quantities of bleach needed. Areas 
of contaminated ground would, however, need to be clearly marked and 
(i) Enclosure 67A. WO/32/3663. 
Enclosure 58A. Unit Scales of Anti-Gas Clothing and Equipment 
para. 4(a). WO/32/3663. 
WO Lerter 86/Chemical/646,12th February 1937. Enclosure 
36A. WO/32/4513. 
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this would be a unit responsibility(t). 
Azain It is difficult to, come to a definite conclusion about the Army's C7 
degree of preparedness for war in September 1939. Soldiers were 
Issued with respirators as intended, but in view of the difficulties the 
War Office was obviously having with the impregnation process, It Is 
unlikely that there was sufficient Impregnated clothing for the greatly 
expanded Army of 1939. Gas capes were certainly Issued In considerable 
quantities("). The Army's state of preparedness was probably far from 
ideal, but considering the limited effect of gas attack even when It came 
as a complete surprise at Ypres In 1915, the rudimentary precautions 
taken by the War Office were probably adequate to have prevented the 
Germans achieving decisive results had they used gas In 1939. 
Staff Talks with the French 
During 1938 the growing danger of war led the Cabinet to re-consIder 
its isolationist strategicý policy and to think in terms of closer co- 
operation with France. This process eventually led to the acceptance 
of a Continental commitment, but It began gradually with Anglo-French' 
staff talks In, the second half of 1938. These talks Included excharges 
of views on the subject of chemical warfare. On Hore-Belisha's 
instructions, a British delegation was sent to Paris In September 1938 to 





7be Commandant of the School of Military Engineering, Chatham 
to P. U. S., War Cffice, 29th June 1938. 
T. I. S. C., War Cffice Memorandum, no. 313 and Minutes of the 215th Meeting, item 13,30th March 1939. T161/1331. 
Minute 1. WO/32/4572. 
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The report of -the Chemical Defence Research 
Departmlent's P 
delegation to Paris explained that the, talks with the French were 
... arranged because It had been observed 
in 
examining recent samples of French and other 
foreign respirators, that a high standard of 
particulate protection had been achieved. 
This high degree of protection suggested that 
these countries considered particulate clouds 
as a definite gas menace to civilian populations 
and that as high a degree of protection as 
possible had been specified. 
We wished to know whether in specifying this high 
degree-of particulate protection, the French were 
aware of any new methods of generating particulate 
clouds (which made such protection an essential 
part of a civilian respirator), or whether they 
aimed at this standard purely as a precautionary 
measure without having any precise Information as 
to how such clouds could be produced(O. 
The delegation was received in Paris on 2nd September 1938 by 
General Pbgnon, Inspecteur- General des Etudes et aperiences Chimiques 
de Guerre, the only French representative present. Ttie British 
I 
delegation consisted of three civilian scientists: - Mr. J. Davidson and 
the Right Honourable Lord Rothschild Ph. D. of the Chemical Defence 
Committee and Mr. K. Kingan the Chief 'Superintendent of the Chemical 
Defence Research Department - and one soldier, Colonel Goldney, 
President of"the Chemical Defence Committee and leader of the delegation. 
The British delegates were on the whole favourably impressed with 
Pbgnon whom they considered "a French technical off Icer of 'the best 
type thoroughly conversant with the subject of anti-gas defence and well 
qualified". But at the same time they sensed that he had his limitations 
Report on visit of C. D. R. D. delegation to-Paris to. discuss, - with French authorities the standards of particulate protection 
for respirators. Enclosure IA. WO/32/4572. 
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and they would have preferred to have had the opportunity of discussion 
with French civilian scientists. As their report explained 
... one had the impression that his outlook 
was not essentially scientific, he was Inclined 
for instance to make very definite assertions 
In answer to some questions, which in the light 
of our own work we found difficult to accept ' 
without qualification. 7be answers which the 
General gave to our questions must be considered 
In this light(i). 
The delegation concluded from their visit that the French were 
taking more interest than the British in toxic smokes and that they 
had improved their techniques for producing these smokes since the 
last war 
(it). The greater French interest In toxic smokes appeared 
to arise from their differing conception of what the next war would be 
like. As the British report on the talks pointed out 
In this country the General Staff have decided 
that arsenical smokes are of limited offensive 
value for the type of war they visualise (mobile), 
but It might be necessary to reconsider this 
decision should we be faced with static conditions 
of warfare. 
Smoke generators were cumbersome devices and not easy to make 
mobile. But as the French were thinking more In terms of static 
warfare it was natural that they should have more interest In this 
weapon. In static war situations the French believed that they could 
use smoke generators to, produce high concentrations of toxic smoke 
to harass the enemy 
(iii) 
. 
The French had no definite knowledge of any means of using 
arsenical smoke effectively in air attacks on civil populations, ý They 
Ibid, part 1, General Summary WO/32/4572. 
Repott on visit of C. D. P. D. delegation to Paris to discuss with 
French authorities the standards of particulate protection for 
respirators. Part II(a). WO/32/4572. 
Ibid, part II(a). WO/32/4572. 
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were simply aware that German civilian respirators, had a high degree 
of protection against arsenical smokes. and thought it best to provide 
the same feature in their own. The British delegation judged the 
standard of protection afforded by the French civilian respirator to be 
high though not as perfect as the French themselves made out(I)e 
The Chemical Defence Committee held a'conference on Wednesday, 
7th December 1938 to review the information gained by the' delegation to 
Paris. it was decided to recommend that the General Staff reconsider 
its policy on toxic smokes and that the Introduction of"a large ground 
toxic smoke generator should be considered. The conference refrained 
from making any recommendations about future talks with the French, 
leaving that Issue for the War Office to decide. The conference itself 
was apparently divided on the issue and some members had expressed 
concern, at the prospect of -a general sharing of offensive chemical 
warfare secrets 
There was also a great deal of uncertainty and divided opinion 'in 
the War Office on the advisability of further talks. In a minute to 
Sir Harold Brown, the Director of Artillery gave a very full explanation 
of the arguments on both sides. 
The suggestion has been raised that discussions 
should be initiated which shall be much wider 
In scope, shall cover the whole field of experi- 
mental as well as approved matters and shall be 
conducted with French civilian scientists. The 
main idea underlying the proposal is that the 
French will undoubtedly be our allies in the next 
war and that on the outbreak of war such 
conversations would certainly be undertaken on 
Ibid, part I(c). General Summary. WO/32/4572. 
Minute 1. WO/32/4572. 
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a completely free and frank basis as was the 
case in the last war. Would it not therefore 
be wise to start such conversations now? It 
can be argued that even if we gave more than 
we received, this country would still be the 
gainer if the result was a stronger France 
better equipped for Chemical Warfare. 
On the other hand 
If conversations were unrestricted In scope and 
conducted without reservation we should have to 
disclose many experimental matters regarded of 
the highest secrecy which are at present withheld 
from the majority of British officers and which 
equally Involve Departments other than the War 
Office. To communicate these matters to our 
friends must inevitably increase the chance of 
their getting known to potential enemies. This 
would be a more serious matter in peace than In 
war, as it would give the potential enemy time to 
find an antidote and would do away with the 
element of surprise in our measures. 
it had also been suggested that staff talks be resumed ostensibly 
without restriction in scope but conducted "with definite reservations 
as to especially secret matters". However, there was the possibility 
that such double-dealing would generate,, mistrust between'the two allies 
and damage their solidarity. Another possibility was to limit 'discussion 
to purely defensive questions. But the British regarded the Impregnation 
process (a defensive technique) as one of their most crucial secrets. 
Knowledge of this process by an enemy might 
result in his producing a gas against which 
it would be ineffective. 
And anyway It would be very difficult to separate defensive from 
offensive matters in detailed staff conversations as the one was dependent 
on the other('). 
(1) Minute 2. WO/32/4572. 
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7be Director of Artillery gave as his personal opinion "further 
conversations should not be undertaken", but this view was not 
unanimously accepted. Sir Ronald Adam, the Deputy C. 1. G. S. believed . 
that discussions should be continued, but restricted to defence questions 
only('). Hore-Belisha's views on the subject were transmitted to Adam 
through G. Roseway, the Secretary of State's personal secretary, who 
m1nuted on 9th February 1939 
S of S agrees generally with the proposal 
for discussion with the French in view of 
the community of defence interests with 
that country now contemplated. 
He Imagines we may have to discuss all aspects, 
not only the defence side of the probIR-00. 
it was decided to refer the question to the C. 1. D. The C. 1. D. 
came out In favour of unrestricted talks and these began with discussions 
on tactical and training matters which took place from the 9th to 12th 
May 1939. The Report of United Kingdom Delegation noted that 
The French delegation was clearly prepared 
for a complete and frank pooling of Infor- 
mation and in view of the C. 1. D. ruling which 
renewed the restriction initially imposed on 
the disclosure of secret processes of manufacture 
we were enabled to be equally frank with the 
result that considerable value was obtained from 
the conversationsO ! I). 
It was found that the general attitude of the French Government towards 
the use of gas was 
exactly the same as that of the British 
Le. that gas will not be used unless it Is 
first used against us, but that It Is necessary 
to be prepared for Immediate retaliation In 
Minute 3. WO/32/4572. 
Minute 7. WO/32/4572. 
Anglo-French Staff Conversations (A. F. C. 28), 7th June 1939, 
para. 2. CAB/29/159. 
I 
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case of tts use by an enemy('). 
The French believed the German and the Italians might well adopt 
chemical warfare from the outset of the campaign, and that their use 
of it would "probably 'I nclude attacks on towns with a high proportion 
of gas in conjunction with high explosive and Incendiary bombs". The 
British delegation agreed that It was possible that the Axis power 
might use gas from the outset, but they considered that there might be 
circumstances in which Its use would be deferred until a later stage. 
There was, however,, general agreement that it was essential to have 
adequate defensive arrangements against gas and "to be prepared to use 
it ourselves In retaliation from the first 'day of hostilities 
I It nevertheless became apparent from an early stage In the discussion 
that there were fundamental differences between British and French 
views on chemical warfare. Most important of these was a wide 
divergence in their assessment of the significance of aerial gas spray. 
The French recognized that gas attack from the air was possible and they 
had developed gas bombs from which they expected good results, but 
they attached little Importance to spray. 7be French apparently 
believed that the Germans and the Italians might use spray from aircraft 
but they did. not envisage its use from a high level and were convinced 
that their A. A. organization could deal with most low-level attacks. 
The French made no provision for any special equipment to afford 
protection against gas spray though they realized that spray attacks 
from low-flying aircraft might succeed at times. The British on the 
(1) Jbid, para. 4. CAB/29/159. 
AnglO--French Staff Conversations (A. F. C. 28),, para. 5. 
CAB/29/159. 
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other hand considered aerial spray "to be one of the most Important 
and dangerous forms of gas warfare"('),, Indeed British anti-gas 
measures and decontamination planning were largely based upon the 
I 
need to, provide protection against it. Whereas the French had "so far 
not succeeded In emitting the spray from an aircraft without contamina- 
ting the aircraft Itself"', and were 
unconvinced that spray dropped from a great 
height (would) ever reach the ground In a 
damaging form because of evaporation, (11) 
the British view - based onýý"experiments not with-mustard gas but 
with safe substitutes having similar physical properties" - was that 
blister gas could be released from great heights -in such a way that I 
it would neither freeze nor evaporate and would, reach the ground "in 
a state dangerous to personnel". The British delegation considered 
it vital to decide which of these views was correct. 
Should the French prove to be correct In 
their views, not only are we complicating 
our administrative organization to no 
purpose, but we are also wasting money on 
impregnated clothing. On the other hand 
if we are right, it is Important that the 
French should not only be protected against 
this form of attack, but that they should 
consider equipping their air force to enable 
it to carry out spraying(iii). 
There were other major differences of opinion. The French placed 
a great emphasis on the use of phosgene whereas the British, because 
of Its non-persistent nature regarded it as "of comparatively little 
lbid, paras. 6,7 and 8. CAB/29/159. 
00 Anglo-French Staff Conversations (A. F. C. 29), 9th June 
1939, para. 3. CAB/29/159. 
(m) Anglo-French Staff Conversations (A. F. C. 28), 7th June 
1939, para. 11. CAB/29/159. 
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value against a well disciplined army equipped with modern respirators". 
The main reason for the French interest In phosgene appeared to be 
their limited capacity for the production of mustard, combined with the 
ready availability of phosgene which was "'a commercial product 
obtainable In large quantities". The French regarded artillery as the 
principal weapon for delivering gas from the ground whereas the 
British thought the low yield from gas shell-a. major disadvantage and 
therefore placed much more emphasis on the Livens projector. Perhaps 
because of their very limited supply of blister gas, the French had 
not thought as seriously as the British about the bulk contamination of 
(1) 
ground as a means of Impeding an advancing enemy 
At the second stage of the Angloý-French chemical warfare discussions, 
from 22nd to 26th May 1939, the purely technical aspects of the subject 
were examined In greater depth. By far the most important of these 
was the question of the practicability of high spray. The. French 
delegation was given a demonstration of an aerial spray attack at Pbrton, 
but as with all the British tests, this was carried out with a substitute 
chemical not with real mustard gas. The French, though extremely 
interested, were keen to do tests with real mustard gas before 
definitely accepting the British view. The British apparently found it 
impossible to do tests in the United Kingdom with real gas because 
of the limited space and the risk of causing casualties among the civil 
population. The French therefore offered to stage and participate 
in trials in the Sahara where real mustard could be sprayed from great 
heights and its effects analyzed. The British delegation "strongly 
Anglo-French Staff Conversations (A. F. C. 28), 7th June 1939, 
paras. 13,14 and 15. CAB/29/159. . 
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recommended that the French offer should be accepted and that the 
trials with British aircraft and equipment should be staged in the 
Sahara not later than November 1939". Unfortunately we do not 
know whether these trials actually took place('). 
it seems clear that British preparations for chemical warfare, 
though recognized as In many ways Inadequate by the British themselves, 
were very much In advanceof the French position. The French had 
no large mustard gas bombs, no mobile projector units, no method of 
aerial spray, and no protection against spraý Nevertheless the 
British were willing to reconsider some of'their own ideas In response 
to French suggestions. They were, for example, willing to consider 
the use of phosgene, seeing the force of the French argument that It 
was much easier to produce than mustard, though Great Britain does 
not seem to have made any serious preparations for the military use 
of phosgene before the outbreak of war("'), 
Conclusion 
There can be no doubt that the General Staff regarded chemical 
warfare as of potentially very great importance. This belief Is re- 
flected in the War office's efforts to protect British troops from 
chemical attack, and in Its Insistence on the development of a large 
amount of industrial capacity for gas production. The Cabinet, however, 
had a policy that Great Britain would not initiate the use of toxic 
chemicals 
(IV) 
. and there was considerable uncertainty as to whether 
(1) - Anglo-French Staff Conversations (A. F. C. 29), 9th June 1939, 
para. 11. CAB/29/159. 
(it) A. F. C. 28, paras. 7,14 and 15. CAB/29/159. 
(111) A. F. C. 29, para. 6. CAB/29/159. 
Ov) The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use In War (C. L D. Paper 
1465-B), para. 1. CAB 4/28. 
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they would in fact be employed in the next war. Most of the existing 
ground-based delivery systems for gas were rather cumbersome, 
and the significance of gas In mobile warfare remained an unknown 
quantity. The General Staff was. therefore reluctant to devote more 
than a small part of the industrial and financial resources at Its 
disposal to the acquisition of specialist ground-based weapons for the 
delivery of gas(). Spraying from the air was seen as the most effective 
(11) 
way of employing chemicals against enemy ground troops About 
80 per cent of the industrial capacity for gas production created during 
the rearmament period was Intended for use by the R. A. F. if at all, 
and was paid for by the Air Ministry, though the War Office was 
responsible for it 
(1) Minute 45. WO/32/3663. 
The Manufacture of Toxic Gas for Use In War (C. L D. Paper 1465-B), para. 17. CAB 4/28. 
(iti) lbid, paras. 2 and 30. CAB 4/28. 
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Conclusion 
The War Office of the 1930s was seen by some contemporaries as 
the domain of Colonel Blimp() and this notion seems to have influenced 
the works of a number of historians who have written about It. This 
thesis has sought to examine the policies and actions of the War Office 
with regard to the making of strategic policy, the development of an 
Industrial base from which to rearm, and the preparations made for 
three of the most modern aspects of war: armoured operations, air 
defence and chemical warfare. 
suggested. 
Some rather novel conclustons are 
The policies of the General Staff appear on re-examination to be 
far more reasonable and progressive than most historians have tended 
to assume. There was remarkable continuity of General S*taff policy 
on the main issues from Montgomery -Mass i ngberd's era to the outbreak 
of war("). Central to General Staff thinking was the need to prepare 
the Army for a Continental role. This was not a mindless urge to 
repeat the experience of 1914, Indeed there were many aspects of the 
1914 experiences, including the shell shortage and the lack of reinforce- 
ments, which the General Staff was at great pains to avoid"'). Rather 
this policy was founded on eminently reasonable strategic principles. 
The General Staff argued that it was essential to provide the French 
with sufficient military assistance on land to keep France In the war. 
The Maginot Line was not regarded as a permanent cure for France's 
deficiencies in manpower and Industrial resources compared with Germany 
See the David Low cartoon "A New Broom At The. War office" 
In Minney, op. cit, p. 76. 
This continuity was commented upon unfavourably by Liddell 
Hart, 11/1938/89. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
D. R. C. 7, paras. 4 and 5. CAB 16/109. 
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and the possibility of a German outflanking attack through the Low 
Countries was fully appreciated by the British General Staff(i). 
Montgomery-Massingberd argued -that while France was In the war only 
about 25% of Gennany's, air strength was likely to be used against 
Britain("). it was, however, quite obvious, that with France over-run 
the whole of Germany's airpower could be used against Britain from 
bases immediately across the Channel. In the late thirties Gort and 
pbwnall argued that If France were in danger of , being. over-run support 
of France could be equated-with home defenc 
p1l). 
A review of War Office policy on some of the most modern aspects 
of war reveals a remarkable degree of continuity of, purpose-by the 
General Staff under three Chiefs. General Staff policy towards the 
development of armoured forces was generally very progressive and 
the part played by Montgomery-Massingberd appears particularly creativd 
In contrast with the Impression given In the writings 
(v) 
of Liddell Hart 
The General Staff's attitude to the developmenv of the anti-aircraft 
defences was certainly 'not one of simple obstruction. The Ceneral 
Staff was prepared to devote a reasonable proportion of the War Office's 
resources to air defence provided that enough was left over to equip 
the Regular Field Force up to European stand ards(vl). With regard 







Ministerial Committee, Defence Requirements Report, Appendix 
III, para. 9. CAB 16/110. 
D. P. C. 7, para. S. CAB 16/109. 
Bond, Chief of Ltaff, Vol. 1, p. 129. 
Hobart to Liddell Hart, 24th July 1934.1/376/7, (Liddell Hart. 
Papers), and Minute 1,15th October 1934. WO/32/2847. 
Liddell Hart, Memoirs. Vol. 1, pp. 261,263,265,290,291. 
C. I. D. 318th Meeting, item 3,7th April 1938. CAB 2/7. 
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best possible protection for the British soldier(l) and to provide the 
Army with the best retaliatory capability which could be prepared 
(11) with limited resources Because of the uncertainty over the Impor- 
tance of gas In mobile warfare, however, the General Staff was very 
wisely unwilling to devote too high a proportion of the financial and 
industrial resources at its disposal to specialist chemical weaponry 
There Is no doubt that In the mid-thirties the War Office's supply 
apparatus was' unsuited to the vast task of organizing a major peacetime 
rearmament effort and of developing the nation's 4ndustrial capacity for 
(IV) 
war production through the Shadow Industry system 7be main 
problem was the enormous and potentially very obstructive power 
wielded by civilian finance offic'ers in the Directorate of Army ,' 
Contracts(v). 7be Director of Artillery, Major-General H. A. Lewis, 
was one of the main advocates of reform(vi) and Duff Cooper, also, 
was anxious to Improve the system'. The opposition to change seems 
to have come not from the'M. G. 0., Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Elles 
and his military colleagues on the Army Council, but rather from the 
civilian finance -officers whose powers were being challenged(v"). After 
the reforms carried out by Sir Harold Brown In the second half of ,, -, 
(1) W. 'O. " Letter 86/Chemical/646,12th December 1936. WO/32/4315. 
(11) Minute 45,3rd November 1936. WO/32/3663. 
(lit) Ibid, WO/32/3663. 
Ov) Industrial Production. Memorandum by Lord Weir, 27th January 
1936. WEIR 17/5. (Weir Papers). 
(v) Conversation with Sir Ronald Adam at his home, 18th ýbvember 1979. 
(vi) Report of the Committee on Armament Supply Functions, 
February 1936, para. 11. WO/32/4583. 
(VII) Sir Arthur Robinson to Lord Weir, 22nd January 1936. WEIR 18/4. 
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1936, however, the evidence points to a dynamic munition production 
and procurement organization determined to expand the R. 0. F. s and 
to Introduce new firms into arms manufacture at every opportunity. 
Our examination of the-work of the War Office In the second half:, 
of the 1930s suggests the, need for a reappraisal of the reputations of 
the Secretaries of State of this period. Whereas Hore-Belisha's 
reputation as a War Minister may have been somewhat inflated, Duff 
Cooper does not seem to have received full credit from historians. ý 
Hore-Belisha's judgment with regard to the Continental commitment was 
veryý Inconsistent and over air defence also his behaviour was most 
erratic. - When he first moved to t he War Office he was eager to give 
home anti-aircraft defence -the highest priority('). - Later,, like the 
General Staff, he, became worried that such a high-proportion of the 
War Office's budget would be absorbed by the ever-expanding air 
defence schemes that it would be Impossible to rearm the Field Army 
and he spoke out against this at the C. L, Do, (") This in Itself was, not 
unreasonable behaviour. Hore-Belisha was merely allowing his - 
preconceptions to be tempered by experience. But it was folly to, make 
Inaccurate boasts about the efficacy of anti-aircraft defences 
Oll) 
, which, 
because of the limited funds and industrial capacity at the War Office's 
disposal were bound to be very imperfect. By these unfounded claims 
Hore-Belisha made the Sandys Storm or something like it almost 
inevitable. - 
11/1938/89. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
C. I. D. 318th Meeting, item 3,7th April 1938. CAB 2/7. 
On "inaccurate boasts" see 11/1938/61, para. 2. (Liddell Hart Papers). 
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Hore-Belisha had strengths: energy, enthusiasm, a willingness to 
Innovate and a flair for publicity. He was able to carry through a 
number of important reforms which Improved the housing, diet -and 
clothing of the ranks - and made his life less miserable by the removal 
of some petty disciplinary restrictions. These necessary administrative 
reforms coupled with the lowering of medical standards helped gain 
(I) - badly needed recruits . The running of a great government department 
In a time of national emergency, however, requires teamwork. Hore- 
Belisha's instability of judgment, Infuriating working methods and lack 
(11) 
of respect for colleagues made him an extremely difficult superior 
His overthrow In 1940 was by no means unprovoked. 
Duff Cooper, by contrast, worked extremely well with the General 
Staff and though Ae have carefully examined Chamberlain's allegation 
that he was "lazy"("') there seems to be considerable evidence against 
this. It may well be that Duff Cooper did not devote much effort to 
the minutiae of administration but it is arguable whether that Is the 
proper function of a Secretary of State. It Is certain that he did take 
the trouble to examine the major policy Issues, that he agreed with 
the General Staff analysis in most essentials and that, during his short 
tenure of the office, he fought very hard for his department's position, 
producing a considerable number of major memoranda written in a 
(1) Minney, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 
(10 Bond, Chief of Staff, Vol. 1, pp. 131-132 and 135-136. 
(III) Mentioned In Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, 
(Cambridge 1975), p. 149. 
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forceful style which seems to be distinctively his('), 
This study will have served a useful purpose if It contributes to 
a juster appreciation of the efforts of Duff Cooper and of others 
serving In the War Office at this period who struggled hard; though 
with limited success, to prepare the Army for an unlimited war. 
For example : 7be Pole of the British Army. Memo. by the 
Secretary of State for War, (C. P. 326 (36)), CAB 53/29. The 
Pole of ' 
the British Army, ý Memo. by the Secretary of State for War, (C. P. 337 (36)), paras. 6 and 7. CAB 53/29. The Tank 
Situation, Memo. by the Secretary of State for War, 15th 
October 1936. 
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Note On Documentary Sources 
When the research for this thesis was begun it was hoýed 
that the main source material would be the War Office papers 
themselves, which did not seem to have ýhad adequate attention 
from historians. A thorough examination of the War Office 
papers was undertaken and did indeed reveal a good deal of 
neglected documentary evidence which led the writer to arrive 
at some novel-interpretations. 
Nevertheless, the War Office papers could not be the sole, 
nor even the bulk of the documentary evidence employed. The 
War Office papers of this period have at-some stage, been 
heavily and rather clumsily "weeded". The staff of the P. R. O. 
indicate that this was done in the War office before the 
documents were sent to the'P. R. O. War Office papers also 
have the characteristic (generally speaking) of being very 
formal in tone and of revealing little about personalities 
and inter-personal relationships. 
To offset the deficiences of the War Office papers, 
Cabinet, Cabinet sub-committee and Treasury papers were, 
therefore, drawn upon very heavily. -This would have been 
inevitable anyway in order to get a balanced view of the War 
Office's place in the general scheme of rearmament, and 
because War Office views were often most precisely articulated 
in inter-departmental discussions. A number of collections 
of private papers were also enormously useful, includin the 9 
papers of Montgomery-Massingberd and Liddell Hart. These 
helped supply information about personalities and relation- 
ships largely lacking in the War Office files. 
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Appendix A- Army Council Members 1935-1939. 
Secretaries of State-for War 
Viscount Hailsham 
Viscount Halifax 
A. Duff Cooper 
Leslie Hore-Belisha 
Parliamentary Under Secretaries 
Lord strathcona and Mount Royal 
Lord Munster 
Financial Secretaries 
Date of Appointment 
Nov. 19 31 
June 1935 
Nov. 1935 
May 19 37 
Feb. 1934 
Feb. 1939 
A. Duff Cooper Sept. 1931 
Douglas Racking - July 1934 
Sir Victor Warrender Nov. 1935 
Permanent Under Secretaries 
Herbert Creedy March 1924 
P. J. Grigg July 1939 
Chiefs-of-the Imperial General Staff 
General Sir Archibald A. Montgomery-Massingberd Feb. 1933 
General Sir Cyril Deverell April 1936 
General The Viscount Gort Dec. 1937 
Adjutants-General 
Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Knox March 1935 
Major-General Clive Liddell Dec. 1937 
General Sir Robert Finlayson July 1939 
Quater-Master General 
Lieutenant-General Reginald May Feb. 1936 
Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Venning Feb. 1939 
Masters-General of the Ordnance 
Lieutenant-Geueral Sir Hugh Elles May 1934 
Dire ctor-General of Munitions Production 
Engineer Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Brown July 1936 
Director-General of the Territorial Army 
Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Kirke Oct. 1937 
Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Brownrigg July 1939 
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Appendi B General-Staff Directors 1935-1939 X 11 
Directors of Militar7 Operations and Intelligence Date appointed 
Major-Gencral J. C. Dill Jan 1934 - Major-General R. H. Haining Sept. 1936 
Major-General H. R. Pownall Mar. 1938 
Directors of Staff Duties 
Major-General C. P. Heywood 
Major-General E. K. Squires 
Major-General L. Carr 
Directors of Militarv Trainine 
Major-General A. E. McNamara 
Major-General A. F. Brooke 
Major-General P. C. S. Hobart 
Major-General H. R. S. Massy 








(Ranks recorded as on date of leaving offIce. ) 
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ýppendix C- Directors in the Department of the Master-General of 
the Ordnance 1935-1939 
Directors of Artillery Date Appointed 
Major-General H. A. Lewis June 1934 
Directors of Mechanization 
Major-General A. Brough 
Major-General A. E. Davidson 
Directors of Ordnance Services 
Major-General J. Baker 
Major-General B. A. Hill 
Director of Ordnance Factories 







Appendix D Directors in the Department of the Director-General 
7- of Mun-itions Production 1936-1939 
Director of Ordiýance Factories Date Appointed 
Sir Reginald Townshend Mar. 1926 
(Transferred from M. G. O. 's department 
July 1936) 
Hr. C. N. McClaren Oct. 1938 
Director of Industrial Planning 
Mr. G. S. Whitham Sept. 1936 
Director of Ordnance Services 
Major-General B. A. Hill - Jan. 1936 
(Transferred from M. C. O. 's department 
December 1937) 
Director of Artille 
Major-General H. A. Lewis June 1934 
(Transferred from M. G. O. s department 
December 1937) 
Major-General E. M. C. Clarke June 1938 
Director of Mechanization 
Major-General A. E. Davidson June 1936 
(Transferred from the H. G. O. 's 
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